Troy E. Meink’s comments were the first public acknowledgment of American weapons in orbit. The Pentagon has been preparing for potential conflict in space with Russia or China.
L’intelligence artificielle ne se contente plus d’assister les hackers, elle leur permet désormais d’automatiser une grande partie de leurs attaques. Une évolution qui change profondément le rapport de force entre cybercriminels et défenseurs, et qui pourrait rendre les méthodes de protection...
Although the new simulations focus on orbital adjustments to extend observation times and increase proximity to U.S. satellites, including critical missile warning and other space defense-oriented systems, Chinese scientists also plan to integrate reinforcement learning methods into future space assets to give satellites even more independence from human operators.
Study Includes Accusations of Cold War in Space Activities
In the 20th century, the concept of war in space remained mostly in the realm of science fiction, as depicted in popular films like Star Wars. Today, advances in space access, orbital maneuvering technologies, and weapons systems have made the possibility of a future conflict in space a very real security concern, and several nations engage in espionage using reconnaissance spacecraft to obtain information on valuable defense targets in Earth’s orbit.
According to the authors of the new study, “acquiring multi-aspect payload information of non-cooperative targets to infer their functions and mission statuses is of great significance for space security assessment.”
The study authors highlight a series of relative motion configurations that modern spy satellites employ, including fly-around, hovering, and drifting flight. They also point to real-world “adversarial” U.S missions they suggest were designed to gather intelligence on their GEO defense assets.
“Since 2014, the US GSSAP (United States Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program) satellite has carried out hundreds of maneuvers and has conducted close observation operations on dozens of normally working satellites near GEO orbit,” the Beijing University of Technology scientists write.
The study authors also include a specific July 2021 accusation, where they charge that “the U.S. satellite ‘USA-271’ deliberately approached the operational ‘Practice 20’ satellite in geostationary orbit and flew in close proximity.”
In an email to The Debrief, a U.S. Space Command Spokesperson did not address the specific incident or the accusations of “dozens” of similar operations, but offered some insight into the agency’s thinking.
“USSPACECOM, working with allies and partners, plans, executes, and integrates military spacepower into multi-domain global operations in order to deter aggression, defend national interests, and when necessary, defeat threats,” the spokesperson told The Debrief, adding that “we have nothing additional to add in response to the article.”
Getting Closer to Adversarial Satellites and Extending Observation Time
In a step toward potential dogfights between satellites, the Chinese scientists looked at several challenges faced by current spy satellites.
For example, they explain, since most spacecraft observation cameras are mounted in a fixed position, “frequent large-angle attitude maneuvers are time-consuming and consume substantial fuel.” The researcher also noted that several different angles and approaches could yield different categories of intelligence data.
However, changing angles and orbital planes requires fuel, an extremely limited resource in GEO. Therefore, the researcher accounting for all the variables required to gather intelligence on adversarial spacecraft as efficiently as possible “has become a key bottleneck in enhancing space situational awareness capabilities.”
To find an optimized solution, the team designed what they called a “waypoint trajectory planning scheme” and a “multi-impulse maneuver strategy” using a common game-theory tool called “minimum integral squared control” theory. Unlike previous research aimed at extending spy satellite observation time and fuel efficiency, the Chinese scientists said their use of sequential coalition game theory “is introduced for the first time into the multi-model combined observation problem.”
Next, the researchers designed a “game tree.” A press release said this approach lets the spacecraft select the “optimal combination of initial motion points and close-range operation models at each stage under minimum fuel constraints, thereby generating an optimal observation strategy sequence.”
Finally, the researchers ran simulations to see whether their approach improved sensor observation times and field of view while reducing fuel use.
Successful Simulations and Future Reinforcement Learning Plans
As hoped, the Beijing University of Technology team said their simulations supported the theories. Specifically, the study authors said the simulations showed that their spacecraft efficiency algorithm “can successfully generate a multi-model combined observation strategy sequence under minimum fuel constraints.”
“The effective observation time increases with larger observation distances and field-of-view angles, and reducing the model configuration size also contributes to improved observation performance,” they explained. The study authors also said that the simulation results “demonstrate that the algorithm can successfully generate the optimal combined observation sequence under minimum fuel constraints.”
When discussing next steps, the Chinese scientists said they will explore optimal initial points to further improve maneuver efficiency. They also plan to explore a “reinforcement learning method,” suggesting future spacecraft could learn and adapt to evolving conditions to further enhance their cold war in space information-gathering capabilities.
Study’s War in Space Implications “Extends Beyond any Single Algorithm”
To understand the potential implications of the Chinese study, including its impacts on a potential future war in space, The Debrief reached out to former U.S. Air Force officer Shelli Brunswick, CEO and Founder, SB Global LLC.
According to the author and futurist, the Chinese team’s research matters not just because it proves China has deployed a “new operational surveillance capability.” Instead, Brunswick said that the work is significant because it “illustrates how sophisticated coordination and optimization could make spacecraft observation more efficient, persistent, and strategically useful.”
The Blue Marble Space Visiting Scholar also told The Debrief that the work “should not be interpreted as demonstrating a complete pursuit-and-evasion capability against a spacecraft that is actively responding,” since the work assumes a stationary target without maneuvering capabilities. Still, Brunswick noted, the Chinese framework “shows how game-theoretic planning could help an observing satellite gather information from multiple angles while managing limited resources.”
When discussing the potential implications for the broader U.S.-China space-security competition, including how such enhanced spacecraft could lead to more activities that could be construed as hostile, the space strategist said this area of research “extends beyond any single algorithm.”
“As rendezvous and proximity operations become more sophisticated, the line between inspection, space situational awareness, intelligence gathering, and potentially threatening behavior becomes increasingly difficult to interpret,” she explained.
When suggesting what potential strategic responses the U.S. and its allies might employ in the emerging cold war in space, Brunswick told The Debrief that they should include “more resilient architectures, improved space-domain awareness, clearer expectations for close approaches, stronger communication mechanisms, and deeper coordination with commercial and international partners.”
