PieceMakers, a Nanya-backed DRAM designer, began trading on Taiwan’s Emerging Stock Board on September 16 at a NT$740 reference price, Cnyes reported ahead of the debut. PieceMakers is not an HBM company. Instead, it bets that inference memory diverges from training memory, President Lee Hsiao-wen told Cnyes, and that DRAM stacked directly on the processor with hybrid bonding can sit between Nvidia’s SRAM-only Groq LPU and HBM. As it stands, design fees, not chips, carry the company's profit, with AI custom-design work accounting for around 40% of the company's revenue in the first half of 2026. Piecemakers Chairman Joseph Ting told TechNews that its first volume customer program will not contribute to the company's financials until 2027 at the earliest.

At roughly 60.4 million shares outstanding, that price values the company at around NT$44.7 billion (around $1.4 billion). Taiwan's Emerging Board is the Taipei Exchange's pre-listing market, not a main-board IPO, so shares trade through market makers ahead of any formal listing application. The stock ended its first session at NT$915, 23.6% above the NT$740 reference price, after opening at NT$1,035 and trading as high as NT$1,205.

Nanya Technology is the largest holder of Piecemakers, at 33.96%, after selling 715,000 shares at NT$740 to seed the float, a disposal it disclosed in a Sept. 9 exchange filing reported by Knews.

What PieceMakers sells

PieceMakers was founded in January 2006 in Hsinchu, Taiwan, led by chairman Joseph Ting and president Lee Hsiao-wen. Historically, the company has designed standard SDR/DDR DRAM and known-good-die (KGD) parts through representatives in China, Japan, France, Turkey, and Israel. Now, the company seeks to shift from direct product sales to custom design services, paid as non-recurring engineering (NRE) fees, and then to IP licensing, royalties, and turnkey production from 2027, the company said at its Sept. 7 briefing, UDN reported.

Revenue from the AI custom design unit has risen from around 4% in 2024 to almost 40% in the first half of 2026. The products behind that increase are HBLL (High Bandwidth, Low Latency RAM), a 2D die rated at 144 GB/s that was taped out in 2016 for Intel’s HPC line and published at ISSCC in 2017, and HiBaLL, the 3D-stacked version rated at more than 1 TB/s, the company claims.

The company described its customers to Cnyes as developers of cloud AI inference accelerators, international semiconductor players, and North American customers, with some programs in design and verification, and none named. Qualcomm CEO Cristiano Amon’s Computex keynote backdrop in June listed PieceMakers among Taiwan ecosystem partners, although neither company has defined the relationship. The takeaway is that the profit is in design fees and not chips. The margin curve matches a pre-royalty Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) business, rather than a traditional memory vendor.

Why Nanya is chasing this instead of HBM

Nanya’s AI-memory strategy is custom and edge rather than HBM3E. PieceMakers is the first half of a strategy laid out in 2024. On Aug. 7, 2025, Nanya announced a joint venture with Etron Technology, a Hsinchu-based chip designer, capitalized at NT$500 million, with 80/20 ownership. The venture was envisioned to design custom high-bandwidth memory for edge AI devices rather than for data center accelerators. Nanya president Pei-Ing Lee said earlier in 2025 that the company would not compete in HBM3 or HBM3E, TrendForce reported.

Both halves of the strategy rely on Formosa Advanced Technologies, the Formosa Plastics Group’s test and assembly affiliate, for packaging. It is building the through-silicon-via (TSV) and die-stacking processes that both need. The surge in DRAM pricing has made commodity memory Nanya’s real business, which leaves PieceMakers a cheap side bet that has become a windfall. Nanya took advantage of this by selling around 3% of its stake in a move that suggests it is acting more as an investor than a parent building a memory stack.

The inference gap

Groq is an AI inference startup that Nvidia struck a $20 billion licensing-and-talent deal for on Dec. 24, 2025. Nvidia announced its first chip built from that, the Groq 3 LPU (language processing unit), Nvidia’s SRAM-based inference chip, at GTC, its annual developer conference, in San Jose earlier this year.

There is no HBM or DRAM on the Groq 3 LPU. Instead, it uses 512MB of SRAM on the die to deliver 150 TB/s of bandwidth against 22 TB/s from the 288GB of HBM4 on each Rubin GPU. It’s a decode-only co-processor with Rubin handling the prompt prefill, displacing Nvidia’s Rubin CPX from the roadmap.

At Hot Chips 2026, Nvidia’s Igor Arsovski, Groq’s former chief architect, said the rack is in production and published the first third-party benchmark: 3,431 tokens per second on a 100K-context, 31B-parameter model, at about four times the next-fastest public endpoint, in a single-request test that we noted isn’t directly comparable to the shared endpoints it was measured against. The cost is capacity: at 512MB per chip, a 256-LPU rack holds 128GB, with the model needing 62 chips at FP8 just to hold the benchmark weights. Nvidia accepted that trade for decode speed, which supports Lee’s point that the market leader’s newest inference product contains no HBM.

At Hot Chips, Samsung’s Sangwook Han laid out a three-phase HBM roadmap that ends in zHBM, which is DRAM stacked directly on top of the processor rather than beside it on an interposer. Samsung projects about 70% less I/O power usage than HBM5 with roughly 2.3x the bandwidth of a four-stack HBM4E system, with zHBM’s stacks limited to about four-high due to heat, at around 100W less. This would require wafer-on-wafer hybrid copper bonding and tight co-design between DRAM and SoC teams. SK hynix’s Jaesik Lee, VP of package engineering, said on Aug. 23 that hybrid bonding won’t be ready for HBM4E, leaving HBM5 as the earliest point. Counterpoint Research expects full-scale HBM production with the technique around 2029–2030.

PieceMakers offers a different version. Instead of the GPU-plus-HBM 2.5D layout, it bonds the DRAM stack directly onto the processor, wafer-on-wafer, with hybrid bonding instead of microbumps. This fits far more connections with the finer pitch, improving bandwidth, and the shorter path reduces both latency and power consumption. The company puts its wafer-on-wafer product at more than 2 TB/s per layer with latency under 20ns, the company figures, but the target is more capacity than SRAM at a lower cost and power than HBM. PieceMakers is not doing the TSV or hybrid bonding itself, as this is handled by the customer’s logic wafer foundry, Ting added. This custom service promises a 2027 date against Samsung's undated roadmap end and SK hynix's HBM5-at-the-earliest timing. Nvidia and Samsung have each, in their own way, settled the architecture question, with the open question being the customer.

Yield is the product

Lee also said that yield is the biggest hurdle to wafer-on-wafer mass production. The repair architecture has to be designed in, with testing before bonding, after bonding, and then after logic integration. Lee’s own example was 80% yield per layer, at which four layers come out at about 41% and eight at 17%. Our recently-published hybrid bonding state of play covers the process side in more detail.

