Google DeepMind CEO Demis Hassabis is pushing for the US AI industry to self-regulate, with the support of government, as a starting point for an international creating shared international standards. In a blog post, he called for a focus on artificial general intelligence (AGI) and national security. 

But it is precisely that focus on national security that may make the results of such an effort, assuming it happens, less than palatable outside of the US.

“The rapid progress we’re seeing in AI requires a new approach to testing frontier AI model capabilities that is dynamic, adaptable, and rigorous,” Hassabis wrote. “The US is well positioned, given its economic and technical standing, to take the first step in developing such a framework. It could establish a new Standards Body modelled on a federally overseen public-private partnership or self-regulatory organization, much like the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), with a board that includes independent leading technical experts and open-source representatives.”

He noted, however, that the funding would need to be substantial, and would most likely come from industry, to allow the new body to attract world-class technical talent and obtain the necessary compute resources for large-scale testing.

Hassabis proposed that the organization “be responsible for developing assessment protocols and working with appropriate federal agencies and the US National Labs to conduct testing in areas relevant to national security,” and that AI vendor participants be encouraged to adopt best practices such as publishing model cards with technical details, maintaining strong internal cybersecurity, vetting key personnel, and providing sufficient resourcing for safety and security research.

This is not the first time Hassabis has expressed worries about AGI. 

DeepMind was involved in an earlier US government initiative evaluating AI safety, alongside Microsoft and xAI (now SpaceXAI) working with the Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI), a division of the US Department of Commerce. It allowed CAISI to conduct pre-deployment evaluations and targeted research to “better assess frontier AI capabilities and advance the state of AI security.”  

The rest of the world may have concerns

Analysts and consultants were mixed about the move, with most expressing concerns about whether an industry-focused group would prioritize the public’s best interests.

“Self-regulation is not viable because it implies everyone is able to regulate themselves and will do so in line with the best interests of the public. Most tech vendors don’t have the capacity to self-regulate. They would just prefer a set of rules within which they can operate,” said Gartner VP analyst Nader Henein. “For-profit organizations are required to do what is best for their shareholders, and external regulation ensures that those organizations are never in a conflict of interest where they have to choose between what is good for their shareholders and what is good for the public.”

And, said Sanchit Vir Gogia, chief analyst at Greyhound Research, given the international nature of AI models, an effort coordinated by the US government might alienate other countries. 

“National security is the proposal’s accelerator in Washington and its poison pill abroad: the framing that opens the only gate available at home invites foreign capitals to read the institution as an instrument of American strategy,” he pointed out.

“The map is already plural,” he said. “Brussels switches on enforcement powers over general-purpose models [starting in August 2026], London runs the AI Security Institute, and Beijing licenses on its own terms. California and New York have legislated for frontier models at home. The durable route is shared technical evidence with sovereign enforcement, sealed through mutual recognition rather than deference, with India and the other major non-Western markets holding authorship rather than seats.”

Gogia added that the rules enacted by even such a group may not address all of the key concerns of enterprise IT. A US government effort along the lines that Hassabis is proposing would result in testing that “sits close to intelligence and industrial policy, and those functions will not stay neatly separated. A model can pass every catastrophic-risk test and still fail the enterprise on privacy, reliability, and liability,” he noted.

Walmart’s former director of cybersecurity Steven Eric Fisher, who is now an independent cybersecurity consultant, said he found the proposal “well-intentioned, but it addresses a highly polarized topic at a time when commercial interests carry unprecedented political influence, which is not always applied benevolently.”

He added, “an exclusive US standard that is not globally respected or enforceable would likely fail to achieve its core purpose and would place US companies at a competitive disadvantage.”

Aman Mahapatra, chief strategy officer for Tribeca Softtech, a New York City-based technology consulting firm, said that a deep dive into how FINRA operates today is illustrative of what IT leaders can expect from this effort, assuming the industry adopts that model.

“When the CEOs of the five companies that would be regulated are also the primary drafters of the standards, the standards will reflect those companies’ interests. FINRA has an independent board, but the operational reality is that member firm perspectives dominate the working groups that write the actual rules,” he said. “There is no reason to expect an AI equivalent to work differently, and every reason to expect it to work worse, because AI standardization is happening faster than any industry has ever attempted to standardize itself, and speed is the enemy of independent oversight.”

Carmi Levy, an independent technology analyst, was even more emphatically opposed to the Hassabis proposal.

“Asking Big Tech companies to self-police is analogous to allowing foxes to guard the henhouse. It hasn’t worked to date, and it won’t work going forward. Expecting these organizations to somehow change their ways at this point in time represents the height of naïve thinking,” Levy said. “The framework proposed by Demis Hassabis is a self-serving roadmap for an industry bent on racing to the AI horizon regardless of the harms caused along the way. It is impossible to quantify the dangers to broader society should frameworks allowing self-regulation become the norm.”

