After years of holding out, Walmart today announced that it will finally begin accepting tap-to-pay options like Apple Pay in some of its Walmart and Sam’s Club stores in the U.S. starting Monday, August 24. The retailer plans to roll out tap-to-pay support to all of its U.S. stores by the end of 2026 and to its gas stations by mid-2027.
Previously:
Apple (developer, details, Hacker News, TechCrunch, The Verge, 9To5Mac):
These changes resolve Apple’s disagreements with the Commission over business terms and alternative distribution. They also reduce complexity by moving every developer that distributes apps in the EU to a single set of business terms.
[…]
The Core Technology Fee, a per-install fee for developers that achieve extraordinary scale, will be replaced by the Core Technology Commission, a simple 5 percent commission on digital transactions in apps distributed outside the App Store. The new terms also eliminate the initial acquisition fee and store services fee.
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Under the updated terms, developers can now offer Apple In-App Purchase alongside alternative payment options, which had not previously been permitted in the EU.
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Apple is also expanding who is eligible to operate an alternative app marketplace or distribute apps via the web in the EU.
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Apple will continue to require every alternatively distributed app to go through Notarization[…]
Apple will charge a 26% fee for apps distributed through the App Store that use in-app purchase.
[…]
Apps in the App Store that use in-app alternative payment processing will pay 20%.
[…]
Apps that link to a website purchase option will pay 15%.
Apps using Web Distribution or App Marketplaces would pay the 5% CTC (and report transactions). I like that the new terms are simpler and that the fees are slightly lower, but it seems like the EU got tricked or surrendered here.
This is bonkers, I can’t believe the EU Commission agreed to it. The main issue that the DMA was about still remains: Apple retains ultimate control over app developers’ dealings with users.
The status quo that the EU should have pushed for, and which Article 6(7) of the DMA requires, is one where a developer can distribute iOS apps to users without ever entering into any contractual relationship with Apple.
All in all, still extremely anti-consumer. If I can download and run arbitrary code on my Mac--even if I have to jump through scary warnings--why should I not be able to do so on my phone? Why would one computing platform be different from the other?
However, while Apple hopes it will be allowed to charge these lower commissions, it has admitted in a new regulatory filing that it may not be allowed to charge any commission at all on purchases made through third-party app stores and other external platforms.
The commission Apple earns from the App Store is shrinking in markets where it has been forced to relax its grip on in-app purchases, based on new analytics data.
Previously:
Update (2026-08-20): M.G. Siegler:
Notably, this isn’t a proposal, it’s the announcement of actual changes that Apple will implement (starting October 1) after “close collaboration” with the EC. And lest we think Apple is overplaying that last aspect, that group gave a statement to Bloomberg backing up the assertion[…]
[…]
This feels like mainly a way to keep the all-important big gaming fees – which make up most of in-app payments, and as such, most App Store fees – mostly intact.
[…]
It sure looks like Apple knew this EU deal was coming down the pike and that the bloc agreeing to their terms would bolster the case that these are “fair”. The US judge still gets to decide that, and Epic has already pushed back as Apple seeks to negotiate directly. One big reason for pushing? Epic wants to ensure any changes Apple tries to negotiate be put in place for all developers.
The European Commission has since confirmed that it approves of Apple’s changes to its App Store policies, giving a statement to the Irish Independent[…]
Epic Games, a longstanding critic of Apple’s App Store practices, called the scheme “junk fees,” adding that the plan did “nothing to open up the mobile app ecosystem to competition, as required by Digital Markets Act.”
“The law makes it clear that Apple must allow developers to offer link outs to the web for purchases ‘free of charge’ and has to allow ‘effective use’ of competing stores,” the company wrote.
This changes effectively nothing I care about and continues to be completely laughable.
Apple still in complete control over what is allowed in any iOS app.
It’s so weird to me that the regulation that is explicitly against gatekeepers still allows Apple to be the gatekeeper.
I hope this isn’t the end of DMA. Apple taking a cut of out-of-store apps revenue makes as much sense as app developers taking a cut of iPhone revenue.
[…]
And also I still want to live in a world where anyone can write a program and run it on the devices they own and send it to friends, without having to pay $100/year of developer account and do the whole notarization thing (which considering the amount of scam in the app store we know is pretty useless in terms of security). Not everybody is a professional programmer, some people are just doing programming as a hobby, some are also young people that don’t even own a credit card yet.
I have refused to sign any of Apple’s EU DMA agreements thus far, because I think they are illegal, and they have been optional.
