The reason for CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s recent surprise visit to Moscow hasn’t been officially revealed. However, indications suggest that at least part of the unusual trip was meant to warn the Kremlin against possible provocations targeting NATO.

Given its current situation, the idea that Russia might deliberately pick a fight with NATO right now seems, on its face, absolutely insane.

Moscow has failed to achieve anything close to its original objectives in Ukraine. Its military remains heavily committed there, and Kyiv is increasingly taking the war inside Russia, creating additional economic and political pressure on the Kremlin.

Why the hell would Putin want to pick a fight with NATO now?

For starters, there’s an important distinction between provoking NATO and actually wanting to start a war with it. The former may very well be the objective. The latter is something Putin almost certainly wants to avoid.

A deliberately murky incident designed to test NATO’s political resolve and widen the growing divide between the United States and Europe, however, is a different story.

Take, for example, a Ukrainian-made drone, or a convincing Russian copy, that crosses into Lithuania or Latvia and strikes critical infrastructure or a military target. Polish and Baltic intelligence officials have recently warned that Russia could be gearing up for precisely this kind of false-flag operation.

Whatever form the provocation takes, it only needs to be serious enough that NATO cannot ignore it, but ambiguous enough that its members can’t agree on how to respond. And that’s the point.

​Article 5 says an armed attack against one NATO member is considered an attack against them all. However, it neither requires every member to respond in the same way nor automatically commits the alliance to war. Each ally ultimately determines what action it considers necessary. Critically, the treaty itself does not explicitly define what constitutes an “armed attack.”

Create enough ambiguity over whether that threshold has even been crossed, and suddenly 32 governments are left debating not only what happened, but what they are willing to do about it.

This type of hybrid attack would put Washington in an especially uncomfortable position.

With the Iran crisis still ongoing and the midterm elections just months away, the Trump administration would likely be deeply reluctant to risk a direct military confrontation with Russia over an ambiguous incident—even if European governments were pushing for a stronger response.

That alone will deepen political divisions at home while simultaneously widening the existing rift between Washington and Europe.

For Moscow, that’s a hell of a payoff from a relatively small provocation. And ultimately, driving the U.S. and Europe further apart would very likely be the larger strategic objective.

U.S.-European relations are already under extraordinary strain. But one thing often gets overlooked is that for nearly 80 years, the U.S. has served as much of the political glue holding NATO, and indirectly, the wider European security order, together. That role has never been based solely on America’s military strength.

​The United States occupies a distinct position within NATO as one of only two members—along with Canada—located distinctly outside the European sphere. As an “outside” ally, America is powerful enough to help guarantee European security while remaining geographically removed from the historical rivalries that have repeatedly divided the continent.

​Today, Western Europe and the EU can look like a collection of regional best friends. However, historically, they most definitely were not.

​For centuries, European powers competed over territory, resources, influence and security, often with disastrous consequences. One of the great achievements of the post-WWII order was finally breaking that cycle.

In fact, NATO expressly notes that preventing renewed destructive competition in Europe—including “the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence”—was one of the founding purposes of the post-World War II transatlantic security order.

We shouldn’t assume Europe’s extraordinary period of tranquility and partnership is somehow its natural state or that it would continue indefinitely under radically different security conditions.

That doesn’t mean European countries will suddenly start shooting at each other if the American “glue” substantially weakens. But national interests, regional rivalries and competing security goals could begin to reemerge. And history gives us plenty of reason to take seriously the possibility that renewed political competition in Europe could eventually become military competition.

In the near term, European governments will begin asking whether resources currently devoted to collective security objectives might eventually be needed closer to home.

And that’s where Ukraine comes into the equation.

If European governments become less certain that the United States will guarantee their security, continued support for Ukraine will look very different in their wider strategic calculations.

Britain, France, Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states will still view Russia as a threat. However, they won’t necessarily agree about how limited defense resources should be allocated, which threats are most urgent, or how much risk each country should accept on Ukraine’s behalf.

