These changes resolve Apple’s disagreements with the Commission over business terms and alternative distribution. They also reduce complexity by moving every developer that distributes apps in the EU to a single set of business terms.
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The Core Technology Fee, a per-install fee for developers that achieve extraordinary scale, will be replaced by the Core Technology Commission, a simple 5 percent commission on digital transactions in apps distributed outside the App Store. The new terms also eliminate the initial acquisition fee and store services fee.
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Under the updated terms, developers can now offer Apple In-App Purchase alongside alternative payment options, which had not previously been permitted in the EU.
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Apple is also expanding who is eligible to operate an alternative app marketplace or distribute apps via the web in the EU.
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Apple will continue to require every alternatively distributed app to go through Notarization[…]
Apple will charge a 26% fee for apps distributed through the App Store that use in-app purchase.
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Apps in the App Store that use in-app alternative payment processing will pay 20%.
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Apps that link to a website purchase option will pay 15%.
Apps using Web Distribution or App Marketplaces would pay the 5% CTC (and report transactions). I like that the new terms are simpler and that the fees are slightly lower, but it seems like the EU got tricked or surrendered here.
This is bonkers, I can’t believe the EU Commission agreed to it. The main issue that the DMA was about still remains: Apple retains ultimate control over app developers’ dealings with users.
The status quo that the EU should have pushed for, and which Article 6(7) of the DMA requires, is one where a developer can distribute iOS apps to users without ever entering into any contractual relationship with Apple.
All in all, still extremely anti-consumer. If I can download and run arbitrary code on my Mac--even if I have to jump through scary warnings--why should I not be able to do so on my phone? Why would one computing platform be different from the other?
However, while Apple hopes it will be allowed to charge these lower commissions, it has admitted in a new regulatory filing that it may not be allowed to charge any commission at all on purchases made through third-party app stores and other external platforms.
The commission Apple earns from the App Store is shrinking in markets where it has been forced to relax its grip on in-app purchases, based on new analytics data.
Notably, this isn’t a proposal, it’s the announcement of actual changes that Apple will implement (starting October 1) after “close collaboration” with the EC. And lest we think Apple is overplaying that last aspect, that group gave a statement to Bloomberg backing up the assertion[…]
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This feels like mainly a way to keep the all-important big gaming fees – which make up most of in-app payments, and as such, most App Store fees – mostly intact.
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It sure looks like Apple knew this EU deal was coming down the pike and that the bloc agreeing to their terms would bolster the case that these are “fair”. The US judge still gets to decide that, and Epic has already pushed back as Apple seeks to negotiate directly. One big reason for pushing? Epic wants to ensure any changes Apple tries to negotiate be put in place for all developers.
The European Commission has since confirmed that it approves of Apple’s changes to its App Store policies, giving a statement to the Irish Independent[…]
Epic Games, a longstanding critic of Apple’s App Store practices, called the scheme “junk fees,” adding that the plan did “nothing to open up the mobile app ecosystem to competition, as required by Digital Markets Act.”
“The law makes it clear that Apple must allow developers to offer link outs to the web for purchases ‘free of charge’ and has to allow ‘effective use’ of competing stores,” the company wrote.
I hope this isn’t the end of DMA. Apple taking a cut of out-of-store apps revenue makes as much sense as app developers taking a cut of iPhone revenue.
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And also I still want to live in a world where anyone can write a program and run it on the devices they own and send it to friends, without having to pay $100/year of developer account and do the whole notarization thing (which considering the amount of scam in the app store we know is pretty useless in terms of security). Not everybody is a professional programmer, some people are just doing programming as a hobby, some are also young people that don’t even own a credit card yet.
I have refused to sign any of Apple’s EU DMA agreements thus far, because I think they are illegal, and they have been optional.
I still think their new terms are illegal — they don’t meet the minimum requirements of the DMA, and will not be approved by stakeholders — but they are no longer optional, so the choice now becomes accept the updated developer agreement or stop being a developer.