I still think their new terms are illegal — they don’t meet the minimum requirements of the DMA, and will not be approved by stakeholders — but they are no longer optional, so the choice now becomes accept the updated developer agreement or stop being a developer.
Update (2026-08-21): John Gruber:
This is a near-total victory for Apple.
[…]
Thanks to the DMA’s sprawling scope, complexity, and overreach, Apple came out of this conceding only 4 percent of the App Store’s 30 percent commission, and no reduction at all to the 15 percent for subscriptions after the first year.
Update (2026-08-24): Jesper:
The CTC is preferable to the CTF in much the same way that a fire burning down your kitchen is preferable to a fire burning down your entire house.
[…]
The Digital Markets Act was introduced to ensure that sideloading would be an available alternative, to essentially force open platforms that have been closed. Debates about the wisdom of this notwithstanding, in the biggest case, and up until recent developments in Android app marketplace governance also only case, it has failed to deliver the promises that were the entire point of the law.
Update (2026-08-25): John Gruber (Mastodon):
I’m sure some of you think I’m all wet in my argument that the point of the DMA was merely to impose ongoing bureaucratic complexity. But my view jibes with the reality of how it’s worked out.
In other words, maybe we who had high hopes were the ones who got tricked, not the EU Commission.
Update (2026-08-28): John Gruber:
I don’t recall seeing POSIWID before, but I love the concept. A friend sent this to me, with the quip that I forgot to include a link to it in my “What Is the Point of the DMA?” piece this week. Indeed, it encapsulates my arguments about the DMA specifically and the European Commission generally. The purpose of the DMA is what it does, not what you imagine it is intended to do.
I admit to being primed by seeing Jeff Johnson’s post, but I’m certain that my mind would anyway have immediately gone to our favorite scam promoting toll booth, the place that “gives people around the world a safe and trusted place to discover apps that meet [Apple’s] high standards for privacy, security, and content.”
Also consider which apps have to pay the toll and which ones show their own ads for free.
Apple has again failed to earn a stay for fee calculations in its ongoing legal fight with Epic Games. Apple's case will be heard by the Supreme Court in the term that begins in October, and Apple asked the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to pause proceedings until then, but the court said no [PDF].
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan today granted Apple a one-day stay in its legal fight with Epic Games, giving Apple more time to outline the fees it wants to charge developers for linking out to purchase options on the web.
Apple tried to freeze the entire thing while they appealed to the Supreme Court – and the Supreme Court denied the freeze. But they didn’t deny hearing the case – yet. That’s why they’re pausing the proceedings for now (after Judge Gonzalez Rogers denied the same request), while they weigh Apple’s appeal. But before they do that, they’re basically likely to decide today – again, it was just a 24-hour delay – whether they should grant a longer stay. Presumably if the court thinks they’re unlikely to hear Apple’s appeal, they may not grant that longer stay. Or if they think Apple filing their number won’t harm their business, they’ll let it proceed. But Apple will argue that if the longer stay isn’t granted, it will cause major harm to their business because again, it will effectively end the App Store cut as we know it.
Juli Clover (Engadget, The Verge):
Apple today submitted a court-ordered proposal outlining the commission it believes is reasonable to collect from U.S. apps that link to purchase options outside of the App Store.
Apple is asking for half of its commission on standard apps, so apps that would pay 30 percent for an in-app purchase would pay 15 percent when linking to a web purchase option. Small Business Program participants that would normally pay 15 percent would pay 5 percent.
[…]
The appeals court suggested the commission could be limited to the direct costs of facilitating link-outs, and under that approach, the fee would be zero. Apple says a zero commission would not reflect the value that it provides developers, and its suggested commission gives it fair compensation for the App Store platform.
[…]
The district court will now evaluate Apple’s fee proposal and hear a response from Epic Games , and Apple will need to implement the fee the court sets.
Unlike cost-only based commissions, Apple’s revenue-based commissions incentivize continued investment. Apple charges developers a $99 annual fee for the Apple Developer Program. May 17, 2021 Trial Tr. at 2762:21–2763:13. This modest fee—designed to prevent fraud and expressly not intended to compensate Apple for the use of its IP-protected tools, technologies, and services (id.)—allows developers to build apps using Apple’s offerings and deliver experiences to iOS and iPadOS users worldwide.
The annual developer fee is nominal. Apple relies on percentage-based commissions to recoup and profit from its investments. See id. ¶¶ 87–93. Apple is incentivized to invest in IP- protected tools, technologies, and services that generate revenue for developers (and benefit users).