​The more national security becomes national again, the harder it is to preserve a unified European position.

​​Russia doesn’t have to defeat NATO militarily. It just has to create a situation where NATO cannot agree on what to do.

That strategy exploits a basic reality of international politics that often gets overlooked because we talk about countries as “friends.” Nations don’t have friends in the same way people do. They have allies with shared strategic interests.

Shift those interests, even slightly, and allies can become competitors. Competitors can become rivals. And history has repeatedly shown what can happen when rivalries in Europe are allowed to spiral out of control.

So if Putin believes he can start pulling at the threads holding NATO together without triggering a war, there is every reason to believe he will try.

The most consequential part of any Russian provocation will not be the incident itself, but how NATO chooses to respond.

​Moscow may be betting that distance, domestic politics, and competing national interests can pull the alliance apart. The best answer would be to prove otherwise.

​The Atlantic may physically separate North America from Europe. Still, in today’s interconnected world, geography provides far less insulation from shared threats than it did 77 years ago when NATO was founded.

Whatever disagreements exist between Washington and European capitals, both sides would do well to remember a fundamental strategic reality. Strong allies make each member stronger, and preserving those relationships remains firmly in everyone’s national interest.

Tim McMillan is a retired law enforcement executive, investigative reporter and co-founder of The Debrief. His writing typically focuses on defense, national security, the Intelligence Community and topics related to psychology. You can follow Tim on Twitter: @LtTimMcMillan.  Tim can be reached by email: tim@thedebrief.org or through encrypted email: LtTimMcMillan@protonmail.com 

This week, Romania accused Russia of sending a drone boat loaded with explosives to a vital European natural gas platform in the Black Sea. A Romanian F-16 fighter jet used its cannons to disable the surface drone so that explosive ordnance experts could blow it up safely.

On August 20, the Romanian Coast Guard first spotted the maritime drone a few hundred meters away from the Neptun Deep project’s main drilling platform, where several hundred workers were busy with the platform’s ongoing installation, Defense Minister Radu Miruță said in a Facebook post. The offshore gas project would make Romania the largest gas producer in the European Union once it starts full production in 2027.

To protect the lives of the workers and the offshore gas infrastructure, the Romanian military scrambled two F-16 fighter jets to stop the drone with cannon fire, Miruță said. Army specialists later carried out a controlled detonation, as seen in a Facebook video shared by the defense minister.

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Ukrainian drone teams demolished a brigade of US Army tanks and armored vehicles during a live war game held this year—but the US soldiers were lucky enough to get “respawn” attempts while learning from the experience.

The semiannual military exercise, called Combined Resolve, gave the US military a firsthand taste of how modern drone warfare has evolved on the battlefields of Ukraine. The Ukrainian drone operators participating in the exercise were easily able to spot and destroy US armored vehicles by mimicking the actions of dropping bombs from above or moving close enough to simulate a kamikaze strike, according to US officials and a participant who spoke with The Wall Street Journal.

US armored vehicles were being destroyed so quickly that they were “respawned” and sent back into the simulated fray, a US official told The Wall Street Journal. The US troops who participated in the exercise—held in Germany from April 9 to May 10—were on rotational deployment from Fort Hood, Texas.

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Romanian army divers used explosives to destroy two Russian-made drones found floating in the Black Sea near Romania’s largest natural gas project, according to the NATO member country’s defense minister.

Defense Minister Radu Miruță posted a Facebook video supposedly showing one of the drones being blown up in the water by explosive ordnance disposal divers of the Romanian army on August 11, as reported by Reuters and other news outlets. The drones were first spotted in the water by a ship working in the vicinity of the Neptun Deep—an offshore gas project under development in the Black Sea that will make Romania the largest gas producer in the European Union.

A Romanian Coast Guard ship that responded with army soldiers aboard found two drifting Gerbera-type drones of Russian design along with other debris. Miruță also disclosed that Romania had reached out to “Ukrainian partners who confirmed that the systems do not belong to them.”

