• Researchers show Gatekeeper can be bypassed by replacing a previously run legitimate macOS app with malware
• Attack requires prior user‑level code execution, then swaps in a malicious app that Gatekeeper won’t re‑verify
• Apple dismissed the issue, saying locally rebuilt bundles fall outside Gatekeeper’s scope, leaving risk to social engineering

A pair of researchers claims to have found a way around Gatekeeper, a built-in macOS security feature that helps protect users from running malicious or untrusted software. However Apple doesn’t really see it that way and has seemingly decided not to pursue the issue further.

Gatekeeper’s modus operandi is rather simple - when a user downloads an app from outside the App Store, it verifies the product comes from an identified developer and is notarized by Apple. If it can’t verify it - it won’t allow it to run on the machine.

Now, security researchers Talal Haj Barky and Tommy Mysk claim that, as long as a legitimate app was run at least once on a macOS device, it can be replaced with a malicious version, and Gatekeeper won’t even blink its virtual eye.

Locally built

That also means the attack is not that straightforward to pull off. The threat actor needs to have a way to execute user-level code (for example, a malicious app, a compromised software package installed through a package manager, or a prompt injection attack that tricks an AI agent).

Once that is obtained, they can archive a legitimate app, remove the original, then replace it with malware, and Gatekeeper will not try to re-authorize it. That malicious version can then trick the victim into compromising the device even further, since a certain level of trust was already established.

After reporting the issue to Apple, the company apparently just closed it.

"Apple doesn't consider this attack to be 'modifying' the signed executable," Mysk said. "Instead, Apple says that by archiving/restoring the app bundle, the proof-of-concept code overwrites the entire app bundle, making it locally built. Locally built app bundles are not covered by macOS guards. And this is why access to Keychain or TCC protected directories require system authorization prompts. And for users to accept those is a matter of social engineering attacks that Apple considers out of scope."

Via The Register

• Recorded Future found an Iran-linked group spreading spyware
• The malware is delivered through fake VPN and media player apps
• Researchers assess that most targets are Iranian users

A new report from Recorded Future's Insikt Group describes a campaign that inverts the whole point of a privacy tool: fake VPN apps built specifically to spy on the people who install them.

Researchers have linked fresh infrastructure to an Iran-nexus threat cluster they track as TAG-182, which is using fake VPN and media player downloads to allegedly deliver a surveillance tool called MarkiRAT. The group is "highly likely" to be targeting Iranians living inside and outside the country, the report says.

It's a blunt reminder that choosing one of the best VPN services is a lot more secure than downloading free, unvetted tools.

Fake apps, real surveillance

Insikt Group identified a cluster of attacker-controlled domains allegedly used to stage downloads of applications that appear nowhere on Google Play or Apple's App Store.

Two names stand out: Pis2ray VPN and a media player branded YESHICA, which was quietly renamed YESHICA YEPlayer in March 2026 after researchers publicly exposed the original.

According to researchers, if you download and run one of these files, you get MarkiRAT, a remote access Trojan. In plain terms, that is software that hands control of your device to somebody else.

Analysts have documented it capturing screenshots and uploading them to attacker-run servers, while disguising itself under believable process names.

It also abuses BITS, the background service Windows uses to fetch updates, to pull down further files. Because that activity looks like ordinary system housekeeping rather than an attack, it tends to slip past routine cleanup.

MarkiRAT is not new. It has previously been used by Ferocious Kitten, a group Kaspersky documented conducting years of covert surveillance against activists inside Iran.

Recorded Future stops short of attributing TAG-182 to any specific Iranian agency, but places it within a broader ecosystem of state-aligned surveillance groups.

Why a fake VPN makes such an effective lure

Distribution runs largely through social media. Insikt Group found Instagram posts promoting Pis2ray VPN in the weeks following street protests in Iran in late 2025, and again around the country's prolonged internet shutdown, which ended with partial restoration of access on 26 May 2026.

The people most desperate for a virtual private network (VPN) in a censored country are exactly the people most likely to install one from a social media link, because the official stores are often the very thing they cannot reach.

Recorded Future considers it almost certain that most targets are located in Iran or tied to anti-government movements in Europe and North America. TechRadar has covered previous Iran-linked fake VPN campaigns, and this one seems to follow the same pattern with better infrastructure.

How to stay safe

Most readers will never be targeted by a state actor, but the underlying lesson travels.

Install VPN apps only from official stores, and check that the provider has a real, verifiable presence outside the app listing.

Treat any VPN promoted through an Instagram post, a Telegram channel, or a direct message as suspect, however polished it looks.

Star ratings are a weak signal, since fake reviews are cheap.

• Huntress spots malicious Claude Artifact spoofing Claude Desktop, spreading SectopRAT malware
• Victims were redirected via Bing ads, infecting at least 29 organizations between July 21–22, 2026
• Claude removed the artifact after 7,000+ views; malvertising risks persist despite disclaimers on artifacts

At least 29 organizations have been infected with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) after mistaking a public Claude Artifact for a legitimate Claude page.

A Claude Artifact is an interactive document, or piece of code, that the AI generates and then hosts on the Claude platform. It can then be shared with other people as an example, or proof of concept, for different solutions. The link to an artifact usually looks something like this:

claude[.]ai/public/artifacts/ca466f1f-21c0-42af-b329-8f1c7534a891

Claude Artifacts are often used for phishing and other forms of scams, and we’ve seen it in ClickFix attacks in the past. Claude responded by adding a disclaimer to every artifact, stating that the content is user-generated and thus unverified.

In this particular case, a malicious artifact was created to spoof the download page for Claude Desktop. Victims would get redirected to an attacker-controlled domain, where instead of the Claude app, they’d download SectopRAT, a remote access trojan capable of stealing credit card data, personal information, files, passwords, and more.

Promoting the scam

The artifact was then promoted on Bing, showing up at the very top of search results to people searching for “Claude Desktop App”.

For years, the cybersecurity community has warned about malvertising, urging users to double-check the domain before clicking on any links, even promoted ones. However, the problem here is that the ad takes the victims to the legitimate Claude domain, making scrutiny that much harder.

The campaign was spotted by security researchers Huntress, who said that between July 21 and July 22, 2026, their SOC “lit up with a swathe of unusual executable installs, Defender exclusions, and anomalous persistence across 29 organizations, all coming from ClaudeDesktop.exe.”

Claude has since removed the malicious artifact, but not before it raked up more than 7,000 views. It is possible that other organizations, outside Huntress’ field of view, also fell victim to this scam.