“The challenge is not simply detecting another spacecraft—it is understanding capability and intent early enough to respond responsibly and effectively,” Brunswick explained.
Christopher Plain has spent the last six years as Associate News Editor and Head Science Reporter at The Debrief. Follow and connect with him on X, learn about his novels at plainfiction.com, or email him at christopher@thedebrief.org.
The US Army has authorized its first production contract for a directed energy weapons system designed to take down uncrewed threats with high-energylasers.
Designed under the Enduring High Energy Laser program (E-HEL), the LOCUST X3 laser counter-drone system weapon dramatically reduces the cost of taking out threats like adversarial drones compared with expensive kinetic missile systems. AeroVironment, Inc., of Albuquerque, New Mexico, will produce the new laser weapons for the U.S. Army.
The move marks a major step toward turning what was once a science-fiction trope into a battlefield reality alongside AI, drones, and other advanced technologies.
America’s Laser Weapon
“This first-of-its-kind directed energy program will enable our formations to defeat unmanned systems and dominate from the outset. Pairing human ingenuity with advanced technology is what ensures our Army will continue to outpace America’s adversaries,” stated General Christopher LaNeve, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
LOCUST X3 draws electrical energy from a magazine to produce the system’s high-energy beam. The system’s power supply then regenerates that magazine, preparing it for further action. This means that, on a per-shot basis, the system is far cheaper to operate than kinetic weapons like missiles, which are expended when fired.
As a result, countering the growing threat posed by uncrewed aerial vehicles could become considerably less economically burdensome. The technology could also help mitigate logistics and supply challenges, which have become a major concern amid the U.S.-Iran war as reports of dangerously low missile stockpiles continue to emerge.
Across Varying Battlefields
“The key to successfully countering all levels of drones is a layered defense of sensors and effectors. AV and the Army have worked for years to develop directed energy solutions, and we are proud to give our soldiers a decisive edge against drone threats,” said the Honorable Mike Obadal, Under Secretary of the Army.
The E-HEL system is designed to be modular, with 11 major interfaces allowing it to be integrated with a variety of platforms and vehicles. With this flexibility, the system can be deployed at permanent installations, temporary bases, and aboard mobile vehicles. Its design also allows for ongoing upgrades as the technology improves. According to U.S. Army Public Affairs, this modular approach will allow LOCUST X3 to be quickly integrated and used across a wide variety of operations.
Making the Laser Weapon a Reality
The contract to develop the systems is valued at $465 million.
“The E-HEL program is an example of how the Army has successfully utilized MOSA, a key element of acquisition reform, as part of our efforts to field technology quickly with an interface to upgrade in the future,” said the Honorable Brent Ingraham, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology and Army Acquisition Executive. “Directed energy weapons have been considered S&T projects, and I’m proud that the Army is moving at speed and scale to deliver this first time capability,” he concluded.
Moving beyond its origins as an expensive laboratory technology, the E-HEL program is bringing laser weapons closer to widespread practical use. According to the Army, the system is scalable and affordable enough for broad integration, with dozens expected to be delivered annually. No longer relegated to testing, the Army is now working to integrate the system across the force, ensuring units will be prepared to deploy it against uncrewed aerial threats once it arrives.
Ryan Whalen covers science and technology for The Debrief. He holds an MA in History and a Master of Library and Information Science with a certificate in Data Science. He can be contacted at ryan@thedebrief.org, and follow him on Twitter @mdntwvlf.
On January 23, 1961, a pair of thermonuclear bombs fell from the sky near Goldsboro, North Carolina. Neither of the weapons was dropped by a foreign adversary—they belonged to the United States, and in a remarkable series of events, they were dropped over American soil after the B-52 carrying them broke apart in midair.
The sobering circumstances that unfolded on that date were just one of several “Broken Arrow” incidents—accidents involving nuclear weapons that, in several cases, demonstrated how catastrophe could arise not from an enemy attack, but from mechanical failure, human error, and chance.
Goldsboro was neither the first nor the last nuclear weapons accident on American soil. More than six decades later, the incident remains a sobering artifact of the Cold War and a reminder of the extraordinary risks that accompanied keeping nuclear-armed aircraft continuously ready for war.
Nuclear Incident Over North Carolina
Early 1961 was a hard time for the B-52 bomber, with several crashes occurring across the United States. Most of these, and even the brief grounding of all B-52s, were minor news stories at the time. Outside the local area, sources like the New York Times gave only brief coverage of what happened in Goldsboro on January 23, 1961. However, the Goldsboro News-Argus placed a dark image of the twisted, flaming wreckage on its front page the next morning, and its ongoing coverage provided some of the only detailed records of how the public viewed the crash. What they didn’t know nearly killed them.
Part of the 4241st Strategic Wing under Strategic Air Command, the B-52G Stratofortress was armed with two Mark 39 hydrogen bombs and flying out of Goldsboro’s Seymour Johnson Air Force Base. Its nighttime flight was part of Strategic Air Command’s round-the-clock alert operations. Following an aerial refueling over the Atlantic, the plane began leaking fuel. This led to a dramatic midair breakup 11 hours into the flight, so spectacular that a night watchman eight miles away reported seeing sparks coming off the stricken plane.
During the crash, centrifugal forces became so great that they pulled a lanyard connected to the release mechanism of one of the bombs. This accidental twist of physics armed the bomb as it fell toward Earth.
A U.S. Air Force photo of the crash site in 1961 (Image Credit: USAF)
Nuclear Response in Goldsboro
The plane crashed only a few hundred feet from the home of the Tyndall family, who described the event as looking “like the whole world was on fire.” Homes for miles around shook from the force of the impact. In the mad dash to reach the crash site, one military police officer was involved in a car accident, adding one more bit of destruction.
The Stratofortress, with its 185-foot wingspan, was an enormous plane, and it left behind a massive debris field. The burning wreckage quickly drew not only about one hundred Air Force personnel but also the state highway patrol, local sheriffs, and the fire department. Onlookers attempted to gain access to the site but were held back by military police warning of a potential radioactivity threat. This would be the only time for decades that the military would concede that the crash posed a nuclear danger.