[…]
Dr. Carlton explains that “reduc[ing] Apple’s incentive to invest and provide the technology and services that benefit users and developers” would harm users and developers, as well as Apple.
I like the part where Apple’s expert argues that its normal commission rates are so high that it would still be profitable for developers to pay the proposed linking commissions on top of what they would pay to Stripe or Paddle. In other words, paying Apple for “IP” almost twice what it admits the other companies charge for “full-service, turnkey payment processing.”
If the point [of the $99] is just to prevent fraud, why do we need to keep paying $99 yearly FOREVER? Is 10 years not enough to prove I’m not a fraud?!?
If the fee doesn’t help pay for Apple IP, then it’s even more blatantly unfair that a minority of apps have to pay for ALL apps to access Apple IP. Free apps, no matter how big or how much $ they make via ads, get access to Apple IP from OUR REVENUE CUT, and not even their $99 counts.
That’s what that enormous hardware margin from customers is already supposed to be paying for — Apple IP! In the early 00’s, I gladly paid the “Apple tax” (PowerBook G4) to get access to the Mac OS X software/ecosystem, including all the Unix and dev tools. I’m not sure why anyone thinks that double-dipping is fine on all the non-Mac platforms, App Store or not.
Jeff Johnson (2):
Schiller’s [previous] testimony about the previous program is extremely misleading, because the new program began in 2008 at the same time as the App Store, so there was no previous iOS developer program, and Mac Developer ID did not begin until 2012, so Apple Developer Program membership was not actually required to distribute Mac apps!
Fourth, it appears that Steve Jobs was wrong: the $99 fee didn’t prevent developers from flooding the App Store with a lot of junk.
I want to quote another remarkable passage from Schiller’s testimony, again with questions from Apple’s own lawyer.
Q. And Mr. Jobs says, “And also just to make it a little clearer, we don’t intend to make money off the App Store. I mean, we don’t make a lot of money off iTunes, and the split with the music companies is about the same, so in the case of the iTunes Music Store, we give all the money to the content owners, and we are basically giving all the money to the developers here. And if that 30 percent of it pays for running the store, well, that will be great, but we just want to create a very efficient channel for these developers to reach every single iPhone user.” Is that a statement that Mr. Jobs made back in March 2008?
A. He did.
[…]
I won’t quote the following passage in which Schiller testifies about his internal email suggesting that Apple limit itself to $1 billion per year in profit from the App Store, hand-waving away the suggestion as merely “spurring conversation.” Of course the email also seems to contradict Schiller’s (absurd) testimony that Apple does not specifically calculate profit from the App Store, only company-wide profit. Apple’s public financial statements also appear to contradict Schiller’s claims.
Previously:
Update (2026-08-20): Marcus Mendes:
On the same day, Apple submitted another motion, asking Judge Gonzalez Rogers to order the parties to attend a settlement conference.
[…]
Epic has now responded to Apple’s motion, stating that although the company “has been, and remains today, willing to entertain any direct approach from Apple with a serious settlement proposal that would introduce competition and benefit all developers,” it “does not believe the prospects of such settlement would be meaningfully advanced through referral to a settlement conference at this juncture.”
Update (2026-09-03): Marcus Mendes:
In addition to the proposal itself, Apple submitted supporting expert reports, alongside a request to seal portions of those filings containing financial data, link-out adoption estimates, developer survey results, and other information Apple considers commercially sensitive.
Epic has now filed an opposition to Apple’s request, arguing “Apple again seeks to conceal information from the public and unnecessarily hamper proceedings.”
The iPhone Ultra price could establish an entirely new tier within Apple’s smartphone range. Current estimates place the company’s first foldable iPhone above $2,000, with some industry forecasts suggesting an average selling price near $2,500 and higher-storage configurations approaching $3,000.
Apple has not confirmed the device, its name, or its retail price. The iPhone Ultra branding also remains unofficial, although it has appeared repeatedly in reports concerning Apple’s planned expansion beyond the Pro and Pro Max levels.
The foldable is expected to join the iPhone 18 Pro family during Apple’s fall hardware cycle. Rather than replacing the iPhone Pro Max, it would sit above it as a separate model built around a book-style design and a display that expands to approximately the size of a small tablet.
A price beyond $2,000 would make it the most expensive iPhone Apple has released. The current iPhone 17 Pro Max starts at $1,199 in the United States, leaving a difference of at least $800 between Apple’s established flagship and the lowest estimates for the foldable.