This better puts into perspective why the company sells repair and known-good-die IP as much as it does bandwidth. It’s also why an IP-and-royalty model fits the strategy — yield IP is portable across customers while a bandwidth number is not.

What to watch

For PieceMakers, AI revenue remains primarily NRE until there is a first named customer, with the first volume program expected in 2027 at the earliest. Ting said that Nanya’s Q3 2026 results, which come in late October, will gauge the PieceMakers gain and reveal further financial information. SK hynix’s hybrid-bonding timing, which targets HBM5 at the earliest, is the current benchmark, although its 16- and 20-layer memory stacks are a separate problem from a few DRAM layers on a logic wafer. Qualcomm may also describe its relationship with PieceMakers more formally.

PieceMakers is likely to end up as an IP licensor with a small number of accelerator customers and turnkey volume through Nanya and Formosa Advanced Technologies. The technology risk is the foundry’s and the customer’s, which is why PieceMakers’ design-fee model works. PieceMakers is expected to benefit from a 2027–2028 ramp, later than Ting’s 2027. If the largest HBM maker won’t bond its own memory this way before HBM5, PieceMakers’ own 2027 date is the one it must meet.

China's progress toward technological self-sufficiency in recent years is undeniable, but there is one thing that the country has so far failed to develop: lithography tools that are on par with those offered by ASML. That shortcoming has greatly hampered its domestic semiconductor industry. But Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang believes China will develop its own advanced lithography systems in just three or four years.

"They are going to get there by 2030," Huang said in an interview with The All-In Podcast (at 43:43). "2030 is just around the corner. The way to think about China is that it is really good at high-volume production. It is just a matter of time[...] so two or three years is just a click; it is nothing. So as far as they are concerned, they are already there."

Huang tends to look optimistically at China's technological development. Specifically, he is known for calling China's AI industry as being 'right behind' American frontier labs, which may well be correct, given how much capital China is investing in AI. But when it comes to the Chinese semiconductor industry in general and its lithography sector in particular, Huang may be too optimistic.

At present, China's leading producer of lithography tools — Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment — can mass-produce a 193-nm ArF dry scanner that can be used to build chips on 90nm-class process technology. While the company has reportedly developed a 28nm-capable ArF immersion scanner, there is no public evidence that such systems are produced in volume and are used for high-volume chip production.

Although there are reports that Shanghai Aishengna Electronic Technology Group (a unit, or an affiliate of SMEE) has delivered its first immersion scanner that may be capable of printing chips using 28nm-class process technology, these tools will require extensive qualification before they can be used for high-volume manufacturing of semiconductors, so if deployment follows standard timelines, it will take years before this unit will be used for mass producing chips.

Even assuming that the first scanners are delivered to Chinese chipmakers in 2026, widespread production use before 2028–2029 appears unlikely. Furthermore, matching the capabilities of an early-generation ASML immersion scanner would still leave Chinese lithography suppliers considerably behind ASML's contemporary systems, which makes technological parity in ArF immersion lithography by 2030 highly unlikely.

China is considerably further behind in extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography. While there are reports that Chinese scientists have managed to develop a laser-produced plasma source that can generate the 13.5-nanometer wavelength light required for the technology, it does not look like China is close to assembling even a prototype EUV scanner itself.

Even if China can assemble an EUV experimental exposure platform without having mastered production-quality immersion DUV, it is hard to imagine a Chinese company producing EUV scanners without solving the hardest problems common to both DUV and EUV technologies. A production lithography scanner requires extraordinary capabilities in wafer and reticle stages, alignment, overlay, projection optics, and metrology, just to name a few.

If China is still struggling to industrialize these capabilities for immersion DUV, there is little reason to assume it has somehow solved them at the substantially more demanding EUV level. But given the potentially existential stakes of the AI race, and the determination of the Chinese government to achieve technological self-sufficiency, it may just indeed be a matter of time.

South Korean memory chip manufacturer SK hynix is in talks with Intel to start manufacturing inside the U.S., according to Reuters. The company is reportedly considering multiple options, including leasing space at the under-construction Intel Ohio One site and forming a joint venture with Intel and other AI hyperscalers desperate for HBM.

This move could help alleviate the memory shortage. It would also complement the company’s expansion in Indiana, where it recently broke ground on an HBM packaging plant a few weeks after its historic $26.5-billion Nasdaq listing. It’s unclear yet if these talks are part of the results of the South Korean president’s visit to Silicon Valley in an effort to expedite negotiations between its top tech companies and their U.S. counterparts, but SK Group chairperson Chey Tae-won told reporters in July, “I think we need to build a factory in the United States. If possible, I believe we should build it.”

However, there are also concerns that Seoul might object to such investment. The South Korean government just unveiled a $520 billion investment plan to increase chipmaking capacity within its shores and keep the country competitive in the AI race; at the same time, it’s also in talks with the U.S. to finalize its $350 billion investment commitment to Washington to reduce tariffs on South Korean goods, $200 billion of which is still undecided on which projects it will be deployed on. Meanwhile, the Commerce Department has threatened to impose more tariffs on South Korean and Taiwanese tech companies if they fail to invest in U.S. manufacturing. This potentially puts SK hynix at a precarious position, especially as it balances the demands from the White House and the Blue House.

Neither company has confirmed these rumors, though. SK hynix told Reuters that it’s “reviewing various measures, including establishing additional production bases, to strengthen the competitiveness of its memory business,” but “no matters have been determined at this stage.” On the other hand, Intel called them speculation and declined to comment on the matter, only saying that it was continuing to invest in the Ohio project, which is expected to come online between 2030 and 2031.

Micron has announced a one-time cash appreciation bonus of NT$1 million (US$31,650) as part of a broader compensation/reward package for its employees based in Taiwan. According to a Reuters report, the full package — which comes amidst ongoing disputes between the U.S. memory giant and its Taiwanese workforce — will see each employee earn a minimum of NT$1.7 million ($53,809.39).

The company called the payouts the largest rewards package in company history, confirming that more than 60,000 employees globally will receive scaled rewards for fiscal year 2026, “following an extraordinary year for the company.” Across the last four quarters, Micron’s cumulative net income from sales of high-demand memory chips has crossed a staggering $50.47 billion, with its Q3 earnings representing a 346% year-over-year increase. After the announcement, the union representing workers at Micron's Taoyuan plant officially rejected the company's bonus proposal, calling the package a distraction.

Under the announced payout, every Taiwan-based employee who joined the company on or before August 29, 2025, is eligible for the flat NT$1 million cash bonus. Those hired during fiscal year 2026 will receive a prorated amount. For direct manufacturing and production-line workers, the total bonus rewards are equivalent to 35 to 68 months of basic salary. Direct labor employees will receive a minimum total cash compensation of NT$1.7 million (US$53,809), while the average total compensation for junior engineers is projected to reach NT$3.4 million (roughly US$106,250), comprising NT$2.9 million in cash and the remainder in equity grants.

