The research literature on why people join tightly bound religious groups is around sixty years old now, and it has been unusually consistent on a finding that never quite made it into general conversation. Those who join are rarely the credulous ones. They are frequently educated, sceptical about the society around them, and carrying a sense of obligation they had not yet found anywhere to put.

What the studies keep landing on instead is timing and company. Somebody meets the group during a stretch when the ordinary structures of a life have come loose, and meets it through a person they have already come to like.

The pattern appears across several independent studies of different movements, conducted by researchers who disagreed with each other about a great deal else. It is also a literature with real boundaries, which we take up further down.

What the 1965 model actually proposed

Most of this traces back to a paper by John Lofland and Rodney Stark, published in the American Sociological Review in December 1965 as “Becoming a World-Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective”. The group they observed was a small millenarian movement on the American west coast. It was later widely understood to have been the first American cell of the Unification Church.

Their model was sequential. Conversion required a person to be experiencing enduring and acutely felt tension, and to interpret that tension in religious rather than political or psychiatric terms. From there, the person had to come to see themselves as a seeker, and to encounter the group at what the authors called a turning point in life. An affective bond with a member then had to form, competing outside attachments had to weaken, and the recruit had to be drawn into sustained daily interaction.

Seven conditions, each necessary, none sufficient alone.

How far the scheme travelled was contested almost immediately. Lofland returned to the same movement in a 1977 article in American Behavioral Scientist, revising his account of how its conversion organisation had changed. Within a decade other researchers were putting the model to work on other groups, with mixed results.

The turning point does more work than the personality

Lofland and Stark meant something specific by a turning point: a stretch in which old lines of action had been completed, disrupted or broken off, and new ones had not yet formed. Graduation. A move to a city where nobody knows you. The end of a marriage. Recovery from a long illness. The month after the work you organised yourself around stops. Somebody in that position has more unassigned hours, fewer people who would notice a changed schedule, and no ready answer to the question of what they are doing with their life.

Later social movement research made a related structural argument. David Snow, Louis Zurcher and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, writing in the American Sociological Review in 1980, found that recruitment ran along existing social networks and worked most efficiently on people with few countervailing commitments holding them in place. That literature came to call the condition structural availability.

Friendship arrives before belief

Sturdiest of all is the finding about who does the recruiting. Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge brought quantitative data from three quite different radical religious groups to the American Journal of Sociology in 1980, and made the case that interpersonal bonds were the essential mechanism. They treated the older deprivation-based explanations and the newer network-based ones as complementary rather than rival, and observed that social ties underpin commitment to conventional faiths as well.

On that account, doctrine comes second. People become close to members and take on the beliefs afterwards, as part of the cost and the pleasure of belonging. It accounts for the failures too. Recruitment stalls when the people already in somebody’s life stay close enough to keep asking questions.

Barker’s figures, and the part that gets left out

Eileen Barker, now emeritus professor of sociology at the London School of Economics, published The Making of a Moonie: Choice or Brainwashing? in 1984, after close to seven years of fieldwork. She attended workshops and communal centres, and put long interviews and questionnaires to four distinct populations: current members, ex-members, non-joiners who had been through the movement’s recruitment approach and declined it, and separate control groups of uninvolved people from comparable backgrounds. Parents, spouses and friends were surveyed too.

Her retention figures are the interesting part. Writing later in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Society, Barker put it plainly: the overwhelming majority of those exposed to the alleged brainwashing techniques did not join the movement. Most of those who did join left of their own accord within a couple of years. Enumerations in the 1984 book put the yield of the residential two-day workshop, described at the time as the movement’s most effective instrument of persuasion, at fewer than a quarter of attendees staying beyond a week.

Very little stuck.

In the same entry, Barker describes the intake of the early 1970s as disproportionately middle-class and well educated: young people giving up college and careers to work long hours on the street for the movement. She characterises the membership of that period as youthful idealists with few responsibilities.

The idealism and the availability arrive together.