Recent projections have pushed that gap even wider. Reports citing analyst Ming-Chi Kuo have discussed a possible range between $2,300 and $2,500, while an IDC estimate cited in supply-chain coverage placed the average selling price at approximately $2,500. Storage upgrades could take selected configurations closer to $3,000.
Apple has spent years arranging the iPhone range around a price ladder. Standard models serve the center of the market, while Air and Pro devices address different preferences involving weight, cameras, materials, performance, and display size.
A foldable iPhone would require another level. Its internal display, hinge, structural materials, battery arrangement, and manufacturing tolerances introduce costs that do not exist in a conventional iPhone.
The rumored hardware points to a device intended to combine phone and tablet functions. Reports describe an outer screen measuring about 5.5 inches and an internal display of approximately 7.8 inches. When closed, the product would operate as a compact iPhone. Opening it would provide enough space for larger applications, side-by-side content, expanded video, and an iPad-style software interface.
Apple is reportedly developing interface changes that would let applications take greater advantage of the internal display instead of simply enlarging an iPhone layout. That software work may become one of the main distinctions between the device and existing foldables, particularly if Apple can connect it closely with iPad multitasking conventions.
The hinge is expected to use liquid metal, an amorphous alloy chosen for strength and resistance to deformation. Apple has also reportedly focused on reducing the visible display crease, one of the most recognizable compromises found on current folding phones.
Those elements help explain a premium price without guaranteeing that customers will accept it. A $2,000-plus phone would compete for spending that could otherwise purchase an iPhone and an iPad, a high-end Mac, or several years of conventional smartphone upgrades.
The device would therefore need to offer more than the novelty of a folding screen. Durability, battery life, camera performance, application behavior, repair costs, and long-term display reliability will influence whether buyers view the iPhone Ultra as a versatile computer or an unusually expensive phone.
Rumors suggest Apple may use Touch ID in the side button instead of Face ID. The change would not necessarily represent a retreat from facial authentication across the rest of the iPhone range. A foldable chassis has limited internal space, and eliminating the TrueDepth camera hardware could help Apple manage thickness around the outer and inner displays.
The reported design includes two rear cameras and front-facing cameras accessible in both folded and unfolded positions. That arrangement may leave the iPhone 18 Pro Max with the more extensive photography system, despite the foldable carrying a much higher price.
Such a decision would position the iPhone Ultra around form factor and productivity rather than making it the automatic leader in every specification. Apple has used similar distinctions elsewhere, allowing one product to command a premium for its design while another retains advantages in cameras, battery endurance, or sustained performance.
Display production is another source of expense. Folding OLED panels require flexible materials, protective layers, specialized hinges, and tighter assembly controls. Apple’s reported pursuit of a nearly crease-free screen may increase component costs and reduce early manufacturing yields.
The company is also entering the category after competitors have spent several generations addressing hinge failures, screen damage, dust protection, and application scaling. Arriving later gives Apple access to a more mature supply chain, but its design standards may create additional production challenges.
Industry estimates suggest Apple’s arrival could help raise the average selling price of book-style foldables throughout 2026. Competitors already sell premium folding phones, yet a model priced near $2,500 would push the category further away from mainstream flagship pricing.
Apple Upgrade could make the iPhone Ultra price appear less intimidating at checkout. The Klarna-backed program lets eligible US customers lease selected Apple devices through fixed monthly payments rather than covering the entire retail price upfront.
Current iPhones can be leased for 12 or 24 months. At the end of the term, customers may return the device, move into another eligible Apple product, or pay the remaining amount required to keep it.
That structure can produce lower monthly payments than traditional financing because the customer is not necessarily paying the entire purchase price during the lease. Part of the product’s value remains in the device at the end of the agreement.
A future iPhone Ultra could fit naturally into this model. Its high retail price and expected resale value would give Apple and Klarna room to separate the cost of using the phone for two years from the cost of owning it permanently.
No monthly figure has been announced for the foldable. Apple cannot price an Apple Upgrade lease until it establishes the phone’s retail cost, residual value, eligible term, and trade-in conditions. A simple calculation that divides $2,000 or $2,500 by 24 months would therefore be misleading.
The monthly charge may be considerably lower than a standard purchase installment, but the customer does not automatically own the iPhone after making the scheduled lease payments. Keeping it requires an additional payment based on the remaining value specified by the agreement.
