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The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has announced the successful test flight of a fully AI-controlled F-16 fighter aircraft that was specifically modified to serve as an anonymous flight testbed. The successful test comes just months after the same AI pilot software platform successfully piloted a one-of-a-kind X-62A VISTA aircraft in an aerial dogfight against an F-16.
DARPA officials said the successful flight of an aircraft category that is still in use for combat operations advances the state-of-the-art technological infrastructure needed to meet the challenges of a rapidly evolving aerial environment and will enable rapid, scalable combat AI pilot development across the broader U.S. military forces.
“These groundbreaking flight tests of VENOM-modified F-16s advance the infrastructure needed to develop trusted, autonomous air combat capabilities,” said Brig. Gen. James “Fangs” Valpiani, Ph.D., DARPA program manager.
According to a statement announcing the successful AI-controlled flights, the F-16 used in the tests was specifically converted to an AI testbed under the agency’s joint venture with the U.S. Air Force, the Viper Experimentation and Next-generation Operations Model (VENOM) program. The specific AI pilot installed in the F-16 is known as the VENOM Autonomy Kit, or VAK.
DARPA said VAK utilizes a “novel interface with the aircraft’s flight controls and mission systems.” This component allows an on-board human pilot to toggle between their traditional control systems and VAK “with the flip of a switch,” ensuring pilot safety during the testing phase where a human is still in the loop.
Valpiani said that the VENOM team installed the AI-controlled VAK interface, which successfully automated the F-16’s sensors and flight controls “without changing the jet’s core software.”
“This enables an efficient pipeline for developing dominant AI for aerial combat, allowing us to rapidly innovate for the warfighter,” the program manager explained.
When discussing the significance of the successful AI-controlled test flights, Valpiani once again highlighted the “emerging threat environment” in relation to aerial combat, including its increasing complexity.
“AI has tremendous potential to help humans manage this complexity in beyond-visual-range combat, but many hard questions remain concerning the performance and trustworthiness of combat AI in the extreme fog and friction of modern warfare,” explained the project leader, who was due to conclude his tenure as a DARPA program manager in the weeks after the announcement. “The AIR program aims to apply cutting-edge combat agents to operationally relevant scenarios to address these questions and field war-deterring, war-winning capabilities to our warfighters.”
Incoming program manager, Lt. Col. Patrick “Dice” Highland, Ph.D., highlighted the milestone’s role in “advancing our nation’s combat autonomy,” while also offering an eye toward the program’s future.
“We now have the opportunity to create dominant autonomy for beyond-visual-range, multi-ship combat,” Lt. Col Highland said. “These flights give us an early glimpse of how AI agents may begin actively transforming air warfare.”
Following the successful AI-piloted F-16 tests, the specially designed VENOM aircraft will join DARPA as it moves the entire venture under the umbrella of the agency’s Artificial Intelligence Reinforcements (AIR) program. According to the agency, this new program will use the aircraft in the VENOM fleet to “test multiple AI agents in live-flight scenarios.” If successful, DARPA said the program will “pave the way for human pilots to seamlessly command and orchestrate teams of autonomous, uncrewed aircraft.”
Current deputy program manager Terry Wilson, Ph.D., who will remain with the program, highlighted AIR’s longer-term goals of future joint force operations, including Collaborative Combat Aircraft programs. DARPA said that these efforts will focus on improving the speed and predictive ability of AI model development and “scale in-flight testing to multi-ship operations with increased complexity to unlock novel and robust AI-driven autonomy.”
“I share Gen. Valpiani’s deep appreciation for the incredible dedication of our DARPA and industry teammates, joint engineers, the System Program Office, Eglin’s test and maintenance crews, and the entire AIR and VENOM ecosystem which has made this milestone possible,” said Wilson. “I look forward to unleashing the VENOM platform and moving these capabilities out of simulation and into the sky.”
Christopher Plain is a Science Fiction and Fantasy novelist and has spent the last six years as Associate News Editor and Head Science Writer at The Debrief. Follow and connect with him on X, learn about his books at plainfiction.com, or email him at christopher@thedebrief.org
For decades, Washington has assumed that military aid translates into political influence. If the United States provides the weapons, intelligence, training, and diplomatic backing that keep an ally fighting, conventional wisdom suggests it should also have considerable leverage over when, and how, that war ends.
Yet, a sweeping new analysis published by the Brookings Institution and authored by Dr. Dafna Rand, a senior fellow at Brookings, the Federation for American Scientists, and the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that the opposite has increasingly become true.