It took seven hours to find the last survivor, one of only three from the eight-man crew aboard the Stratofortress.
After most of the wreckage was hauled away, the Air Force continued excavating the area to recover every piece of the plane and even turned to the public for help locating a lost ejector seat. These continued searches fueled a wave of rumors that the Air Force was looking for missing nuclear weapons and that the town might be evacuated. What the military called “routine” water tests did little to assuage some residents’ fears that they were in danger from whatever had come down. By late February, the Air Force was issuing official denials that anything was amiss in Goldsboro.
Historical image of U.S. Air Force personnel working to retrieve components of an Mk-39, one of the two nuclear bombs that fell near Goldsboro, NC, in 1961 (Image Credit: USAF)
Soviet Propaganda
At a time of rising Cold War tensions, the USSR did not let the American crisis go to waste. Soviet propagandists employed “Moscow Molly,” a mysterious figure of the Soviet propaganda machine. Speaking in unaccented English between broadcasts of popular American music, Moscow Molly delivered messages designed to demoralize American, British, and Canadian soldiers. She would sometimes disconcert soldiers on lonely and remote bases by directing messages specifically at them, using personal information reportedly obtained by the Soviet intelligence apparatus. Several women likely played the role of Moscow Molly, but their identities have never come to light.
By January 24, just a day after the event, Moscow Molly was broadcasting over Radio Moscow that the United States hadn’t just inadvertently dropped a bomb on Goldsboro, but that it had gone off, claiming that locals were “incensed.” Soviet propagandists did not stop there, reportedly using ham radio operators to beam the broadcasts into the United States as well.
Their efforts attracted little notice in the United States. The Goldsboro Kiwanis Club drafted an official rebuttal statement to be read over the U.S.-backed broadcaster Radio Free Europe, stating that “The people of Goldsboro are stronger than ever in their belief that the Air Force is a good friend and neighbor.” This statement may have been more than mere propaganda, as hundreds of people attended the funerals of the deceased airmen, demonstrating how the community rallied in the aftermath of the event.
Nuclear Secrets Revealed
The story of rumors, propaganda, and community spirit stood still for decades as the United States continually denied that there had ever been a nuclear close call on US soil. Journalist Eric Schlosser overturned that story while researching his 2013 book Command and Control. One of his Freedom of Information Act requests turned up a document with the rather lengthy title Goldsboro Revisited or How I Learned to Mistrust the H-Bomb or To Set the Record Straight. The title’s parody reference to the film Dr. Strangelove perhaps makes its content even more eerie and surreal.
Sandia Laboratories nuclear weapons safety supervisor Parker F. Jones wrote the report in 1969. In it, he revealed that one of the bombs—the weapon that separated from the aircraft and descended by parachute before becoming entangled in a tree—had come disturbingly close to detonating. The weapon incorporated multiple safety mechanisms intended to prevent an unintended nuclear detonation. When investigators examined it, they found that several steps in its arming sequence had occurred, leaving one crucial low-voltage switch preventing the sequence from proceeding further.
Each Mark 39 carried a yield of several megatons, making the weapons vastly more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Japan at the end of World War II. Had one successfully detonated, the immediate destruction would have been catastrophic, while radioactive fallout could potentially have affected areas far beyond Goldsboro.
History often balances on the head of a pin, and this remarkable close call is just one of many such occurrences in the history of nuclear weapons.
Ryan Whalen covers science and technology for The Debrief. He holds an MA in History and a Master of Library and Information Science with a certificate in Data Science. He can be contacted at ryan@thedebrief.org, and follow him on Twitter @mdntwvlf.
The reason for CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s recent surprise visit to Moscow hasn’t been officially revealed. However, indications suggest that at least part of the unusual trip was meant to warn the Kremlinagainst possible provocations targeting NATO.
Given its current situation, the idea thatRussia might deliberately pick a fight with NATO right now seems, on its face, absolutely insane.
Moscow has failed to achieve anything close to its original objectives in Ukraine. Its military remains heavily committed there, and Kyiv is increasingly taking the warinside Russia, creating additional economic and political pressure on the Kremlin.
Why the hell would Putin want to pick a fight withNATOnow?
For starters, there’s an important distinction between provoking NATOand actually wanting to start a war with it. The former may very well be the objective. The latter is something Putin almost certainly wants to avoid.
A deliberately murky incident designed to test NATO’s political resolve and widen the growing divide between the United States and Europe, however, is a different story.
Take, for example, a Ukrainian-made drone, or a convincing Russian copy, that crosses into Lithuania or Latvia and strikes critical infrastructure or a military target. Polish and Baltic intelligence officials have recently warned that Russia could be gearing up for precisely this kind of false-flag operation.
Whatever form the provocation takes, it only needs to be serious enough that NATOcannot ignore it, but ambiguous enough that its members can’t agree on how to respond. And that’s the point.
Article 5 says an armed attack against one NATO member is considered an attack against them all. However, it neither requires every member to respond in the same way nor automatically commits the alliance to war. Each ally ultimately determines what action it considers necessary. Critically, the treaty itself does not explicitly define what constitutes an “armed attack.”
Create enough ambiguity over whether that threshold has even been crossed, and suddenly 32 governments are left debating not only what happened, but what they are willing to do about it.
This type of hybrid attackwould put Washington in an especially uncomfortable position.
With the Iran crisisstill ongoing and the midterm elections just months away, the Trump administration would likely be deeply reluctant to risk a direct military confrontation with Russia over an ambiguous incident—even if European governments were pushing for a stronger response.
That alone will deepen political divisions at home while simultaneously widening the existing rift between Washington and Europe.
For Moscow, that’s a hell of a payoff from a relatively small provocation. And ultimately, driving the U.S. and Europe further apart would very likely be the larger strategic objective.
U.S.-European relations are already under extraordinary strain. But one thing often gets overlooked is that for nearly 80 years, the U.S. has served as much of the political glue holding NATO, and indirectly, the wider European security order, together. That role has never been based solely on America’s military strength.