Some love the proposal

An almost completely opposite stance came from Yuri Goryunov, CIO of consulting firm Acceligence, who applauded the proposed move.

“This is one of the rare setups where industry self-regulation has a real shot, and enterprise IT should be enthusiastically rooting for it,” he said. “It fails when harms are externalized, such as in social media content moderation. Or when the overseer outsources judgment to the overseen, such as the FAA’s delegation to Boeing before the 737 MAX. It works when everyone in the industry shares the catastrophic downside.”

He suggested, however, that the best precedent here isn’t FINRA, it’s INPO, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, which the nuclear industry created within months of the 1979 Three Mile Island partial reactor meltdown “on the logic that an accident anywhere is an accident everywhere. INPO peer-reviews every US plant, its evaluations move insurance premiums, and it sits on top of the NRC’s statutory floor. That is a public-private stack very close to what Hassabis is describing. Frontier AI has the same structure: one lab’s catastrophic failure brings regulation down on all of them.”

For enterprise CIOs and other IT executives, Goryunov said, that model has the potential for being a big win.

“Today, every enterprise duplicates the same AI diligence of red-teaming, eval suites, governance committees and each does so with less information than any certifying body would have,” Goryunov said. “A credible standards regime does for AI what UL did for electrical equipment and SOC2 did for cloud: it converts an unknowable risk into a procurable product and gives boards a defensible standard of care. That’s not red tape. That’s peace of mind with an audit trail.”

However, Mahapatra said, “the countervailing view is that the alternative to industry-led standards is probably not thoughtful legislation. It is probably no standards, or state-by-state fragmentation, or the current pattern of ex-post enforcement actions where regulators surface concerns years after harm has already occurred.”

Thus, he noted, “Hassabis is making the reasonable argument that imperfect fast standards are better than perfect slow ones, and there is genuine merit to that view for topics like agent identity, evaluation methodology, and interoperability, which are exactly the areas OpenClaw is also targeting.”

This article first appeared on CIO.

Google DeepMind CEO Demis Hassabis on Tuesday reiterated his push for an AI industry self-regulation effort, led by the US government, that is particularly focused on artificial general intelligence (AGI) and national security. 

But it is precisely that focus on national security that may make the results of such an effort, assuming it happens, less than palatable outside of the US.

“The rapid progress we’re seeing in AI requires a new approach to testing frontier AI model capabilities that is dynamic, adaptable, and rigorous,” Hassabis wrote. “The US is well positioned, given its economic and technical standing, to take the first step in developing such a framework. It could establish a new Standards Body modelled on a federally overseen public-private partnership or self-regulatory organization, much like the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), with a board that includes independent leading technical experts and open-source representatives.”

He noted, however, that the funding would need to be substantial, and would most likely come from industry, to allow the new body to attract world-class technical talent and obtain the necessary compute resources for large-scale testing.

Hassabis said he would propose that the organization “be responsible for developing assessment protocols and working with appropriate federal agencies and the US National Labs to conduct testing in areas relevant to national security,” and that AI vendor participants would be encouraged to adopt best practices, such as publishing model cards with technical details, maintaining strong internal cybersecurity, vetting key personnel, and providing sufficient resourcing for safety and security research.

This is not the first time Hassabis has expressed worries about AGI. He has already worked on a US government initiative evaluating AI safety, which involved DeepMind, Microsoft and xAI (now SpaceXAI) working with the Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI), a division of the US Department of Commerce. It allowed CAISI to conduct pre-deployment evaluations and targeted research to “better assess frontier AI capabilities and advance the state of AI security.”  

The rest of the world may have concerns

Analysts and consultants were mixed about the move, with most expressing concerns about whether an industry-focused group would prioritize the public’s best interests.

“Self-regulation is not viable because it implies everyone is able to regulate themselves and will do so in line with the best interests of the public. Most tech vendors don’t have the capacity to self-regulate. They would just prefer a set of rules within which they can operate,” said Gartner VP analyst Nader Henein. “For-profit organizations are required to do what is best for their shareholders, and external regulation ensures that those organizations are never in a conflict of interest where they have to choose between what is good for their shareholders and what is good for the public.”

And, said Sanchit Vir Gogia, chief analyst at Greyhound Research, given the international nature of AI models, an effort coordinated by the US government might alienate other countries. 

“National security is the proposal’s accelerator in Washington and its poison pill abroad: the framing that opens the only gate available at home invites foreign capitals to read the institution as an instrument of American strategy,” he pointed out.

