Enterprises are increasingly investing copious amounts of cash in AI without a lot to show for it. This could be, in part, because the wrong people are leading the change.

As I’ve argued before⁠, AI isn’t likely to eliminate developers so much as change what we need from them. For example, we keep asking whether junior developers are needed in a world where large language models can write code faster and cheaper. What this overlooks is the reality that these younger developers and their relative inexperience may be exactly what we need to rewrite the rules of software development.

This thought hit me while reading James Governor’s riff on something Ben Griffiths⁠ wrote about our industry’s habit of confusing age with authority. Griffiths remembered sitting through a conference talk in which a speaker tried to shame a young audience for not recognizing some of the older men who had shaped computing. The irony, Ben noted, was that many of those “old men” had done their world-changing work when they were younger than the people being lectured. Bill Joy wrote vi when he was 22, John Carmack created Doom at 23, Linus Torvalds launched Linux at 22, etc. Many of our industry’s titans made their biggest contributions before they had decades of experience.

The point isn’t that young people are smarter. They’re not. The point isn’t that the key to AI success is to ignore more experienced developers. That’s dumb. Rather, it’s a suggestion that Griffiths’ larger point is right: At the beginning of big shifts, experience can be a mixed blessing. It can help you see risk, but it can also make you overconfident in old ways. The most successful enterprises will find ways to balance youthful innovation with experienced guardrails.

The factory doesn’t redesign itself

Zara Zhang recently pointed to Paul David’s classic 1990 paper, “The Dynamo and the Computer,”⁠ as a way to understand why so many companies have “adopted” AI without much to show for it. David’s argument, simplified, is that electricity didn’t immediately transform factories. For a long time, factories simply swapped out the central steam engine for an electric motor while keeping the same layout, the same workflows, and the same assumptions.

Electricity was new, but we largely stifled its potential by force-fitting it into old factory systems.

The big productivity gains came later, when factories stopped treating electricity as a cleaner steam engine and started redesigning work around smaller motors distributed throughout the factory. Once each machine could have its own motor, the factory no longer had to organize itself around a single driveshaft. Work could instead be reorganized around the flow of production.

That’s a decent description of where many enterprises are with AI. Enterprises today are buying copilot licenses by the thousands, wiring agents into existing applications, etc., and then wondering why the results are so uneven, as I’ve written⁠. This is the equivalent of swapping the steam engine for an electric one and declaring that the AI modernization work is done. It’s not. Not even close.

The real payoff won’t come from asking AI to write the same tickets a bit faster. It will instead come from changing how teams define work and how (and what) developers build. The “factory” has to change.

So here’s the uncomfortable question: Who is most likely to build the new factory?

Experience cuts both ways

There’s an obvious danger in romanticizing youth. Plenty of bad software has been written by people with unlimited confidence and limited context. Enterprises need software that works, yes, but “works” also means it complies, scales, respects security boundaries, and more.

This is where experienced developers matter. A lot.

As I pointed out recently, the agent era makes engineering judgment more important than ever. After all, AI makes it easier to generate code, but easier code generation can become easier technical debt generation. Hence, the limiting factor becomes less of “Can we create something?” and more of “Can we create the right thing, in the right place, with the right constraints?” Taste is required, in other words.

Senior engineers are often better at seeing those constraints because their experience gives them “taste.” They know why the weird validation rule exists, and they remember the customer who depended on the undocumented behavior. They understand why a simple schema change can turn into a multi-week migration.

But experience also has a shadow side, because it can make the current process feel inevitable. A senior engineer may see an AI assistant as a faster autocomplete because that’s the easiest way to fit AI into their existing mental model. A junior developer, less invested in the old workflow, may ask the more interesting questions: Why are we doing this ticket at all? Why isn’t the spec executable? Why can’t the agent generate the test harness first?

It’s not that the more experienced developers don’t know these questions. Rather, they may simply not have the energy to rage against the machine, as it were.