The United States occupies a distinct position within NATO as one of only two members—along with Canada—located distinctly outside the European sphere. As an “outside” ally, America is powerful enough to help guarantee European security while remaining geographically removed from the historical rivalries that have repeatedly divided the continent.
Today, Western Europe and the EU can look like a collection of regional best friends. However, historically, they most definitely were not.
For centuries, European powers competed over territory, resources, influence and security, often with disastrous consequences. One of the great achievements of the post-WWII order was finally breaking that cycle.
In fact, NATO expressly notes that preventing renewed destructive competition in Europe—including “the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence”—was one of the founding purposes of the post-World War II transatlantic security order.
We shouldn’t assume Europe’s extraordinary period of tranquility and partnership is somehow its natural state or that it would continue indefinitely under radically different security conditions.
That doesn’t mean European countries will suddenly start shooting at each other if the American “glue” substantially weakens. But national interests, regional rivalries and competing security goals could begin to reemerge. And history gives us plenty of reason to take seriously the possibility that renewed political competition in Europe could eventually become military competition.
In the near term, European governments will begin asking whether resources currently devoted to collective security objectives might eventually be needed closer to home.
If European governments become less certain that the United States will guarantee their security, continued support for Ukraine will look very different in their wider strategic calculations.
Britain, France, Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states will still view Russia as a threat. However, they won’t necessarily agree about how limited defense resources should be allocated, which threats are most urgent, or how much risk each country should accept on Ukraine’s behalf.
The more national security becomes national again, the harder it is to preserve a unified European position.
Russia doesn’t have to defeat NATO militarily. It just has to create a situation where NATO cannot agree on what to do.
That strategy exploits a basic reality of international politics that often gets overlooked because we talk about countries as “friends.” Nations don’t have friends in the same way people do. They have allies with shared strategic interests.
Shift those interests, even slightly, and allies can become competitors. Competitors can become rivals. And history has repeatedly shown what can happen when rivalries in Europe are allowed to spiral out of control.
So if Putin believes he can start pulling at the threads holding NATO together without triggering a war, there is every reason to believe he will try.
The most consequential part of any Russian provocation will not be the incident itself, but how NATO chooses to respond.
Moscow may be betting that distance, domestic politics, and competing national interests can pull the alliance apart. The best answer would be to prove otherwise.
The Atlantic may physically separate North America from Europe. Still, in today’s interconnected world, geography provides far less insulation from shared threats than it did 77 years ago when NATO was founded.
Whatever disagreements exist between Washington and European capitals, both sides would do well to remember a fundamental strategic reality. Strong allies make each member stronger, and preserving those relationships remains firmly in everyone’s national interest.
Tim McMillan is a retired law enforcement executive, investigative reporter and co-founder of The Debrief. His writing typically focuses on defense, national security, the Intelligence Community and topics related to psychology. You can follow Tim on Twitter:@LtTimMcMillan. Tim can be reached by email: tim@thedebrief.org or through encrypted email:LtTimMcMillan@protonmail.com
Private space launch services company Rocket Lab has unveiled its GHOST (Global Hypersonic & Orbital Spaceport Technology) self-contained mobile launch system, capable of placing payloads in orbit or enabling suborbital launches from virtually anywhere on Earth.
Designed to accommodate the company’s Electron and HASTE rockets, the company said GHOST’s “launch-anywhere, launch-anytime” capability can support multi-launch flight campaigns for commercial applications. Rocket Lab said the system’s versatility also offers benefits for “critical” national security missions.
GHOST Private Space Launch System Fits Into Standard Shipping Containers
Now, Rocket Lab says the company has created an all-in-one launch solution called GHOST that can accommodate rocket launches from seemingly anywhere.
For example, when announcing the formal unveiling of GHOST, the company said the entire system can be packaged in standard shipping containers. This includes all the hardware to launch complete rockets and the ground support infrastructure needed to complete single-launch missions or multi-launch campaigns.
Perhaps most critically, the system can be shipped to any destination for customized launch services worldwide. If the already scheduled real-world inaugural launches prove the claims, that launch-location versatility could give Rocket Lab a technological edge over its private space launch competitors.
Two New Alaska Launch Pads Will Provide the System its First Real-World Test
When unveiling GHOST, Rocket Lab also announced its first launch site. Dubbed Rocket Lab Complex 4, GHOST’s new home will be at the Pacific Spaceport Complex at Kodiak, Alaska. The company said this inaugural site will include two distinct launch pads for “high-frequency launch campaigns.”
The new site will join the already operational Launch Complex 1 in New Zealand and Launch Complexes 2 and 3 in Virginia. The company said that taken together, Rocket Lab now controls six total launch pads “across two hemispheres.” Along with its reported mobility, the company emphasized GHOST’s ability to accommodate both Electron and HASTE.
“GHOST delivers a dual-launch capability across new locations, allowing Rocket Lab to expand the mission profiles of both vehicles and meet increasing international demand for orbital and suborbital sovereign launch capability,” the company explained.
Rocket Lab also said that the mobile launch platform is “purpose-built to support responsive launch needs and time-critical national security missions, enabling rapid site activation and simultaneous launch possibilities.”
The company expects to conduct its first GHOST-supported launch from Launch Complex 4 in 2027, including launches announced in July for the U.S. Space Force.
“The size and scale of this contract reflects the Space Force’s confidence in our ability to meet their urgent national security demands with speed, responsiveness, and scale, and we’re proud to provide the high-frequency launch capacity required to keep the U.S. ahead of global threats,” company CEO Sir Peter Beck said at the time of the announcement.
“Leading the Field in Small Launch for Missile Defense and National Security”
After noting that Rocket Lab has been “leading the field in small launch for missile defense and national security for years,” Sir Beck heralded GHOST’s seemingly sci-fi-sounding ability to launch a rocket into space from virtually anywhere in the world as another example of the launch service reliability and repeatability.