Thanks to the DMA’s sprawling scope, complexity, and overreach, Apple came out of this conceding only 4 percent of the App Store’s 30 percent commission, and no reduction at all to the 15 percent for subscriptions after the first year.
The CTC is preferable to the CTF in much the same way that a fire burning down your kitchen is preferable to a fire burning down your entire house.
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The Digital Markets Act was introduced to ensure that sideloading would be an available alternative, to essentially force open platforms that have been closed. Debates about the wisdom of this notwithstanding, in the biggest case, and up until recent developments in Android app marketplace governance also only case, it has failed to deliver the promises that were the entire point of the law.
I’m sure some of you think I’m all wet in my argument that the point of the DMA was merely to impose ongoing bureaucratic complexity. But my view jibes with the reality of how it’s worked out.
In other words, maybe we who had high hopes were the ones who got tricked, not the EU Commission.
I don’t recall seeing POSIWID before, but I love the concept. A friend sent this to me, with the quip that I forgot to include a link to it in my “What Is the Point of the DMA?” piece this week. Indeed, it encapsulates my arguments about the DMA specifically and the European Commission generally. The purpose of the DMA is what it does, not what you imagine it is intended to do.
I admit to being primed by seeing Jeff Johnson’s post, but I’m certain that my mind would anyway have immediately gone to our favorite scam promoting toll booth, the place that “gives people around the world a safe and trusted place to discover apps that meet [Apple’s] high standards for privacy, security, and content.”
Also consider which apps have to pay the toll and which ones show their own ads for free.
“Fim do monopólio da Apple.” “iPhone liberado no Brasil.” “Mudança histórica.” As manchetes das últimas semanas não economizaram no tamanho. Do outro lado, o que o usuário recebeu de fato foi uma opção nova e discreta nos Ajustes do iPhone — e, se você não for atrás dela, sua vida com o aparelho seguirá exatamente igual. Aposto que vai seguir…
Recapitulando rapidamente: em 18 de junho, com o iOS 26.5, a Apple oficializou a abertura do iOS no Brasil, cumprindo o acordo assinado com o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) em dezembro de 2025 — desfecho de uma investigação que começou lá em 2022, com uma denúncia do Mercado Livre. Lojas alternativas de apps agora são permitidas — a AltStore PAL chegou no mesmo dia —, desenvolvedores podem usar meios de pagamento próprios e incluir links para compras fora do app. O acordo vale por três anos, sob supervisão do Cade, com multas de até R$150 milhões se a Apple descumprir. Nós mostramos como tudo funciona em um vídeo.
Até aqui, a notícia. Agora, a leitura que ninguém fez direito. Passei mais de 20 anos construindo aplicativos que viveram sob as regras da App Store (apps de banco, varejo, montadora, etc.) e, quando li os termos do acordo com olhos de gerente de produto, a conclusão foi rápida: a Apple não abriu a porta. Ela redesenhou o funil.
Siga o dinheiro: ele continua indo para Cupertino
O detalhe que as manchetes de “fim do monopólio” esquecem de contar: a Apple criou uma estrutura de taxas em que ela recebe em praticamente qualquer caminho que o desenvolvedor escolher. Vale comparar os cenários:
Onde o app vive e como cobra
Como cobra
Quanto a Apple leva
App Store
Pagamento pelo sistema da Apple
De 10% a 21% + 5% de processamento
App Store
Pagamento por sistema próprio dentro do app
De 10% a 21%
App Store
Link para compra externa
15% (10% para quem se qualifica)
Loja alternativa
Pagamento próprio
5% sobre bens digitais
Olhe a última linha com calma. Um app que sair da App Store, for distribuído por uma loja concorrente e processar o pagamento por conta própria (ou seja, um cenário em que nenhuma infraestrutura de venda da Apple aparece) ainda deve 5% de cada transação de bens digitais para a Apple. É a chamada “comissão de tecnologia essencial”, e ela viaja junto com o app para onde ele for.
