• Recorded Future found an Iran-linked group spreading spyware
• The malware is delivered through fake VPN and media player apps
• Researchers assess that most targets are Iranian users

A new report from Recorded Future's Insikt Group describes a campaign that inverts the whole point of a privacy tool: fake VPN apps built specifically to spy on the people who install them.

Researchers have linked fresh infrastructure to an Iran-nexus threat cluster they track as TAG-182, which is using fake VPN and media player downloads to allegedly deliver a surveillance tool called MarkiRAT. The group is "highly likely" to be targeting Iranians living inside and outside the country, the report says.

It's a blunt reminder that choosing one of the best VPN services is a lot more secure than downloading free, unvetted tools.

Fake apps, real surveillance

Insikt Group identified a cluster of attacker-controlled domains allegedly used to stage downloads of applications that appear nowhere on Google Play or Apple's App Store.

Two names stand out: Pis2ray VPN and a media player branded YESHICA, which was quietly renamed YESHICA YEPlayer in March 2026 after researchers publicly exposed the original.

According to researchers, if you download and run one of these files, you get MarkiRAT, a remote access Trojan. In plain terms, that is software that hands control of your device to somebody else.

Analysts have documented it capturing screenshots and uploading them to attacker-run servers, while disguising itself under believable process names.

It also abuses BITS, the background service Windows uses to fetch updates, to pull down further files. Because that activity looks like ordinary system housekeeping rather than an attack, it tends to slip past routine cleanup.

MarkiRAT is not new. It has previously been used by Ferocious Kitten, a group Kaspersky documented conducting years of covert surveillance against activists inside Iran.

Recorded Future stops short of attributing TAG-182 to any specific Iranian agency, but places it within a broader ecosystem of state-aligned surveillance groups.

Why a fake VPN makes such an effective lure

Distribution runs largely through social media. Insikt Group found Instagram posts promoting Pis2ray VPN in the weeks following street protests in Iran in late 2025, and again around the country's prolonged internet shutdown, which ended with partial restoration of access on 26 May 2026.

The people most desperate for a virtual private network (VPN) in a censored country are exactly the people most likely to install one from a social media link, because the official stores are often the very thing they cannot reach.

Recorded Future considers it almost certain that most targets are located in Iran or tied to anti-government movements in Europe and North America. TechRadar has covered previous Iran-linked fake VPN campaigns, and this one seems to follow the same pattern with better infrastructure.

How to stay safe

Most readers will never be targeted by a state actor, but the underlying lesson travels.

Install VPN apps only from official stores, and check that the provider has a real, verifiable presence outside the app listing.

Treat any VPN promoted through an Instagram post, a Telegram channel, or a direct message as suspect, however polished it looks.

Star ratings are a weak signal, since fake reviews are cheap.

• Windscribe said Bill C-22 won't change its privacy policies
• The bill would require service providers to retain user metadata
• Canada's Senate is set to discuss Bill C-22 in September

A Reddit user recently put a blunt question to Windscribe: is paying for a Canada-based VPN a privacy problem, given the surveillance bill working its way through Parliament?

The company's official support account answered without hedging. Windscribe will keep operating exactly as it has, the account said, with "no changes to our logging or privacy policies".

Canada is bringing in laws that genuinely complicate things for the company, Windscribe added, but that is internal work to sort out rather than something subscribers should expect to feel.

It's a calmer message than the one Windscribe was broadcasting in May, when it said it would sooner relocate its headquarters than start logging users. That put it alongside Signal and NordVPN, and made it one of the sharpest voices among the best VPN providers fighting the bill.

Bill C-22, formally the Lawful Access Act, cleared the House of Commons on June 18 and now sits with the Senate, which won't begin its study until Parliament returns in September.

Windscribe and Bill C-22: what the VPN provider said

Is paying for Windscribe a problem to privacy given they’re based in Canada and the likely upcoming Bill C-22? Would love to subscribe if not for this. from r/Windscribe

Pressed further in the thread, Windscribe drew a line between where the company is registered and where its infrastructure lives.

The incoming laws could see it served with a court order requiring it to start logging users, the support account acknowledged. Its answer is jurisdictional: a virtual private network (VPN) operating outside Canada doesn't have to comply with Canadian law.

That echoes the route the company has been signalling since May, when CEO Yegor Sak told the Globe and Mail he was actively exploring moving Windscribe out of the country.

Windscribe was also careful to separate provider obligations from user liability. No law currently stops Canadians from using a VPN, it pointed out, and the risk it describes only reaches customers if a provider stays put and starts logging traffic.

For anyone uneasy about the paper trail, Windscribe's suggestion was simple: pay in crypto, so neither the government nor a card issuer sees the purchase.

What's next for Canada Bill C-22

Introduced in March by Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree, Canada Bill C-22 would let the government compel electronic service providers to retain user metadata and build technical capabilities for law enforcement access.

The House passed it at third reading on June 18 after the government moved to limit debate, and the Senate is set to pick it up on September 21, according to Parliament's own LEGISinfo tracker.

Late amendments cut the maximum metadata retention period from twelve months to six and added a clause stating the act can't be read as compelling decryption, unless the provider already holds the keys.

Still, law professor Robert Diab argues that doesn't go far enough, since ministerial orders could still sweep up the metadata of people under no suspicion whatsoever.

The government has consistently rejected the surveillance framing, insisting the bill builds no backdoors and that authorities still need judicial authorisation to obtain data.