In a laboratory in Broomfield, Colorado, 98 atoms are suspended in mid-air, held in place by electric fields and cooled to temperatures close to absolute zero.
Each atom is far smaller than anything the naked eye could ever see, yet each carries information in a form that has no counterpart in classical physics.
Together, they form Helios, a new quantum computer built by the British-American company Quantinuum. Quantum computers use the power of quantum mechanics, the rules that govern how physics operates at atomic and sub-atomic scales. Those that use Helios’ model of suspended atoms are known as trapped-ion.
A paper published in Nature describes it as a 98-qubit processor with very high accuracy and performance that pushes beyond what can easily be simulated on classical machines. That sounds impressive, but the important question is not simply whether this is a
bigger quantum computer (the previous biggest, System Model H2, had 56 qubits). It is whether it is a better one.
Quantum computers are not just faster versions of ordinary computers. The qubits (quantum bits) that they use to process information can exist in quantum states that do not behave like the ones and zeroes of conventional digital technology.
This allows some calculations to be arranged in ways that may eventually outperform even the largest supercomputers. The possible applications are fascinating: new materials, better optimisation methods, improved chemistry simulations and new approaches to cryptography.
An introduction to the Helios quantum computer (Quantinuum).
The difficulty is that qubits are extremely fragile. They are disturbed by temperature variations, imperfect control, unwanted interactions with the environment and, in some systems, even the act of moving information around the device.
For this reason, the race in quantum computing is not only about having more qubits. It is about having more good qubits, controlled accurately enough to perform long and meaningful calculations.
Why it matters
This is why Helios’ result matters. Quantum computing has been promising to change the world for decades, but many announcements still tend to focus on the number of qubits.
This is like judging a race by the number of runners at the starting line. What matters is how many reach the finish, and in what condition. Helios takes both sides of that challenge seriously. Not only is the 98 qubits relatively large; it also reports very low error rates at this scale.
Errors are more common with quantum computers than with classical ones, so error correction is a big challenge in this area.
The Nature paper gives an average error rate for single-qubit gates of about 2.5 in 100,000 for Helios. A quantum gate is the building block of a circuit in quantum computers. For two-qubit gates in Helios, which are harder and more important for useful computation, the average error rate is about 7.9 in 10,000. This is similar to the best demonstrations of around 5 in 10,000 errors.
Quantum operations are cumulative. A small error in one step may not matter much, but a useful quantum algorithm may require thousands, millions or more operations. Lower error rates mean that more complex calculations become possible before the quantum information falls apart.
Helios’ other notable feature is all-to-all connectivity. In many quantum computers, qubits can interact only with their nearest neighbours, rather like people who can speak only to those sitting next to them. If two distant qubits need to interact, the information must be moved through a chain of intermediate steps. Each extra step adds time and error.
In Helios, any qubit can in principle interact with any other. This is especially valuable for algorithms where the required pattern of interactions does not fit neatly onto a fixed grid.
Quantum railway
The hardware behind this is also interesting. Trapped-ion quantum computers such as Helios use charged atoms as qubits. These ions are held using electric fields and manipulated with laser pulses.
The approach is known for high accuracy, but scaling it up while preserving that accuracy is technically difficult. Helios uses barium ions in what is called a quantum charge-coupled device, or QCCD, architecture. A useful way to picture it is as a tiny quantum railway.
Ions can be stored in memory regions and physically moved into operation zones when the computer programme needs a calculation to be performed using particular qubits. In those operation zones, carefully controlled laser pulses perform the basic steps of a quantum algorithm, known as quantum gates. These gates change the quantum state of one ion, or link the states of two ions together, allowing the computer to process information. In Helios, a ring-shaped storage area and a junction help route the ions around the device.
This separation of storage, movement and computation is not just smart engineering.
It is a sign that quantum computing is becoming more like a full computing system,
rather than a collection of impressive laboratory components.
The machine also uses software that can make routing and control decisions while a program is running. In practice, this means deciding which physical ion should represent each qubit, which ions need to be moved into the operation zones, and in what order the quantum gates should be carried out. This is important for more advanced quantum programmes, especially those where later steps may depend on measurements made during the computation.