How to read the psychiatric data

Marc Galanter, Richard Rabkin, Judith Rabkin and Alexander Deutsch published a study of 237 Unification Church members in the American Journal of Psychiatry in February 1979. Members completed a 216-item questionnaire. They scored below the mean of an age and sex matched comparison group on a general wellbeing scale, and reported significantly more distress in the period before conversion than after it.

Two cautions on that. The pre-conversion measure is retrospective self-report gathered from people currently inside the group, and a movement that teaches members to read their earlier life as empty has supplied both a reason and a vocabulary for describing it that way. Elevated distress before a transition also sits some way short of psychiatric instability, which a cross-sectional questionnaire was not designed to assess.

What survives is less comfortable than either misreading. Whatever else the organisation was doing to its members, they reported feeling better inside it than they remembered feeling outside.

What the literature does not settle

Nearly all of it describes one window: American and British new religious movements between the mid 1960s and the mid 1980s, examined by sociologists who were arguing, often explicitly, against the brainwashing accounts then running in the press. That argument shaped which questions got asked.

Within the model itself, the turning point element has had a harder time than the friendship element. David Snow and Cynthia Phillips tested the Lofland-Stark sequence against data on the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist movement in America, writing in Social Problems in 1980, and found little empirical support for the model in its entirety. The tension, seekership and turning point conditions fared poorly in their data. Affective bonds and intensive interaction held, and the authors concluded that conversion was highly improbable in their absence. Any ordering inside the pattern belongs to those datasets and those groups.

How people get in also says almost nothing about what happens to them once they are inside, and the two questions have frequently been run together, including by critics who read this body of work as going easy on the groups it described. An entry route can be entirely ordinary while the organisation waiting on the other side of it does real damage.

Across these studies, what predicted joining was what else somebody had on that month, and who was already sitting beside them.

The post Researchers who study cults say the people most likely to join aren’t the gullible or the unstable: they’re often people in the middle of a life transition who met the group through someone they already liked appeared first on Space Daily.

Published in Animal Behaviour in August 2015, the experiment was a small piece of domestic theatre staged in front of 54 dogs. The owner sat in the middle. A stranger sat on either side. For eight to ten seconds the owner struggled with the lid of a transparent container holding a roll of vinyl tape, then turned to one of the strangers and held the container out, asking for help.

In one version the stranger took the container in both hands, the lid came off, and the owner cheerfully showed the tape to the dog. In another, the stranger turned away and the owner kept failing. Afterwards both strangers held out an identical treat on an open palm at the same moment, neither of them looking at the dog.

The dog chose one.

Dogs who had watched the refusal took food from that person less often than from the stranger on the other side who had done nothing at all. Across the four trials each dog completed, choices of the refuser fell significantly below the chance level of two, at P = 0.023. Hitomi Chijiiwa, Hika Kuroshima, Yusuke Hori, James R. Anderson and Kazuo Fujita published it as “Dogs avoid people who behave negatively to their owner: third-party affective evaluation”.

This is one study, not settled consensus. None of us are comparative psychologists, and what follows is a reading of the paper, of the university’s own summary published on 24 June 2015, and of the research it sits beside.

What the dogs were actually watching

One obvious objection is that a person turning their body away is simply unpleasant to watch, and the design anticipates it. Dogs were assigned to one of three groups of eighteen. In the helper condition the owner asked and received help. In the nonhelper condition the owner asked and was refused. In the control condition the owner worked at the lid for the same interval, paused briefly, and the actor turned away without having been asked anything. In that condition too, the owner failed to open the container.

Dogs in the control condition showed no preference. Turning away, on its own, cost the actor nothing. What cost the actor something was turning away after being asked.

Smaller details make the result harder to explain away. Inside the container was a roll of tape, of no use to a dog, and the authors record that no dog tried to get it out at any point. The neutral person sat looking at the floor throughout, nobody made eye contact with the dog at the moment of choosing, positions were counterbalanced, and every dog got a treat whichever hand it went to.

The half of the result that goes missing

In the helper condition, the dogs’ choices were indistinguishable from chance. Watching a stranger step in and solve the owner’s problem did not make that stranger more attractive than a person who had spent the whole sequence studying the carpet. Reported effect sizes were r = 0.54 in the nonhelper condition, against 0.32 in the helper condition and 0.16 in the control, neither of the latter two reaching significance.