Agora, pense com a cabeça de um desenvolvedor. Os apps gratuitos (WhatsApp, Nubank, iFood e a imensa maioria dos que você usa) não pagam nada de comissão hoje. Se migrarem para uma loja alternativa, passam a pagar 5% sobre qualquer venda digital que façam. Migrar significa criar um custo que não existia. E são justamente esses apps gigantes que dariam tração a uma loja concorrente. Ou seja: o desenho das taxas torna a mudança irracional exatamente para quem faria a diferença. Isso não é acaso; é arquitetura de incentivos, e das bem-feitas.
A porta existe, mas tem um cadeado de US$1 milhão
Tem mais um filtro, ainda menos comentado. Para operar uma loja alternativa no Brasil, a empresa precisa apresentar uma carta de crédito de US$1 milhão emitida por uma instituição financeira com nota BBB ou superior — ou, alternativamente, ter dois anos contínuos no programa de desenvolvedores da Apple com mais de 1 milhão de instalações anuais no mundo. Na prática, isso deixa de fora todo mundo, menos gigantes bem capitalizadas: a Epic Games (que já prometeu trazer sua loja “nos próximos meses”), talvez o próprio Mercado Livre (que, ironicamente, foi quem começou essa briga) e pouquíssimos outros.
Sem várias lojas competindo de verdade, não há pressão de preço. E sem pressão de preço, o usuário não tem motivo para mudar de comportamento. O ciclo se fecha sozinho.
A Europa já fez esse filme, e o final não anima
Nada disso é especulação minha; é o roteiro que a União Europeia vem rodando desde março de 2024, quando a Lei dos Mercados Digitais (Digital Markets Act, ou DMA), obrigou a Apple a uma abertura muito parecida — e que serviu de modelo para o acordo brasileiro. Dois anos depois, o balanço europeu é magro: as lojas alternativas seguem como nicho, a Setapp Mobile (da MacPaw, empresa séria, com catálogo bom) fechou as portas em fevereiro citando “a complexidade excessiva dos termos comerciais da Apple” e a Comissão Europeia precisou multar a Apple em 500€ milhões por continuar dificultando que desenvolvedores direcionassem usuários para compras mais baratas. A Apple recorre da multa até hoje.
O Cade, vale dizer, aprendeu algo com isso: o acordo brasileiro exige que os avisos da Apple sobre lojas e pagamentos de terceiros sejam “neutros e objetivos”, sem telas de fricção empurrando o usuário de volta para o caminho de Cupertino. É um detalhe regulatório esperto. Mas o incentivo econômico de fundo (a taxa que persegue o desenvolvedor aonde quer que ele vá) é o mesmo da Europa. E foi ele que esvaziou a festa por lá.
Onde as coisas podem mudar de verdade
Para ser justo, nem tudo é fumaça. Duas frentes me parecem promissoras — e nenhuma delas envolve você trocar de loja.
A primeira são as assinaturas. Um serviço que lhe leva para pagar no site, na faixa de 10% a 15% de comissão em vez dos até 26% de antes, tem margem real para repassar desconto — se quiser.
A segunda é o pagamento dentro do próprio app: agora, nada impede um jogo ou serviço de oferecer checkout com Pix, com taxas de processamento muito menores que as do cartão internacional embutido no sistema da Apple.
Repare, porém, no que essas duas frentes têm em comum: dependem de o desenvolvedor escolher repassar a economia. A Apple, aliás, avisou que não cuida de reembolso nem de gestão de assinatura de nada comprado fora do sistema dela — mais um empurrãozinho para que tudo fique como está.
O jardim ganhou um portão; o pedágio continua o mesmo
No fim das contas, o acordo com o Cade é real, tem dentes (R$150 milhões deles) e coloca o Brasil num clube seleto — só União Europeia, Japão e Coreia do Sul forçaram abertura parecida. Como precedente regulatório, é enorme. Como mudança no seu dia a dia, é quase nada: o botão novo nos Ajustes vai continuar intocado na imensa maioria dos iPhones brasileiros, os apps vão continuar vindo da App Store e os preços vão continuar os mesmos.
