The integration of Apple Maps in Ford’s future electric vehicle platform generates discussions of the auto industry picking and choosing technology. The MacVoices Live! panel also examines security risks involving Claude Cowork and exposed shared chats, OpenAI’s dispute with Hugging Face, and the hazards of autonomous AI tools. If that wasn’t enough, selfie-based account recovery puts a new spin on the facial recognition.The panel includes: Chuck Joiner, Web Bixby, Eric Bolden, Marty Jencius, David Ginsburg, Brian Flanigan-Arthurs, Jim Rea, Jeff Gamet, and Mark Fuccio.
Do smart glasses need video recording to be relevant? The MacVoices Live! panel debate the importance of privacy, accessibility, navigation, object recognition, captions, and visual assistance as measures of usefulness. They examine the stigma created by existing smart glasses, the difference between processing and storing images and the public expectations around recording, detection apps, and […]
The panel debates whether giving Claude controlled access to 1Password credentials is a practical automation feature or an unnecessary security risk, weighing trust, passkeys, vault isolation, and AI limitations. The conversation then shifts to the humor of waterproof phone holders and shower tech before wrapping with a discussion of how autonomous vehicles could reshape liability, […]
The MacVoices Live! panel discusses Apple’s updated App Store review guidelines, the challenge of filtering low-quality or AI-generated apps, and whether trusted developers should receive faster review. Chuck Joiner, David Ginsburg, Jim Rea, Marty Jencius, Web Bixby, Jeff Gamet, and Eric Bolden also debate Apple’s Passwords app gaining automatic password-changing abilities, weighing convenience against account-lockout risk. They also provide reactions to Snap’s new Specs and the uncertain future of smart glasses.
Na semana passada, pesquisadores revelaram falhas de segurança nas configurações de proxy da Retransmissão Privada (Private Relay) do iCloud+, que também afetam navegadores baseados no WebKit que utilizam a API 1Application programming interface, ou interface de programação de aplicações. de proxy para privacidade, expondo o endereço IP dos assinantes do serviço. Pois bem, não demorou muito para que surgisse o primeiro processo relacionado ao caso.
A ação coletiva foi movida pelo escritório jurídico Clarkson, que você talvez lembre pelo envolvimento no processo sobre o adiamento dos recursos de inteligência artificial (IA) apresentados durante a WWDC24, o que resultou em um acordo o qual previu o pagamento de US$250 milhões a clientes em dezembro do ano passado.
Como sambemos, a Retransmissão Privada oferece proteção para ocultar o seu endereço IP e dificultar a ciência sobre os seus acessos na web por parte de provedores de internet e terceiros, direcionando o seu tráfego para duas camadas de proteção.
O novo caso menciona o problema na Retransmissão Privada que faz a sua barreira ser burlada nos iOS em qualquer site compatível com as Chaves-senha (Passkeys) — algo que acontece pois o dispositivo do usuário faz uma requisição web fora do próprio navegador sempre que o usuário faz login, ignorando o Private Relay — e acusa a Apple de publicidade enganosa, declarações falsas ou deturpadas e fraude.
[A Apple] sabia, ou deveria saber, que as declarações contestadas eram falsas, enganosas, fraudulentas e ilegais, no momento em que a ré fabricou, comercializou, anunciou, rotulou e vendeu as assinaturas [do iCloud+].
Convidada a comentar o caso pelo 9to5Mac, a Apple ainda não se pronunciou sobre o tema. Tim Giordano, um dos sócios do escritório, por outro lado, disse que a empresa traiu a confiança de usuários “expondo-os ao mesmo rastreamento, criação de perfis e segmentação sobre os quais a Apple os alertava”.
O texto completo da ação coletiva pode ser conferido nesse link [PDF].
Notas de rodapé
1
Application programming interface, ou interface de programação de aplicações.
Last week a researcher outlined what he said was a “novel attack surface” in passkeys, the new authentication paradigm that offers a more secure alternative over password-based methods. In fact, the attacks demonstrated in the post are neither novel nor unique to passkeys. This distinction is important because the research has generated confusion among end users and security professionals as they assess whether this new mechanism is truly safe to use.
The attack is called Pass-ta-key—a blending of the word passkey with the phrase “pass the key” and a nod to a plate of pasta. Arie Olshtein, a researcher at security firm Palo Alto Networks, described in a post last week how Pass-ta-key could obtain all passkeys stored in the Google Password Manager app (GPM) for Windows when it’s running on a machine infected with malware.
This came as a surprise to many people because they believed passkeys are stored exclusively in the trusted platform manager (TPM), the locked-down enclave in a hardened silicon chip that’s reserved for storing cryptographic keys and other highly sensitive information on Windows machines. If passkeys are stored in the TPM, then how was Pass-ta-key able to extract the entire set of passkeys stored by the app, they wanted to know?
Last week, a researcher outlined what he said was a “novel attack surface” in passkeys, the new authentication paradigm that offers a more secure alternative to password-based methods. In fact, the attacks demonstrated in the post are neither novel nor unique to passkeys. This distinction is important because the research has generated confusion among end users and security professionals as they assess whether this new mechanism is truly safe to use.
The attack is called Pass-ta-key—a blending of the word passkey with the phrase “pass the key” and a nod to a plate of pasta. Arie Olshtein, a researcher at security firm Palo Alto Networks, described in a post last week how Pass-ta-key could obtain all passkeys stored in the Google Password Manager app (GPM) for Windows when it’s running on a machine infected with malware.
This came as a surprise to many people because they believed passkeys are stored exclusively in the trusted platform manager (TPM), the locked-down enclave in a hardened silicon chip that’s reserved for storing cryptographic keys and other highly sensitive information on Windows machines. If passkeys are stored in the TPM, then how was Pass-ta-key able to extract the entire set of passkeys stored by the app, they wanted to know.
WebKit-based browsers on iOS and macOS can be configured to route all web traffic through proxy servers, which is how Tor browsers on iOS and our own Psylo work. We found three WebKit features — DNS prefetching, WebAuthn Related Origin Requests, and WebTransport — that bypass the configured proxy and send traffic directly from the device, which exposes the user’s real network. The same leaks also affect Apple’s iCloud Private Relay.
[…]
It must be noted that VPNs are not affected, since they tunnel the device’s entire network traffic at the system level.
[…]
We’ve addressed all three leaks in Psylo 1.3.1[…] Passkeys and WebTransport have legitimate uses, so both can be re-enabled at any time through per-silo toggles. This keeps Psylo leak-free out of the box, while users who need one of these features on a given site can opt in explicitly, with a clear understanding of the trade-off.
In an ideal world, we’d report the issues to Apple, they acknowledge the issue, and ship a fix in a timely manner. Unfortunately, our past experience with Apple tells us that reporting this issue would involve months of delays, inconsistent communication, and in some cases, denying the issue’s impact entirely.
We weren’t willing to wait months, or upwards of a year, sitting on bugs that undermine the core privacy guarantees of Psylo and iOS Tor browsers while saying or doing nothing.
[…]
Should we knowingly leave our users exposed while waiting for a system-level fix? We didn’t think that was acceptable or fair to our users. Or should we quietly ship our own mitigations without telling anyone? We didn’t think that was acceptable either. Security fixes deserve transparency, especially when they involve tradeoffs.
Soon after we published the blog, we sent a link to the blog and demo website to Apple in a security report to make them aware of it. Now the report is already in the status “We’re planning to address the issue you reported.” and a fix is planned for Fall 2026 🤯🤯🤯
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