And the paper reports that Helios can run random quantum circuits that would be extremely difficult to simulate on classical machines. That is an important benchmark, but not the same as having a generally useful quantum computer. Random circuit sampling tests the power and complexity of the machine; it does not, by itself, solve problems in medicine, climate science or engineering.
So how big an advance is Helios? It is a serious one, because even if it is not the
arrival point of a quantum revolution, it brings together scale, accuracy, connectivity and programmability in one machine.
It is a reminder that transformative technologies rarely arrive in a single leap; they are built step by step, atom by atom, until the impossible starts to look engineered.
Domenico Vicinanza does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Did you click on this article out of your own free will? Or was it predetermined by the cosmic evolution of particles, unfolding in an unbroken chain reaction set in motion by the big bang? Perhaps you think random quantum processes or unconscious brain activity were responsible? Whether you are philosophically inclined or not, the topic of free will is something most of us have pondered at some stage.
Research has shown that people tend to believe in free will, at least in some form. A more important question, perhaps, is whether it matters. This is the exact conundrum that researchers in psychology and experimental philosophy have been trying to answer recently. What would ultimately happen if people gave up on the idea of free will?
It may seem like a dangerous idea; something that could result in chaos and depression. And indeed, research has largely found that when you manipulate people to doubt free will, bad things happen – including an increase in behaviour such as cheating and aggression. This suggests that even if free will doesn’t exist, as many scientists and philosophers assume, it might be better for us to pretend that it does. But newer research by me and others suggests that doubting the existence of free will may not have such bad consequences, after all.
Philosophers have argued for centuries about what free will is and whether we have it. Positions vary widely, and it is impossible to give the subject full coverage here. At one end of the debate are libertarians, who contend that at least some of our choices and actions are not causally determined. At the other end are hard determinists who argue that every thought, action or event is a result of past events and the laws of nature.
When people talk about a disbelief in free will, determinism is usually the position that springs to mind. Yet, determinism is one of many positions within a family of views that dismiss the notion of free will. A position that has emerged more recently is called free will scepticism. While this position rejects the idea that humans possess genuine free will (but not necessarily agency), only some sceptics reject it because of determinism, while others argue that free will is impossible in an indeterministic or random universe.
But whichever tribe you identify with, what are the actual consequences of your beliefs? Before looking at some of the issues with recent experiments, let’s first explore how researchers began manipulating beliefs in the first place.
The Insights section is committed to high-quality longform journalism. Our editors work with academics from many different backgrounds who are tackling a wide range of societal and scientific challenges.
The benefits of believing in free will
The first piece of research to experimentally manipulate free will beliefs was conducted by Kathleen Vohs and Jonathan Schooler in 2008. This work, which is now a seminal paper in the area, comprised two experiments. In the first experiment, the researchers asked participants to read text taken from Francis Crick’s classical book The Astonishing Hypothesis. Participants were allocated to read either an anti-free will version or a neutral one.
In the group that was manipulated to not believe in free will, the text stated that free will was illusionary and behaviour was driven by unconscious brain activity. For example, the text included sentences such as “everything people are and do is the product of simple, physical processes in their brains” and “although we appear to have free will, in fact, our choices have already been predetermined for us and we cannot change that.” In the control condition, the text did not mention free will and instead discussed research on consciousness.
After reading the text, all participants completed a mental-arithmetic task on a computer. They were told that a “programming glitch” meant that the solutions/answers to the task that they were meant to solve themselves would be visible. Participants were therefore encouraged to press the spacebar, which would ensure the solutions remained hidden. Therefore, whether or not participants decided to keep the answers hidden was used to indicate cheating.
The researchers speculated that those reading the anti-free will text would press the spacebar less so than the control condition. And this is what they found. To confirm these findings, they ran a second experiment with some slight methodological changes. This second experiment essentially found the same thing: participants made to disbelieve in free will cheat more.
This paper led to a proliferation of studies seeking to examine other outcomes associated with free will beliefs. Roy Baumeister and colleagues investigated the link between the belief in free will and aggressive behaviour. After a free will belief manipulation, participants completed a cooking task and were told that the individual they were preparing food for disliked spicy food. Therefore, the amount of hot sauce administered by the participant served as the measure of aggression. Consistent with the researchers’ prediction, participants whose belief in free will had been weakened slathered on more hot sauce. The researchers therefore concluded that belief in free will is related to aggression. That said, they only looked at the direct consequences of manipulating people doubt free will rather than capturing the exact thought process of why they used more hot sauce.