“The map is already plural,” he said. “Brussels switches on enforcement powers over general-purpose models [starting in August 2026], London runs the AI Security Institute, and Beijing licenses on its own terms. California and New York have legislated for frontier models at home. The durable route is shared technical evidence with sovereign enforcement, sealed through mutual recognition rather than deference, with India and the other major non-Western markets holding authorship rather than seats.”

Gogia added that the rules enacted by even such a group may not address all of the key concerns of enterprise IT. A US government effort along the lines that Hassabis is proposing would result in testing that “sits close to intelligence and industrial policy, and those functions will not stay neatly separated. A model can pass every catastrophic-risk test and still fail the enterprise on privacy, reliability, and liability,” he noted.

Walmart’s former director of cybersecurity Steven Eric Fisher, who is now an independent cybersecurity consultant, said he found the proposal “well-intentioned, but it addresses a highly polarized topic at a time when commercial interests carry unprecedented political influence, which is not always applied benevolently.”

He added, “an exclusive US standard that is not globally respected or enforceable would likely fail to achieve its core purpose and would place US companies at a competitive disadvantage.”

Aman Mahapatra, chief strategy officer for Tribeca Softtech, a New York City-based technology consulting firm, said that a deep dive into how FINRA operates today is illustrative of what IT leaders can expect from this effort, assuming the industry adopts that model.

“When the CEOs of the five companies that would be regulated are also the primary drafters of the standards, the standards will reflect those companies’ interests. FINRA has an independent board, but the operational reality is that member firm perspectives dominate the working groups that write the actual rules,” he said. “There is no reason to expect an AI equivalent to work differently, and every reason to expect it to work worse, because AI standardization is happening faster than any industry has ever attempted to standardize itself, and speed is the enemy of independent oversight.”

Carmi Levy, an independent technology analyst, was even more emphatically opposed to the Hassabis proposal.

“Asking Big Tech companies to self-police is analogous to allowing foxes to guard the henhouse. It hasn’t worked to date, and it won’t work going forward. Expecting these organizations to somehow change their ways at this point in time represents the height of naïve thinking,” Levy said. “The framework proposed by Demis Hassabis is a self-serving roadmap for an industry bent on racing to the AI horizon regardless of the harms caused along the way. It is impossible to quantify the dangers to broader society should frameworks allowing self-regulation become the norm.”

Some love the proposal

An almost completely opposite stance came from Yuri Goryunov, CIO of consulting firm Acceligence, who applauded the proposed move.

“This is one of the rare setups where industry self-regulation has a real shot, and enterprise IT should be enthusiastically rooting for it,” he said. “It fails when harms are externalized, such as in social media content moderation. Or when the overseer outsources judgment to the overseen, such as the FAA’s delegation to Boeing before the 737 MAX. It works when everyone in the industry shares the catastrophic downside.”

He suggested, however, that the best precedent here isn’t FINRA, it’s INPO, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, which the nuclear industry created within months of the 1979 Three Mile Island partial reactor meltdown “on the logic that an accident anywhere is an accident everywhere. INPO peer-reviews every US plant, its evaluations move insurance premiums, and it sits on top of the NRC’s statutory floor. That is a public-private stack very close to what Hassabis is describing. Frontier AI has the same structure: one lab’s catastrophic failure brings regulation down on all of them.”

For enterprise CIOs and other IT executives, Goryunov said, that model has the potential for being a big win.

“Today, every enterprise duplicates the same AI diligence of red-teaming, eval suites, governance committees and each does so with less information than any certifying body would have,” Goryunov said. “A credible standards regime does for AI what UL did for electrical equipment and SOC2 did for cloud: it converts an unknowable risk into a procurable product and gives boards a defensible standard of care. That’s not red tape. That’s peace of mind with an audit trail.”

However, Mahapatra said, “the countervailing view is that the alternative to industry-led standards is probably not thoughtful legislation. It is probably no standards, or state-by-state fragmentation, or the current pattern of ex-post enforcement actions where regulators surface concerns years after harm has already occurred.”

Thus, he noted, “Hassabis is making the reasonable argument that imperfect fast standards are better than perfect slow ones, and there is genuine merit to that view for topics like agent identity, evaluation methodology, and interoperability, which are exactly the areas OpenClaw is also targeting.”

This article originally appeared on CIO.com.

When Apple sued OpenAI last week, the argument it made was that former employees had stolen Apple data and then used it to benefit OpenAI. 

The technical details — an employee used “a rare, previously unknown authentication bug to access Apple’s shared network folders” — are interesting. But the larger story is Apple’s ridiculous attempt to stop its people from using anything they learned at Apple in other jobs.

“Hiring managers don’t mind some files being brought into the org during onboarding, but suddenly take umbrage when that same employee exits with some files later on,” said Mike Wilkes, enterprise CISO at Aikido Security. “Legal should be equally concerned about both events.”