“Creating GHOST is about packaging that up into a deployable system that can serve the world’s most important programs from wherever those missions need,” Sir Beck said. “Whether it’s for missile defense and deterrence, or opening up more trajectories, orbital missions, and sovereign launch capabilities in allied nations, GHOST is the answer to launching anywhere, anytime, and without compromise.”
Christopher Plain is a Science Fiction and Fantasy novelist and has spent the last six years as Associate News Editor and Head Science Writer at The Debrief. Follow and connect with him on X, learn about his books at plainfiction.com, or email him at christopher@thedebrief.org.
One of planetary defense‘s biggest opportunities will come as the asteroid Apophis makes its tight flyby of our planet on April 13, 2029, allowing international space missions to interact with the near-Earth object. Asteroids this size only approach this close to Earth about once every 7,500 years, making the event a rare opportunity for real-world planetary defense research.
In a new paper published in the journal Space: Science & Technology, a team of researchers analyzes the many opportunities the Apophis flyby will offer for science and planetary defense.
The closest distance between Earth and Apophis during the flyby will be a mere 38,000 kilometers, about one-tenth of the distance from the Earth to the Moon. Coordinating these planetary defense efforts among the Earth’s nations may be one of the biggest challenges as the object comes uncomfortably close.
Apophis Explained
As soon as astronomers first discovered Apophis in 2004, the asteroid’s 340-meter-wide diameter and close pass by Earth immediately made it a concern for scientists. Fortunately, it is expected that on April 13, 2029, it will safely pass our planet at a distance of close to 20,000 miles—closer than some of our weather and communication satellites, but still with no risk of an impact.
Yet the near-Earth asteroid still holds mysteries for scientists. Models of the object depend heavily on assumptions, not hard data, to predict not just its tidal effects but also its composition, size, internal structure, and spin state.
A series of images of the asteroid Apophis captured in March 2021 (Image Credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech and NSF/AUI/GBO)
With so many open questions about the asteroid and the unique opportunity to collect data and test processes for future planetary defense operations, many countries are planning missions to Apophis, but in this new paper, the researchers note that some of these activities require increased international coordination to avoid interference.
Part of the paper synthesizes known data on Apophis, including radar observations, light-curve, and spectral data. From this data, the team then developed new predictions for the asteroid’s dust ejection, orbital and spin changes, internal structural response, and surface material displacement. These projections were crucial in the researchers’ evaluations of the feasibility of various currently proposed or authorized missions and their likely scientific value.
Apophis Missions are Gearing Up
Future Apophis missions fit into four primary categories: rendezvous, flyby sample return, and impactor experiments.
In the recent research, the team found that flyby missions should capture data at very fine scales, down to the centimeter or decimeter for surface changes and hours for changes in spin period. Additionally, these space-borne instruments should be able to measure dust ejection phenomena. Together, this data stream alone could provide important direct evidence for how such rubble-pile asteroids evolve structurally. Relatively low-cost sample return missions could push this even further.
The activities coordinated under the International Asteroid Warning Network constitute the largest multinational asteroid detection and observation effort ever assembled and are its first global joint exercise. The network will build experience responding to potentially deadly space threats in the future.
Earth Interactions
On the other hand, the asteroid’s close approach to Earth will affect Apophis as well. Our planet’s gravity is expected to alter Apophis’s orbit from an Aten-type to an Apollo-type, changing the object’s spin period and orbital uncertainty.
Additionally, roughly 1% of Apophis may experience a surface material disruption, potentially altering the object’s spectral properties by exposing fresh material.
The asteroid’s extremely low gravity may also cause it to lose surface dust to Earth’s magnetosphere, posing an electromagnetic disturbance hazard to spacecraft. Space agencies will need to monitor the situation to protect our increasingly essential space-based communications infrastructure during the event.
While there is no immediate danger to our planet, the researchers say this event is shaping up to be a pivotal moment in international space cooperation and a turning point for organized space defense.
Ryan Whalen covers science and technology for The Debrief. He holds an MA in History and a Master of Library and Information Science with a certificate in Data Science. He can be contacted at ryan@thedebrief.org.
The United States Department of Defense has funded an effort by SUNY Polytechnic Institute scientists to use artificial intelligence to evaluate complex defense scenarios before they unfold, including real-time predictive analysis of multiple potential scenarios in a concerted effort to predict the future on the battlefield.
DoD and SUNY Poly officials said the ‘landmark’ $61.8 million award, which will directly support the U.S. Army Transformation Decision Analysis Center (TDAC), will use advanced, data-driven analytical tools to offer the U.S. Army an unprecedented tactical advantage, improving preparedness and reducing uncertainty in high-stakes decision-making battlefield environments
“The initiative aims to provide commanders with a decisive strategic advantage in an increasingly volatile global landscape by integrating high-velocity AI into the Army’s core decision-making frameworks,” a statement announcing the new award explained.
Using AI to Predict the Future Helps Army “Respond to Evolving Threats”
The first phase of the effort to use AI to predict the future will focus on synchronizing military operations in several critical domains, including land, air, space, and cyberspace. The team, which includes researchers from the University of South Florida and the University System of Maryland, said this phase will emphasize integrating generative AI, foundation models, and advanced inference systems to “simulate complex operational scenarios and provide predictive insights.”
“These tools will enable the Army to better assess risks, evaluate strategies, and respond to evolving threats in both competitive and crisis environments,” they explain.
As the SUNY Poly-led team moves into future phases, it will also explore several “advanced” capabilities not covered in the initial phase. For example, the team will evaluate synthetic data generation and anomaly detection. The announcement said the team also plans to explore large language models (LLMs) and time-series foundation models to “enhance situational awareness.”
Other areas of focus include AI system security and reliability, including the ability to operate in “adversarial and resource-constrained environments.” Critically, this effort also includes ensuring robust AI performance “even under cyber threats or disrupted conditions.”
Evaluating Complex Scenarios Before They Unfold
One of the more intriguing components of the new award involves simulating battlefield environments to predict the future. Specifically, the team said it hopes to use battlefield simulations to enable “spatial reasoning through the integration of generative AI and active inference models.”
