Screen Time has received one of its most substantial parental-control updates with iOS 27, iPadOS 27, and macOS 27, adding new ways for parents to manage how long children use categories of apps, which websites they can visit, and what content reaches them through Messages and FaceTime.
The features were previewed at WWDC in June and are now available as part of Apple’s latest operating-system releases. Rather than relying only on fixed app limits, the redesigned Screen Time gives parents a more flexible set of controls that can change throughout the day and adapt as a child gains access to more apps and services.
Among the additions are Time Allowances, Ask to Browse, a simpler child-device setup process, expanded Communication Safety protections, and faster controls for temporarily pausing or extending access.
Apple is also working with the American Academy of Pediatrics to adapt the organization’s Family Media Plan into guidance parents can reference when setting up devices and Screen Time.
Time Allowances give parents a daily amount of time that can apply across categories including Entertainment, Games, and Social Media.
That differs from managing each application individually. Parents can set time allowances for categories such as Entertainment, Games, and Social Media, then adjust those settings based on the needs of their household.
Apple provides suggested starting points based on a child’s age and guidance informed by clinical and child-development research. Those recommendations are optional, with parents able to change them based on their own household and the individual child.
The updated Screen Time also supports schedules that control which apps remain available at different periods of the day. Parents can therefore create separate access patterns around school, homework, evenings, and weekends rather than relying on one universal daily restriction.
Temporary adjustments have been made easier as well. Parents can quickly limit access to apps and the web during periods such as meals, then restore access without rebuilding their existing restrictions. When a child reaches a limit, they can request additional time from a parent to complete an activity or finish a conversation.
The redesigned interface puts device usage and the most frequently used applications closer to the front, reducing the amount of navigation required to understand how a child is spending time on a device.
Ask to Browse brings a permission model already familiar from app downloads to the web.
When the feature is active, a child who attempts to visit a new website in Safari can be required to request permission first. The parent receives the request through Messages and can review it before allowing access.
The feature is available across iPhone, iPad, and Mac and works alongside existing web-content restrictions.
It complements Ask to Buy, which requires children to obtain permission before downloading or purchasing an app or making an in-app purchase. Apple has also expanded the initial setup process so a parent configuring a personal device for a child can choose which apps are available from the beginning.
Setup Assistant offers the option to provide only essential apps, use a recommended group, or manually choose which ones are permitted. More applications can then be introduced later as the parent decides the child is ready for them.
The approach gives parents a way to begin with a comparatively limited device instead of configuring a full standard account and removing unwanted access afterward.
Communication Safety now intervenes when it detects gore or violent imagery in shared photos and videos, expanding protections that previously centered on nudity.
Apple says the feature works with content shared through areas including Messages and FaceTime, with the new protection also extending to live FaceTime calls.
Communication Safety is designed to intervene before a child views or shares detected sensitive material. Apple has previously built these protections around on-device analysis, allowing the system to identify content without requiring Apple to receive the underlying images.
Parents can also continue controlling who children communicate with. Contact-management settings can require approval before a child adds someone new and then communicates through Phone, Messages, or FaceTime.
Child Accounts remain the foundation for these controls. Apple generally requires Child Accounts for children under 13, although the applicable age can vary by state, country, or region. Child Accounts remain available for family members up to age 18.
The accounts automatically activate age-based safeguards and connect parental controls through Family Sharing.
The new Screen Time controls arrive with one practical requirement: devices participating in the same Family Sharing setup need current software.
Apple says all devices in the Family Sharing group must be updated to the corresponding 27-generation releases — iOS 27, iPadOS 27, macOS 27, watchOS 27, and visionOS 27 — before the updated Screen Time controls can be used consistently across the family.
The family organizer, parent, or guardian must also update the parental-control configuration after the software upgrades.
That requirement is worth checking before troubleshooting a missing setting on one child’s device. If every device in the group cannot be updated, Apple says the family can continue using the previous version of Screen Time and its parental controls, but the new controls will not be available consistently across the group.
The features themselves also vary by platform. Ask to Browse and Time Allowances are available on iPhone, iPad, and Mac, while some Family Sharing and communication features extend to other devices.
Apple has launched a dedicated Child Safety site alongside the software release, collecting setup instructions, explanations of Child Accounts, Screen Time controls, communication protections, App Store age tools, Find My, and Apple Watch options for families.
The updated Screen Time controls are available now with iOS 27, iPadOS 27, and macOS 27, although individual features can vary by region, language, and hardware. For families upgrading several devices at once, checking every device in the Family Sharing group for its corresponding version 27 update is the most useful place to start.
The post Screen Time adds Time Allowances and Ask to Browse with iOS 27 appeared first on AppleMagazine.
Microsoft’s top lawyer argued Tuesday that legislators “must make secrecy [orders] the exception” in government subpoenas demanding information about LinkedIn users.
LinkedIn, which is owned by Microsoft, is fighting what it calls overly broad subpoena demands from the US government, which sometimes come with secrecy orders that prevent LinkedIn from alerting customers whose information is being requested.
The company is asking federal courts “to enforce meaningful limits on both the scope of government demands and the secrecy that can accompany them,” wrote Jon Palmer, Microsoft’s chief legal officer, in a Tuesday blog post. “We recognize law enforcement’s important role in protecting public safety and investigating crime, and sometimes that does need to be done covertly. At the same time, customers and users deserve meaningful limits and independent oversight through an adversarial process.”