The value of inexperience

The worst way to use junior developers in the AI era is to treat them as cheaper versions of senior developers. That was always a bad idea, but AI makes it worse. If the job is “take this ticket, generate some code, and send it to a senior person for review,” the junior developer becomes a human wrapper around a coding assistant. That helps no one. The junior doesn’t learn much, the senior gets buried in review, and the enterprise ends up with more code, which, as I’ve said, is hardly a good thing.

Instead, junior developers should be given room to explore new workflows, with just enough oversight from experienced colleagues. That might mean giving these newer developers interesting questions to answer, such as:

• How would we redesign onboarding if every internal API had an AI-readable contract and examples that actually worked?
• How would we change code review if the agent produced a change summary, test evidence, dependency risk, and rollback plan with every pull request?
• How would we build features if product requirements were written as executable acceptance tests rather than vague prose?
• How would we reduce toil if agents could safely perform routine migrations, dependency updates, or incident triage within clearly defined boundaries?

These are not toy problems. They’re not “junior work.” They’re exactly the sort of process redesign that enterprises need but generally avoid because everyone is too busy running on the existing hamster wheel.

Finding the balance

So what should engineering leaders do? First, stop treating AI adoption as an individual productivity contest. We seem to be moving quickly away from the idea that “lots of tokens” equals “great engineer,” but the fact that we even flirted with it is damning. I love how Santiago Valdarrama eviscerates this vanity metric: “Measuring AI productivity in number of lines written is a stupid mistake. One day, everyone will have always been against this.” Instead we should be asking questions like, “What part of our software delivery process no longer makes sense?” AI’s biggest gains will come when we change how we specify, test, review, and ship software.

Second, mix up your AI workflow teams. No, not committees or PowerPoint-producing centers of excellence. I’m talking about combining two or three newer developers who are already fluent in AI-native tools with two or three senior engineers who understand production, security, architecture, and organizational constraints. Then give them a real workflow to redesign, such as dependency upgrades or test creation.

Third, make the senior engineer’s job less about saying no and more about defining the guardrails within which others can say yes. I’ve argued that golden paths are key to using AI effectively. Good senior engineers should define the paved roads: approved patterns, test requirements, observability standards, etc. Then let junior developers and agents move quickly inside those boundaries.

Fourth, reward deletion. This may be the most important point. Going back to the factory electricity metaphor, we’ll fail with AI modernization if we simply add AI without removing outdated processes.

Bring everyone to the table

The future of software development won’t belong to the young. It won’t belong to the old, either. It will belong to teams that combine the talents of both.

Newer developers often bring impatience. They’re less likely to accept the existing workflow as sacred. They’re more likely to try weird tools, compose them in unexpected ways, and wonder why enterprise software development feels like a ritualized exercise in waiting for permission.

Experienced developers bring judgment. They know that software has users, auditors, attackers, budgets, latency, history, and consequences. They know that the right answer is often boring, and boring is good.

Enterprises need both. They need the developer who asks why the factory is still organized around the old drive shaft, and they need the developer who knows which machines will kill someone if moved casually. In sum, every development team needs people who know why the old system exists… as well as those who don’t.

A US federal judge has ruled that the Trump administration’s $100,000 fee on new H-1B visa petitions was unlawful, giving technology companies temporary relief from a policy that threatened to raise the cost of hiring foreign skilled workers.

The decision removes, at least for now, a major cost burden for employers that use the H-1B program to fill roles in domains including software development, cloud computing, data science, and AI.

US District Judge Leo Sorokin in Boston found that the fee functioned as a tax that the administration did not have authority to impose without congressional approval. The ruling came in a lawsuit brought by 20 Democratic state attorneys general challenging the fee.

Standard employer costs for H-1B petitions typically range from about $2,000 to $5,000, making the proposed $100,000 payment a sharp increase for companies seeking foreign talent.

The ruling is unlikely to end uncertainty for employers, with the Trump administration expected to appeal. But it could allow companies that had paused international hiring plans to resume normal recruitment for the upcoming H-1B cycle, said Pareekh Jain, CEO of Pareekh Consulting. Still, he said, employers should remain cautious because the legal and policy concerns are likely to continue.