The lawsuit focused on Chang Liu, an employee who had been recruited to work at OpenAI after working at Apple for eight years as a Senior System Electrical Engineer. The full text of the filing depicts a comedy of errors by Apple, offering the perfect “do not do” list of handling employee resignations — especially when they’re going to a direct competitor. 

“When Apple contacted Mr. Liu to sign Apple’s confidentiality reminder, schedule an exit interview, and confirm that he had returned his devices and complied with other exit procedures, Mr. Liu did not respond.” And “after leaving Apple, Mr. Liu failed to return an Apple-issued work laptop that he had previously authenticated to Apple’s network.”

First, typical procedure for handling departures is to tie the return of all equipment and the signing of documents to any final payments. With Apple, that is likely to be a large amount of money. The lawsuit does not say whether Apple exerted any financial pressure on their employee for compliance. 

But in terms of equipment with high-level access, why weren’t all privileges revoked, both for the employee and any and all company-issued devices? Did they not maintain a remote-wipe capability for these devices? Although remote-wipe is usually used when devices are missing or stolen, it should work as well when a departing employee refuses to return company equipment. 

According to Apple, Liu apparently had help at Apple from Tang Yew Tan, who was supposedly also interviewing with OpenAI. “While employed by OpenAI, [Liu] accessed and used his former colleague’s Apple-issued work computer that was authenticated to Apple’s network, without Apple’s authorization.”

Apple tried to make much of this Liu’s fault. Legally, yes, there might be liability there; still, Apple made itself look as if it couldn’t protect its own data. “Upon discovering that he had this unauthorized access to Apple’s systems, [the former employee] did not report it, return his stolen Apple-issued work laptop or delete the program that allowed the access.” 

Really, Apple? Your data-protection plan relies on ex-employees to “delete the program that allowed the access”? I’m not so sure you didn’t bring some of this data-leakage on yourselves. 

This gets worse: “Over several weeks, while developing hardware for OpenAI, Mr. Liu surreptitiously accessed and downloaded dozens of Apple’s confidential hardware-related files, including voluminous, detailed information about unreleased products, engineering presentations, technical specifications, and proprietary project data.”

Setting aside the issue of privileges, access, and unreturned equipment that apparently had its own privileges, that statement points to massive data exfiltration from Apple systems. Even if it is coming from a current employee, why didn’t that raise any red flags? 

Let’s get back to the broader implications. When professionals move from one company to another, they — of course — are bringing their experience and knowledge with them. Can Apple reasonably tell them that they can’t do so? Isn’t that experience and knowledge exactly why another company would want to hire them?

Now, to be sure, stealing diagrams and product spec sheets is a clear violation. Let’s say Apple spent a lot of money on some hardware research projects. A member of that technical team would learn an awful lot, all on Apple’s dime. 

But is it fair and reasonable for Apple to say that the former employee can’t leverage that knowledge at his or her next job? 

This brings us back to the point Wilkes made: If Apple is going to try to prevent any former employee from leveraging on-the-job experience, then it should instruct all new employees not to use anything they learned in a previous job. 

That would be ridiculous. Companies pay for experienced talent because of that experience. Why pay for expertise if you insist employees not leverage any of it?

Then there’s the amorphous nature of knowledge. So, it’s wrong to take detailed diagrams and spec details and hand them over to a new employer. But what if that worker heading out the door memorizes the documents (photographic memory) a day before resigning? Is a person prohibited from using something from memory?

There’s also the fruit-of-the-poisonous tree legal argument. Even if a former employee doesn’t directly use stolen data, what if their knowledge leads to other money-saving insights for the new employer? 

Given that Apple hires as many specialists as it loses to rivals, wouldn’t it make sense to leverage everything your workforce knows and then let new employers do the same? But before you do that, Apple, tighten your exiting employee tech controls. 

Then maybe you wont’t have to file lawsuits like this down the road.

The best time for tech workers to unionize was 20 years ago, when they had plenty of leverage. The second-best time is now, when they don’t.

Mass layoffs, AI-driven displacement, corporate surveillance, workplace disillusionment have created conditions that have made organizing compelling for tech professionals. But the federal labor board that has historically protected workers’ right to organize has been weakened, and the companies that once feared it are openly defying it.

Here’s how organizers and labor experts describe the pros and cons to organizing — and how you can get started.

This is Part 2 of a series on tech worker unionization. Also see Part 1: “A brewing battle: More IT workers want unions. The industry doesn’t.”