A Apple declarou que, com as novas regras, desenvolvedores pagarão “o mesmo ou menos” do que antes. Curiosamente, é a frase mais honesta de toda essa história — porque o objetivo do desenho inteiro é exatamente esse: que tudo mude o suficiente para satisfazer o regulador, e pouco o bastante para não mudar nada.
EU tech regulation, Digital Markets Act, Apple Europe sales, Apple regulation, European Union, Siri AI, iPhone features, device interoperability, App Store changes, alternative marketplaces, iPhone Mirroring, AirPods translation, Apple privacy, iPhone security, app sideloading, platform competition, DMA compliance, Apple Intelligence, European technology, government control
EU tech regulation is no longer limited to App Store payment rules or competition disputes hidden from ordinary consumers. It is beginning to determine which features reach European devices, how quickly they arrive and how deeply third-party companies can interact with the iPhone, iPad and Mac.
The Digital Markets Act was designed to reduce the control of large technology platforms over software distribution, payments, browsers, digital assistants and connected hardware. For Apple, compliance has already produced alternative app marketplaces, web distribution, third-party payment options, additional default-app controls and expanded access to iPhone technologies.
The next phase reaches much deeper into the operating system. European regulators want competing accessories, cloud services and AI assistants to receive access to capabilities traditionally reserved for Apple’s own products.
Apple argues that some of those demands could weaken privacy and security. The European Commission says the company is responsible for creating compliant systems that preserve both competition and user protection.
Between those positions sits a large and commercially significant group of customers. Europe generated $28.06 billion in Apple sales during the quarter ending March 28, 2026, up from $24.45 billion one year earlier. Six-month European sales reached $66.20 billion, compared with $58.32 billion during the same period of fiscal 2025.
Europe therefore represented more than one-quarter of Apple’s latest quarterly revenue. It is too valuable to leave behind, but increasingly difficult to serve with the same software experience available elsewhere.
EU Tech Regulation Is Splitting Feature Availability
Regional differences once centered mainly on language support, licensing agreements or local services. EU tech regulation is creating a more structural divide.
Apple has blamed Digital Markets Act requirements for delaying Siri AI across the European Union. The company says regulators expect competing AI assistants to receive extensive access to personal information, apps and device actions before Apple can reserve those capabilities for its own assistant.
The disagreement concerns more than answering questions. Siri AI is designed to read personal context, understand onscreen information and complete actions across apps. That may include finding messages, accessing files, making purchases or sending information on the user’s behalf.
Opening those capabilities to outside AI systems requires new permission structures, technical interfaces and safeguards. Apple says it cannot release its assistant first and add competing access later without risking regulatory action. The Commission says Apple had sufficient time to design an interoperable solution.
Other delayed European features have included iPhone Mirroring on Mac, Live Translation through AirPods and certain location-based Maps capabilities. Each feature touches a different part of the ecosystem, but all depend on privileged communication between Apple devices, software and services.
The consequence is becoming visible at purchase. Two customers can buy the same iPhone model at similar prices and receive different capabilities because one lives inside the European Union.
Image Credit: Apple Inc.
Feature Adoption Becomes Slower and Less Predictable
Delayed availability can weaken the adoption of new hardware features even when the devices themselves continue selling well.
Siri AI is intended to become a central part of newer iPhones, iPads and Macs. Buyers who cannot access it lose part of the justification for newer chips, additional memory and on-device AI processing. Developers also face a smaller addressable audience for apps built around the new assistant.
AirPods Live Translation presents a similar problem. A feature designed to demonstrate the combination of iPhone processing, microphones and wearable audio becomes unavailable in a region built around dozens of languages and frequent cross-border travel.
iPhone Mirroring affects the relationship between iPhone and Mac. Users outside the EU can interact with the phone from macOS, while European users may receive notifications without gaining the complete experience.
These differences do not necessarily stop hardware sales. Apple’s newest results show strong European demand despite years of regulatory conflict. They can, however, reduce the speed at which customers use the ecosystem’s newest capabilities.
The effect may grow as software becomes a larger part of hardware differentiation. A faster processor has limited emotional value when the feature designed to demonstrate it is unavailable.