“These innovations will allow military planners to evaluate complex scenarios before they unfold, improving preparedness and reducing uncertainty in high-stakes decision-making,” the statement explains, adding that the effort will “contribute to the Army’s broader modernization strategy, supporting the development of next-generation analytical tools that inform readiness, capability development, and operational planning.”
Dr. Michael Carpenter, Vice President for Research at SUNY Poly, said the work represents a major step forward for the integration of AI and machine learning to “support resilient and adaptive decision-making for the Army.”
“Our team is developing sophisticated models that can synthesize vast amounts of data, generate realistic scenarios, and provide actionable intelligence,” Dr. Carpenter explained. “These capabilities will be critical in helping the Army anticipate challenges and maintain a strategic edge.”
After noting their honor at receiving the award, SUNY Poly President Dr. Winston Soboyejo said the DoD’s confidence in their program “reflects SUNY Poly’s research excellence and our commitment to solving the nation’s most complex security challenges.”
“By working closely with our partners, we will deliver transformative technologies that ensure the Army remains agile, informed, and ready for any multi-domain conflict,” Dr. Soboyejo concluded, adding that “we are proud to contribute to technologies that advance science and engineering, and strengthen national security and global stability.”
Christopher Plain is a Science Fiction and Fantasy novelist and has spent the last six years as Associate News Editor and Head Science Writer at The Debrief. Follow and connect with him on X, learn about his books at plainfiction.com, or email him at christopher@thedebrief.org
For nearly three decades, 1998 SH2 looked like a fairly ordinary near-Earth asteroid. It was discovered in 1998, catalogued, and followed through a 4½-year orbit around the Sun. Then, during a close but safe pass by Earth in August 2025, its motion refused to match the path astronomers had calculated. The explanation, announced by NASA […]
On Thursday, a US District Court in Oregon ordered the US government to restart the process of approving wind projects. All new wind development in the US has been on hold since August 2025, when the Department of Defense (DoD) stopped participating in a process that allows it to compel developers to alter projects in order to limit their interference with radar equipment. The court ruled, however, that the DoD's national security claims did not allow it to opt out of a process that is legally mandated.
The Trump administration has made many attempts to block wind development, both offshore and land based. Its attempts to stop offshore wind included the same approach at issue in this case: Claim that drone developments mean that radar interference by wind turbines creates a national security risk. The courts were not sympathetic to this claim, including in cases where judges examined a classified report that the DoD was using to justify blocking offshore wind construction. As a result, the administration has turned to paying companies not to pursue wind development.
In parallel, the government was pursuing a similar approach for onshore wind. Here, a law lays out a process for the DoD to evaluate any problems posed by wind turbines and negotiate changes to planned wind farms with the developers. As laid out in the new decision, the government simply stopped participating in this process in August 2025, first by refusing to sign off on previously negotiated agreements, and later by refusing to draft agreements entirely. Eventually, it simply refused to participate in negotiations at all. This has brought a halt to all wind development in the US.
On Thursday, a US District Court in Oregon ordered the US government to restart the process of approving wind projects. All new wind development in the US has been on hold since August 2025, when the Department of Defense (DoD) stopped participating in a process that allows it to compel developers to alter projects in order to limit their interference with radar equipment. The court ruled, however, that the DoD's national security claims did not allow it to opt out of a process that is legally mandated.
The Trump administration has made many attempts to block wind development, both offshore and land based. Its attempts to stop offshore wind included the same approach at issue in this case: Claim that drone developments mean that radar interference by wind turbines creates a national security risk. The courts were not sympathetic to this claim, including in cases where judges examined a classified report that the DoD was using to justify blocking offshore wind construction. As a result, the administration has turned to paying companies not to pursue wind development.
In parallel, the government was pursuing a similar approach for onshore wind. Here, a law lays out a process for the DoD to evaluate any problems posed by wind turbines and negotiate changes to planned wind farms with the developers. As laid out in the new decision, the government simply stopped participating in this process in August 2025, first by refusing to sign off on previously negotiated agreements, and later by refusing to draft agreements entirely. Eventually, it simply refused to participate in negotiations at all. This has brought a halt to all wind development in the US.
DARPA officials said the successful flight of an aircraft category that is still in use for combat operations advances the state-of-the-art technological infrastructure needed to meet the challenges of a rapidly evolving aerial environment and will enable rapid, scalable combat AI pilot development across the broader U.S. military forces.
“These groundbreaking flight tests of VENOM-modified F-16s advance the infrastructure needed to develop trusted, autonomous air combat capabilities,” said Brig. Gen. James “Fangs” Valpiani, Ph.D., DARPA program manager.
AI-Controlled F-16 Test Flights Part of VENOM Program
According to a statement announcing the successful AI-controlled flights, the F-16 used in the tests was specifically converted to an AI testbed under the agency’s joint venture with the U.S. Air Force, the Viper Experimentation and Next-generation Operations Model (VENOM) program. The specific AI pilot installed in the F-16 is known as the VENOM Autonomy Kit, or VAK.
DARPA said VAK utilizes a “novel interface with the aircraft’s flight controls and mission systems.” This component allows an on-board human pilot to toggle between their traditional control systems and VAK “with the flip of a switch,” ensuring pilot safety during the testing phase where a human is still in the loop.
An F-16 Fighting Falcon modified for the Viper Experimentation and Next-gen Operations Model – Autonomy Flying Testbed (VENOM) program conducts flight operations during autonomous systems testing in June 2026 at Eglin Air Force Base. The VENOM F-16s serve as modified airborne test platforms equipped with specialized hardware, software, and instrumentation designed to enable artificial intelligence agents to pilot the aircraft while human pilots remain in the cockpit to monitor the AI agents and ensure flight and mission systems test objectives are met to rapidly evolve autonomous capabilities. Image Credit: U.S. Air Force | Samuel King Jr., 96th Test Wing
Valpiani said that the VENOM team installed the AI-controlled VAK interface, which successfully automated the F-16’s sensors and flight controls “without changing the jet’s core software.”