What unions can — and can’t — do for you

The single biggest benefit of a union contract for most tech workers isn’t pay — it’s protection against arbitrary termination, especially in the wake of recent mass layoffs in tech. In the United States, nonunion “at-will” workers can be fired at any time without a stated reason, while unionized workers negotiate protections written into their contracts.

“That fear of the company letting you go for anything at any time…with a union they just can’t do that,” says Zak Thompson, a senior software engineer at Kickstarter and union steward at Kickstarter United. Now that Kickstarter employees are unionized, people are less worried that saying something negative will result in termination.

“I’ve been shocked at the willingness of my co-workers to speak up against what they see as poor or controversial business decisions,” Thompson says.

Beyond job security, unions can deliver concrete material gains. Kickstarter United was formed in 2020, although getting there wasn’t easy: two employees were fired during the organizing campaign — which itself became a galvanizing event. And while the union hasn’t been able to prevent layoffs, it did negotiate better terms: four months of severance pay and four to six months of continued health insurance, versus the two to three weeks per year of work that management had initially proposed.

Other benefits include a four-day work week; AI protections; a minimum pay floor; and standards for raises, promotions, and time off for the company’s 59 employees.

Unions can give tech workers a voice in decisions that affect their daily work — including how AI tools are deployed. “Nobody I’ve spoken to is against new technology or getting trained in it,” says Max Belasco, a business systems analyst at the University of California Los Angeles School of Law and co-chair of the UCLA chapter of the University Professional and Technical Employees/Communications Workers of America (UPTE-CWA) Local 9119.

“But when new technology is being implemented, we want to know: what’s the five-year vision, the 10-year vision? Are we implementing this in a way that betters staffing, increases efficiency, or eases the lives of people already working? Or are we trying to take away jobs, automate people out of their pension or paycheck?” Belasco says.

The challenges are real. Tech professionals are less inclined to leave their jobs in the current market because wages haven’t been increasing as fast as they once were, and it can take longer to land another job.

“Tech moved from a very tight labor market in 2022 (1.85% unemployment rate) to a noticeably weaker one in 2024–2026 (3.49%),” although that’s still better than the national unemployment rate of 4.36% through May of this year, says Liya Palagashvili, senior research fellow and director of the Labor Policy Project at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

Flexibility is a concern. The more substantive challenge, raised by economists including Palagashvili, is that traditional union contracts impose uniform terms across an entire bargaining unit, limiting the flexibility that many tech workers — and their employers —currently enjoy. Tech firms need to move fast, adjusting teams, products, and roles on the fly.

“Collective bargaining agreements can make those adjustments much more difficult, whether by making them slower, costlier, or inconsistent with the contract,” she says.

Workers skeptical of unions in a survey of 1,900 tech professionals conducted by the career site Blind cited specific concerns: that unions are “not meritocratic,” “prevent innovation,” and “hold back earnings of top performers.”

Thompson from Kickstarter United pushes back: “We have nothing in our contract about ‘you can’t bend down and pick up a piece of trash because that’s someone else’s job.’ The company is free to give bonuses and individual raises as much as they like. This is all just up to the people who are bargaining the contract from the union side.”

Organizing carries potentially serious personal risks. During negotiations for a second three-year contract in 2025, Kickstarter United went on strike for 42 days. A few months later, the company announced layoffs.

“They let go strong union leaders, including a person who had bargained our last contract,” Thompson says. The union appealed, and the issue is now going to arbitration.

If you form a union, don’t expect much support from the National Labor Relations Board, the agency that certifies US labor unions and protects workers’ right to organize, in terms of prosecuting complaints of unfair labor practices, Thompson warns. “We’re in a political moment in this country with a pretty weakened NLRB. You have to be ready to organize and withhold worker power without any guarantee of safety.”

Organizers are up against an enormous union avoidance industry. Organizers can expect fierce pushback as soon as the business discovers that organizing is underway.

“There’s a multi-billion-dollar industry in union avoidance,” says Alan McAvinney, a Google software engineer and organizing chair, Alphabet Workers Union-CWA, a 1,400-member minority union of Alphabet employees. (Google is a subsidiary of Alphabet.)

US employers spend roughly $1.7 billion a year on union avoidance consultants and law firms, according to a May 2026 report by the Economic Policy Institute and LaborLab.

Expect hardball tactics. Management may play hardball during the time between when organizers announce their intention to unionize and the actual vote. For example, management can threaten to fire foreign-born workers in the US on H-1B visas if they support the union. Those workers would then have just 60 days to find a new sponsoring employer or lose their H-1B status, according to a recent Tech Workers Coalition blog post.

And at venture capital-backed startups, investment agreements sometimes require management to attest there is no union activity — meaning a public organizing drive can trigger funding withdrawal. Or, if a unionized company is acquired, the new management can dissolve the union overnight by reclassifying unionized workers as new hires.