The consequences of this programme of work were clear: if we make people disbelieve in free will, negative outcomes will follow. Consequently, even if we believe free will is an illusion, people should be shielded from this information as a society. However, there are some issues with these manipulation studies and the catastrophic conclusions derived from this line of research.
Are these conclusions premature?
An important issue concerns the beliefs that these manipulations are targeting. As mentioned earlier, many arguments against free will exist, and each argument aligns itself to a different philosophical position. The texts given to participants typically make claims related to the inevitability of events, the nature of science and the role of consciousness.
They are an amalgamation of philosophical positions that have their own ramifications. One idea that is commonly used in manipulations is the suggestion that people’s thoughts, desires, and wills are ineffectual – that the brain prepares for action before we consciously decide to do something. So when you reach for that chocolate bar at the end of a hard day, it’s not a result of conscious choice – unconscious brain processes are entirely to blame.
But this is not the only way think about a lack of free will; and it’s not something a sceptic would endorse. Many sceptics believe that thoughts and desires do influence how people behave but, importantly, the cognitive processes that underlie them (including genetics and past experiences) are either determined or due to chance. This suggests your desire was at play when you ate that chocolate bar – you can have agency without having full, God-like control deserving of ultimate moral responsibility. In this view, free will is more of a metaphysical concept whereas agency is involved in day-to-day events.
This is an important but subtle difference. Telling people that their thoughts have no say in what they do might lead to feelings of demotivation, disillusionment and alienation. It may even lead them to immoral behaviour. But these consequences are likely a result of far-fetching, dramatised arguments that pose direct threats to agency, and not a general, sceptic approach.
Suppose the manipulations do weaken belief in free will, but only according to a sceptical position that maintains some belief in agency. Will it still lead to dramatic, abhorrent outcomes? Recall that the experiments with the mathematical task, with cheating behaviour represented by the number of keypresses that did or did not occur.
The most that can be concluded from this experiment is that weakening belief in free will can influence cheating in a fictitious mental arithmetic task. The study did not find a relationship between belief in free will and other, more socially relevant, ways of deceptiveness, such as fraud, infidelity, academic dishonesty and so forth. To assume people cheating in a controlled laboratory experiment, which has no real-life consequences, would also commit these other forms of cheating appears far-fetched.
Similarly, the cooking study showed that beliefs about free will can affect how much hot sauce participants allocate in a laboratory setting. It is possible that the same manipulation could also increase verbal hostility or confrontation, and perhaps even aggression or threatening conduct. However, these conclusions remain completely speculative – we just don’t know.
For argument’s sake, let’s assume that they do lead to bad things in real life. We may still question just how meaningful the findings are. Researchers talk a lot about the “effect size” of a finding, which basically tells us the magnitude or size of the effect. A large effect size indicates a finding has practical significance, whereas a small effect indicates limited practical application. Researchers obviously strive for the former.
To get a sense of the effect size in free will belief research, a 2022 paper reviewed studies administering manipulations to free will beliefs. It found that these manipulations only had a small effect size. What’s more, it showed that the strongest effects happened directly after the manipulation instead of at the end of the experiment. This indicates that manipulation effects may not only fade after the experiment, but wane over the course of the experimental session – we don’t think about whether we have free will constantly. Not only that, but the review found that changes in free will beliefs did not have any meaningful, lasting change in behaviours.
A final issue has to do with replication, the confirmation of scientific findings in other studies. Whether a finding is replicated is one of the major principles in science. Repeating an experiment and consistently finding the same thing can increase confidence about an initial finding. And a replication crisis has recently engulfed psychology.
This is also the case for free will research. For example, some researchers have failed to change participants’ belief in free will. Others, despite successfully changing free will beliefs, have found difficulty replicating the consequences. For example, one study could not replicate the findings regarding cheating on the mathematical task. These difficulties question the credibility of the original findings and pose serious challenges to the assumption that negative consequences come about from a disbelief in free will.
Can a disbelief be good?
We have seen different reasons why it may be premature for researchers to conclude that disbelieving in free will has negative consequences. But we may also question whether these negative outcomes are to be expected anyway, and whether adopting a sceptical position can actually have societal benefits.