Chijiiwa and colleagues flagged the lopsidedness themselves, noting that the same one-sided pattern has turned up in three-year-old children and in the tufted capuchin monkeys their lab had tested earlier. Their reading was that negative evaluation comes first, with positive evaluation of helpful agents arriving later in human development. Whether dogs show the positive version under other conditions they left open, and put on their own list of things to test next.

Why the shape of it is familiar

Anyone who has spent time with the human negativity-bias literature will recognise the contour. Most of that work traces back to Roy Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, Catrin Finkenauer and Kathleen Vohs, writing in Review of General Psychology in 2001. They worked through evidence across everyday events, close relationships, feedback, learning and impression formation, and found the same skew almost everywhere they looked. Bad impressions form faster than good ones and hold up better against later evidence that contradicts them.

That paper deserves the same scrutiny we are applying to everything else here. It is a narrative review rather than a meta-analysis, assembled a quarter of a century ago and before psychology’s replication reckoning, and its authority comes from breadth of convergence rather than from any single robust result.

Most people can audit the ordinary human version of this themselves. A colleague who did not back you in a meeting stays filed, retrievable years later, in some detail. The one who did back you is remembered as having been there. Help that arrives because it was requested tends to get absorbed into the expected, and things absorbed into the expected stop being events.

What the study does not establish

It does not show that dogs have a moral sense, and the authors do not claim it. Their framing in the university summary puts the weight on affective functions, not on language or on close evolutionary proximity to humans, and allows that the process may be automatic rather than conscious.

One alternative route stays open. That control condition rules out the turning-away gesture and holds the owner’s failure constant, which is careful work. What it cannot fully hold constant is the owner. A person who has been visibly refused may carry themselves differently in the seconds afterwards than a person who has simply paused, and a dog reading its owner’s bearing would produce the same result as a dog evaluating the actor. Separate work from the same lab that year, by Akiko Takaoka and colleagues, showed how finely dogs track human reliability when their own interests are at stake.

Eighteen dogs per condition and four trials each is a small foundation, and the adjacent human literature has become less tidy than it looked. A 2007 study by Kiley Hamlin, Karen Wynn and Paul Bloom reported that infants prefer a character who helps over one who hinders, and it became the anchor for the claim that social evaluation appears in the first year of life. A preregistered multi-laboratory replication run through the ManyBabies framework and published in Developmental Science targeted the video-stimulus version instead of the original live puppet show. Across 37 laboratories and 567 retained infants aged five and a half to ten and a half months, the preference did not differ from chance.

That has not settled the matter against Hamlin. Replication attempts have gone both ways over nearly two decades, and swapping live puppets for video is itself a candidate explanation for a null result. Contested is the accurate word.

Kyoto’s own follow-through is instructive. Running the identical procedure with cats, Chijiiwa and colleagues reported in Animal Behavior and Cognition in 2021 that cats showed no avoidance of the person who had refused their owner. They published the null result rather than leaving it in a drawer, which is more than the field always manages.

The bookkeeping

What the dog result suggests, if it holds, is how little machinery this kind of accounting requires. No language, no theory of anyone’s motives, nothing at stake, and the record still comes out one-sided. A mechanism that cheap is unlikely to be one that insight corrects, and whether knowing about the asymmetry does anything to interrupt it is not a question this literature has answered.

In their write-up, the Kyoto group listed what they wanted to test next. One was whether a helper would earn a positive evaluation if the help came unprompted. That idea is smaller and more testable than anything about moral sense: being asked may change what an act is worth to whoever is watching.

The post At Kyoto University, dogs who saw a stranger snub their owner later took fewer treats from that stranger, and what’s hard to shake is how closely it mirrors us: keeping careful account of who let us down while barely noting who showed up appeared first on Space Daily.

Stupidity is not low intelligence. It is damage without gain to anyone involved.

Scientists from the Salk Institute have determined that brain waves in the visual cortex serve as a computational engine, allowing the brain to construct internal representations of the external world that enhance prediction, reconstruction, and perception capabilities.