Apple Sales Show Why Europe Cannot Be Ignored
Apple does not report European Union revenue separately. Its Europe segment also includes countries outside the bloc, along with India, the Middle East and Africa. The official segment remains the best regularly published measure of the region’s commercial weight.
European sales rose approximately 15% year over year in Apple’s latest reported quarter. During the first six months of fiscal 2026, the segment expanded by roughly 14%.
Those figures weaken the argument that regulation is already driving customers away from Apple hardware. Demand remains strong, supported by the iPhone 17 family, Mac sales, services and the company’s installed base.
The financial risk is more gradual. Regional software fragmentation can raise engineering costs, delay launches and make European devices less competitive against products able to offer complete feature sets.
Apple must maintain separate distribution rules, payment systems, browser options and eligibility checks. Developers must decide whether alternative stores, external payments or EU-specific business terms justify additional work. Support teams must explain why features differ between countries using the same operating-system version.
A market responsible for more than $28 billion in one quarter can absorb considerable compliance expense. It can also influence Apple’s global product decisions when regulators demand interfaces that cannot be restricted to Europe easily.
A Slow Transfer of Ecosystem Control
The escalating regulatory environment also creates a more fundamental concern: control over complex technology ecosystems can gradually move away from the companies that designed them and toward government committees, regulatory bodies and administrative processes.
That transfer rarely happens through one dramatic order. It develops through repeated obligations covering app distribution, payment systems, browser engines, digital assistants, hardware access, data portability and interoperability. Each requirement may appear narrow when considered alone. Together, they can redefine who determines how the ecosystem operates.
Apple built its platform around tight integration between hardware, software, services and security. Regulators increasingly treat parts of that integration as market power that must be opened to competitors. The danger is that an ecosystem designed as one coordinated environment becomes subject to decisions made by committees that do not carry direct responsibility for product quality, reliability or long-term maintenance.
This can become a slow trap. Once a platform is required to expose one layer, regulators may use that access as the basis for demanding another. A payment exception can be followed by alternative app stores. Alternative stores can lead to broader installation rights. Device interoperability can expand into access for AI assistants, personal data and system actions.
The boundaries of the platform are then set less by engineering judgment and more by regulatory negotiation.
Government agencies have legitimate authority to address competition and consumer harm. The concern appears when regulation shifts from preventing abusive conduct to directing product architecture. At that point, public authorities begin influencing feature design, release timing, software permissions and the relationship between first-party and third-party services.
That creates consequences beyond Apple. Any company considering a tightly integrated product may decide that deep integration invites intervention. Businesses could avoid building ambitious ecosystems if successful coordination later becomes grounds for forced access.
Innovation then becomes shaped by what regulators are likely to permit rather than by what engineers believe will produce the safest or most coherent experience.
Image Credit: Ink Drop / Alamy Stock Photo
Competition Gains Come With Real Consumer Choices
EU policy has produced benefits that Apple rarely emphasizes. Users can install apps through alternative marketplaces or directly from authorized developers. Developers can offer external payment methods, promote different prices and avoid relying entirely on Apple’s distribution system.
Alternative browser engines can compete with WebKit, while users have more control over default apps. Contactless payment access has expanded beyond Apple Pay, allowing competing wallet providers to use the iPhone’s NFC technology under approved conditions.
Interoperability requirements could also improve third-party accessories. Smartwatches, headphones and other devices may gain better notification access, background connectivity and proximity pairing with the iPhone.
These changes can increase competition and reduce the advantage Apple gives its own services and accessories. A third-party smartwatch should not become artificially less useful simply because it was not made in Cupertino.
The difficulty is separating legitimate platform access from unlimited access. A notification interface is one thing. An autonomous AI assistant capable of reading messages, accessing files and acting across apps introduces a different level of sensitivity.
Privacy and Security Risks Are Not Theoretical
Alternative app distribution increases user choice, but it also moves some responsibility away from the App Store. Apple continues to notarize apps distributed through approved alternative channels, checking for known malware and severe fraud. That process is narrower than a complete App Store review.
