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DARPA Wants to Build an Army of 100,000 AI Agents That Can Think and Act on Their Own

The future of military artificial intelligence may not be a single all-knowing machine directing a battlefield from a distant command center. Instead, DARPA is preparing to explore enormous collectives of AI agents capable of organizing themselves, dividing up missions, adapting to chaos, and continuing to operate even when some members of the group fail, disappear, or go rogue.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has formally launched a new effort called Decentralized Artificial Intelligence by Controlled Emergence, or DICE, aimed at developing AI collectives that can operate in contested environments without requiring a human or central AI planner to explicitly direct every action.

By the program’s final phase, DARPA wants researchers to test simulated collectives involving as many as 100,000 AI agents exchanging up to 1 million messages as they work toward shared objectives.

A recently released solicitation notice describes DICE as a 36-month effort divided between decentralization, adversarial robustness, and large-scale testing.

“Future conflicts will unfold at machine speed, and the current centralized planning and scripted orchestration approach is too slow, too rigid, and too predictable for the hyper-dynamic, contested environments of the future,” researchers write. “Surprise, adaptability, and resilience will depend on the ability to compose and recompose AI capabilities on demand.”

The basic premise behind DARPA’s DICE program is that today’s approach to multi-agent AI has a serious weakness. Most systems involving multiple AI agents still rely on some form of central orchestrator.

Think of it as a manager overseeing a team of specialized employees. One AI agent might gather information. Another analyzes it. A third creates a plan. A fourth executes a particular task. But somewhere in the system, a central planner or workflow typically decides who does what and combines the results.

That works reasonably well for predictable tasks. However, DARPA argues it may be dangerously vulnerable on a battlefield.

A central orchestrator creates a bottleneck because every increasingly complex mission must ultimately flow through a single decision-making structure. As the number of agents, roles, and interactions grows, the central planner must absorb more information, preserve greater context, and coordinate an expanding web of specialized systems.

Eventually, DARPA says, even an AI orchestrator can hit the context and inference limits of its underlying foundation model. There is also a more obvious military problem. A central command node is a single point of failure.

If communications are degraded, information arrives late, or the orchestrator itself is compromised, errors can potentially spread throughout the entire AI collective.

In a future conflict where electronic warfare, cyberattacks, deception, and broken communications are expected rather than exceptional, that vulnerability could be catastrophic.

DICE proposes a radically different model.

Rather than having a central AI issue instructions, individual AI agents would communicate directly with one another. They could form temporary teams, divide missions into smaller tasks, negotiate roles, combine incomplete information, and reorganize themselves when conditions change.

DARPA compares the idea to the architecture of the internet, where resilient global behavior can emerge from relatively simple local rules and decentralized interactions.

Essentially, an AI agent might receive a mission and determine that only part of the objective falls within its capabilities. The agent could volunteer to handle that portion and broadcast the remaining problem to neighboring agents.

Another agent might take the next task. Others could compete to perform the same job, potentially bidding based on cost or capability. Through repeated local interactions along with distributed consensus, the collective could gradually assemble its own mission plan.

If an agent fails, the entire mission does not necessarily need to be replanned. Its particular task could simply be offered back to the collective.

DARPA calls the larger concept “controlled emergence.”

Similar systems already exist in nature. Ant colonies, or flocks of birds, can engage in surprisingly complex group behavior even though no individual member possesses a complete understanding of the collective.

Computer scientists have long studied similar phenomena. DARPA’s solicitation even points to Conway’s Game of Life, the famous mathematical simulation in which extraordinarily complex patterns can emerge from a handful of simple rules.

The challenge is applying that principle to cognitive systems capable of reasoning, planning, and independently pursuing goals.

A sophisticated AI system may interpret ambiguous information, interact with tools, maintain memory, and generate its own intermediate objectives. Put thousands of such agents together, allow them to communicate, and the resulting collective could behave in ways that were never explicitly programmed.

That unpredictability is both the attraction and the danger of DICE.

DARPA wants the collective to remain creative enough to discover unexpected courses of action. However, it also wants individual agents to continue aligned with their designated roles, the wider mission, established doctrine, and ultimately the human user’s intent.