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For decades, Washington has assumed that military aid translates into political influence. If the United States provides the weapons, intelligence, training, and diplomatic backing that keep an ally fighting, conventional wisdom suggests it should also have considerable leverage over when, and how, that war ends.

Yet, a sweeping new analysis published by the Brookings Institution and authored by Dr. Dafna Rand, a senior fellow at Brookings, the Federation for American Scientists, and the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that the opposite has increasingly become true.

Whether in Ukraine, Gaza, Yemen, or Afghanistan, the U.S. has repeatedly discovered that sustaining an ally’s war effort is often far easier than steering its ultimate direction. Instead of conclusive victories followed by lasting peace, modern conflicts are increasingly settling into drawn-out stalemates, frozen conflicts, or recurring cycles of violence that resist outside pressure—even from Washington.

Dr. Rand’s report examines one of the defining strategic dilemmas confronting American foreign policy in the 21st century: why the world’s most powerful military and diplomatic actor has struggled to shape the decisions of partners whose war efforts depend heavily on U.S. support.

Drawing on more than 30 interviews with senior American officials involved in decision-making throughout four major conflicts, alongside hundreds of government documents, the analysis shows recurring patterns that appear independent of geography or the adversary involved.

“Wars, whether between or within states, are not ending in the 21st century,” Dr. Rand writes. “Frozen conflicts, on-again-off-again fighting, and stalemates have become the norm.”

Dr. Rand argues that this changing nature of warfare has profoundly changed the assumptions underpinning American security strategy.

Following the costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington increasingly shifted toward supporting partners rather than committing large numbers of U.S. troops directly to combat. The expectation was that supplying allies with military assistance would provide the United States with considerable influence over battlefield strategy and political consequences.

Instead, Dr. Rand says that American leverage consistently diminishes as conflicts drag on.

One of the study’s central conclusions is that Washington and its partners frequently begin wars without agreeing on what victory actually means. At the outset of each conflict examined—including Ukraine’s defense against Russia, Israel’s campaign against Hamas, the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, and America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan—American and partner governments shared broad objectives, though often failed to establish detailed political end states.

That omission, Dr. Rand argues, becomes increasingly costly as wars continue.

Early battlefield success frequently encourages partners to pursue more ambitious goals than originally envisioned. At the same time, Washington gradually becomes more interested in negotiated settlements as financial costs mount, domestic political support declines, and wider strategic priorities begin competing for attention.

According to Dr. Rand, many officials interviewed expressed regret that these conversations about political objectives, postwar governance, and acceptable settlement terms did not occur before military campaigns gained momentum.

The report also highlights an uncomfortable reality of modern alliances. Although the United States provides enormous military assistance, it does not exercise command over allied governments or their armed forces. As a result, disagreements naturally emerge over strategy, operational design, and acceptable risks.

Ukraine provides one of the clearest examples. Initially, Washington and Kyiv shared an overriding objective of preventing Russia from conquering the country. However, over time, American officials became increasingly divided over whether continued fighting or eventual negotiations better served long-term U.S. interests.

Some officials viewed prolonging the conflict as strategically beneficial because it weakened Russia’s military while strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Others believed diplomatic attempts should have begun earlier, particularly after Ukraine’s battlefield gains in 2022 created what they viewed as an opportunity to negotiate from a stronger position.

Dr. Rand notes that internal disagreements within the U.S. government complicated communication with Ukrainian leaders, in particular regarding expectations for territorial objectives and the role military offensives were intended to play in eventually creating conditions for diplomacy.

The Gaza conflict exposed a different, but related, collection of challenges.

Following Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attacks, President Joe Biden’s administration moved rapidly to reassure Israel of unshakable American support while simultaneously urging restraint based on lessons learned from America’s own post-9/11 military campaigns.

Dr. Rand concludes that Israeli leaders largely heard the reassurances while failing to fully internalize Washington’s accompanying warnings about civilian casualties, operational design, and the long-term strategic consequences of an extended campaign.