With these sobering facts in mind, here is how organizers who have done it describe the process of creating a union.

Step 1: Start a conversation with your co-workers

At the University of California, a two-tier system had evolved where some tech workers were unionized and some weren’t, Belasco says. Management created new titles that fell outside the union even though they had similar job descriptions and responsibilities to those in the union. Those nonunion employees received lower pay and benefits than their unionized peers, which created resentment and instability.

Belasco and other organizers wanted to eliminate that division by bringing everyone under the same contract. But when they began their unionization drive, “the biggest barrier we faced wasn’t management opposition — it was that people felt this was just the best-case scenario realistically available: ‘We have this job at the university, we have concerns about automation and layoffs, but what can we really do about it?'” he says.

The antidote to that fatalism, organizers say, is simple: “Just start talking to your immediate co-workers. Are they experiencing the same challenges you are experiencing?” says McAvinney. “There’s no need to start talking about a union at this point.”

Just get a consensus and start building a group of like-minded individuals, Thompson advises. “Always start with one-on-one conversations, and that’s what you should do the whole time. That’s the key to organizing,” he says.

Tech workers often think they’re a special case, says Thompson, and therefore that unionization isn’t a good fit. “You’re not special. You are a company of workers, you are organizing, and there is a playbook for that. Trust the process, because it tends to work pretty well,” he says.

Step 2: Who’s on board, and who’s not? Map your workplace, but keep it quiet

Once there’s a consensus, continue to grow your network. Keep a list of everyone you’ve spoken with and note their disposition: “Is this person union-friendly or anti-union? Would they be a strong organizer?” Thompson says.

Maintaining secrecy early on is essential, because anti-union tactics will start immediately, and that can stop union organizing before it can gain momentum.

“Generally, employers do not want to share power with their workforce,” McAvinney says. Employers will deploy every means at their disposal to stop organizing efforts and peel away potential yes votes.

“If you look at historical examples, having 70% approval before the employer finds out about you results in a high percentage of wins when you actually cast the vote. Historically, that’s an effective buffer,” he says.

There’s a real threat of firing and layoffs. The traditional tech worker belief that job mobility makes collective action unnecessary is now being tested by a tighter job market, McAvinney says, noting that workers who many believe were fired for speaking out back in 2019 were a galvanizing factor in his union’s formation.

“You generally don’t want to be in a situation where the employer feels comfortable firing everyone. Part of that is thinking from a cynical standpoint about what the consequences would be to the employer if they did fire everyone,” he says.

One-on-one conversations that include personally asking co-workers to keep conversations confidential are key to keeping things quiet, Belasco says. When 2,100 UC tech workers voted to unionize in May, 96% voted in favor. To stay out of earshot of managers, avoid employee surveillance tools, and sidestep conference calls that could be recorded, organizers met with workers in their homes.

“That tactic is probably what made the difference between winning the election and getting the majority we got,” he says.

Step 3: Find the right union affiliation or go it alone

“Running a campaign against major employers requires the resources and expertise of the larger labor movement, even if workers publicly present as independent,” says Kate Bronfenbrenner, director of labor education research and senior lecturer emeritus at Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations.

Options include the Communications Workers of America (CWA), Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and the Office and Professional Employees International Union (OPEIU), among others. Another resource, the Tech Workers Coalition (TWC), provides training on organizing tactics, AI-in-workplace issues, and contract negotiation, and can match workers to the right unions for their needs.

The Alphabet Workers Union decided early on to affiliate with CWA. “They gave us a bunch of support early on in our campaign with no strings attached,” McAvinney says.

Kickstarter is organized through OPEIU, Thompson says. “They’ll usually have resources and staff that can help you through the next steps: collecting signatures in support of a union, bringing that to management, holding a vote — the more formalized things that interact with US labor law. They’ll also help with organizing along the way,” he says.

For workers at institutions where a union already exists, there may be a faster path. Organizers at UCLA did what’s called a “unit modification,” aligning with UPTE. By organizing under UPTE, the workers didn’t have to negotiate a new contract from scratch — they joined an already-negotiated contract covering existing UPTE tech members, which put them in “a much stronger position” than starting fresh, Belasco says.

Step 4: Choose your union model: majority vs. pre-majority or minority

Assess what’s practical for your organizing effort. In a majority union, more than 50% of all workers in a defined bargaining unit must vote to join the union through an NLRB-supervised election in the private sector, or a Public Employment Relations Board (PERB)-supervised election for public sector workers.

The NLRB must certify the union, which then operates under its legal protections. This means, for example, that the employer must bargain, negotiated contracts are enforceable, violations must go to the NLRB or arbitration, and workers can’t be dismissed without just cause.

