The European Commission’s decision to fine Google €890 million (US$1 billion) for failing to comply with the EU Digital Markets Act sounds like a significant financial and political intervention against one of the world’s largest technology companies.

The ruling is certainly further evidence of Europe’s desire to regulate US big tech platforms more strictly.

But can such fines really change the behaviour of companies like Google, whose global resources and technical capabilities substantially exceed those of the institutions responsible for regulating them?

Alphabet, Google’s parent company, reported revenues of approximately US$402.8 billion (£302bn) for 2025, and a net income of US$132.2 billion. The EU fine represents less than 0.3% of one year’s revenue.

This makes it, simultaneously, one of the largest penalties imposed under the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and a financially manageable cost for the company receiving it. But that does not mean the penalty is irrelevant. Fines can also carry reputational costs, establish legal boundaries, and create a basis for more serious sanctions.

Europe has been here before

The European Commission has been here before. In 2004, after a five-year investigation, it fined Microsoft more than €497 million for using its position in PC operating systems to restrict competition in adjacent software markets.

Just under a decade later, the same company was fined a further €561 million, after it failed to provide the browser-choice screen it had committed to making available to European Windows users. This judgment was significant, as it showed the initial legal decision was only one stage of the commission’s enforcement process.

Google has since become the principal focus of EU technology concerns. The commission opened proceedings over the company’s comparison-shopping practices in November 2010, finally imposing a €2.42 billion fine in June 2017. A separate three-year investigation into restrictions associated with Google’s mobile operating system, Android, resulted in a €4.34 billion fine in July 2018.

Brussels has used the DMA against other big tech gatekeepers too. In April 2025, it fined Apple €500 million for breaching its anti-steering obligation – which forbids online platforms from blocking out cheaper rival deals – and Meta €200 million in connection with the choices it offered users about their personal data.

While these decisions demonstrated the commission’s willingness to intervene, they also established a recurring pattern: an investigation is opened and a substantial fine is imposed. Then, the company in question introduces a series of technical or contractual changes, only for a further dispute to emerge over whether those changes amount to effective compliance.

In short, the central difficulty is not the absence of legal authority. It is the translation of that authority into timely, measurable changes in market behaviour.

Do fines change big tech behaviour?

There are three main ways in which the effectiveness of a fine such as this can be assessed:

1. Formal compliance: has the company amended its contracts, interfaces or internal policies in response to the decision?

2. Market effectiveness: have the changes given competitors a meaningful opportunity to reach customers, enabled app developers to offer lower prices, or increased consumer choice?

3. Deterrence: has the penalty made Google – and other gatekeepers – less likely to engage in equivalent conduct through future services, product designs or contractual arrangements?

A 2025 study examined the implementation and effectiveness of company responses in 12 major EU antitrust cases. Although most of the imposed remedies had been implemented, fewer than half were found to have been fully effective.

So, it’s not enough to ask whether Google will change the appearance of a search page or amend the wording of its developer terms in response to this latest fine. The commission must assess whether, after Google’s 60-day compliance period, competing services receive meaningful visibility, rival companies can communicate with customers without excessive friction or fees, and consumers are genuinely able to exercise greater choice.

A criticism levelled at regulators in many jurisdictions is that investigations are too slow to curb anti-competitive behaviour. Article 29 of the DMA states that the European Commission should adopt a non-compliance decision within 12 months of opening proceedings.

This is an aspirational timetable, rather than an absolute legal deadline. Nevertheless, the present Google investigations were opened on March 25, 2024 and concluded on July 23, 2026 – approximately 28 months later.

A January 2026 consultation highlighted complaints about the DMA’s slow processes and limited transparency, as well as circumvention and delaying tactics on the part of big tech companies. Suggested changes included binding procedural timelines, independent audits, and public testing of the remedies imposed by the European Commission.

The speed of technological change

When the EU’s latest proceedings against Google began in March 2024, much of the digital competition debate concerned the ordering and presentation of conventional search results. During the investigation, however, Google continued to develop AI Overviews and AI Mode, which offer users AI-generated answers, summaries and recommendations rather than a traditional page of ranked links.

This creates a significant enforcement problem. Self-preferencing can occur not only through the vertical ranking of links, but through the selection of sources, the framing of an answer, the services through which a transaction is completed and the options presented to the user by an AI agent.

Accordingly, the issue should not be whether a rival service has been given a particular box on a search page. It should be whether competing services have a fair and effective opportunity to be discovered, selected and used, irrespective of whether the interaction takes place through a conventional search result, an AI-generated answer, or an automated purchasing agent.

The commission’s ruling announcement recognised this rapid technological development. It also noted that Google had submitted proposals concerning how the principles of the decision should apply to AI Overviews and AI Mode, and that discussions on these services would continue.