Too much control could produce a predictable but unstable AI force incapable of adapting. Too little control could allow agents to drift from their roles or develop what DARPA calls “instrumental goals” that are not consistent with the mission.

In other words, the Pentagon’s research arm wants emergence—but only within boundaries.

To solve the problem, DICE researchers will develop a local adaptor designed to interface with each AI agent. Rather than functioning as a central command system, each adaptor would operate locally, helping the agent coordinate with peers while simultaneously monitoring and modifying its behavior.

For AI models whose internal activations are accessible, researchers may experiment with techniques such as “activation steering.”

The simplified idea is that assigning an AI a particular role can create detectable patterns inside the model. Researchers may be able to identify a mathematical representation associated with that role and continuously steer the model back toward it when the agent begins to drift. DARPA describes these representations as potential “role vectors.”

For proprietary or black-box AI models whose internal activations cannot be directly examined, the challenge becomes considerably harder. DICE researchers may instead experiment with memory editing, context engineering, tool restrictions, or even game-theoretic incentives created to encourage collaborative behavior.

The solicitation draws an intriguing comparison to the way social norms emerge and spread among humans. As AI models become better at reasoning and more aware of the context in which they operate, DARPA suggests that the same growing sophistication that fuels fears about rogue AI could also provide a new way to control it.

The scale DARPA ultimately envisions is enormous.

During the first nine-month phase of DICE, simulated missions are expected to involve approximately 500 agents and 5,000 interactions. DARPA will compare the decentralized systems with state-of-the-art centrally orchestrated multi-agent AI systems.

The second phase increases the target to 5,000 agents and 50,000 interactions while introducing adversarial conditions. Agents may fail, receive deceptive information, or deliberately behave as compromised or rogue members of the collective.

By the final 12-month phase, DICE aims to test simulations involving 100,000 agents and 1 million interactions.

At that scale, DARPA is not simply studying better chatbots working together. The agency is exploring whether collective intelligence itself can become a military capability.

One example described in the solicitation imagines AI agents conducting operational planning across an entire conflict ecosystem. Some agents could negotiate for raw materials in contested areas. Others might manage supply chains, optimize manufacturing, deploy units, conduct battle management, or analyze post-battle damage.

Even an individual simulated drone could effectively become a miniature AI collective composed of separate navigation, perception, and networking agents.

Under the DICE concept, those capabilities may potentially be recombined as conditions change. DARPA offers the example of a surveillance drone being repurposed as a network router because the collective recognizes an emerging communications need.

The important distinction is that no central planner necessarily has to foresee that solution. The collective discovers it.

Still, DARPA is careful to note that DICE is a research program centered on simulation. The agency’s public program page explicitly states that its scope does not include developing or launching autonomous systems in the real world.

Instead, DICE will use Department of War-relevant simulated environments to measure whether decentralized AI collectives can outperform today’s centrally orchestrated systems. Those simulations may resemble extraordinarily large and complicated strategy games.

DARPA suggests researchers could draw inspiration from StarCraft or massively multiplayer online role-playing games, although the environments must remain relevant to military problems. High-fidelity physics is not necessarily required. In fact, rendering every drone, vehicle, or battlefield interaction in photorealistic detail could make a simulation of 100,000 AI agents computationally impossible.

The focus is on reasoning. DARPA wants to know whether thousands of AI agents can gather and combine fragmented information without simply reinforcing one another’s incorrect assumptions. The systems will be tested on their ability to recognize deception, isolate compromised agents, adapt when communications fail, and remain focused on a mission across thousands of reasoning steps.

Perhaps most importantly, DICE is designed to examine how these massive AI collectives behave when their interactions yield outcomes their designers never anticipated.

DARPA explicitly wants its test environments to provoke emergent collaboration, competition, and even collusion.

During later phases, DICE teams will face one another in simulated “team vs team playoffs.” The second phase will culminate in a competition used to select which research teams advance. The final phase will feature another head-to-head competition after the systems have been pushed toward full scale.