Purchases made outside Apple’s payment system also fall outside its normal refund and billing support. Users may need to resolve disputes directly with the developer or payment provider.
A malicious marketplace, deceptive payment page or compromised developer account can create opportunities for fraud. Enterprise users face additional concerns when employees install software from sources their organization has not approved.
The AI question reaches further. A third-party assistant may need permission to access messages, photos, calendars, documents and app controls. Even a reputable provider can collect more information than the user expects or introduce vulnerabilities through poorly designed integrations.
Apple can build permission prompts, app isolation and revocation controls, but technical access always creates some exposure. Security depends on how narrowly permissions are defined, how visibly they are used and whether the operating system can stop unauthorized actions.
The Commission maintains that interoperability and privacy can coexist. Apple maintains that regulators are demanding access before adequate protections are ready. Both positions contain a legitimate concern: dominant platforms should not block competition, and competition should not require users to surrender control of personal data.
When regulators require a company to alter its architecture, responsibility can become blurred.
Apple remains the company customers blame when an iPhone feature fails, a third-party marketplace distributes a harmful app or an outside assistant misuses personal data. Regulators may have required the access, but they do not operate the device, provide technical support or repair the damage to the platform’s reputation.
This creates an accountability gap. Government committees can mandate openness without assuming the commercial and security consequences of that openness. Apple must comply, maintain the system and explain the outcome to users.
The same problem applies to delayed features. Regulators may argue that Apple chose not to release a service, while Apple may argue that the required conditions made the launch unsafe or technically impractical. Customers are left with less functionality and no simple way to determine who caused the delay.
Over time, the ecosystem can become a negotiated compromise rather than a product with one coherent direction. That may satisfy formal compliance while producing a weaker experience for everyone involved.
The risk is not that governments will literally operate Apple’s software. It is that committees increasingly define the conditions under which Apple can design, connect and release its own features. Control shifts through constraints.
The Industry Will Follow Europe’s Experiment
The consequences extend beyond one company. Google, Meta, Microsoft, Amazon and other platform operators face related European obligations. Hardware makers must consider whether ecosystem advantages can survive when core services are required to support rivals.
Smaller developers may gain new distribution and payment choices, but they may also inherit more compliance, customer-service and security responsibilities. Accessory companies could compete more effectively while becoming accountable for handling sensitive device data.
Other governments are watching. Rules introduced in Europe can influence legislation elsewhere, particularly when companies decide that maintaining one global technical framework is easier than operating several regional versions.
Apple is unlikely to abandon Europe or stop adapting its products. Its sales provide too much evidence of the region’s importance. The company will continue negotiating, appealing decisions and building compliance systems while withholding features it considers unsafe under current demands.
European customers may receive more app stores, payment choices and accessory compatibility. They may also wait longer for headline features included with the same hardware elsewhere.
The deeper consequence may be a technology industry that becomes more cautious about building tightly integrated products. Companies may design around anticipated regulatory demands from the beginning, limiting exclusive features, reducing private-system integration or avoiding innovations that depend on controlled access.
EU tech regulation began as an effort to constrain dominant platforms. Its long-term effect may be to transfer part of the power to shape those platforms from companies and users to regulatory institutions.
That shift deserves scrutiny equal to the market power it is intended to correct. Competition rules can restrain abuse. They can also become a slow mechanism for placing product design, security choices and ecosystem evolution under government supervision.
Shady Control and Bureaucracy
The danger grows when regulatory discretion becomes buried beneath permits, approvals, negotiations and technical committees that operate beyond meaningful public scrutiny.
The more power officials hold over which features, contracts or technologies may proceed—and when—the greater the opportunity for lobbying, favoritism and selective enforcement to influence outcomes. What begins as oversight can gradually become a system in which delay itself is leverage, while responsibility disappears inside layers of administration.
For the technology industry, that risks replacing transparent product decisions with political access, negotiated exceptions and regulatory influence exercised far from the consumers expected to live with the consequences.
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