The announcement — which mirrors bonus payouts by Samsung and SK Hynix amid the soaring profits from the AI boom — comes after local unions in Taoyuan and Taichung, representing 10,000 of Micron's 15,000 Taiwan workforce, began threatening a strike on September 1, demanding packages similar to the payouts that will see Samsung employees receive over $300,000 in bonuses. The Taiwanese government stepped in to force a mediation. However, unlike in Samsung's case, which also involved government intervention that narrowly averted a potential strike, the talks fell through on September 4 after both parties failed to reach a consensus, leading Micron to announce the NT$1 million bonus package a week later.

In an official statement following Micron's announcement, the union said the new package "sidestepped" the real discussion about a transparent bonus system. The union is pushing for structural change, including a permanent profit-sharing model in which 15% of the company's operating profits are allocated directly to workers and distributed quarterly. They are also demanding a larger one-off payment equivalent to roughly 83 months of salary for fiscal year 2026. Last September, South Korea’s SK Hynix reached a settlement with its union to allocate 10% of annual operating profit directly to employees as performance bonuses for the next decade, eliminating bonus caps.

Similar incidents have played out across the semiconductor industry as companies continue to pull in unprecedented profits from the AI boom. Workers in these industries believe they should share in profits and are requesting concrete institutional safeguards to ensure they are fairly compensated during high-profit AI booms, rather than relying on arbitrary, opaque bonuses decided solely by management. Samsung's unions were ready to strike before reaching an agreement with the company and even held a demonstration attended by over 30,000 Samsung union members.

In the case of Micron — which announced a record-breaking GAAP net income of $28.24 billion in just Q3 2026 — the threat of a strike continues to loom following the Union’s rejection of its proposed payout. A critical second round of mediation is officially scheduled for September 21, 2026. If that upcoming meeting falls apart, the union plans to hold a vote allowing members to strike. In an earlier internal survey, 80% of union members voted in favor of a strike.

Jiangsu Pacific Quartz, a high-purity quartz (HPQ) producer from China, is already supplying its HPQ material to leading domestic and overseas producers of chipmaking tools, including Lam Research and Tokyo Electron. More recently, the company's materials/components have passed certification by a domestic DRAM manufacturer. Analyst TP Huang, who hosts the China Tech Talk podcast, believes that the DRAM maker is CXMT.

While Pacific Quartz's achievements are significant, the company's components are used in semiconductor production equipment after the silicon wafer has been made. Meanwhile, Ingots for semiconductor wafers are grown in crucibles made from high-purity fused quartz, typically over 99.999% SiO₂ (5N+), with much tighter limits on individual critical contaminants. For now, such quartz can only be obtained in significant volumes from Sibelco and The Quartz Corp., which operate in Spruce Pine, North Carolina, and from Russian Quartz LLC, which can produce modest volumes.

Pacific Quartz has supplied Lam Research and Tokyo Electron with ultra-high-purity quartz consumables, such as LPCVD diffusion tubes, wafer boats, quartz ingots, quartz plates, and high-purity quartz tubes, since 2019–2020. Typically, quartz used for process equipment is 4N5 – 5N purity (~99.995–99.999% SiO₂). So Pacific Quartz's products are good enough for semiconductor tools.

More recently, Pacific Quartz said its quartz products manufactured from its own high-purity quartz sand passed qualification at a leading Chinese DRAM manufacturer, apparently CXMT, for use in 300-mm wafer production. This is particularly significant because it demonstrates a largely domestic supply chain for Chinese quartz that starts with Pacific Quartz's purified high-purity sand, which is then processed into semiconductor furnace-tube material that goes to a DRAM fab. While CXMT certainly uses equipment from Lam Research and Tokyo Electron, we cannot say for sure that all the quartz consumables that these tools use are made by Pacific Quartz.

Semiconductor furnace tubes are typically made from roughly 5N-class high-purity fused quartz, with stringent limits on electrically active and mobile contaminants, as they can migrate onto/into hot silicon wafers and alter transistor characteristics, ultimately creating defects and lowering yield.

While China-based Pacific Quartz can produce components for semiconductor production equipment, it still cannot produce crucibles good enough to grow silicon wafers with 9N–11N purity. Will it change in the foreseeable future? Only time will tell.

ABF substrates, the specialized insulating and wiring bases that connect tiny silicon chips above them to the much larger printed circuit boards below, sit beneath most high-end CPUs, GPUs, and AI accelerators. Featuring the Ajinomoto build-up film (ABF), these substrates have been critical to the semiconductor industry since the late 1990s, with personal computers, workstations, servers, and networking silicon driving steady demand for decades.

The artificial intelligence boom has multiplied that demand exponentially. Training and inference for frontier models now run across data centers, each housing hundreds of thousands of accelerators and providing hundreds of megawatts of compute. Nvidia alone shipped an estimated 3.2 million Blackwell GPU packages through the end of 2025, with every one of those accelerators packaged on an ABF substrate. Meanwhile, the industry is already entering the gigawatt era with humongous data center buildouts, each expected to house millions of AI accelerators.

This edifice rests on a remarkably narrow supply chain. Practically every advanced logic and AI chip made today by Intel, AMD, and Nvidia depends fundamentally on ABF substrates. These substrates are the conventional default for high-performance packaging. They are made by a small group of specialists, including Unimicron, Ibiden, Kinsus, Shinko Electric Industries, Samsung Electromechanics, and Nan Ya PCB. The upstream supply chain gets much tighter.

The one common denominator across ABF substrates, regardless of manufacturer, is the Ajinomoto build-up film itself. Each substrate maker laminates its build-up layers using dielectric film supplied by Japan's Ajinomoto, which controls a reported 95% or more of the global market. A single company, better known for food seasoning than microelectronics, sits at the base of one of the most concentrated supply chains in computing, almost singlehandedly supplying a material for hundreds of millions of semiconductor devices. Not surprisingly, demand is now growing beyond what the supply chain can comfortably supply.

Compounding this crunch, modern AI accelerators now pack multiple compute, memory, and supporting components onto a single board. As a result, the substrate is getting larger across the X-Y footprint to accommodate the expanding package. Manufacturers are also adding more build-up layers to the substrate to route the growing number of signals and power connections. Each additional layer requires another ABF layer, further multiplying demand across millions of accelerators and extending manufacturing times.