Whether in Ukraine, Gaza, Yemen, or Afghanistan, the U.S. has repeatedly discovered that sustaining an ally’s war effort is often far easier than steering its ultimate direction. Instead of conclusive victories followed by lasting peace, modern conflicts are increasingly settling into drawn-out stalemates, frozen conflicts, or recurring cycles of violence that resist outside pressure—even from Washington.
Dr. Rand’s report examines one of the defining strategic dilemmas confronting American foreign policy in the 21st century: why the world’s most powerful military and diplomatic actor has struggled to shape the decisions of partners whose war efforts depend heavily on U.S. support.
Drawing on more than 30 interviews with senior American officials involved in decision-making throughout four major conflicts, alongside hundreds of government documents, the analysis shows recurring patterns that appear independent of geography or the adversary involved.
“Wars, whether between or within states, are not ending in the 21st century,” Dr. Rand writes. “Frozen conflicts, on-again-off-again fighting, and stalemates have become the norm.”
Dr. Rand argues that this changing nature of warfare has profoundly changed the assumptions underpinning American security strategy.
Following the costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington increasingly shifted toward supporting partners rather than committing large numbers of U.S. troops directly to combat. The expectation was that supplying allies with military assistance would provide the United States with considerable influence over battlefield strategy and political consequences.
Instead, Dr. Rand says that American leverage consistently diminishes as conflicts drag on.
One of the study’s central conclusions is that Washington and its partners frequently begin wars without agreeing on what victory actually means. At the outset of each conflict examined—including Ukraine’s defense against Russia, Israel’s campaign against Hamas, the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, and America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan—American and partner governments shared broad objectives, though often failed to establish detailed political end states.
That omission, Dr. Rand argues, becomes increasingly costly as wars continue.
Early battlefield success frequently encourages partners to pursue more ambitious goals than originally envisioned. At the same time, Washington gradually becomes more interested in negotiated settlements as financial costs mount, domestic political support declines, and wider strategic priorities begin competing for attention.
According to Dr. Rand, many officials interviewed expressed regret that these conversations about political objectives, postwar governance, and acceptable settlement terms did not occur before military campaigns gained momentum.
The report also highlights an uncomfortable reality of modern alliances. Although the United States provides enormous military assistance, it does not exercise command over allied governments or their armed forces. As a result, disagreements naturally emerge over strategy, operational design, and acceptable risks.
Ukraine provides one of the clearest examples. Initially, Washington and Kyiv shared an overriding objective of preventing Russia from conquering the country. However, over time, American officials became increasingly divided over whether continued fighting or eventual negotiations better served long-term U.S. interests.
Some officials viewed prolonging the conflict as strategically beneficial because it weakened Russia’s military while strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Others believed diplomatic attempts should have begun earlier, particularly after Ukraine’s battlefield gains in 2022 created what they viewed as an opportunity to negotiate from a stronger position.
Dr. Rand notes that internal disagreements within the U.S. government complicated communication with Ukrainian leaders, in particular regarding expectations for territorial objectives and the role military offensives were intended to play in eventually creating conditions for diplomacy.
The Gaza conflict exposed a different, but related, collection of challenges.
Following Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attacks, President Joe Biden’s administration moved rapidly to reassure Israel of unshakable American support while simultaneously urging restraint based on lessons learned from America’s own post-9/11 military campaigns.
Dr. Rand concludes that Israeli leaders largely heard the reassurances while failing to fully internalize Washington’s accompanying warnings about civilian casualties, operational design, and the long-term strategic consequences of an extended campaign.
As the war progressed, American officials increasingly concluded that humanitarian concerns and mounting civilian casualties were not exclusively moral issues but strategic ones as well, arguing that prolonged destruction could ultimately strengthen Hamas’ long-term recruitment and undermine Israel’s own security objectives.
Despite this growing divergence, the report suggests Washington hesitated to use its available leverage aggressively, partly because of domestic political sensitivities surrounding support for Israel.
Another recurring finding centers on American public opinion.
Support for allies often begins overwhelmingly strong immediately after major attacks or invasions. But that support steadily erodes as wars lengthen, casualties mount, humanitarian problems increase, or questions come up regarding the conduct of partner governments.
Dr. Rand says this pattern appears across Yemen, Afghanistan, Gaza, and, increasingly, Ukraine.
Importantly, she argues this erosion can occur even when Americans continue believing the underlying cause remains just. Instead, fatigue over prolonged commitments, concerns about costs, or doubts regarding the likelihood of decisive success gradually reshape political calculations in Washington.