“This enables an efficient pipeline for developing dominant AI for aerial combat, allowing us to rapidly innovate for the warfighter,” the program manager explained.
Creating Dominant Autonomy Beyond Visual Range
When discussing the significance of the successful AI-controlled test flights, Valpiani once again highlighted the “emerging threat environment” in relation to aerial combat, including its increasing complexity.
“AI has tremendous potential to help humans manage this complexity in beyond-visual-range combat, but many hard questions remain concerning the performance and trustworthiness of combat AI in the extreme fog and friction of modern warfare,” explained the project leader, who was due to conclude his tenure as a DARPA program manager in the weeks after the announcement. “The AIR program aims to apply cutting-edge combat agents to operationally relevant scenarios to address these questions and field war-deterring, war-winning capabilities to our warfighters.”
Incoming program manager, Lt. Col. Patrick “Dice” Highland, Ph.D., highlighted the milestone’s role in “advancing our nation’s combat autonomy,” while also offering an eye toward the program’s future.
“We now have the opportunity to create dominant autonomy for beyond-visual-range, multi-ship combat,” Lt. Col Highland said. “These flights give us an early glimpse of how AI agents may begin actively transforming air warfare.”
Moving VAK’s Capabilities “Out of Simulation and Into the Sky”
Following the successful AI-piloted F-16 tests, the specially designed VENOM aircraft will join DARPA as it moves the entire venture under the umbrella of the agency’s Artificial Intelligence Reinforcements (AIR) program. According to the agency, this new program will use the aircraft in the VENOM fleet to “test multiple AI agents in live-flight scenarios.” If successful, DARPA said the program will “pave the way for human pilots to seamlessly command and orchestrate teams of autonomous, uncrewed aircraft.”
Current deputy program manager Terry Wilson, Ph.D., who will remain with the program, highlighted AIR’s longer-term goals of future joint force operations, including Collaborative Combat Aircraft programs. DARPA said that these efforts will focus on improving the speed and predictive ability of AI model development and “scale in-flight testing to multi-ship operations with increased complexity to unlock novel and robust AI-driven autonomy.”
“I share Gen. Valpiani’s deep appreciation for the incredible dedication of our DARPA and industry teammates, joint engineers, the System Program Office, Eglin’s test and maintenance crews, and the entire AIR and VENOM ecosystem which has made this milestone possible,” said Wilson. “I look forward to unleashing the VENOM platform and moving these capabilities out of simulation and into the sky.”
Christopher Plain is a Science Fiction and Fantasy novelist and has spent the last six years as Associate News Editor and Head Science Writer at The Debrief. Follow and connect with him on X, learn about his books at plainfiction.com, or email him at christopher@thedebrief.org
For decades, Washington has assumed that military aid translates into political influence. If the United States provides the weapons,intelligence, training, and diplomatic backing that keep an ally fighting, conventional wisdom suggests it should also have considerable leverage over when, and how, that war ends.
Yet, a sweeping new analysis published by the Brookings Institution and authored by Dr. Dafna Rand, a senior fellow at Brookings, the Federation for American Scientists, and the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that the opposite has increasingly become true.
Whether in Ukraine,Gaza, Yemen, or Afghanistan, the U.S. has repeatedly discovered that sustaining an ally’s war effort is often far easier than steering its ultimate direction. Instead of conclusive victories followed by lasting peace, modern conflicts are increasingly settling into drawn-out stalemates, frozen conflicts, or recurring cycles of violence that resist outside pressure—even from Washington.
Dr. Rand’s report examines one of the defining strategic dilemmas confronting American foreign policy in the 21st century: why the world’s most powerful military and diplomatic actor has struggled to shape the decisions of partners whose war efforts depend heavily on U.S. support.
Drawing on more than 30 interviews with senior American officials involved in decision-making throughout four major conflicts, alongside hundreds of government documents, the analysis shows recurring patterns that appear independent of geography or the adversary involved.
“Wars, whether between or within states, are not ending in the 21st century,” Dr. Rand writes. “Frozen conflicts, on-again-off-again fighting, and stalemates have become the norm.”
Dr. Rand argues that this changing nature of warfare has profoundly changed the assumptions underpinning American security strategy.
Following the costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington increasingly shifted toward supporting partners rather than committing large numbers of U.S. troops directly to combat. The expectation was that supplying allies with military assistance would provide the United States with considerable influence over battlefield strategy and political consequences.
Instead, Dr. Rand says that American leverage consistently diminishes as conflicts drag on.
One of the study’s central conclusions is that Washington and its partners frequently begin wars without agreeing on what victory actually means. At the outset of each conflict examined—including Ukraine’s defenseagainst Russia, Israel’s campaign against Hamas, the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, and America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan—American and partner governments shared broad objectives, though often failed to establish detailed political end states.
That omission, Dr. Rand argues, becomes increasingly costly as wars continue.
Early battlefield success frequently encourages partners to pursue more ambitious goals than originally envisioned. At the same time, Washington gradually becomes more interested in negotiated settlements as financial costs mount, domestic political support declines, and wider strategic priorities begin competing for attention.
According to Dr. Rand, many officials interviewed expressed regret that these conversations about political objectives, postwar governance, and acceptable settlement terms did not occur before military campaigns gained momentum.
The report also highlights an uncomfortable reality of modern alliances. Although the United States provides enormous military assistance, it does not exercise command over allied governments or their armed forces. As a result, disagreements naturally emerge over strategy, operational design, and acceptable risks.
Ukraine provides one of the clearest examples. Initially, Washington and Kyiv shared an overriding objective of preventing Russia from conquering the country. However, over time, American officials became increasingly divided over whether continued fighting or eventual negotiations better served long-term U.S. interests.
Some officials viewed prolonging the conflict as strategically beneficial because it weakened Russia’s military while strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Others believed diplomatic attempts should have begun earlier, particularly after Ukraine’s battlefield gains in 2022 created what they viewed as an opportunity to negotiate from a stronger position.