Unfortunately, the complications don't stop there. Beyond further straining the supply chain, expanding the substrates is creating technical problems, such as warpage, yield issues, and electrical losses within the component itself. This leaves the ABF substrate ecosystem facing two related challenges: producing enough advanced substrates for a rapidly expanding fleet of AI accelerators, while simultaneously re-engineering these substrates so they can continue to scale without becoming unmanufacturable or impractical.

The ABF substrate roadmap is consequently as much about supply-chain capacity as it is about the hardware itself, with suppliers such as Ajinomoto and Ibiden outlining plans to expand material and manufacturing capacity, respectively. At the same time, the wider industry — Intel, Samsung, and SK's Absolics among them — is exploring glass-core substrates and other material technologies to push past the limits of organic ABF.

ABF substrates

Silicon dies, including CPUs and GPUs, cannot communicate directly with the printed circuit board beneath them. The connection pads on a die are spaced micrometers apart, while the traces on a motherboard are spaced hundreds of micrometers to millimeters apart. Every high-performance chip, therefore, sits on an intermediary package substrate — a dense, multilayer board that fans the ultra-fine connections on the die outward into connections large enough for the motherboard to handle, while also providing signal routing, power and ground distribution, and mechanical support for the package.

ABF substrates used in AI accelerators typically consist of a rigid, glass-reinforced resin core sandwiched between successive build-up layers of copper wiring and insulating film. The core provides much of the mechanical rigidity, while the layers provide the increasingly dense wiring required close to the silicon.

To create the substrate, the manufacturer laminates the ABF dielectric onto the structure, forms microscopic vias — commonly with a CO2 laser — and then uses lithography and copper deposition to create a new wiring layer. High-end substrates typically use a semi-additive process (SAP), in which fine copper traces are plated up from a thin conductive seed layer. Another ABF layer is then laminated over it, and the process repeats. The film electrically separates successive copper layers, while plated microvias connect them vertically.

Ajinomoto developed the film in the 1990s, after which it gradually became the industry default for its low dielectric loss, fine-line capability, and smooth lamination. The company reportedly accounts for roughly 95% of the substrate film market, with its nearest competitor, Sekisui Chemical, holding only a low-single-digit share.

The manufacturing tier above the film is more populated but still concentrated. Unimicron, Ibiden, and Shinko together account for roughly three-quarters of the substrate market by most estimates, with AT&S and Nan Ya PCB rounding out the leading group. These companies take ABF and other materials and manufacture the finished multilayer substrate. Semiconductor packaging companies, such as TSMC and Amkor, then integrate those substrates into packages containing the processor, memory, and other components.

AI accelerators are pushing substrates outward and upward

To deliver the compute and memory bandwidth that frontier models demand, the industry is packing ever more silicon onto each AI accelerator. Designers now place multiple large logic dies alongside a growing number of high-bandwidth memory stacks on a single package. Nvidia's Blackwell generation mounts two reticle-sized GPU dies and eight HBM3E stacks on a single package, with its upcoming Rubin and Rubin Ultra parts pushing it further still. TSMC's CoWoS packaging is scaling from around 3.3 reticles — each roughly 830 square millimeters of silicon — a generation ago to 5.5 reticles in volume production in 2026, with a roadmap reaching 9.5 reticles in 2027 and beyond 14 reticles by 2029, when a single package is expected to carry roughly ten compute dies and twenty or more memory stacks.

This expansion of the accelerator package is driving the substrate’s expansion on two physical levels. The first expansion is the substrate's footprint in the X-Y axes. The base has to get wider and longer to accommodate the larger package footprint. Ibiden's current roadmap puts its cutting-edge substrate size at 90 × 90mm (3.54 x 3.54 inches) in 2026, 110 × 110mm (4.33 x 4.33 inches) in 2028, and 130 × 130mm (5.12 x 5.12 inches) and larger from 2030 onward. Ajinomoto independently expects the representative advanced AI packages its film goes into to grow from roughly 100 mm² in 2026 to about 120 mm² for 3D AI packages from 2031.

The second expansion is along the Z axis through additional layers. An expanded collection of compute dies and memory creates more signals to route, while the corresponding increase in power draw requires extensive power and ground distribution, all of which must be carried in a growing number of layers. Ibiden's roadmap targets a 10-X-10 buildup structure in 2026, 12-X-12 in 2028, and 14-X-14 from 2030. Here, the numbers represent the build-up layers on either side of the central substrate core: “10-X-10” means 10 build-up layers per side of the core — which is represented by the “X” — each comprising one dielectric layer (ABF) plus one patterned copper layer, working as a pair.

Nan Ya PCB's roadmap points in the same direction. From an 11+N+11 baseline, it targets 24-layer substrates in 2026 and more than 24 layers in the first half of 2027, while tightening line and space from a 9/12 µm baseline to 8/8 µm and then to 6/7 µm by early 2027. Layer-counting conventions differ between vendors, so a per-side figure and a total layer count don't necessarily line up directly.

The substrate’s expansion in both directions creates several challenges. Increasing the X-Y area makes the package harder to keep flat. Silicon, copper, the substrate core, and the polymer build-up materials that make up the substrate expand by different amounts when heated. As the package is bonded during assembly at around 250⁰C and then cooled, these mismatches cause the layers to pull against one another, leading to warping — a problem that becomes harder to control as package dimensions increase.

Excessive warpage can undermine solder-joint formation, layer-to-layer alignment, and reliability, while a larger substrate also occupies more manufacturing-panel area and exposes more area to potential defects. Organic substrates are reported to lose usable flatness once packages exceed roughly 120mm per side, a threshold that the largest AI accelerators are now reaching and that Ibiden's own roadmap — climbing toward 130mm and beyond — is set to cross.

The growing layer count along the z-axis also creates manufacturing challenges around yield, capacity, and time. Every new substrate layer requires a full manufacturing sequence of several steps, all held to sub-ten-micron tolerances. Each added layer increases the chance of a defect or alignment error that can scrap the whole substrate.

Additionally, layer count consumes manufacturing capacity and time in proportion. This is why Ibiden frames future demand in terms of semi-additive processing load rather than a simple substrate count, as a single advanced substrate now consumes far more of a line's capacity than a finished-unit tally would suggest.

Overall, the simultaneous expansion in substrate area and layer count means ABF consumption is rising much faster than processor shipments alone suggest. Ajinomoto illustrated this in its 2025 integrated report with a larger AI substrate that had about 3.5 times the board area and three times as many ABF layers as a conventional design — 18 layers against six — consuming roughly ten times as much ABF overall. This surging material consumption, set against an extremely concentrated supply base, extends the ABF substrate story beyond a technical problem into a supply-chain constraint.

The supply chain constraint

Like many components in the semiconductor industry chain before the AI boom, demand for ABF substrates periodically swung both ways. A severe bottleneck through 2020-2022 — driven by pandemic-era PC and server demand — was followed by an oversupply in 2023, as substrate manufacturers expanded capacity. However, that capacity was built for low-layer-count, smaller consumer substrates, not the large-body, multi-layer packages AI demands.