By Phase 3, the program will bring in another significant complication: AI agents creating other AI agents. That progression draws attention to the deeper tension at the center of DICE.

For years, much of the AI safety debate has focused on preventing autonomous systems from exhibiting unforeseen behavior. DARPA is approaching the problem from a different direction. The agency appears to believe that, in future contested environments, some degree of unforeseen behavior may be precisely what gives an AI collective its value.

A perfectly scripted system is predictable not only to its commanders but potentially to an adversary.

DICE is therefore attempting something considerably more ambitious than building a larger multi-agent AI framework. DARPA wants to understand whether engineers can deliberately cultivate emergent machine intelligence, allow it enough freedom to improvise, and still build controls capable of keeping an enormous AI collective aligned with a human-defined mission.

Whether those competing demands can coexist remains an open question. The program’s own solicitation repeatedly acknowledges the possibility of role drift, deceptive agents, collusion, compromised systems, and AI agents independently developing misaligned actions.

Ultimately, those are not side issues. They are the fundamental questions the DICE program was created to answer.

“DICE is built for such autonomy-powered, high-tempo battlespace,” the solicitation notice reads. “It is a future where success is measured by the relentless, creative ability of an autonomous collective to execute missions in the face of chaos and uncertainty. This is a profound and necessary departure from the past.”

Tim McMillan is a retired law enforcement executive, investigative reporter and co-founder of The Debrief. His writing typically focuses on defense, national security, the Intelligence Community and topics related to psychology. You can follow Tim on Twitter: @LtTimMcMillan.  Tim can be reached by email: tim@thedebrief.org or through encrypted email: LtTimMcMillan@protonmail.com 

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“We Must Act Now”: Congress Warns of Potential Threat in New Effort to Ban A.I. From Making Life-and-Death Military Decisions


A new proposed Senate bill aims to establish clear guardrails for the U.S. military’s use of artificial intelligence (AI), drawing a definitive line on one of the most consequential questions in modern warfare: who has the final say when lethal force is used?

On June 8, Senator Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) introduced the proposed Human Authority in Lethal Operations Act of 2026, or “HALO Act,” which would impose sweeping requirements on the Department of War (DoW) to ensure that autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems remain under meaningful human control.

The legislation would establish new design standards, testing requirements, oversight procedures, and legal safeguards for military systems that use artificial intelligence to identify, recommend, prioritize, or engage targets.

The bill aims to ensure that responsibility for battlefield decisions remains with human commanders, rather than shifting to algorithms. The legislation would require the Pentagon to designate accountable commanders for any engagement involving AI-enabled autonomous or semi-autonomous weapons and mandates that those commanders retain “ultimate discretion, judgment, and control over the use of force.”

“The past few months have shown us that there is an urgent need for commonsense guardrails to ensure the Defense Department’s use of AI is in line with Americans’ national security and privacy priorities,” Sen. Schiff said in a press release. “There are good reasons to use AI technology to advance our national security,” although he emphasized that, like with any tool, AI should not be allowed solely to guide human enterprises, “particularly when the risks of harm can be fatal.”

The proposal arrives amid growing concern among policymakers, military planners, and technology experts about the increasing role of artificial intelligence in combat operations.

Significantly, these concerns are no longer theoretical. As The Debrief previously reported, Israel’s reported use of the AI targeting system “Lavender” in Gaza triggered renewed debate over how much trust militaries should place in algorithmic target selection, particularly when civilian lives may be at risk.

Other recent examples have added to the concern, including studies showing that AI models can escalate dangerously in simulated war games, as well as the Pentagon’s continued push toward autonomous drones, AI-controlled aircraft, and robotic battlefield systems.

Even Pope Leo XIV recently weighed in on the issue in Magnifica Humanitas, his first encyclical, or formal papal teaching letter, warning that autonomous weapons could make war more feasible and less subject to human control, and arguing that lethal decisions must not be delegated to opaque or automated processes.

While the Pentagon has repeatedly stressed its commitment to responsible AI development, the HALO Act would codify many of those principles into law and create new statutory requirements governing how military AI systems are designed, tested, approved, and monitored.