“This provides breathing room for CIOs, even though it’s temporary,” said Neil Shah, vice president for research and partner at Counterpoint Research. “They should make the necessary contingency plans, whether that means doing more with less by leveraging AI or relying more on local talent.”

How companies may rethink hiring

If higher H-1B costs return in another form, CIOs will have to be more selective about sponsorship, weighing the added cost against the strategic value of the role and the long-term potential of the employee, Shah said.

“Ultimately, the decision comes down to business unit P&L: whether the unit can absorb the cost of acquiring the talent for that role,” Shah added.

That uncertainty could also lead CIOs to compete for talent from other companies, potentially driving up salaries for skilled workers. Some CIOs may conclude that paying a one-time $100,000 fee, amortized over the employee’s tenure, is still more cost-effective than engaging in a bidding war for scarce local talent.

Danish Faruqui, CEO of Fab Economics, said that CIOs may reserve H-1B sponsorship for a narrower set of mission-critical roles if costs increase.

“If there is such a financial burden, CIOs will justify sponsoring very specific roles,” Faruqui said. “These would be principal enterprise architects, AI, ML, and deep-tech researchers, senior product managers, and regulatory and compliance experts.”

More routine or project-based roles are likely to be treated differently, Faruqui said.

“Junior to mid-level software engineers, entry-level business analysts, and entry-level data scientists would shift from H-1B to domestic hiring,” Faruqui said. “Cloud migration, DevOps, ERP, and CRM implementation could be done through contractors or consulting firms, while QA, product testing, tier-one help desk support, and legacy maintenance are roles that CIOs could prioritize for automation.”

Who would be most affected?

Startups, smaller companies, and enterprise IT departments would have faced the greatest pressure from the fee and stand to benefit most from the ruling, Jain said.

Large technology companies would have been better placed to absorb the $100,000 cost, he said. Meanwhile, companies with mature offshore delivery models may be less likely to increase their reliance on H-1B hiring.

The article originally appeared on CIO.

Enterprises are moving aggressively into generative AI. On the surface, that seems like the right call. The technology is powerful, accessible, and increasingly embedded in how businesses build applications, automate processes, and support decision-making. A development team can connect an application to a large language model in days. A product team can add AI features in weeks. Business leaders see quick wins, faster innovation, and a path to modernizing nearly every part of the company.

These are the upsides everyone is talking about. The part we don’t discuss enough is the economic trap forming underneath all this convenience.

Most enterprises think of tokens as a technical billing detail. They are not. Tokens are the unit of economic dependency in generative AI. Every prompt, response, summarization, retrieval step, workflow action, and agent decision is measured and monetized through tokens. Tokens are not just part of the plumbing. They are the tollbooth between your enterprise and a provider’s intelligence platform. The more AI becomes central to your operations, the more power that tollbooth holds over your future costs.

Tokens are not just a pricing unit

A token is usually described as a chunk of text processed by a model. That is accurate enough for developers, but it misses the bigger issue for CIOs, architects, and corporate boards. In the enterprise, tokens are the mechanism by which AI capabilities are rented. They are the meter attached to the intelligence itself.

That distinction matters because token usage grows faster than most companies anticipate. A simple user prompt rarely remains simple in production systems. It can trigger retrieval from internal knowledge stores, multiple model calls, tool use, post-processing, policy checks, and agent loops. What appears to be a single transaction to the user may involve several layers of token consumption behind the scenes. As a result, enterprises often underestimate the true operating cost of AI-enabled systems, especially as those systems mature and spread across departments.

Today, those costs still feel manageable. In many cases, they feel surprisingly low. That is exactly why the trap is so dangerous.

The market is in a subsidy phase

Current token pricing is giving enterprises a false sense of comfort. Many remote LLM providers are aggressively competing for market share. They want developers building on their APIs. They want enterprise applications tightly coupled to their platforms. They want AI agents, copilots, workflows, and customer experiences to depend on their models. To make that happen, pricing remains highly attractive relative to the value delivered.

That does not mean the economics of generative AI are stable. It means the market is still being shaped by investor capital, strategic pricing, and growth expectations. Providers are racing to establish position, and enterprises are benefiting from that race. But no market stays in that phase forever. At some point, investors will expect durable profitability. At some point, weaker providers will disappear, consolidate, or retreat. At some point, the survivors will have more leverage and much less reason to price primarily for adoption.