These advanced products require sufficiently large manufacturing formats, fine SAP wiring, tight layer registration, acceptable warpage, and high yields across much larger structures. Ibiden captures this by measuring demand not in finished substrates but in semi-additive-process load — the actual processing work each part imposes on a line. Indexing 2024 at 1.0, it expects the SAP load of a single AI-server substrate to reach 1.8 times that in 2026 and 2.5 times in 2028, with the company stating that substrate expansion will push total SAP demand beyond industry supply capacity, indicating a constraint in the manufacturing process itself.

The bottleneck is even tighter at the ABF material level. Ajinomoto's film capacity was already running at full load in the second quarter of 2026, at a reported two million square meters per month, although the company has outlined plans to increase capacity. A near-monopoly supplier at full capacity while consumption surges paints a clear picture of the bottleneck’s severity.

Unsurprisingly, prices have moved accordingly. Ajinomoto notified substrate manufacturers in May 2026 that it would raise ABF film prices by approximately 30%, effective in the third quarter. The hike is coming alongside comparable increases in copper-clad laminates from Resonac and Mitsubishi Gas Chemical, compounding pressure across the whole stack. Further tightening the squeeze, Ajinomoto recently cut shipments of the critical ABF film to China by 30%.

The growing ABF substrate problem cannot simply be attributed to Ajinomoto running out of film. In fact, while it's running at full capacity, the company says it has no concerns about its overall supply chain. The constraint stretches across the entire chain containing ABF, glass cloth, and other materials, SAP equipment, large-format substrate factories, yield, and customer-qualified production capacity.

The immense industry demand is progressively tightening the crunch. Several supply-chain analyses converge on an ABF supply-demand shortfall of roughly 10% in the second half of 2026, widening to around 21% in 2027 and potentially exceeding 40% by 2028, with demand for substrate area projected to grow at a compound annual rate near 39% from 2025 to 2028 as accelerators integrate more components.

The roadmap to recovery: more capacity, better materials

The industry is responding to ABF substrates' multifaceted constraints on multiple fronts: expanding manufacturing capacity to relieve near-term supply pressure while qualifying new materials and substrate architectures to break through the technical limits. Capacity expansion is already underway across the supply chain.

Ibiden is executing ¥500 billion ($3.1 billion) in capital investment across fiscal years 2026 to 2028 — the largest single substrate expansion on record — targeting 2.8 times its 2024 capacity for ASIC and AI-server substrates by 2028. Unimicron raised its 2026 capital spending to a record NT$34 billion ($1.07 billion), with a focus on ABF substrates. Meanwhile, Samsung Electro-Mechanics, Samsung's substrate arm, has committed $1.2 billion to expand ABF substrate production, with volume production expected by the third quarter of 2027.

Pegatron's substrate unit, Kinsus, has approved NT$23.5 billion ($722 million) for ABF equipment over three years and now focuses its most advanced lines almost entirely on AI clients, aiming to lift monthly output at its Taoyuan plant by roughly 25% by 2027. While these projects address the shortage directly, their lead times mean the crunch may continue for a while, as supply cannot respond instantly to the AI demand spike.

Ajinomoto is expanding upstream as well. A new plant in Gunma entered full operation in 2025. The company has invested roughly ¥25 billion ($157 million) in ABF production since 2023 and has said it will invest at least as much again by 2030, targeting a capacity increase of more than 50%. It is also adding a third Japanese base for varnish production — envisioned to provide capacity comparable to Gunma — with construction planned for 2028 and operations to begin in 2032.

However, capacity only solves the problem if the current substrate architecture can continue to scale. The material roadmap — aimed at addressing the physical constraints of ABF substrates — is therefore advancing parallel to the factory roadmap. Ajinomoto says present and future ABF generations are being engineered for larger, more multilayered substrates, high-bandwidth I/O, lower transmission loss, and improved resistance to warpage and humidity. The company expects newer, higher-value ABF grades to take an increasing share of its portfolio through 2030.

Substrate makers are addressing the problem from the process side. Nan Ya plans to move beyond 150 mm body sizes and 24 layers while shrinking copper line/space geometry toward 6/7 microns in the first half of 2027. Its materials roadmap includes an ultra-low-CTE core material with a CTE below 3 ppm/°C, alongside low-Dk, low-Df, and low-CTE dielectrics. Finer wiring allows a substrate to support more connections without relying solely on additional area or layers, while low-expansion materials help keep the growing structure flat.

Eventually, the substrate's central core itself may change to glass. Organic substrate cores are increasingly difficult to keep dimensionally stable as packages approach and surpass 100 mm. Glass can be matched more closely to silicon's thermal expansion — providing dimensional stability — and offers substantially lower dielectric loss for high-speed links. It has therefore emerged as one of the industry's main solutions to warpage.

As we detailed in our glass substrate roadmap, the move to a glass core is drawing a broad field, as it sits at the intersection of substrate-making, glass manufacturing, and advanced packaging, pulling in chip-and-packaging houses, display and glass specialists, and the incumbent substrate makers alike. Intel demonstrated a package that combines EMIB with a glass substrate at NEPCON Japan in January 2026, although the company still places commercial glass-substrate deployment in the latter half of the decade.

SK Group subsidiary Absolics is operating a low-volume glass-substrate manufacturing facility in Covington, Georgia — backed by $100 million in US CHIPS Act funding — producing prototype and qualification samples for customers, such as AMD for its MI400-series accelerators, while Samsung Electro-Mechanics is producing prototypes on a pilot line in Sejong and now plans mass production through its glass-core joint venture after 2027.

TSMC, meanwhile, is pursuing panel-level packaging through its chip-on-panel-on-substrate (CoPoS) platform, moving to a 310 x 310mm panel format, with a pilot line at its VisEra subsidiary, trial production targeted for 2027 and mass production for the second half of 2028. Glass-core substrates are a separate, later step on TSMC's roadmap, with commercial scale projected after 2030. Ibiden also puts “glass core” on its substrate technology roadmap around 2030 as a solution for warpage control.

The glass core — most likely a late-2020s-to-2030s technology — is positioned as a solution to the warpage wall. It replaces the organic core, not the ABF itself, which would remain the buildup material. A glass core may soften ABF demand per package, as glass's flatness allows finer routing and potentially fewer buildup layers, but it does not remove the material or the dependency. There's the possibility that a future dielectric material will eventually replace ABF, although that doesn't seem to be the industry's main focus currently.