Dr. Rand notes that internal disagreements within the U.S. government complicated communication with Ukrainian leaders, in particular regarding expectations for territorial objectives and the role military offensives were intended to play in eventually creating conditions for diplomacy.
The Gaza conflict exposed a different, but related, collection of challenges.
Following Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attacks, President Joe Biden’s administration moved rapidly to reassure Israel of unshakable American support while simultaneously urging restraint based on lessons learned from America’s own post-9/11 military campaigns.
Dr. Rand concludes that Israeli leaders largely heard the reassurances while failing to fully internalize Washington’s accompanying warnings about civilian casualties, operational design, and the long-term strategic consequences of an extended campaign.
As the war progressed, American officials increasingly concluded that humanitarian concerns and mounting civilian casualties were not exclusively moral issues but strategic ones as well, arguing that prolonged destruction could ultimately strengthen Hamas’ long-term recruitment and undermine Israel’s own security objectives.
Despite this growing divergence, the report suggests Washington hesitated to use its available leverage aggressively, partly because of domestic political sensitivities surrounding support for Israel.
Another recurring finding centers on American public opinion.
Support for allies often begins overwhelmingly strong immediately after major attacks or invasions. But that support steadily erodes aswars lengthen, casualties mount, humanitarian problems increase, or questions come up regarding the conduct of partner governments.
Dr. Rand says this pattern appears across Yemen, Afghanistan, Gaza, and, increasingly, Ukraine.
Importantly, she argues this erosion can occur even when Americans continue believing the underlying cause remains just. Instead, fatigue over prolonged commitments, concerns about costs, or doubts regarding the likelihood of decisive success gradually reshape political calculations in Washington.
Those changing domestic dynamics, in turn, reduce America’s leverage abroad.
Once congressional debates begin questioning military assistance or public enthusiasm declines, allied governments recognize that Washington’s ability to maintain long-term support has become less certain.
Dr. Rand argues this weakens American bargaining power precisely when policymakers most need it.
Among the study’s most significant recommendations is that future administrations should treat leverage as a rapidly diminishing resource.
Rather than assuming influence will expand alongside continued military assistance, Dr. Rand contends the opposite usually occurs. The strongest opportunity to shape an ally’s political objectives exists during the opening weeks of conflict, before battlefield realities, domestic politics, and diverging national interests begin pulling partners in different directions.
To address this, the report proposes forming formal “security contracts,” or a memorandum of understanding, early in future conflicts that clearly define shared political objectives, expected end states, standards for humanitarian conduct, and mechanisms for periodically reassessing strategy.
Dr. Rand also recommends keeping consistent communication across the entire U.S. national security apparatus, warning that mixed signals from different agencies make it easier for partners to ignore American advice or exploit disagreements inside Washington.
Perhaps most notably, the report argues that future administrations should not focus solely on influencing allies. Even in conflicts involving close partners, Washington should simultaneously pursue diplomatic means with adversaries whenever possible, recognizing that negotiated settlements often require engaging both sides rather than relying exclusively on pressure directed at friendly governments.
Ultimately, the analysis shows that the challenge confronting U.S. policymakers goes beyond any single conflict. As interstate wars, civil wars, and proxy wars become increasingly protracted, America’s ability to translate military assistance into political influence may continue shrinking unless it fundamentally rethinks how partnerships are managed from the very beginning of a war.
“The United States must be brutally honest with its partners,” Dr. Rand writes. “The United States must recognize that pressuring its partners to end wars will get harder, not easier, as time passes and the partner grows better able to resist U.S. pressure.”
Tim McMillan is a retired law enforcement executive, investigative reporter and co-founder of The Debrief. His writing typically focuses on defense, national security, the Intelligence Community and topics related to psychology. You can follow Tim on Twitter:@LtTimMcMillan. Tim can be reached by email: tim@thedebrief.org or through encrypted email:LtTimMcMillan@protonmail.com
A massive wildfire that scorched the Nevada desert near the U.S. Air Force’s classified Area 51 facility over the weekend has now exceeded 2,000 acres.
The fire, which began on Friday, continued spreading through Lincoln County, Nevada, according to officials with the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM), one of the agencies working to control the blaze.
“This is a restricted area, closed to the public, always, regardless of fire activity,” BLM officials said in a statement, adding that there are presently no additional closures in effect in the area.
Dubbed the Quail Springs fire, crews continued battling against heavy smoke and flames within the Nevada Test and Training Range throughout the weekend.
One of two military training areas located within the Nellis Air Force Base Complex in Nevada, the classified site is home to a simulated Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) and features close to 1,200 targets and other military assets frequently used in training operations.
With its storied history involving the development and testing of some of America’s most secretive aircraft, Area 51 has long remained an item of public fascination. Presently, there is no indication that the fire could impact operations at the facility.
Additionally, while BLM officials say there are no residences or other structures currently being threatened, the fire reportedly still has zero containment, according to information available on the Nevada Wildfire Information Dashboard.
“Warm, dry weather with afternoon breezes is expected through Tuesday,” read a portion of a statement that appeared on the BLM website. “Fire activity is expected to increase during the afternoon burning period before moderating overnight as temperatures cool and humidity recovers.”
Presently, the BLM says there are no significant weather changes expected, although some isolated thunderstorms are possible in the area over the next several days. While the presence of moisture would seemingly be hoped for under such conditions, BLM officials said that such storms could also introduce “potentially gusty and erratic winds,” which may “contribute to fire spread.”
Lightning associated with such isolated storms is often a key trigger for such fires during the otherwise arid summer months. Presently, BLM officials believe a lightning strike had likely triggered this weekend’s fire, as well.
“The fire will continue to be monitored closely,” the BLM statement read.
Micah Hanks is the Editor-in-Chief and Co-Founder of The Debrief. A longtime reporter on science, defense, and technology with a focus on space and astronomy, he can be reached atmicah@thedebrief.org. Follow him on X @MicahHanks, and at micahhanks.com.
Login
America has crossed a rhetorical threshold in an increasingly militarized space race. 
The secret to Bennu’s astonishing fragility may be the dust it does not have. 