Ultimately, the fine represents an early test of whether the DMA can remain relevant as the technology changes. It is this, not the size of the initial fine, that will decide whether Europe really can keep big tech in check.

Iain Nash does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Many of the biggest online platforms have long argued they aren’t publishers of the content their users upload, merely hosts. The likes of Google, YouTube, Meta and TikTok claim they simply store and display information created by others, so should not be seen as legally responsible for it.

But a recent ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) makes that argument harder to maintain – at least in cases where the platform’s algorithm is deciding which content gets pushed, ranked or amplified.

The case relates to Coyote, a French driving assistance company which stores traffic reports submitted by users and redistributes them to the wider network. The question being tested was whether Coyote merely hosts its users’ information, or also controls (and benefits from) how that information is circulated.

The significance of this case – brought by the Conseil d’État, France’s highest administrative court and the government’s chief legal adviser – extends far beyond driving apps. It clarifies when a provider may lose the legal right of “intermediary immunity” for the user information it stores and circulates.

Traditional book, newspaper and magazine publishers have always been held responsible for their content. A defamatory article generally exposes the publisher to liability, since it chose to make the material available.

In contrast, technology companies have been treated as neutral intermediaries – closer to a corner shop stocking newspapers than a publisher producing content, with clear limits to their liability.

For these companies, the Coyote judgment is significant because it sharpens the boundary between neutral hosting and algorithmic control. A platform that merely stores user content is likely to remain legally protected. But one that decides, in its own interest, how that content is disseminated may no longer be.

One important caveat: as this case is from the CJEU, it does not apply to users in the UK and elsewhere outside the EU. However, it will affect British and international companies that have a significant audience within the EU. So, no technology platform can dismiss the issue simply because it is headquartered outside Europe.

What the court decided

A hosting provider is protected under Article 6 of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) if it lacks actual knowledge of illegal content – and then acts expeditiously once notified about it.

The question in the Coyote case was whether a service that stores and retransmits user-generated information still counts as a neutral host when its algorithm decides how that information circulates.

The court concluded that a platform can have no knowledge of a specific message’s content, yet can still have legal responsibility for its dissemination. Where a platform’s algorithm determines – in its own interest – the conditions, manner or priority with which information is disseminated, then the “safe harbour” of being a neutral host falls away.

This outcome was anticipated in 2019 by technology law experts Jennifer Cobbe and Jatinder Singh, who argued that algorithmic curation complicated the assumption that platforms are passive, neutral hosts.

The ruling does not doom every algorithm. Simple categorisation, such as showing all posts by one user or from the past 24 hours, remains close to traditional hosting. But ranking or promoting content in the platform’s own interest does not.

None of this makes these platforms automatically liable. Losing the exemption only opens the door to being sued – claimants must still prove the platform’s conduct actually caused harm.

Potential impacts of the Coyote ruling

1. For social media content

A social media company may remain protected when it stores user content or displays it in ways that are largely user-directed or chronological. But algorithmic feeds are different.

“For You” pages, recommendation systems, trending modules and paid amplification systems all decide what content is shown to which users and in what priority. When that decision is made in the platform’s commercial or service interest, Coyote makes it harder to describe the platform as merely hosting the content.

The same reasoning may matter for extreme or graphic material. If a platform simply stores content uploaded by a user, the hosting exemption could still apply. But where a recommender system repeatedly pushes that material to users because it drives engagement, Coyote gives claimants a stronger argument that the platform was not passive.

The content does not always need to be unlawful in itself. But claimants would still need to demonstrate both liability and harm.

2. For paid search

When a platform sells priority, decides how a sponsored result is displayed, and presents that result to users because doing so serves its own commercial interest, it becomes harder to argue that the platform is merely storing or neutrally indexing third-party information.

This matters because online advertising has become a major route for fraud and consumer harm. Following the Coyote ruling, claimants harmed by paid advertisements may have a stronger argument that the harm arose at least in part because the provider sold, ranked and prioritised that information.

But they would still need to prove the advert was unlawful, that the platform’s role fell outside immunity, that the promotion caused their financial loss or other harm.

3. In libel cases

A newspaper that publishes a defamatory allegation can be liable because it has chosen to publish it. In contrast, a hosting platform where a user makes and uploads such an allegation has not been treated in this way.

However, if the platform’s recommender system promotes that post or pushes it into feeds, the CJEU ruling gives claimants a clearer argument that the platform should be held responsible for increasing the audience reach of the allegedly defamatory content.

Changing the terrain

The Coyote judgment does not abolish hosting immunity – but it does change the terrain. It makes clear that the “safe harbour” argument depends not only on where information came from, but what the provider does with it.

The more a platform determines dissemination in its own interest, the harder it is to maintain that it is merely hosting, according to this groundbreaking ruling. And this, remember, holds for international as well as European technology companies.

Iain Nash does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.