Regardless, the near-term roadmap centers on more advanced SAP capacity, rapidly expanding factories, improved materials, and increased supply. Through the late 2020s, finer wiring, lower-loss ABF, lower-CTE materials, and better warpage control will enable organic substrates to stretch toward 110 mm and beyond. Around 2030, glass cores offer a path toward the 130 mm-plus packages that Ibiden and others already have on their roadmaps.

ASML, Intel, Samsung, and TSMC are teaming up to drive the industry transition to 6×12-inch photomasks (reticles). This shift is paramount for High-NA EUV lithography, as the larger stencil would enable printing large chips in a single pass, instead of having to stitch smaller designs together, as ASML explained in a press release this week.

This kind of collaboration between chipmakers isn't entirely unheard of, but it is rare. But when they face an industry-wide challenge, they set aside their rivalry and join forces to move the industry forward. This happened several times in recent decades, first with the failed transition to 450-mm wafers co-funded by GlobalFoundries, IBM, Intel, Samsung, TSMC, and New York State, then with the EUV transition, which was spearheaded by Intel, TSMC, and Samsung.

Higher resolution comes with a nuance

High-NA EUV lithography is a major step forward from today's Low-NA EUV tools. With a numerical aperture of 0.55, High-NA systems can achieve an 8nm single-exposure resolution, compared with 13nm for 0.33-NA EUV scanners. The higher resolution enables chipmakers to pattern smaller, denser features in a single exposure, replacing complex Low-NA EUV multipatterning schemes with a single High-NA exposure. This can reduce the number of masks and process steps, shorten manufacturing cycle times, and potentially improve pattern fidelity and yields, especially on critical layers of next-generation process technologies.

However, this improvement comes with a significant tradeoff. Conventional 0.33-NA EUV uses 4X reduction optics in both directions, which enables a 26×33 mm exposure field with standard 6×6-inch photomasks. By contrast, High-NA EUV uses 4X/8X anamorphic optics, so the same mask can only expose a 26×16.5 mm half-field, which is hardly a problem for client-oriented designs that are barely larger than 429 mm². However, large dies that fit within a conventional 26×33 mm EUV field must now be patterned using two High-NA exposures stitched together, or split into a multi-chiplet design.

Stitching is a workable near-term solution that all chipmakers, including Intel, Samsung, and TSMC, use, but it comes with multiple drawbacks. First, it reduces the throughput of ASML's Twinscan EXE:5200B scanner from up to 175 wafers per hour for half-field exposures to around 125 wafers per hour when stitching is used. Secondly, chip designers must account for the stitching boundary, which means additional design rules and reduced floor planning freedom.

Finally, the two exposures must be aligned with extreme precision so that features crossing the boundary connect properly. Even tiny alignment errors can distort lines and vias, or compromise interconnects and thus potentially create defects and lower yields. Such yield loss is very expensive in the context of large CPUs and GPUs produced using Low-NA EUV systems. If yield is lost on more expensive High-NA EUV tools, the costs will be even higher, which greatly lowers the appeal of using these scanners.

New photomasks are needed

To eliminate the need for stitching, the industry is exploring larger orthogonal 6×12-inch photomasks to compensate for anamorphic optics. By doubling the reticle dimension corresponding to High-NA's 8X reduction direction, these masks are set to restore the traditional 26×33 mm full exposure field and enable even reticle-sized dies to be patterned without stitching.

However, 6×6-inch photomasks have been an industry standard for around three decades since the 1990s. Even the transition from DUV to EUV did not change the basic mask dimensions: EUV replaced transmissive masks with reflective multilayer masks but retained the 6×6-inch substrate form factor. As a result, the adoption of 6×12-inch reticles would require the industry to change the entire mask-making, mask handling, and lithography infrastructure built around the existing format.

Mask-blank suppliers like AGC and Hoya would need new or modified equipment to produce larger substrates and deposit uniform reflective EUV multilayers across a much larger area. Mask shops would need new or modified writers and etch tools to pattern the larger masks, as well as inspection and metrology systems capable of precise characterization of the new format. Cleaning equipment, pellicles, and pellicle-mounting devices would also require modifications.

The mask handling infrastructure would have to change as well. Suppliers would need larger mask pods, while fabs and mask shops would require compatible storage, transport, and automated handling systems. At the same time, they would have to retain support for existing 6×6-inch masks since existing and future Low-NA EUV and DUV scanners will continue to use the established format.

Perhaps the biggest changes would be required from ASML. Its High-NA EUV scanners would need modifications or a redesign to accept, clamp, move, and position the substantially larger reticles with the extreme precision required for EUV lithography.

Intel, Micron, Samsung, SK hynix, TSMC, and other chipmakers planning to adopt High-NA EUV lithography would then have to qualify the new masks, scanners, and other tools for their process flows and ensure that the full-field exposure capability works as intended.

As a result, the adoption of 6×12-inch masks would require a coordinated effort and significant investments from chipmakers, ASML, mask makers, and numerous equipment and materials suppliers.

To make matters more complicated, 6×12-inch masks will not replace the existing 6×6-inch format altogether, as noted above. The industry would therefore have to manufacture, inspect, transport, store, and handle two mask formats in parallel, which will add cost and complexity to an already expensive transition.

Timeline

The transition to 6×12-inch reticles is an industry effort currently supported by ASML, Intel, Samsung, and TSMC. It is going to take years and will happen well after High-NA EUV enters high-volume manufacturing with today's 6×6-inch photomasks, as the semiconductor industry prefers to adopt new technologies gradually.

Intel already uses High-NA EUV scanner(s) for select Intel 18A layers (patterned at Fab D1X) and supports both floorplanning within the half-field and stitching; Samsung plans to introduce High-NA EUV into DRAM high-volume manufacturing by 2028, and TSMC intends to deploy the technology for advanced-node production starting in 2030. All three companies plan to start High-NA EUV adoption with 6×6-inch masks.

Intel seems to be leading the pack with 6×12-inch reticles as it has been working for three years to make them a reality, but the company remains tight-lipped about the timing of its adoption of the new photomasks. Meanwhile, the ASML-TSMC initiative targets a 6×12-inch photomask pilot line by 2031, which should provide the foundry with a platform to develop and qualify the new mask format and associated manufacturing infrastructure. The ultimate target is full lithography-system readiness for advanced-node production by 2033.

That said, 6×6-inch and 6×12-inch photomasks for High-NA EUV patterning will likely co-exist on the market at least for some time rather than undergo an abrupt transition. At the end of the day, square 6×6-inch reticles that enable High-NA EUV scanners to expose fields as large as 26×16.5 mm (or 429 mm²) should be sufficient for the vast majority of client processors produced in the coming years. Larger 6×12-inch masks will matter primarily for much bigger designs, such as high-end AI accelerators, data center CPUs, DPUs, high-end GPUs, and FPGAs, where the ability to expose a full 26×33 mm field without stitching becomes considerably more valuable.