AppleCare+ is also separate from the current Apple Upgrade lease price. That differs from the former iPhone Upgrade Program, which bundled AppleCare+ coverage into its monthly payments. Protection could be particularly relevant for an expensive first-generation foldable containing a flexible display and complex hinge.
Trade-in credit may reduce the monthly charge, while storage selection would push it higher. Sales tax, cellular service, accessories, and optional protection would remain additional costs. Apple Upgrade changes when and how customers pay, but it does not turn a $2,000-plus product into a lower-priced iPhone.
Apple is reportedly preparing millions of foldable units, but production may be heavily weighted toward the final months of 2026 and 2027. Supply-chain estimates have ranged from 7 million to 10 million devices, with different reports using different production periods and assumptions.
The foldable may be announced alongside the iPhone 18 Pro and iPhone 18 Pro Max but reach customers later. That would resemble the 2017 launch of the iPhone X, which was introduced with the iPhone 8 family in September and released in November.
A delayed retail date would give Apple more time to accumulate inventory while preserving the device’s place in its fall presentation. It could also place the iPhone Ultra into the holiday quarter with considerable demand concentrated around a relatively small supply.
High pricing does not necessarily prevent shortages during the first weeks of an Apple product launch. Early adopters, developers, collectors, and customers waiting specifically for an Apple foldable represent a smaller audience than the conventional iPhone market, but they may still outnumber the units available at release.
Apple Upgrade could add another source of demand by replacing the full retail figure with a monthly lease price inside the Apple Store. That presentation may make the phone accessible to customers who would reject a $2,500 purchase while accepting a recurring payment and returning the device later.
Kuo expects only 500,000 to 1 million foldable iPhones to ship during the third quarter, a supply level that could push some deliveries four to six weeks beyond the opening preorder window.
The post iPhone Ultra Price Could Take Apple’s Foldable Beyond $2,000 appeared first on AppleMagazine.
App Store regulatory changes are beginning to affect Apple Services growth as developers gain more ways to avoid Apple’s payment system or pay lower commissions in major markets.
Apple finance chief Kevan Parekh told investors that changes to the App Store business model in some countries had affected its performance during the June quarter. Softer spending on mobile games created additional pressure.
The acknowledgement is significant because regulatory risk has appeared in Apple filings for years without producing a clearly identified effect on Services performance. Apple is now confirming that rule changes have advanced far enough to influence reported results.
The impact does not mean the App Store has stopped growing. Apple described the store as reaching another June-quarter revenue record, while Services expanded by approximately 12% from the previous year.
The emerging issue is the rate of growth. A purchase can still occur inside an iPhone app while generating less revenue for Apple when the customer pays through a developer’s website or uses terms carrying a reduced fee.
Apple did not identify one country or policy as solely responsible for the effect.
The company is adapting to a collection of court orders, competition laws and regulatory agreements that differ substantially among the United States, European Union, China, Brazil, Japan, South Korea and other markets.
Some rules concentrate on payment choice. They allow developers to place links or buttons inside apps leading customers to external checkout pages.
Other changes permit alternative app marketplaces or direct distribution outside the App Store. Several regulators are also examining whether Apple can charge developers for transactions completed through another payment provider.
The financial result depends on the model adopted in each country. Apple may receive no commission, a reduced commission or another fee connected with platform technology and distribution.
This creates a more fragmented App Store business. A subscription sold through the same application can produce different revenue for Apple according to the customer’s country, payment route and the developer terms governing that version of the app.
The most direct change in the United States came from the long-running legal dispute between Apple and Epic Games.
A federal court previously ordered Apple to stop preventing developers from directing customers toward outside purchasing options. Apple responded by allowing certain external links while seeking commissions of between 12% and 27% on purchases completed through them.
The company also introduced design restrictions, an approval process and a warning screen displayed when customers left the App Store environment.
In April 2025, the district court found Apple in civil contempt for failing to comply fully with the anti-steering injunction. The ruling prohibited the company from collecting a commission on purchases made through external links and removed several restrictions governing their appearance.
Apple updated its App Review Guidelines in May 2025. Apps distributed through the United States storefront can include buttons, external links and other calls to action leading customers toward another payment method.
The rules no longer require a special external-link entitlement for the U.S. storefront.
That change gives developers a straightforward financial reason to move some transactions to the web. A company can process a payment through another provider instead of giving Apple a percentage of the digital sale.
The customer can return to the iPhone app and use the purchased subscription or content. The app remains distributed through Apple, but the associated transaction no longer produces the same App Store commission.