A pre-majority or minority union is a minority labor organization operating without NLRB protections or collective bargaining agreements. “Pre-majority means that workers are able to demonstrate majority support — through signed cards, petitions, a walkout, or everyone wearing solidarity T-shirts — without going through a formal election,” Bronfenbrenner says.

The Alphabet Workers Union-CWA (AWU-CWA) formed as a pre-majority union because achieving majority status across a globally distributed workforce of over 100,000 was not a realistic near-term goal. “An underground model where you try to reach 70% support across a workforce of over 100,000 people isn’t realistic,” McAvinney says.

A pre-majority union can still make a difference, he says. For example, the Alphabet Workers Union-CWA convinced management to offer voluntary exit packages — buyouts — prior to announcing layoffs.

For smaller organizations, a majority union may be the more practical option — it’s more attainable, McAvinney says. “I don’t think [the pre-majority union model] is the correct thing to do in all situations. I certainly would not recommend it to a 200-person shop.”

Kickstarter, which had fewer than 100 employees, was able to form a majority union, with 55% voting to organize.

Ultimately, says McAvinney, “there’s no inflection point where you go from being able to win nothing to winning everything, even with a contract and a supermajority. But the more people you have who are willing and able to fight for what they want, the more you’ll be able to get.”

Step 5: Who should — and should not — be in your union?

Belasco’s situation at UCLA illustrates a broader strategic choice that every organizing campaign must make. He had been in a union position in educational technology when he was told his role would be reclassified as a non-union position.

“I was given a choice: apply to the new non-union position to continue doing the work I’d trained for, or stay in my union position doing service desk work I wasn’t used to,” he says. “Essentially, it was a choice between job security and career progression.”

Belasco joined a “wall-to-wall” union, which represents a broad range of university professional and technical employees across the UC system rather than a single job category, such as engineers or tech professionals.

Kickstarter United is another example of a wall-to-wall union. “It’s not just the engineers who are unionized, but also customer support, designers — everyone,” Thompson says.

Wall-to-wall unions are more powerful, but they’re also more difficult to achieve. Under US labor law, “professionals have to vote separately on whether they want to be combined with other workers,” says Bronfenbrenner. “You can never have a wall-to-wall unit without giving professionals the chance to decide whether they want to be separate.”

The law’s “professional employees” category includes roles like software engineers and developers but not necessarily others. For example, customer support specialists and QA analysts would fall into the “non-professional workers” category.

“For decades, the pattern was either to organize everybody except the engineers, or manage to organize the engineers and fail to bring in everybody else — neither of which builds real worker power,” says Simone Robutti, an organizer with Tech Workers Coalition Global, an international branch of TWC based in Berlin.

Step 6: You won the vote. Get ready for what comes next

Winning a union vote means having a seat at the table, says Thompson. “Once the workers have come together and agreed they want that seat, you bring that to management, and they have a chance to voluntarily recognize a union,” he says.

But in most cases employers contest the results, which must be certified by the NLRB or PERB. That process, in which the employer uses various tactics to challenge the legitimacy of the outcome, can take weeks or months.

Unfortunately, the legal framework that is supposed to protect workers during this process has been significantly weakened in the last few years. In a potentially more ominous development, SpaceX, Amazon, Trader Joe’s, Starbucks, and the University of Southern California have in separate legal actions challenged the constitutionality of the NLRB, arguing that the agency’s structure violates the separation of powers. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld injunctions against the NLRB in SpaceX’s case in August 2025 — a serious challenge to the agency’s authority.

In the meantime, some companies may disregard negotiated contracts, which can lead to lengthy legal appeals or extended arbitration.

“The NLRB can still force an election, but it can’t force a contract, and companies are saying they simply won’t comply,” Bronfenbrenner says. This is where the expertise and resources of affiliation with a major union can help, she adds.

As a result, contract negotiations can take far longer than workers might expect. At Kickstarter, for example, two years and four months elapsed from the time of the union vote to the first contract, and that was at a 59-person company with a relatively cooperative employer. At larger companies with more aggressive legal teams, the timeline will be longer.

Forming a union is hard work, Robutti says. “It’s not a service you pay for and they protect you. It doesn’t happen spontaneously, and it doesn’t happen magically. It’s the choice to take responsibility for improving your workplace.”

See Part 1: A brewing battle: More IT workers want unions. The industry doesn’t.

The model of the forward deployed engineer is sweeping through enterprise IT like a gold rush, and I’m concerned that many companies don’t understand what they’re signing up for.