For years, TSMC has tried to avoid making public comments about its plans to use EUV lithography with a 0.55 numerical aperture optics, or High-NA EUV, because the company's developers had a good idea how to keep advancing process technologies without using $400 million scanners. However, TSMC cannot rely on Low-NA EUV systems forever, so this week the company announced plans to use High-NA EUV starting from 2030.

TSMC did not formally reveal which fabrication technology will be the first to adopt High-NA EUV, though the year 2030 points to a few candidates. What TSMC did say is that it expects the number of layers processed using High-NA EUV to eventually increase as its fabrication technologies become more complex, driven by increasing complexity of transistor architectures, which is probably an implication for more sophisticated implementations of gate-all-around (GAA) transistors as well as complementary field-effect transistors (CFETs) later on.

TSMC plans to start using High-NA EUV lithography tools for high-volume manufacturing in 2030 using conventional 6×6-inch photomasks. The company then plans to build a pilot line that uses 6×12-inch photomasks in 2031 with the goal of bringing 6×12-inch High-NA lithography systems into advanced node production by 2033.

High-NA EUV lithography tools can achieve an 8nm single-exposure resolution, as opposed to a 13nm single-exposure resolution offered by today's Low-NA EUV litho systems. However, when used with conventional 6×6-inch photomasks, High-NA EUV scanners have only half the exposure field of their Low-NA counterparts, which creates challenges for manufacturing very large dies. As a result, chipmakers building massive AI accelerators must either stitch multiple exposure fields together or adopt multi-chiplet designs, two approaches that have their own other challenges, such as tool productivity and power consumption. To circumvent the 6×6-inch photomask limitations, TSMC is working with ASML to set the stage for 6×12-inch photomasks.

Changing the size of photomasks is not a trivial endeavor as it requires changing everything from EDA software to tools that produce and write masks as well as systems that handle them, which essentially means that the entire industry must work on this change. ASML seems to be optimistic about the transition as it is supported not only by Intel and TSMC, but also by Samsung.

"We expect the adoption of High NA EUV to increase progressively along the device scaling roadmap, first using current 6-inch masks and then further supported by 12-inch masks, which enable greater scanner productivity and allow the industry to meet the demand for smaller, faster and more energy-efficient chips," said Christophe Fouquet, president & CEO, ASML. "We are pleased by the strong initial support of semiconductor manufacturers, mask suppliers and partners for this initiative."

Perhaps the biggest intrigue about TSMC's usage of High-NA EUV lithography is which process technology will be the first to use the new systems. Based on what we know about TSMC's roadmap, A10 or A11 (1/1.1nm-class) seems to be by far the strongest candidates to use High-NA EUV scanners for the most critical layers. TSMC's latest strategy separates its roadmap into annual client-oriented nodes (N2, N2P, N2X, A14, A13) and roughly biennial high-performance nodes (A16 in 2027, then A12 in 2029). The company has already confirmed that A12 and A13, due in 2029, will continue to rely on conventional EUV lithography.

Since A13 is an optical shrink of A14 that increases transistor density by only 6%, with performance and power improvements yet to be disclosed, its successor in 2030 will likely have to deliver considerably more substantial gains. It is therefore reasonable to expect A13’s successor — whether it is called A11 or A10 — to adopt more advanced lithography and/or TSMC's 3^rd Generation nanosheet GAA transistors to deliver significantly higher transistor density as well as meaningful performance and power improvements over its predecessor. Yet, we are of course speculating.

A 52-year-old Belgian-Chinese man has been arrested on suspicion of espionage for allegedly transferring specialized semiconductor intellectual property and trade secrets from Belgian chipmaker BelGaN, where he worked, to China. According to an AP News report citing details released by Belgium's federal prosecutor’s office on September 7, the Beijing-born Belgian resident was taken into custody on May 10 at a Brussels airport while attempting to board a flight to China.

The suspect — identified by Belgian media only as H.L. — previously held a senior research position at the now-defunct BelGaN, which specialized in gallium nitride (GaN) semiconductors. Investigators suspect he was concurrently leading a Chinese chip firm, GanKool, which was developing the exact same specialized gallium nitride chip technology as BelGaN. The company was established only a few months after H.L. joined BelGaN and was financed by a Chinese investment fund. The suspect now faces charges of industrial espionage, membership in a criminal organization, misuse of company assets, and unlawful disclosure of business secrets.

The espionage allegations emerged from an investigation into BelGaN's collapse. When the company collapsed into bankruptcy in the summer of 2024, Belgian authorities launched a routine financial probe into the failure. Investigators eventually uncovered highly unusual corporate activity. Instead of trying to keep BelGaN financially viable, the managers and the researcher may have actively tried to make the Belgian company “disappear” after transferring its proprietary knowledge. This led to further investigations that revealed GanKool’s existence and its connections to BelGaN.

In addition to the researcher’s role, the investigators also found evidence linking BelGaN's last CEO, a Chinese national, to the same Chinese rival. The prosecutors have said a second suspect remains at large, with Belgian media speculating that the CEO is the suspect.

The incident highlights the increasingly intense competition over technology and intellectual property in the semiconductor industry, particularly as China pushes to reduce its reliance on foreign chip technology while the U.S. continues to restrict its access to advanced processors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Just last month, South Korean court documents accused Chinese memory maker CXMT of using a detailed “Project Hefei” roadmap to obtain Samsung's proprietary DRAM technology, including a 620-step process recipe. A former Samsung engineer has already been sentenced to seven years in prison over the scheme.

Intel announced on Monday that it had processed more than one million 300-mm wafers using its High-NA EUV scanners, less than two and a half years after its first tool was assembled. For now, the company intends to use industry-standard 6-inch photomasks, which can expose 26×16.5 mm half-fields and therefore require field stitching for larger chips. However, Intel is also working on larger 6×12-inch photomasks that would enable High-NA EUV scanners to expose full 26×33 mm fields without stitching.

One million High-NA wafers

Intel's one million wafers figure includes wafers processed during tool installation and certification, R&D, and production. Earlier this year, Intel certified using High-NA EUV scanners for its 18A process technology, so right now these tools are used to make some of Intel's Panther Lake processors. Intel currently has two ASML Twinscan EXE:5000 tools and at least one EXE:5200B scanner. As of late February 2025, Intel processes around 30,000 wafers using its High-NA EUV tool, so going from 30,000 wafers by February 2025 to over a million by September 2026 is an enormous increase in cumulative High-NA utilization.

Since Intel's fleet expanded from two EXE:5000 systems to three and now includes the much faster EXE:5200B, the million-wafer milestone is really a fleet and process-maturity milestone that Intel has achieved first in the industry. What makes the company's milestone even more important is that ASML announced this April that all of the High-NA EUV scanners shipped by then processed over 500,000 wafers which achieving over 80% availability, which means that Intel has now processed more wafers using High-NA tools than the rest of the industry combined.