Those changing domestic dynamics, in turn, reduce America’s leverage abroad.
Once congressional debates begin questioning military assistance or public enthusiasm declines, allied governments recognize that Washington’s ability to maintain long-term support has become less certain.
Dr. Rand argues this weakens American bargaining power precisely when policymakers most need it.
Among the study’s most significant recommendations is that future administrations should treat leverage as a rapidly diminishing resource.
Rather than assuming influence will expand alongside continued military assistance, Dr. Rand contends the opposite usually occurs. The strongest opportunity to shape an ally’s political objectives exists during the opening weeks of conflict, before battlefield realities, domestic politics, and diverging national interests begin pulling partners in different directions.
To address this, the report proposes forming formal “security contracts,” or a memorandum of understanding, early in future conflicts that clearly define shared political objectives, expected end states, standards for humanitarian conduct, and mechanisms for periodically reassessing strategy.
Dr. Rand also recommends keeping consistent communication across the entire U.S. national security apparatus, warning that mixed signals from different agencies make it easier for partners to ignore American advice or exploit disagreements inside Washington.
Perhaps most notably, the report argues that future administrations should not focus solely on influencing allies. Even in conflicts involving close partners, Washington should simultaneously pursue diplomatic means with adversaries whenever possible, recognizing that negotiated settlements often require engaging both sides rather than relying exclusively on pressure directed at friendly governments.
Ultimately, the analysis shows that the challenge confronting U.S. policymakers goes beyond any single conflict. As interstate wars, civil wars, and proxy wars become increasingly protracted, America’s ability to translate military assistance into political influence may continue shrinking unless it fundamentally rethinks how partnerships are managed from the very beginning of a war.
“The United States must be brutally honest with its partners,” Dr. Rand writes. “The United States must recognize that pressuring its partners to end wars will get harder, not easier, as time passes and the partner grows better able to resist U.S. pressure.”
Study: Dr. Dafna H. Rand, Why can’t the United States end allies’ wars?, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy at Brookings (2026).
Tim McMillan is a retired law enforcement executive, investigative reporter and co-founder of The Debrief. His writing typically focuses on defense, national security, the Intelligence Community and topics related to psychology. You can follow Tim on Twitter: @LtTimMcMillan. Tim can be reached by email: tim@thedebrief.org or through encrypted email: LtTimMcMillan@protonmail.com
A massive wildfire that scorched the Nevada desert near the U.S. Air Force’s classified Area 51 facility over the weekend has now exceeded 2,000 acres.
The fire, which began on Friday, continued spreading through Lincoln County, Nevada, according to officials with the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM), one of the agencies working to control the blaze.
“This is a restricted area, closed to the public, always, regardless of fire activity,” BLM officials said in a statement, adding that there are presently no additional closures in effect in the area.
Dubbed the Quail Springs fire, crews continued battling against heavy smoke and flames within the Nevada Test and Training Range throughout the weekend.
One of two military training areas located within the Nellis Air Force Base Complex in Nevada, the classified site is home to a simulated Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) and features close to 1,200 targets and other military assets frequently used in training operations.
With its storied history involving the development and testing of some of America’s most secretive aircraft, Area 51 has long remained an item of public fascination. Presently, there is no indication that the fire could impact operations at the facility.
Additionally, while BLM officials say there are no residences or other structures currently being threatened, the fire reportedly still has zero containment, according to information available on the Nevada Wildfire Information Dashboard.
“Warm, dry weather with afternoon breezes is expected through Tuesday,” read a portion of a statement that appeared on the BLM website. “Fire activity is expected to increase during the afternoon burning period before moderating overnight as temperatures cool and humidity recovers.”
Presently, the BLM says there are no significant weather changes expected, although some isolated thunderstorms are possible in the area over the next several days. While the presence of moisture would seemingly be hoped for under such conditions, BLM officials said that such storms could also introduce “potentially gusty and erratic winds,” which may “contribute to fire spread.”
Lightning associated with such isolated storms is often a key trigger for such fires during the otherwise arid summer months. Presently, BLM officials believe a lightning strike had likely triggered this weekend’s fire, as well.
“The fire will continue to be monitored closely,” the BLM statement read.
Micah Hanks is the Editor-in-Chief and Co-Founder of The Debrief. A longtime reporter on science, defense, and technology with a focus on space and astronomy, he can be reached at micah@thedebrief.org. Follow him on X @MicahHanks, and at micahhanks.com.
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