Enough developers adopting that route can slow Apple Services growth even if total spending on iPhone applications continues increasing.
The European Union’s Digital Markets Act requires Apple to permit alternative app marketplaces, outside payment systems and other changes intended to reduce its control over iOS distribution.
Developers can remain under Apple’s conventional App Store terms or adopt business terms designed for the European market.
The alternative structure separates several services that were previously combined inside one commission. Developers can choose different levels of App Store support, use Apple’s payment system, provide another payment option or distribute software through a competing marketplace.
Apple introduced reduced commissions and technology-related fees to preserve compensation for the tools, security systems, distribution infrastructure and platform access it provides.
Those terms have changed several times following regulatory objections. Beginning in 2026, Apple started moving from its earlier Core Technology Fee toward a Core Technology Commission applied to eligible digital transactions under particular conditions.
The structure means outside payments do not always eliminate Apple fees in Europe. They can still reduce the amount Apple collects or shift revenue among different fee categories.
Regulators continue examining whether the terms provide meaningful choice or discourage developers from leaving the standard model.
Apple argues that alternative stores and payment systems create additional privacy, security and fraud risks. The European Commission has focused on whether Apple’s warnings, technical requirements and fees make those options unnecessarily difficult to use.
European developers must calculate more than one commission. They need to consider payment-processing costs, marketplace charges, customer acquisition, reporting obligations and the Apple terms attached to each distribution method.
The result may be lower App Store revenue without an equally large shift toward independent marketplaces. External website payments can change Apple’s economics more quickly because they do not require customers to install another store.
App Store regulatory changes are not limited to alternative stores and external payments.
Apple lowered several commission rates in the China mainland storefront beginning March 15, 2026.
Qualifying transactions under the App Store Small Business Program and Mini Apps Partner Program now carry a 12% commission. The same rate applies to eligible auto-renewing subscriptions after the subscriber’s first year.
These transactions previously qualified for a higher 15% rate.
A three-percentage-point reduction may appear small beside demands for completely independent payments. At the scale of China’s app economy, it can remove a meaningful amount of revenue while improving the share retained by developers.
The Mini Apps Partner Program is particularly important in China because large platforms can contain many smaller services inside one host application.
Reducing the commission can encourage those ecosystems to continue using Apple In-App Purchase. It also demonstrates how Apple may respond to pressure by offering more favorable terms before regulators require a more disruptive change.
Lower commissions can support transaction growth over time, but the immediate calculation is straightforward: Apple receives less from each qualifying purchase.
Apple introduced alternative app distribution and payment options in Brazil through an agreement with the country’s competition regulator, CADE.
Beginning with iOS 26.5, developers can distribute apps through alternative marketplaces, operate those marketplaces and process digital payments outside Apple In-App Purchase.
Apps can also present links leading users to an external website where the transaction is completed.
Apple continues applying notarization and other technical requirements to software distributed outside the App Store.
The company maintains that these protections reduce risks but cannot provide the complete safeguards associated with App Review.
Brazil is a major smartphone and digital-services market. Its effect on Apple Services will depend on whether large developers adopt the new options and whether customers are willing to leave the familiar App Store purchasing flow.
An external option existing in software does not guarantee that people will use it. The developer must usually offer a meaningful advantage, such as a lower price, a different subscription package or payment methods better suited to local customers.
Adoption can increase gradually as existing apps release updates. The financial impact may therefore become more visible over several quarters rather than appearing immediately after the regulatory agreement takes effect.
Apple receives a commission when an eligible digital purchase uses its in-app payment system.
The fee compensates Apple for distribution, payment processing, fraud management, developer tools, customer support and access to the iOS platform, according to the company.
The standard percentage varies. Small developers and long-running subscriptions can qualify for reduced rates, while other eligible digital transactions may carry higher commissions.
When payment moves to a developer’s website, an independent processor handles the financial transaction. The developer pays that provider, manages more of the customer relationship and retains the amount that would otherwise become an App Store fee.
Apple may still provide the operating system, APIs, development tools and App Store distribution without receiving the conventional payment commission.
This separation explains why App Store activity and App Store revenue can move differently. People may download more applications and spend more on digital services while Apple captures a smaller percentage of the commerce.
The same customer could maintain several subscriptions used exclusively on an iPhone without any of their monthly payments passing through Apple.
Apple can collect other revenue from that user through hardware, advertising, iCloud or its own subscriptions. The external transaction nevertheless removes one part of the Services model.