Sticking to stitching

Conventional 0.33-NA EUV has 4X magnification in both directions, enabling the familiar 26×33 mm exposure field with traditional 6-inch photomasks. However, 0.55-NA EUV uses anamorphic 4X/8X magnification, so the same 6×6 mask can provide only approximately 26×16.5 mm on the wafer. As a result, large dies that fit within a conventional 26 × 33 mm EUV field must be exposed as two half-fields using High-NA EUV, which is called stitching. While stitching is a workable near-term solution, it has several drawbacks.

Firstly, it greatly reduces throughput from 175 wafers per hour to 125 wafers per hour on an EXE:5200B. Secondly, chip designs must account for stitching and must be developed with stitching in mind, which means less floor planning freedom. Thirdly, the two exposures must be aligned extremely precisely so that features crossing the stitching boundary connect properly. Even a tiny misalignment can distort lines and vias, or break interconnects, which potentially creates defects and reduces yields, which will be a particularly costly problem for large CPU and GPU dies.

6×12 mask effort progressing

To avoid using stitching, the industry — led by Intel — plans to shift to larger 6×12 masks, which will enable a 26×33 mm full field in one exposure. While this looks easy on paper, make the mask twice as long, changing the mask represents an enormous ecosystem change.

Moving from 6×6-inch to 6×12-inch photomasks would require substantial changes across the existing mask ecosystem, including mask blanks and deposition, etching, inspection and metrology, cleaning, pellicles, mask writers, and mask handling systems. Crucially, High-NA EUV scanners would also have to be modified or redesigned to accommodate the larger masks, which will make the transition a major retooling effort across the semiconductor supply chain. While neither ASML nor Intel confirmed that existing or planned High-NA EUV scanners can be modified to handle larger masks, all of the future High-NA EUV scanners to be launched before and after 2033 are designed around 6×6-inch reticles and stitching, according to ASML's roadmap.

It remains to be seen whether the industry moves on to larger 6×12-inch photomasks, but Intel appears to be the main evangelist for changing the mask standard that has defined projection lithography infrastructure for decades. If the effort comes to fruition, then Intel will likely have a considerable first-mover advantage over its industry peers because it will define and set the standard for the projection lithography industry for decades to come, an advantage that is hard to overestimate.

Intel is set to raise $19.7 billion by selling new common stock in a bid to finance the building out of new production capacity, the development of next-generation leading-edge process technologies like 14A and others, and day-to-day operations. While the company does not assign money to a particular project, Intel needs to build capacity to land orders from large external clients, so capacity expansion will likely be a priority. According to Bloomberg, the share sale attracted $100 billion in demand.

Intel will sell 210,526,315 shares for $95 apiece through an underwritten public offering. In addition, participating banks have 30 days to acquire as many as 31,578,947 more shares at the same $95 price, minus applicable underwriting discounts. Should they exercise all their options, Intel could sell approximately 242.1 million shares altogether and increase the proceeds to roughly $23 billion. Without the additional shares, Intel expects net proceeds of approximately $19.7 billion after underwriting discounts, commissions, and estimated expenses. The transaction is scheduled to close on August 12, 2026.

Intel's market capitalization increased from roughly $90 billion last August to $491 billion at press time, so the time is right to sell some shares and raise some much-needed cash, as the company must compete against giants like TSMC and Samsung, which spend tens of billions of dollars every year on new fabs and advanced process technologies. Meanwhile, Intel's capitalization reached its all-time high of $673 billion on June 20, 2026.

Intel has not assigned the money it is going to raise to particular projects and says the capital can be used across the business, including for capital expenditures and working capital. The company is currently ramping up its Fab 52 in Arizona and is on track to start using adjacent Fab 62 when it needs to. In addition, the company still has to build its fab complex in Ohio, which is expected to cost over $100 billion when fully built, so it badly needs money.

In its risk disclosures, the company specifically mentioned Intel 14A — which is due to enter mass production in 2028 — and other advanced process technologies, manufacturing expansion required to support them, and the need to secure design wins and volume commitments from major external foundry customers. While Intel does caution that these long-term investments amounting to tens of billions may not generate adequate returns, it is impossible to land sizeable contracts from external customers without having production capacity readily available.

Interestingly, Intel also mentioned alternative financing arrangements, government grants, and the U.S. government's significant equity position in the company among relevant factors.

House Select Committee on China Chairman John Moolenaar has written a letter that demands the U.S. government enforce an existing export control measure designed to prevent Chinese companies from getting advanced chips produced by contract chipmakers like TSMC or Samsung Foundry.

When Joe Biden was about to leave the office in early 2025, he signed a law that required chipmakers to determine their end customers in a bid to prevent contract manufacturers from unknowingly fabricating chips using American technologies for companies that served as intermediaries for restricted organizations tied to the Communist Party or the People Liberation Army. The regulation was introduced after it was discovered that chips made by TSMC for China-based Sophgo were actually Huawei's Ascend 910B AI accelerators. However, the Trump administration announced in May 2025 that it would not enforce this semiconductor regulation known as the 'Foundry Due Diligence Rule,' which naturally created uncertainty about whether the foundry-focused requirements would be actively implemented at all.

"The announcement created ambiguity as to whether front-end fabricators like TSMC can export unpackaged advanced dies to non-approved designers located outside of China, without performing the due diligence specified in the Foundry Due Diligence Interim Final Rule (IFR)," the letter reads. "These exports enabled Huawei to obtain millions of controlled Ascend logic dies from TSMC, using its front company, Sophgo in 2023 and 2024."

Before the adoption of the 'Foundry Due Diligence Rule,' Chinese companies and/or their intermediaries could misrepresent chip specifications and end users when placing orders with TSMC or other foundries, which allowed restricted devices to be made despite U.S. export controls. Under the rule, foundries and OSAT providers exporting chips produced on 14/16nm-class process technologies or more advanced nodes must presume those devices qualify as controlled AI processors subject to a global licensing requirement, unless they meet an exemption. According to the letter, foundries have generally complied with these requirements since the rule took effect. As a result, Moolenaar essentially asks the government to enforce the existing controls rather than introduce stricter export controls.

Moolenaar believes that the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security could clarify its current stance on the Foundry Due Diligence Rule in two ways:

• By issuing guidance, which confirms that the worldwide Regional Stability (RS) licensing requirement still applies to exports from front-end foundries;
• By formally annulling the AI Diffusion IFR and amending §744.23 to explicitly restore that requirement for both foundries and OSAT providers.

Either approach would eliminate conflicting interpretations and reinforce enforcement of existing export controls, Moolenaar believes.