One view is that beliefs about free will make no difference to how people think and behave. Think about meaning in life, something which research has supposedly showed to be weakened by a disbelief free will. Imagine that a person’s meaning is strongly attached to their career. This person harbours the ambition to become a lawyer and after years of dedication, finally achieves her dream. Would the belief that she lacked free will affect her meaning and how she perceived this success?
Not necessarily so. She was still the one that got up early, arrived home late and dedicated hours to studying. The pride in her accomplishment does not evaporate in the knowledge that she was not the ultimate controller. She may be thankful for her upbringing, the education she received and her family support. There can still be meaning and gratitude. People ascribe meaning to all sort so things – intelligence, athleticism and beauty – none of which have got anything to do with free will.
What’s more, I conducted a study that specifically looked at meaning in life across people holding a range of views about free will. One group read a text passage denouncing free will (a traditional free will disbelief manipulation); and a second read neutral text (a control condition). I also had a third group which did not receive a manipulation but was selected by identifying as free-will sceptics.
All participants reported on how meaningful their life was. As would be expected, those manipulated to disbelieve in free will showed lower meaning than the control, supporting previous studies. But crucially, the sceptic group had the same sense of meaning and purpose as the control.
This indicates that, as suggested earlier, the manipulations claiming to make people doubt free will are not doing so in accordance with a sceptical perspective. More importantly, this suggests that the meaning in life of people taking sceptic views is unaffected by their philosophical position.
Further supporting this, a 2024 paper examined the views of free will sceptics exclusively and found that 41% (out of 164) claimed that their disbelief had no effect on their life at all. And the most reported consequences were indeed positive, including having compassion for others, being less controlling and more relaxed.
Does this mean a sceptical position could in fact provide societal benefits? One of the most debated consequences of free will beliefs concerns morality and responsibility. In the current legal system, retributive punishment is predicated on the assumption that the criminal was morally responsible for their action and acted out of their own free will. Supporting this view, research has found that participants with a stronger belief in free will are actually less empathic towards wrongdoers, and hand out harsher sentences. Yet, if free will does not exist, it would seem unduly harsh to punish an individual based on an act they were not responsible for.
Gregg Caruso and Derk Pereboom are prominent free will sceptics who question the morality of punitive decisions. They suggest that instead of punishing people because they are morally responsible for their actions, more empathetic, non-punitive approaches can be adopted in line with sceptical beliefs. For example, their quarantine model seeks to isolate offenders and provide rehabilitation until they no longer pose a risk to society – regardless of their level of responsibility. Seen in this way, a disbelief in free will could potentially overhaul a legal system that’s at odds with the view that free will does not exist.
Holding the belief that people can freely determine their circumstances may also lead to other harmful outcomes, such as social inequalities, injustice, a lack of empathy, hatred and victim blaming. For example, a belief in free will can promote the idea that poor people are somehow deserving of their abhorrent conditions and are living in situations of their own making. These perceptions can change if the notion of free will is relinquished. Because people are not morally responsible for their own situations, a greater deal of compassion and empathy could be shown towards those underprivileged. So there could indeed be positive outcomes of declining to believe in free will.
Researchers have claimed that making people disbelieve in free will can have dramatic negative consequences. A disbelief in free will may indeed lead to bad things; however, due to various methodological issues, it is premature to make this conclusion. In fact, it could turn out that disbelieving in free will is actually a good thing.
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Tom St Quinton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The Caspian Sea, the largest inland body of water on Earth, is shrinking. Not fluctuating, not entering another natural cycle, but shrinking.
For decades, scientists and policymakers treated changes in the Caspian as part of the basin’s natural variability. Water levels in the sea have always risen and fallen.
But our new study shows something far more troubling: the current decline is increasingly driven by human decisions to dam and divert rivers, and by fragmented decision-making across five countries that border this body of water.
Using satellite observations together with ground-based hydrological records from rivers across all five shoreline states (Iran, Russia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan), we found that flow into the Caspian Sea has declined sharply over the past three decades.
The main reason is not declining rainfall. In fact, rain over the Volga Basin, which supplies roughly 80% of the Caspian’s inflow, has slightly increased. That finding matters because it overturns one of the most common assumptions surrounding the Caspian crisis. The common narrative has been straightforward: climate change increases evaporation, rainfall declines, and the sea shrinks.