The size of the App Store economy should not be confused with Apple’s commissionable revenue.
Apple says the global App Store ecosystem facilitated more than $1.4 trillion in developer billings and sales during 2025. More than 90% of that commerce did not produce a commission for the company.
The largest categories involve physical goods and services such as retail purchases, travel, grocery delivery, restaurant orders and transportation.
Apple does not collect a percentage when someone uses an Amazon app to order furniture, books a hotel or pays for a meal delivered through an iPhone.
App Store commissions generally concentrate on digital goods, application features, virtual items and subscriptions sold through Apple In-App Purchase.
Regulatory changes target this smaller but financially important part of the ecosystem.
Digital transactions require no physical inventory or delivery network, allowing payment commissions to carry attractive margins. Losing part of that revenue can therefore affect profitability more than the dollar amount alone suggests.
Apple does not disclose App Store revenue or profit separately. The category remains combined with cloud services, advertising, media subscriptions, AppleCare, payments and other operations inside Services.
Regulation was not the only factor Apple identified.
Parekh said softer mobile gaming activity also affected the App Store. Games represent an important source of digital transactions because players purchase virtual currency, characters, cosmetic items, subscriptions and access to additional content.
A decline in game spending directly affects the commission Apple receives through In-App Purchase.
Gaming is also one category where developers have pushed aggressively for alternative stores and payments. Epic Games began its legal confrontation with Apple after introducing another payment method inside Fortnite and attempting to bypass App Store commissions.
The simultaneous effects are difficult to separate. A game can generate lower revenue because players are spending less, because payments moved outside Apple’s system or because both changes occurred together.
Apple does not provide enough category detail to calculate the contribution from each factor.
The distinction matters for the outlook. Gaming demand can recover with successful releases and stronger consumer spending. A permanent regulatory change does not reverse when one popular game reaches the top of the charts.
Outside payments can improve the amount a developer retains from each purchase.
A company moving from a conventional App Store commission to a lower-cost web payment processor may use the difference to reduce prices, fund development or improve profitability.
The developer also assumes responsibilities previously handled through Apple.
Independent billing requires payment processing, tax management, fraud protection, refunds, account recovery and customer support. Subscription status must synchronize correctly between the website and the iPhone app.
Customers changing devices or reinstalling an app expect their purchases to remain available. The developer needs its own account system capable of verifying ownership without relying entirely on Apple’s purchase history.
Small developers may decide that Apple In-App Purchase remains worth its fee because it removes operational complexity and gives customers a familiar checkout experience.
Large subscription businesses have stronger incentives to build their own systems. They already maintain accounts and payments across websites, televisions, Android devices and other platforms.
The regulatory effect will therefore vary by developer size and business model. One company may remove Apple billing completely, while another continues using it because external infrastructure would cost more than the commission saved.
External payments create the possibility of lower subscription prices because developers no longer need to incorporate the complete App Store fee into the amount charged.
Some services already cost more when purchased through an iPhone app than through their websites. The higher price allows the developer to preserve similar revenue after Apple receives its share.
A visible external link makes comparing those prices easier. Customers can leave the app, complete the transaction on the web and return with an active account.
Savings are not guaranteed. A developer can retain the entire difference rather than passing it to subscribers.
Independent billing can also make subscription management less consistent.
Settings > Apple Account > Subscriptions
A subscription purchased directly must be canceled through the developer’s website or account system. Customers using many external services may need to remember several billing portals and renewal policies.
Refunds and purchase disputes also move away from Apple. The developer or its payment processor becomes responsible for resolving the transaction.
Choice can reduce prices while increasing complexity. The practical outcome depends on whether developers make external checkout clearly cheaper and easy to manage.
Apple is responding to the changing environment by adding business models and marketing systems that can keep developers using its commerce platform.
Monthly subscriptions with a 12-month commitment allow participating apps to offer lower recurring payments while securing a complete year of revenue.
The Advanced Commerce API supports more complex content catalogs, optional add-ons and subscription structures that were previously difficult to manage through standard In-App Purchase products.
Apple has also expanded tools for custom product pages, promotional offers, application analytics and international distribution.
These additions increase the value attached to App Store billing. A developer may tolerate a commission when Apple provides conversion tools, subscription management and access to promotional placement that would be expensive to reproduce independently.
The company can also adjust rates for particular categories. The Small Business Program, Mini Apps Partner Program and reduced commission for longer-running subscriptions already demonstrate differentiated pricing.