That’s when the token trap closes.

Enterprises that build deep dependence on remote models during the subsidy phase may find that what seemed inexpensive at pilot scale becomes punishing at enterprise scale. The application that costs $1,000 per month today may cost 10 or 20 times that amount a few years from now, not only because usage has increased, but also because the market has repriced the dependency.

Easy to adopt, expensive to exit

Cloud computing followed a similar path, with many enterprises mistaking short-term convenience for long-term economics. In the early years, the case was compelling and largely accurate. Move faster, reduce friction, avoid capital spending, and scale with ease. Those benefits were real. Many organizations made architectural decisions that prioritized speed over leverage. They became dependent on managed services, provider-specific tools, and operating models that were easy to adopt but expensive to unwind.

Years later, many enterprises discovered that their cloud bills were much higher than expected and their exit options much narrower than advertised. That was not because the cloud failed. Architectural dependency eventually became financial dependency.

Generative AI is repeating that pattern, only faster. The integration barrier is lower, the pressure to adopt is higher, and the pace of enterprise experimentation is far greater. As a result, companies are wiring remote LLMs into applications, workflows, and agentic systems with very little thought about how these costs will behave in the next five to 10 years.

Agentic AI makes things worse

The more enterprises move from simple prompt-response systems to agentic architectures, the more dangerous the token trap becomes. Agents are not single-call systems. They plan, deliberate, retrieve information, invoke tools, evaluate results, retry steps, and often coordinate with other agents. Each of those actions consumes tokens. Costs no longer rise in a neat linear fashion. They compound.

This matters because agentic AI is increasingly being presented as the future of enterprise automation. It’s true in many cases. But if an enterprise builds agentic systems primarily on remotely hosted intelligence, it is also building future business processes on top of someone else’s pricing model. That is a major strategic risk. The more successful those systems become, the harder they are to replace. The harder they are to replace, the more pricing power shifts to the provider.

This is how businesses end up operationally dependent on a cost structure they do not control.

The appeal of AI sovereignty

The answer is not to reject public models or pretend that external providers play no role. They clearly do. There will always be cases where renting frontier AI capabilities makes sense. But enterprises need to stop assuming that renting is the default for every workload.

AI sovereignty is the alternative that deserves much more attention. That means building, tuning, deploying, and governing models inside the enterprise for use cases where long-term control matters more than access to the absolute frontier. Enterprises need to recognize that most business applications do not need a world-class general-purpose model. They need a model that is good enough for a specific purpose, aligned to the enterprise’s data, governed by the enterprise’s rules, and operated at a predictable cost.

It’s a very different way of thinking.

A self-hosted or enterprise-controlled model may not match the rich feature set of the largest public offerings. It may lack the same breadth, polish, or marketing appeal. But for many internal business tasks, those factors do not matter.

Here’s the most critical question to guide your architectural direction: Can a sovereign AI model solve the problem reliably, securely, and economically over time? If the answer is yes, owning that capability may be far more strategic than forever renting something with more power than you need. In effect, the enterprise becomes its own provider for the workloads that matter most.

Prepare for changing markets

Too many companies still treat generative AI architecture as a tactical IT issue. It is not. These decisions directly affect cost structure, operating flexibility, data control, and long-term competitiveness. If AI becomes a force multiplier across the business, the economics of AI become strategic to the business itself.

The companies that get this right will not necessarily be the fastest adopters. They will understand the difference between experimentation and dependency. They will use external models when it makes sense, but they will also invest in sovereign capabilities where ownership matters. They will think like architects, not consumers.

Here’s the takeaway: Cheap tokens come with strings. They are a gateway to a dependency model that will typically look very different once providers stop pricing for growth and start pricing for leverage. Enterprises cannot keep mistaking today’s bargain for tomorrow’s reality. Boards and executive teams need to act now to get ahead of this issue. The key question is not whether generative AI creates value. It clearly does. The real question is whether the enterprise can still afford and control the value it creates once the market matures.