Let’s start with the headline numbers. AWS announced a $1 billion investment in a new Forward Deployed Engineering organization. Google Cloud committed $750 million to expand similar programs. Microsoft has been running Azure-focused embedded engineering teams for years, including partnerships with Accenture to scale forward deployed engineering practices. All three are pitching the same story: We’ll send engineers to work directly with your teams, help you deploy AI, and accelerate your digital transformation. You get top-tier technical talent for free, and we get to partner with you on your journey.

It sounds reasonable on the surface. It sounds collaborative, even generous. But I’ve been in this industry long enough to know that when a multi-billion-dollar company offers you something for free, they’re sure to get much more than they give.

What you actually get

The forward deployed engineer model isn’t new. The consulting industry has been doing some version of it for decades. What makes this different is the scale and the direct financial incentive behind it.

These engineers work for the cloud provider. They’re not your employees. They’re not independent consultants. They’re technically excellent professionals who are being paid to solve your immediate problems while simultaneously building relationships and architectures that favor their employer’s ecosystem. Think about it from their perspective. Those forward engineers are evaluated on whether customers succeed with their employer’s platform. They’re rewarded when enterprises adopt more services from that platform. Their career advancement depends on making AWS, Google Cloud, or Microsoft Azure the obvious choice for all of your technical decisions.

This isn’t a criticism of the individual engineers. Many of them are genuinely talented and genuinely want to help. But they’re operating within a system that rewards specific outcomes, and those outcomes align with the vendor’s financial interests, not necessarily yours.

The problem no one talks about

Here’s what I see happening at enterprises right now. A company decides they need help deploying AI. A cloud provider offers to embed engineers at no additional cost. Those engineers work alongside internal teams, make architectural recommendations, and help build out systems. Six months later, the company has a production AI system running on a single cloud platform, built by people with deep expertise in that specific platform.

The problem? Nobody evaluated whether that platform was actually the best choice for the business. Nobody looked at alternatives. Nobody asked whether a multicloud architecture or best-of-breed approach might deliver better results at lower cost.

The engineers embedded in these programs are not going to recommend that you split your workloads across providers. They’re not going to suggest you use open source tools where they make sense. They’re not going to point you toward a competitor when their employer’s solution will work well enough. That’s not how these programs are designed to function. What you’re getting is optimized architecture for a single cloud brand, not optimized architecture for your business.

The financial reality will hit

The bills are going to come due, and they’re going to be painful. I’ve watched this pattern play out before. When enterprises lock into a single cloud provider through these embedded engineering programs, they often discover two or three years later that they’re paying premiums that their more independent-thinking competitors avoided.

The reasons are straightforward. When you’re architecting systems around a single platform, you naturally fall into usage patterns that favor that platform’s pricing structures. You use their managed databases instead of portable alternatives. You adopt their AI services instead of evaluating third-party options. You build workflows that only work within their ecosystem. And when it comes time to renegotiate or benchmark against alternatives, you find that migrating would cost more than accepting whatever pricing they offer.

I’ve spent the past decade helping companies untangle from these situations. I’ve seen organizations with cloud bills 15 to 20 times higher than they should be, unable to migrate because their entire AI infrastructure is built on proprietary services that only work on one platform. The forward deployed engineer programs are accelerating this problem. They’re making it easier to get into these situations and harder to get out.

Think before you commit

Before you accept one of these programs, consider these three recommendations.

First, require independent architecture oversight from day one. Hire or engage architects who work for your company, not for your cloud provider. They should evaluate every recommendation made by embedded engineers against business requirements and compare options across providers. This isn’t about being suspicious of the engineers. It’s about ensuring that decisions are made with your interests in mind.

Second, demand a clear exit strategy before you begin. Ask the cloud provider to document which proprietary services you’re using, what migration paths exist, and what the cost would be to move to an alternative platform. If they can’t provide that information, or if the migration costs seem impossibly high, that’s a sign that you’re building technical debt that will be very expensive to service later.

Third, benchmark your costs continuously. Set up internal processes to compare your cloud spending against industry benchmarks and against what your competitors might be paying for similar workloads. Don’t wait until your contract renewal to discover that you’re paying premium prices. Monitor expenses from the beginning, and be willing to challenge your cloud provider if you’re not getting value that justifies the cost.

The bottom line

The forward deployed engineers are solving real problems. Enterprises genuinely struggle with AI deployment, and having experienced engineers available to help is valuable. I’m not suggesting these programs are fundamentally bad. However, they’re being marketed as neutral partnerships when they’re actually strategic sales programs designed to lock enterprises into specific platforms. The helpful engineers showing up at your office are building dependencies that will be very difficult to break. The “free” technical assistance is being funded by margins on services you’ll be buying for years.

Go in with your eyes open. Use these programs but add your own independent oversight. Build architectures that you could leave if you needed to. And don’t let the immediate satisfaction of having problems solved today blind you to the financial consequences that will arrive tomorrow.