Climate change certainly plays a role: our analysis confirms that evaporation across the Caspian has increased significantly as regional temperatures rise. But evaporation alone explains only about 40% of the observed water loss since the mid-1990s.
The remaining decline points overwhelmingly toward human activity. The Volga River has been heavily engineered for decades. Dams, reservoirs, use for irrigation, industrial consumption and navigation systems have fundamentally altered the hydrology of the basin).
Water that once flowed naturally into the Caspian is increasingly intercepted upstream. One critical but rarely discussed example is the Volga–Don canal system, which links the Caspian basin to the Black Sea through Russia’s internal waterways. Geopolitically and economically, the canal is strategically valuable. But it diverts water away from the Caspian system.
The cumulative effect is now visible from space. Since the mid-1990s, the Caspian Sea has lost roughly 24,000km² of surface area, an area approaching the size of Sicily. Water levels have fallen by about two metres.
The shallow northern Caspian, ecologically one of the most productive parts of the sea, is drying particularly rapidly. This matters because the northern Caspian is not empty water. It is a critical ecological zone supporting fisheries, wetlands, migratory birds and spawning grounds for sturgeon, the ancient fish species that produce most of the world’s caviar.
Threats to shipping
As water retreats, ecological stress intensifies. Our study also detected a long-term rise in chlorophyll-a concentrations in the northern Caspian, a key indicator of algal activity and declining water quality. In plain terms, the sea is becoming warmer, shallower and increasingly nutrient-rich: ideal conditions for harmful algal blooms.
This is not merely an environmental story. The Caspian region sits at the centre of major energy and trade corridors linking Europe and Asia). Russia’s north-south transport routes and China’s international development plan, the Belt and Road Initiative, plus offshore oil infrastructure and regional shipping networks all depend on the Caspian remaining navigable and stable.
Falling water levels threaten ports, shipping lanes and coastal infrastructure. Declining depths reduce cargo capacity and increase transport costs. What appears initially as an environmental issue gradually becomes an economic constraint.
Then there is the political dimension. Unlike oceans, inland seas cannot rely on global circulation to buffer local mismanagement. Their survival depends directly on the behaviour of neighbouring states. And the Caspian is surrounded by countries with competing strategic interests, uneven governance systems and limited transparency over their water use.
That fragmentation has become one of the greatest risks facing the sea. Although regional agreements exist, including the 2018 Aktau Convention (formally the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea), there is still no comprehensive and enforceable system governing water allocation, hydrological monitoring or ecological protection across the basin. Data sharing remains limited. Water withdrawals are often opaque. Environmental management is fragmented.
This resembles a pattern seen repeatedly across modern environmental crises: governments prefer to discuss climate change because it externalises responsibility. It allows leaders to portray ecological decline as an unavoidable planetary process.
But the Caspian story is more uncomfortable than that. It is also a story about political choices. Rivers were dammed. Water was diverted. Wetlands were degraded. Pollution controls remained weak. Oil and gas development expanded while ecological safeguards lagged behind. Economic growth consistently outranked hydrological sustainability.
The danger is not simply that the Caspian shrinks, but that ecological thresholds may be crossed – beyond which, recovery becomes extraordinarily difficult.
The Aral Sea, the world’s fourth largest lake, demonstrated how quickly collapse can accelerate once a chain reaction begins. Exposed lakebeds generate dust storms. Fisheries collapse. Salinity rises. Biodiversity crashes. Local climates shift. Economic systems unravel around the drying basin.
The Caspian has not yet reached that stage – but the warning signs are becoming increasingly visible.
There is still time to slow the trajectory. However, doing so would require something historically rare in the region: long-term coordination that prioritises hydrological stability – safeguarding the sea’s natural water balance and keeping water levels from dropping past a dangerous point of ecological collapse – over short-term extraction and geopolitical competition.
This would mean transparent water accounting – the open tracking and sharing of data on exactly how much water each nation is pulling from the feeding rivers for agriculture and industry. It would mean negotiated environmental flow releases from upstream reservoirs, and recognition that the Caspian is not simply an energy corridor or a shipping route, but a fragile water system.