Technology companies announced 38,242 job cuts in the US in May 2026, the highest monthly total for the sector since August 2024, according to research by employment placement company Challenger, Gray & Christmas. So far this year the company has observed 123,653 US technology job cuts, a rise of 66 percent from the same period in 2025.

These figures represent the third successive month that there has been an increase in job layoffs across all sectors, the company said.

“The labor market is being reshaped by technology in real time. AI is now the leading reason companies give for cutting jobs and the primary industry citing it is technology,” said Andy Challenger, chief revenue office at Challenger, Gray and Christmas.”

AI was blamed for 38,579 of the 97,006 job cuts announced across all industries tracked by the company. It accounted for 40% of the cuts observed in May, up from 7% in January.

This year has already seen some major layoffs in technology. In March, HPE slashed 2,500 jobs from its wage bill, while Oracle announced plans to shed an unspecified number of developers. And the cuts keep on coming, just last month, Meta shed 8,000 employees.

The European Union has now published a set of measures aimed at boosting Europe’s tech industry to help reduce reliance on US and Chinese suppliers for AI, cloud, and semiconductors. The proposals include rules to restrict the use of US hyperscalers for certain public sector procurement purposes, but stop short of banning them outright.

“Technological sovereignty does not mean protectionism. Europe remains grounded in openness, partnership, and fair competition,” Henna Virkkunen, executive vice president for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, said in a statement Wednesday. “At the same time, Europe wants to be in the position to make its own choices, avoiding dependence on single dominant suppliers, especially from non-like-minded countries.”

The European Technological Sovereignty Package — released after several delays — includes two legislative proposals: the Cloud and AI Development Act and Chips Act (CAIDA) 2.0 and the Open Source Strategy and Strategic Roadmap for Digitalization and AI in Energy.

CAIDA aims to triple data center capacity in the next five to seven years by easing restrictions for deployments across the EU. It also includes rules that, if enacted, would require EU public bodies to meet certain sovereignty criteria for cloud service procurement related to certain sensitive workloads.

Amid ongoing trans-Atlantic tensions and a long-time deep reliance on US tech providers, European organizations have become increasingly wary of a “kill switch” that would cut off access to digital services. There are also concerns that US hyperscalers could be compelled to share data with US government under the CLOUD Act and Foreign Intelligence Services Act (FISA), even when data centers are located in Europe.

The CAIDA proposals include four levels of criteria for suppliers; the most basic includes data center infrastructure located and operated in the region – something  many US cloud suppliers already provide – with stricter rules around supplier ownership, full control over the software stack, and more stringent cybersecurity certification.

The majority of existing EU public sector workloads (70%) fall under the first level, with 20% at level 2, and 9% at level 3. Only a small proportion (1%) of the most sensitive workloads would require level 4.

Other proposals include the Chips Act 2.0, a follow-up to the 2023 legislation that sought to improve semiconductor production capabilities; the updated version now aims to boost research and spur demand for domestically produced processors. 

The legislative proposals must be negotiated by the European Parliament and Council of the European Union before adoption.

Tech companies seem to be falling over each other these days in firing people to either replace them with AI or to pay to build AI infrastructure. Wouldn’t it be nice if they at least waited until AI actually worked for business?

On the one hand, top tech businesses such as Amazon, Block, Cisco, Cloudflare, and Meta have all announced that they’re slashing payrolls — either because AI can do the same work as people or they need the cash to build out their AI infrastructure. Isn’t that great? All together, of the 37,638 tech job cuts so far this year, 47.9% — almost half —  can be tracked back to AI. 

On the other hand, despite all the AI hype and hysteria, no one has yet proven that AI is, generally speaking, really all that helpful for businesses. Oh, I know, I know. You did great things with OpenClaw vibe programming. Microsoft’s CEO, Satya Nadella, claims 20% to 30% of the company’s code was written by AI. And Nvidia assures us that 88% of its surveyed customers report AI has increased their revenues. 

But really, what else would they say? “Dear Board, we just blew half a billion bucks on Nvidia GPUs, and we’re losing money hand over fist?” I don’t think so.