As the war progressed, American officials increasingly concluded that humanitarian concerns and mounting civilian casualties were not exclusively moral issues but strategic ones as well, arguing that prolonged destruction could ultimately strengthen Hamas’ long-term recruitment and undermine Israel’s own security objectives.

Despite this growing divergence, the report suggests Washington hesitated to use its available leverage aggressively, partly because of domestic political sensitivities surrounding support for Israel.

Another recurring finding centers on American public opinion.

Support for allies often begins overwhelmingly strong immediately after major attacks or invasions. But that support steadily erodes as wars lengthen, casualties mount, humanitarian problems increase, or questions come up regarding the conduct of partner governments.

Dr. Rand says this pattern appears across Yemen, Afghanistan, Gaza, and, increasingly, Ukraine.

Importantly, she argues this erosion can occur even when Americans continue believing the underlying cause remains just. Instead, fatigue over prolonged commitments, concerns about costs, or doubts regarding the likelihood of decisive success gradually reshape political calculations in Washington.

Those changing domestic dynamics, in turn, reduce America’s leverage abroad.

Once congressional debates begin questioning military assistance or public enthusiasm declines, allied governments recognize that Washington’s ability to maintain long-term support has become less certain.

Dr. Rand argues this weakens American bargaining power precisely when policymakers most need it.

Among the study’s most significant recommendations is that future administrations should treat leverage as a rapidly diminishing resource.

Rather than assuming influence will expand alongside continued military assistance, Dr. Rand contends the opposite usually occurs. The strongest opportunity to shape an ally’s political objectives exists during the opening weeks of conflict, before battlefield realities, domestic politics, and diverging national interests begin pulling partners in different directions.

To address this, the report proposes forming formal “security contracts,” or a memorandum of understanding, early in future conflicts that clearly define shared political objectives, expected end states, standards for humanitarian conduct, and mechanisms for periodically reassessing strategy.

Dr. Rand also recommends keeping consistent communication across the entire U.S. national security apparatus, warning that mixed signals from different agencies make it easier for partners to ignore American advice or exploit disagreements inside Washington.

Perhaps most notably, the report argues that future administrations should not focus solely on influencing allies. Even in conflicts involving close partners, Washington should simultaneously pursue diplomatic means with adversaries whenever possible, recognizing that negotiated settlements often require engaging both sides rather than relying exclusively on pressure directed at friendly governments.

Ultimately, the analysis shows that the challenge confronting U.S. policymakers goes beyond any single conflict. As interstate wars, civil wars, and proxy wars become increasingly protracted, America’s ability to translate military assistance into political influence may continue shrinking unless it fundamentally rethinks how partnerships are managed from the very beginning of a war.

“The United States must be brutally honest with its partners,” Dr. Rand writes. “The United States must recognize that pressuring its partners to end wars will get harder, not easier, as time passes and the partner grows better able to resist U.S. pressure.”

Study: Dr. Dafna H. Rand, Why can’t the United States end allies’ wars?, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy at Brookings (2026).

Tim McMillan is a retired law enforcement executive, investigative reporter and co-founder of The Debrief. His writing typically focuses on defense, national security, the Intelligence Community and topics related to psychology. You can follow Tim on Twitter: @LtTimMcMillan.  Tim can be reached by email: tim@thedebrief.org or through encrypted email: LtTimMcMillan@protonmail.com 

In the latest twist on battlefield innovations, Ukraine has used both flying drone carriers and drone boats to send ground robots armed with weapons or explosives into battle.

The drone-assisted deployments have enabled slower wheeled robots to bypass tough terrain and Russian defenses, and to carry out an unusual robotic amphibious assault on a contested position. Such tactics also showcase the Ukrainian military’s ongoing experimentation with using drones and robots to offset a Russian military advantage in manpower while also sparing Ukrainian soldiers from making dangerous assaults.