Nature eventually imposes consequences on societies that ignore those limits. The Caspian Sea is beginning to deliver that message.
Nima Shokri is affiliated with Hamburg University of Technology.
Amir AghaKouchak is affiliated with the University of California Irvine, and the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health.
The men’s football World Cup presents a unique global opportunity to showcase new football technology – from boots and balls to digital systems designed to enhance both officiating accuracy and fan engagement.
The process of bringing these technologies to the game often begins in universities and other research institutions. The academic journal Sports Engineering, of which I am editor-in-chief, publishes peer-reviewed studies that are closely monitored by the sport’s global governing body, Fifa.
Data obtained from tracking player movements can be used to create virtual avatars. Use of this technology is being explored to further grow audiences for what is already the world’s most popular sport, both in terms of players and fans.
Goal three of Fifa’s strategic objectives (2023-27) is to “deliver fan engagement including through eFootball, and to invest in digital technology and artificial intelligence for the next generations”.
So what innovations have made it to the current World Cup in North America – and which others are likely to be introduced at future tournaments?
Enhanced viewing angles
Perhaps the most discussed technological innovation at this World Cup is the frequent use of body cameras by referees. This additional view has been widelypraised for giving fans a fascinating new perspective on key moments, including goals and what refs saw when making key decisions.
But the revolution in viewing angles doesn’t stop there. An increasingly common aspect of match coverage is 3D recreations – for example, when tight offside decisions are explained following a VAR (video assistant referee) review. These use data on player positions and movements from optical tracking systems to recreate gameplay from new perspectives – potentially giving fans entirely new views of the action, such as from the goalkeeper’s perspective.
Official help
Goal-line technology was first used in the 2014 men’s World Cup to determine whether the whole of the ball had crossed the goal-line. The 2026 World Cup has gone a step further by using out-of-bounds technology for the first time to determine whenever the ball has left the field of play – whether for a throw-in or corner.
Viewers may also notice team officials using a digital substitution tablet in place of handwritten paper notes to explain the player swaps they wish to make. This makes it easier for substitutions to be approved by match officials and rapidly communicated to broadcasters – while also being “less sensitive to weather conditions” in the form of a rain-sodden notepad.
Data analytics
Fifa has pledged that for this World Cup, all 48 teams should “benefit from the same pre- and post-match analytical capabilities” through its AI Pro system. The system uses “AI agents capable of querying structured match data” to deliver rapid tactical insights, performance analyses and strategic recommendations.
Each World Cup sees the introduction of a new ball. The 2026 Adidas Trionda features four uniquely shaped panels – the smallest number ever used to make a World Cup ball.
These panels, made of polyurethane, have grooves and small, raised surface features in the form of eagle, maple leaf and star symbols to reflect the three host nations. Along with the seams, these are intended to give the ball desirable aerodynamics that produces predictable and stable flight behaviour.
Like its predecessor, the Trionda also has an internal sensor that can sample data at 500 times per second to measure its movement. This is relayed to match officials in real time, supporting their decision-making.
Fifa’s football testing manual even incorporates a balance test for balls with this internal sensor. This is to ensure the internal sensor does cause the ball to behave unpredictably when rolling or in the air.
Pitches
Some players at this World Cup have complained about the temporary grass pitches used at some stadiums feeling “more like an artificial surface”.
There is a huge amount of research on the effect of pitches on player performance, including injury risk. This can be particularly important for female players, for whom knee injuries are more prevalent.
The latest football turf testing manual includes a “critical fall height test”. This is designed to ensure surfaces are sufficiently soft and compliant to avoid posing an excessive head injury risk to players falling from a minimum of 0.6 metres.
Boot design
Academic research continually informs updates in football boot design. For example, it has shown that padding on the upper section of the boot can hinder shooting accuracy.
We are now starting to see 3D-printed boots worn by some players. These boots use metamaterials – artificially-made materials with unconventional properties – that promise to improve fit and comfort.
While you may see a few of these boots at this World Cup, the inexorable march of technology means you can expect such designs to be a common sight in Morocco, Portugal and Spain in four years’ time – along with many other new innovations currently at the research stage.
Thomas Allen has received research funding from FIFA. He is the Editor-in-Chief of the Sports Engineering journal.
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