The truth is, as an IDC study reports, a mind-boggling 88% of proof-of-concept AI projects never reach production. Lest we forget, MIT’s The GenAI Divide: State of AI in Business 2025 study found that 95% of AI projects fail to deliver measurable P&L impact. 

Now, I have to acknowledge that AI is finally becoming truly helpful in business. As a guy who knows a thing or two about programming, Linus Torvalds, creator of Linux and Git, said at Open Source Summit North America, “I’m personally 100% convinced that AI is changing programming.” He estimates that “AI will increase your productivity by a factor of 10.” 

But is that reason enough to slash make workforce cuts of between 10% to 40%? (Short answer: No. Longer answer: Noooo!)

It’s not just the mass firings. Workers who are either awaiting the axe, or have escaped it for the moment, are miserable. As one Meta employee told The San Francisco Standard, “I tend to cry in the shower,” and, “A lot of my feelings about my job are about the general chaos and not just the layoffs. ” 

So, explain this to me: When everyone knows AI-driven layoffs are coming, exactly how well do you expect them to work? You really think they can give their best? 

Making matters worse, it’s an open secret that IBM, Google, and Meta are having their employees train their AI replacements. As a popular meme puts it, workers are now “building your own coffin.” Is it any wonder that a lot of people — 29% of all employees and 44% among Gen Z workers —  are deliberately sabotaging work when the boss insists they train their AI replacements?

It also sure doesn’t help office morale when the CEO keeps saying AI will replace half of all employees. A particularly egregious example of this was when Standard Chartered CEO Bill Winters proclaimed his bank would slash thousands of jobs and replace “lower-value human capital” with AI.  

He’s since backed off the claim, but come on — we all know he meant it. Just like all the other CEOs who’ve said similar things, between FOMO and the knowledge that AI job news is sure to make the stock price jump, they’re eager to cut headcounts and boast about how successful AI will make them. 

What happens a few quarters down the road? Their attitude today seems to be let  tomorrow take care of tomorrow. I hate to tell them, but that really doesn’t work in the long run. (Not, mind you, that a future much farther ahead than the next quarter seems to matter much anymore to business executives.)

It should. As a recent Deloitte study stated: “Most respondents reported achieving satisfactory ROI on a typical AI use case within two to four years. This is significantly longer than the typical payback period of 7seven to 12 months expected for technology investments. Only 6% reported payback in under a year, and even among the most successful projects, just 13% saw returns within 12 months.” 

AI, in short, is not the miracle cure for what ails businesses that its fans claim. 

Will that stop businesses? I doubt it. While I appreciate that California Gov., Gavin Newsom is trying to bandage the AI job bleedout by mandating studies on subsidizing companies to keep employees rather than replace them with AI, I doubt that will do much to staunch the wound. 

At the Open Source Summit North America, Linux Foundation CEO Jim Zemlin was optimistic about AI and jobs. He pointed out that, thanks to AI becoming  “pretty damn good coders,” the number of open-source projects on GitHub has led to a “surge of new code and projects.” 

Zemlin also believes that while few developers will write code, “engineers will still design, review, secure, and integrate that code.” (He’s referring to what’s becoming  known as forward-deployed engineers.) This, in turn, will supposedly lead to tech job growth. 

I’d feel a lot better about that prediction if I believed the C-suite suits at most companies were capable of truly forward-looking thinking rather than focusing entirely on hiking the stock price by making the next quarter look good through staffing cuts. 

In the long run, sure, AI will make us more productive. But, we’re not there yet. For now, companies need to keep employees happy, not shove AI down their throats — and work out carefully and thoughtfully how AI will really work for business. 

If ever there were a lawsuit in which a jury and judge should have ruled against both the accuser and the defendants, Elon Musk’s suit against OpenAI and Microsoft was it. 

The high-profile legal battle pitted the world’s richest man against a company worth more than $3 trillion, another that might soon launch a $1 trillion IPO, and tech execs claiming to have only the good of the world in mind, not mere filthy lucre, while they develop a technology some fear could eventually destroy humankind.