He pointed out: “People and organizations increasingly entrust their most sensitive information to online services. If providers cannot challenge demands they know are overbroad—or if courts may silence them without a rigorous, adversarial review—the safeguards the law requires will be weakened precisely when they are most needed.”
The issue is a tricky one. Law enforcement often use this type of subpoena as an investigative tool, seeking those who are engaged in illegal activities. The theoretical justification for secrecy is to avoid alerting the investigative target to make it less likely the suspect will try to destroy evidence or flee the jurisdiction.
Government lawyers are supposed to only make secrecy requests when absolutely essential. Microsoft is suggesting that courts and congress need to step in to curtail blanket government efforts.
“The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. That right applies to papers kept in a desk and it also applies when personal and business records are stored online,” Palmer wrote. “Online service providers, like LinkedIn and Microsoft, also have a First Amendment right to speak to their customers when the government obtains an order to search their private information. Secrecy may sometimes be justified, but it should be tailored to demonstrated needs and subject to meaningful review.”
He added: “The government must seek only relevant information, justify secrecy with specific evidence and infringe on speech to the least extent possible.” In his post, he pointed to a recent legislative effort in the US House of Representatives that might mitigate the issue if it ends up becoming law.
“On August 31, the House passed legislation to rein in secret surveillance and strengthen notice protections when the government seeks data held by technology providers,” he wrote. “The reforms would place clearer limits on secrecy orders, require greater accountability, and help ensure that secrecy is the exception – not the rule. The Senate should act promptly to send these historic reforms to the President.”
LinkedIn itself is currently fighting litigation that accuses it of directly violating the privacy rights of its customers, and a federal judge this month dismissed another similar case, but gave plaintiffs permission to refile, with a caveat.
“Given LinkedIn’s further arguments that users voluntarily download browser extensions, which by their nature intentionally expose data to websites, it seems unlikely that the plaintiffs will ever be able to allege a privacy violation, much less prevail at the end of the day,” US District Court Judge Vince Chhabria wrote. “But in an abundance of caution, dismissal is with leave to amend.”
But, he added, if the amended complaint isn’t filed within 14 days, “dismissal will be with prejudice.”
Jeff Valdes, a director at Acceligence, noted, “there is definitely some irony here.”
“If Microsoft wants customers to view it as a steward of their privacy when the government comes asking for their information, customers are naturally going to apply that same standard to how Microsoft and LinkedIn collect, use, protect, and disclose information themselves,” he said. “Privacy is difficult to compartmentalize. You cannot have one philosophy of customer privacy for government access, another for product design, and another for your own commercial data practices without eventually creating a credibility problem.”
Mike Wilkes, enterprise CISO at Aikido Security, agreed, pointing out, “without meaningful limits, judicial scrutiny, and an expiration mechanism, a temporary investigative necessity starts looking a lot like a permanent architecture for invisible surveillance. The individual may never have an opportunity to challenge the scope of the request, because they may never even know the request existed until prosecutors show up with an indictment.”
That, he said, “is why Microsoft’s argument matters, despite the obvious irony of LinkedIn simultaneously defending itself against privacy claims from its own users.”
But Ryan O’Leary, an IDC research director, offered a different perspective.
“Microsoft makes no bones about using the data contained within its own systems for its own purposes. Both things can be true: Microsoft can fight for the privacy of its platform while still not necessarily respecting the privacy rights of its end users,” O’Leary noted. “This seems to come down to protecting its own proprietary data sets, not some altruistic privacy crusade.”
At the same time, Valdes pointed out, Palmer’s post highlights how deeply privacy has become a top-tier enterprise IT priority.
“Privacy is rapidly becoming a much broader data stewardship obligation,” he said. “Companies holding sensitive information increasingly have to think simultaneously about government requests, third-party access, their own collection practices, AI use, data retention and what they tell customers about all of it. If you want to be trusted as the custodian of the world’s data, customers are going to judge how you protect that data in every direction.”
However, Wilkes noted, “Microsoft does not need to be a perfect privacy saint to be right about this particular problem.”
This article originally appeared on CSOonline.
Apple (Hacker News, MacRumors):
Our solution hinges on splitting the Apple Reference Image process into two phases: creating a secure digital negative, and developing that negative into a reference image. Each phase receives our strongest protections.
[…]
Apple Reference Image provides both a lower bound and an upper bound on capture time from Apple’s cryptographic timestamp service, and we guarantee the photo was taken between the two bounds. On a regular heartbeat, the device requests a cryptographic timestamp token, and retains the most recent one it has received. Globally this happens on average every 15 minutes, though the interval depends on local network conditions. This provides a proven lower bound timestamp for the photographic capture. After capture, the device requests a second timestamp to use as an upper bound, and both timestamps are embedded and signed with the sensor data.
[…]
When the user chooses to create a reference image, the device uploads the digital negative to PCC, which runs the processing steps needed to render the image — including demosaicing, tone mapping, and compression — in a highly secure, private, and verifiable environment. Experts can verify that PCC doesn’t alter a digital negative during development: they can examine the software that does the work.
[…]
Finally, as no security system is perfect, we created a revocation system that can revoke individual photos, as well as all photos from a specific sensor.
[…]
We built Apple Reference Image to avoid using an explicit, public credential for photographers, and to avoid even implicit public association between different photos taken by the same sensor. The final reference image is instead signed by Apple’s signing service, after validation by PCC.
Previously:
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