On July 19, a Russian military Telegram channel posted a video showing a Ukrainian hexacopter drone carrying a ground robot suspended below by a cable, according to the Ukrainian government-run news platform United24. The Russian Telegram channel described the Ukrainian heavy bomber drone as deploying a four-wheeled ARK-1 robot armed with explosive anti-tank mines on the ground where it continued toward Russian military positions—and apparently generated plenty of outraged comments from pro-Kremlin social media users.

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By any historical measure, the human cost of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has entered unprecedented territory. Now, a new analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimates that Russia has suffered roughly 1.4 million battlefield casualties, including as many as 450,000 deaths, since launching its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

If accurate, those losses not only dwarf those sustained by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and Russia’s wars in Chechnya—they exceed the combined military fatalities Russia and the Soviet Union suffered in every conflict since the end of the Second World War.

​More striking, researchers estimate that Russia’s battlefield losses have become increasingly lopsided relative to Ukraine’s, with the casualty ratio climbing from roughly two or three Russian casualties for every Ukrainian casualty during much of the war to nearly eight-to-one during the first half of 2026.

​CSIS estimates Ukraine has suffered between 525,000 and 625,000 battlefield casualties, including between 125,000 and 150,000 fatalities, since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Combined, the report finds, Russian and Ukrainian battlefield casualties have now exceeded 2 million.

​The evidence shows that while Moscow continues to push offensive operations, it is doing so at an increasingly staggering human cost.

The report, Russian Blood and Treasure: The Ballooning Costs of Putin’s War, examines battlefield casualties, fatalities, territorial gains, rates of advance, and more than 20,000 documented Ukrainian strikes against Russian targets.

Rather than relying on anecdotal assessments, the researchers compiled numerous datasets to evaluate how Russia’s military campaign has evolved over more than four years of fighting. Their conclusion: although Russia continues to wage war, its battlefield performance has deteriorated while the costs in manpower have reached historic levels.

“Russian battlefield costs continue to mount, with as many as 450,000 battlefield deaths and 1.4 million casualties between February 2022 and June 2026,” researchers write. “These rates are astounding.”

Those numbers place the war in a category unlike virtually any other conflict fought by a major military power since 1945.

According to the report, Russia’s estimated fatalities in Ukraine are more than four times greater than all U.S. military deaths in every war combined since World War II, including Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf War.

The report estimates that the United States has suffered approximately 102,000 combat fatalities across every major conflict fought over the past 80 years since World War II. Russia, by comparison, is estimated to have suffered as many as 450,000 battlefield deaths in Ukraine alone in just over four years.

The comparison is even more extraordinary when viewed through Russia’s own military history. The Soviet Union lost an estimated 14,000 to 16,000 troops during its decade-long war in Afghanistan. Russia’s First and Second Chechen Wars claimed between 12,000 and 25,000 military fatalities.

​Even when combined with every other Soviet and Russian military intervention since 1950—including Georgia, Syria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and earlier fighting in Ukraine before 2022—the total remains dramatically below the losses estimated in the current war.

​According to the CSIS analysis, Russian battlefield deaths in Ukraine are now more than nine times greater than all Soviet and Russian military fatalities in other conflicts since World War II combined.

Significantly, the casualty imbalance between Russia and Ukraine continues to widen.

For much of the conflict, researchers estimate Russia suffered between two and three casualties for every Ukrainian casualty. However, by early 2026, that ratio had nearly quadrupled to approximately 8:1, reflecting mounting Russian losses while Ukraine increasingly leveraged defensive positions and new technologies to inflict disproportionate damage.

​Combined, both sides have now endured more than two million casualties, underscoring the extraordinary scale of Europe’s largest land war since World War II.

The report identifies several reasons for Russia’s escalating losses. Russian commanders have increasingly relied on attritional tactics that send small, often poorly trained infantry squads forward to probe Ukrainian positions, supported by artillery, glide bombs, first-person-view drones, and armored vehicles.

If Ukrainian defenders reveal their positions by opening fire, those locations are identified, mapped, and then targeted with artillery, FPV drones, and glide bombs before additional Russian forces press the attack.