While the scientists behind the new study focused their work on the visual cortex, they suspect that similar brain waves washing over other areas of the brain’s surface likely serve a similar role for other sensory systems.

Unraveling the Role of Traveling Brain Waves in the Visual Cortex

The human brain uses electricity to communicate between synapses. Research has shown that this electrical activity can travel in waves across the brain’s surface. Called neural traveling waves, the phenomenon’s role in brain function and consciousness is not completely understood.

Previous studies have established that traveling brain waves play a significant role in behavior and attention. In 2020, Salk neuroscientist John Reynolds, PhD, successfully identified traveling brain waves in the visual systems of animals during a wakeful state.

According to a statement from Reynolds, the senior and co-corresponding author on the new paper, and colleagues, the 2020 research effort also found a direct correlation between traveling brain waves in the visual cortex and an animal’s ability to perceive objects directly in front of them. The authors suggest this discovery explained the “classic conundrum” of searching for something like a pair of keys or a phone that was right in front of you the whole time.

Although the connection between traveling brain waves and an awake animal’s ability to perceive objects seemed solid, Reynolds said he was left wondering why. 

Process is Analogous to LLM’s Like ChatGPT

In their newly proposed theory, Reynolds and colleagues suggest that traveling brain waves are not simply “electrical noise” resulting from the brain’s normal relaying of signals. Instead, the Salk Institute team proposes that the neural connections responsible for the generation of traveling brain waves change their physiological structure, or “synaptic weights,” to more accurately reflect the outside world.

“Each sight, smell, sound, and action of an animal alters the connections that generate these waves, building the neural circuitry that the brain uses to construct an internal representation of the external world,” the team’s statement explains.

In the visual cortex, the part of the brain responsible for receiving and processing visual information, the team proposed that traveling brain waves perform four distinct functions. These include modulating visual perception from moment to moment and turning recent visual sensory inputs into “internal representations” of objects, people, and surroundings.

The team proposes that traveling brain waves also help humans generate short-term predictions about their surroundings, and “store and replay patterns that represent memories of events unfolding in time.” Reynolds said the process laid out by his team is analogous to how ChatGPT and other LLMs translate and interpret data.

“They learn statistical structure from language and use that knowledge to generate meaningful and appropriately structured text that reflects the patterns of language,” the researcher explained. “The brain may be doing something functionally similar—a biological generative model built from the ground up by experience.”

“One Step Closer” to Understanding How Our Brains Compute the World

When detailing the potential impact of their proposed role for traveling brain waves in the visual cortex, the team highlights the contrast between a rich and complex world and its general predictability.

“Objects around you exist in 3D space, you see the world in retinal images that change with your eye and body movements, and the laws of physics and physiology overlay this all,” they explain.

Reynold’s team says that traveling brain waves are merely the brain’s way of internalizing these predictable “regularities” and encoding them in its synapse network. If correct, they said that this encoding would allow the brain to “infer the likely causes of sensory input and construct an internal model of the world.”

“This framing brings us one step closer to understanding how our brains compute the busy, messy world around us, turning a complicated sensory onslaught into behaviors and experiences,” they conclude.

The study “Neural traveling waves in cortex: network mechanisms and potential roles in neural computation” was published in Neuron.

Christopher Plain is a Science Fiction and Fantasy novelist and has spent the last six years as Associate News Editor and Head Science Writer at The Debrief. Follow and connect with him on X, learn about his books at plainfiction.com, or email him at christopher@thedebrief.org

I can’t blame my patients for turning to its straightforward assessments. But it has real risks – and care may require human messiness

“Chat told me I should break up with him.”

I instructed my face to remain therapist-neutral, but I must have smirked. The truth is, I was annoyed. We had been discussing the viability of this relationship for weeks, and in an instant AI had brought the answer. “How do you feel about it?” She said this had been her gut feeling all along. The following session, her relationship was over.

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© Photograph: AnnaStills/Getty Images

© Photograph: AnnaStills/Getty Images

© Photograph: AnnaStills/Getty Images