Among the bill’s most significant provisions are requirements that autonomous weapon systems operate within predefined geographic areas, target sets, and timeframes. If a system cannot complete an engagement within those authorized parameters, it would be required to terminate the engagement until additional human operator and commander review is completed.

The legislation also calls for extensive record-keeping, cybersecurity protections, and continuous oversight to guard against unintended engagements and hostile manipulation.

The bill would also require senior Pentagon officials to conduct formal reviews before AI-enabled weapons enter development and again before they are fielded. Those reviews would assess legal compliance, operational safety, reliability, cybersecurity, and risks to civilians and protected infrastructure under the Law of Armed Conflict.

Beyond battlefield autonomy, the legislation targets several controversial uses of artificial intelligence in national security. It would prohibit covered Defense Department AI capabilities from inferring a person’s religion, race, political identity, sexual orientation, or emotional state. It would also restrict the purchase or receipt of Americans’ personal data from data brokers or other third-party sources when that data was obtained in a manner that would violate the bill’s rules.

Perhaps most notably, the proposed HALO Act explicitly forbids removing humans from decision-making processes involving presidential actions related to nuclear weapons.

“No covered artificial intelligence capability may be used with the intent, purpose, or outcome of… removing a human from the chain of decisionmaking for actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the President, including initiating or terminating nuclear weapons employment,” the proposed bill reads.

The measure also includes whistleblower protections for personnel working on military AI systems, mandates regular reporting to Congress, and requires the Pentagon to identify and remediate any fielded systems that fail to meet the law’s requirements.

Existing autonomous systems would undergo a comprehensive review, and any system found to be noncompliant could face retirement, modification, or suspension pending corrective action.

While the bill includes exemptions for certain defensive systems, cyber capabilities, mines, and other categories of military technology, its wider message is that as artificial intelligence becomes more deeply integrated into national defense, Congress wants humans, not machines, to remain responsible for high-stakes decisions.

The HALO Act is not the only effort underway on Capitol Hill to establish guardrails around military AI.

In March, Senator Elissa Slotkin (D-MI) introduced the AI Guardrails Act. Last week, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.) introduced separate legislation that would similarly prohibit the Pentagon from using artificial intelligence to launch nuclear weapons, conduct warrantless surveillance of Americans, or deploy fully autonomous weapons.

“Right now, the Pentagon is moving toward deploying incredibly powerful AI technology without commonsense guardrails in place, which could have catastrophic consequences that make all of us less safe,” Sen. Gillibrand said in a statement. “We must act now – not to stifle technological progress, but to establish clear rules of the road that keep humans in charge and keep AI’s use in warfare smart and safe.”

The competing proposals could set the stage for a broader congressional debate over the role of artificial intelligence in future military operations, particularly if lawmakers seek to incorporate them into the Fiscal Year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

Before that can happen, however, the HALO Act and similar proposals must navigate the legislative process. The bills will first be considered by the relevant Senate committee, where lawmakers may hold hearings, debate their provisions, amend the text, or decline to advance them. If approved, it would then need to pass both the Senate and the House before being sent to the president for signature, either as a standalone measure or as part of a larger NDAA.

“My legislation would protect Americans from unlawful domestic surveillance, ensure that humans in the chain of command exercise responsibility for the use of any lethal technology, and maintain strong ethical protections in the deployment of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons,” Sen. Schiff said in a statement.

Tim McMillan is a retired law enforcement executive, investigative reporter and co-founder of The Debrief. His writing typically focuses on defense, national security, the Intelligence Community and topics related to psychology. You can follow Tim on Twitter: @LtTimMcMillan.  Tim can be reached by email: tim@thedebrief.org or through encrypted email: LtTimMcMillan@protonmail.com 

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Orbs Orbit Aircraft | Faked Imagery, Alien Spacecraft or Covert Military Tech?

The video clip of orbs circling a passenger plane prompts speculation about its origins, including faked footage, extraterrestrial craft, or military technology. After analysis, I dismiss the latter two due to physical impossibilities, instead propose that these are interdimensional craft linked to the spiritual realm.

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