According to the report, the strategy has inflicted staggering casualties while producing only incremental territorial gains.

Ukraine, meanwhile, has spent years constructing dense defensive belts consisting of trenches, minefields, anti-tank obstacles known as “dragon’s teeth,” artillery positions, and increasingly sophisticated drone networks.

​According to the report, the battlefield has effectively become a vast “kill zone” stretching roughly 12 to 25 miles from the front, where soldiers and vehicles are under near-constant surveillance from drones capable of detecting and directing attacks against almost any movement.

​Estimates cited in the report suggest that more than 90 percent of Russian casualties may now result from drone attacks rather than traditional infantry engagements, showing how unmanned systems have radically changed the battlefield.

​AI-enabled drones capable of autonomous target identification and terminal guidance provide further increased Ukraine’s defensive advantages while reducing the effectiveness of Russian electronic warfare.

Critically, this tremendous human cost has not translated into rapid military gains.

CSIS found that Russian offensives around key cities such as Kostiantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Sloviansk have advanced at average rates of only about 55 to 100 yards per day—roughly half the length of a football field on a good day and among the slowest offensive rates recorded in modern warfare.

​The researchers compare these advances to the infamous Battle of the Somme during World War I, one of history’s most attritional campaigns, while noting that Russia’s early invasion advances in 2022 moved between 30 and 100 times faster than current operations.

Perhaps even more telling, the report notes that Russia’s territorial gains have begun moving in the opposite direction. After years of incremental advances, Russian-controlled territory actually shrank during April and May 2026, marking the first monthly net territorial losses since 2024. Ukrainian counteroffensives reclaimed roughly 155 square miles during the spring, suggesting Russia’s immense expenditure of manpower is producing diminishing strategic returns.

The staggering casualty figures raise questions about Russia’s ability to sustain its current strategy indefinitely.

Researchers estimate Russia is currently suffering between 30,000 and 34,000 battlefield casualties each month, while recruiting roughly 27,000 new soldiers monthly. If those estimates are accurate, Moscow may now be losing personnel faster than it can replace them, continuing to strain an already strained wartime economy.

Despite these staggering losses, the report concludes that neither side appears close to military collapse. Russia retains considerable manpower reserves and continues operating a wartime economy capable of sustaining prolonged combat.

In a June 28 speech to the ruling United Russia Party Congress, Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to project strength, insisting that Russia had the resources, political will, and national unity needed to pursue the war. He also rejected the idea that Western pressure could force a strategic defeat, claiming Ukrainian forces were retreating across the front, and framing Russian victory as equally inevitable and essential to the country’s core interests.

Ukraine, meanwhile, has demonstrated an ability to impose disproportionate costs through defensive tactics, long-range strikes, and rapidly evolving drone technologies that continue to reshape modern warfare.

Ultimately, this suggests the war remains locked in a brutal contest of attrition with no clear military end in sight. Although both sides continue adapting their tactics and technologies, neither has demonstrated the ability to achieve a decisive breakthrough.

As long as the conflict continues under these conditions, the report suggests the human toll—already unprecedented in post-World War II Europe—is likely to continue climbing, with both Russia and Ukraine facing the prospect of hundreds of thousands more casualties before the fighting ultimately ends.

“The war in Ukraine heavily favors the defender, a dynamic that has frustrated Russian offensives but also constrained Ukrainian counterattacks,” researchers write. “As the data in this analysis shows, Russia’s progress on the battlefield has been historically poor, with Russian casualties, fatalities, and average rates of advance among the worst of any major power in any war since World War II.”

Tim McMillan is a retired law enforcement executive, investigative reporter and co-founder of The Debrief. His writing typically focuses on defense, national security, the Intelligence Community and topics related to psychology. You can follow Tim on Twitter: @LtTimMcMillan.  Tim can be reached by email: tim@thedebrief.org or through encrypted email: LtTimMcMillan@protonmail.com