A more competitive payment market may push Apple toward additional service tiers rather than one universal commission.
The United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority is consulting on rules that would allow developers to direct customers outside Apple and Google’s payment systems.
The regulator expects any fee charged for steering to be fair, reasonable and lower than current app-store commissions. It wants the resulting savings passed to customers or reinvested in developer businesses.
The UK proposal is not yet a final requirement. Its eventual structure could determine whether developers receive the broad freedom available in the United States or a fee-based model closer to some European arrangements.
Regulators are also considering app-review fairness, interoperability and access to mobile-platform capabilities.
The outcome will matter beyond British customers. Each major jurisdiction creates another model that regulators elsewhere can examine when designing their own rules.
Apple must decide whether to continue maintaining different commercial systems by country or move toward broader global terms that reduce operational complexity.
Developers face the same choice. Supporting a separate payment route, marketplace package and reporting process for every region can become expensive enough to cancel some of the benefits regulation intended to create.
The next evidence will come from behavior rather than another policy announcement: how many major apps add external payment links, whether they offer lower prices and how quickly customers move away from Apple’s checkout.
The post App Store Regulatory Changes Begin Slowing Services Growth appeared first on AppleMagazine.
I know there are options out there like Paddle, FastSpring, and Lemon Squeezy that have worked for many apps like mine over the years. But I also wanted something simple for my users. Not to mention Apple Pay was a must-have.
I believe all the services he mentions do support Apple Pay.
RevenueCat serves as the source of truth for whether or not a customer is licensed.
I create RevenueCat customer IDs from local iCloud identifiers (more specifically, calling
userRecordID()on myCKContainerin CloudKit).When the user makes a purchase, they earn an entitlement that I look for in Arborist to grant them a license.
He doesn’t need to run his own server, and the purchases are automatically tied to the user’s iCloud account, so there are no e-mails or serial numbers to deal with. On the other hand, well, it’s all dependent on the Apple Account.
The app, which helps manage Git worktrees, is shipping now.
Previously:
The EU required Apple to permit third-party app stores, while a US court ruled that developers have the right to direct iPhone users to third-party payment platforms for app purchases and subscriptions. Britain’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is now proposing to apply this latter rule in the UK.
The U.K.’s competition regulator has proposed letting app developers direct users to payment options outside Apple’s App Store and Google’s Play Store, in a move aimed at increasing competition and reducing the fees charged by the two companies.
[…]
The regulator said any fees Apple and Google charge developers for enabling such “steering” must be fair and reasonable, remain below existing App Store and Play Store commissions, and allow developers to either pass savings on to consumers or reinvest them in innovation.
Requiring Apple to allow apps to steer users to the web to make payments is, I’ve long argued, sensible regulation. I’ve also long argued that Apple has been obstinate in disallowing it. If in-app payments — through Apple’s system — can’t compete with out-of-app payments on the web, something is wrong with IAP. But it’s wrong to assume that payments outside IAP will result in lower prices and better policies for users.
They may increase prices when costs grow but that does not mean they do the opposite. But who cares? Lower costs permit more flexibility on pricing and, even if that money ends up in the pockets of developers instead of Apple, is that supposed to be a bad thing? Is there a reason why someone should be upset that they might pay the same amount but an indie developer gets to keep more of it?
The proposed policies are pretty straightforward from what I can see. Among other obligations, Apple is not allowed to use or require scare tactics when users are routed to an external payment mechanism and, while it is allowed to charge a steering fee, it is not allowed to count services not used by developers offering third-payments nor double-count for services already accounted for by other developer fees. Also, the CMA calls bullshit on Apple’s claim that third-party payments are particularly risky[…]
Previously:
Update (2026-07-30): Juli Clover:
Apple said new UK App Store rules would give regulators a “highly intrusive” role dictating how it runs its business, reports Reuters. Apple submitted feedback to the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority as it considers forcing Apple to change its App Store rules around steering.
[…]
UK regulators said Apple can charge developers a fee, but it must be fair and reasonable, and below existing App Store commissions, so developers can pass savings to customers or reinvest them in innovation.
According to Apple, the CMA’s proposed rules would undermine innovation and investment, and would amount to price regulation because of the restriction on fees.
The cackhanded pursuit of Net Zero by Ed Miliband and his predecessors has left Britain having to pay France and other countries to take excess power off our hands for a significant part of the year.
The post Net Zero Leaves Britain Paying France to Take Our Power appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
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