The lawsuit was eventually thrown out, but only on technical grounds. Meanwhile, unregulated AI marches on, with Musk, OpenAI and Microsoft all getting richer.

The only winner in this suit was hypocrisy. Here’s why.

Back to the beginning

To understand how this unfolded, we need to go back to OpenAI’s beginnings. The company was founded by current CEO Sam Altman, Musk and others in 2015 — back when AI was a niche technology, used primarily for image and speech recognition, robotics, and experiments in self-driving cars.

The founders funded OpenAI out of their own pockets as a nonprofit company aimed at developing AI for the good of the world. Then, as the technology evolved, Altman, Musk and others grew worried it might become so powerful that, without serious guardrails, it could pose a danger to humans. They feared what might happen if AI reached the level of a super-powerful artificial general intelligence (AGI) system, superior to humans on a variety of tasks, with general problem-solving skills rather than narrowly targeted ones – and the ability to think for itself rather than heeding humans. 

In an earlier version of Musk’s suit against OpenAI and Microsoft, Musk put their fears this way: “A.G.I. poses a grave threat to humanity — perhaps the greatest existential threat we have today.”

Early on, OpenAI wasn’t on many people’s radar. When Microsoft invested $1 billion in the company in 2019, few outside the tech industry took notice. Between 2021 and 2023 Microsoft invested $2 billion more, still without drawing a lot of attention.

Then in November 2022, OpenAI released ChatGPT, launching the generative AI (genAI) revolution — and all the disruption that has followed since. Eventually, as it became clear how important and valuable genAI technology would become, Microsoft’s investment ballooned to $13 billion.

Nonprofit no more

OpenAI insiders were convinced several years before ChatGPT’s release that the company could become tremendously profitable. With potentially trillions of dollars at stake, in 2017 they started looking for a way to turn the nonprofit operation into a for-profit company.

It was at that point, OpenAI says, that Musk pushed to gain majority equity in the company if it went public, take control of the board, and become CEO. When the other founders balked, Musk withheld funding.

Last year, OpenAI released copies of emails he sent to it during the height of their in-fighting. In one, in February 2018, he lobbied for the creation of a for-profit arm, pointing out that, “a for-profit pivot might create a more sustainable revenue stream over time and would, with the current team, likely bring in a lot of investment.” 

Musk then suggested that OpenAI “attach to Tesla as its cash cow.” When the other founders dismissed the idea, Musk threw a fit and quit the company. OpenAI went ahead and launched a for-profit arm, becoming a hybrid of a for-profit and nonprofit company in 2019.

Years later, in 2024, Musk filed suit, targeting OpenAI, Altman, OpenAI co-founder and president Greg Brockman, and Microsoft — accusing them of “stealing a charity” by creating the for-profit arm of OpenAI, and taking the $13 billion Microsoft investment. He claimed they had all illegally enriched themselves through the profit/nonprofit setup and sought $150 billion in damages. (OpenAI fired back last year with a counter suit.)

It took only two hours for the jury to rule against Musk, though the ruling didn’t address his actual claims. Rather, the suit was thrown out because it had been filed after the statute of limitations had run out.

Cynicism and hypocrisy win out

Everyone in this case was driven by venality. Altman portrayed himself as only wanting to develop AI to help humanity — and as evidence, pointed out he has no equity in OpenAI. What he neglected to add, though, is that he has more than a $2 billion stake in companies that have deals with OpenAI, and stands to gain billions more if those deals grow after any IPO.

Microsoft, meanwhile, has used its investments in OpenAI to become a multi-trillion-dollar company. And if, as expected, OpenAI becomes a trillion-dollar company when it files its IPO later this year, Microsoft’s 27% ownership stake in the company would make it $270 million richer. That’s not a bad payoff for turning a blind eye to the way in which OpenAI performed a bait-and-switch from nonprofit to for-profit company. 

As for Musk…, well, what can you say about someone who claims he wants to save humankind from the evils of AI, while at the same time lobbying for OpenAI to become a for-profit company and milking it like a cash cow? 

He’s shown he’s not only the world’s wealthiest man. He’s also the world’s most hypocritical.