The quote has a clean, precise quality that most observations about fear do not. Reid Wiseman posted it to Twitter in October 2014, a few days after completing the first spacewalk of Expedition 41 aboard the International Space Station: “While #spacewalking I realized something: I used to think I was scared of heights but now I know I was just scared of gravity.”

He was floating outside the station at roughly 400 kilometres above Earth, working with European Space Agency astronaut Alexander Gerst for six hours and thirteen minutes on cooling pump relocation and external robotics work. The spacewalk was conducted on 7 October 2014. At that altitude, with nothing below and the planet curving away at the edge of peripheral vision, Wiseman noticed the absence of something he had expected to find: the fear he thought he had.

The quote has resurfaced in the months around the Artemis II mission, for which Wiseman serves as commander. On 1 April 2026, he launched as part of the first crewed mission to the Moon since Gene Cernan commanded Apollo 17 in December 1972. The insight is more than a decade old. It reads differently now, from a trajectory that takes Wiseman and his crew past the Moon and back.

The distinction itself

The difference between fearing heights and fearing gravity sounds like wordplay until you hold it carefully. Both terms are commonly used to describe the same cluster of behaviour: the discomfort on balconies, the reluctance to stand near the edge of a cliff, the particular unease of a glass floor above a long drop. The behaviours are consistent. What Wiseman is questioning is the diagnosis.

A fear of heights, understood as a response to elevation and exposure, locates the problem in the altitude. But what most people are responding to in those situations is not the height in any abstract sense. It is the fall. It is gravity’s action on the body in the event of a slip. It is the trajectory the body would follow if the ledge gave way, and the irreversibility of what that trajectory leads to. The height is the setup. Gravity is the mechanism.

In microgravity, the mechanism has been removed. There is no directional pull toward a surface that recedes infinitely. There is no trajectory the body would follow if it lost contact with the station. An astronaut outside the ISS is not high in the sense that a person on a balcony is high, because the relationship between position and consequence that produces the fear of heights has been cancelled. Wiseman was in the most extreme version of elevation a human can occupy, and the thing he expected to feel was not there.

He worked backward from that absence to what it meant. The fear he had carried was not of heights. It was of gravity.

What reclassification does

This kind of revision is harder than it sounds. Most people who believe they fear heights have arranged something around that belief: the avoidance patterns, the decisions about which windows to stand near, the self-description offered when explaining a refusal. The label has become load-bearing. It organises behaviour.

What Wiseman found was that the label was describing a proxy rather than the cause. The altitude was consistently present when the fear appeared, so the altitude got named. But the consistent presence of altitude was itself a consistent presence of gravity’s consequences. The two variables had never been separated. Spacewalking separated them.

The implication is not that people who fear heights are wrong about their fear. The fear is real and the behaviour it produces is real. What shifts is the precision of the account. Someone who understands their discomfort as being about gravity’s consequences, rather than about altitude per se, has a different description of where the sensitivity lives. That description may or may not change anything practical about what they avoid. But it is more accurate, and accuracy in these matters has a certain value even when it is not immediately actionable.

Wiseman did not overcome a fear. He reclassified one. The distinction matters because overcoming implies confronting the same situation repeatedly until the response diminishes. Reclassification involves recognising that the situation you have been avoiding is not quite the thing you thought it was.

Twelve years and a lunar trajectory

Wiseman is 50 years old, a retired United States Navy captain and test pilot. As of April 2026, he is the commander of a mission carrying him further from Earth than any human since the Apollo programme. His crew includes NASA astronauts Christina Koch and Victor Glover and Canadian Space Agency astronaut Jeremy Hansen.

Artemis II is a circumlunar flyby, not a landing. The crew will loop around the Moon and return. The distances involved, the communication delays, the duration, make any analogy between this and an ISS spacewalk look quite small. The environment Wiseman occupied in 2014 was far more controlled than the one he entered in April 2026.

The 2014 insight does not become more or less true in this context. It is not predictive of how Wiseman or anyone else experiences the Artemis II mission specifically. But the Artemis II frame does something to the quote: it makes the scale of what he has learned to not be afraid of more visible. The man who discovered in 2014 that his fear was of gravity, not altitude, is now travelling to a distance at which Earth’s gravity is a much smaller presence.

There is a version of this story that treats it as an arc of overcoming, each mission more extreme than the last, the fear perpetually shrinking. That is not what Wiseman is describing. He is describing a single clarification, arrived at empirically, during six hours of work outside a space station. The rest followed from that, or did not.

The question the observation leaves open

Wiseman’s observation raises a question that has no clean answer: when we say we fear something, how often are we naming the right thing?

The fear of heights is a durable shorthand, but it collapses a set of variables that could in principle be separated. The height. The exposure. The lack of handholds. The awareness of what would happen if the body fell. The mental simulation of the fall itself. These are not identical. They would, if separated, suggest different things about where the sensitivity lives. Most people never encounter the conditions that would separate them. Wiseman did.

There is no general lesson here that applies predictably from person to person. What seems clear is that the precision of Wiseman’s account is a function of the specificity of the test. An environment that removed gravity as a variable allowed him to see that gravity was the variable that mattered. Ordinary environments, which almost always include gravity as a background constant, do not offer the same diagnostic clarity.

He has not said whether the reclassification changed anything else. He has said that he now knows which word to use.

The post Artemis II astronaut Reid Wiseman on spacewalking: “I used to think I was scared of heights — now I know I was just scared of gravity” appeared first on Space Daily.

A few months ago, I found myself deep in a conversation about Mars colonization timelines. The other person — a software engineer, genuinely enthusiastic, not naive about the engineering — was walking me through radiation shielding approaches, the habitability of lava tubes, the logistical case for SpaceX’s Starship architecture. It was fascinating. He clearly knew far more than I did about the technical specifics. But somewhere in the middle of it, a question started forming that I couldn’t quite place, until eventually I did: we hadn’t once asked whether any of this was a good idea.

We had been talking about how for an hour, and neither of us had said the word why.

That conversation has been sitting with me since. Not because the technical questions aren’t important — they’re genuinely hard, and the people working on them are doing serious work. But there is a gap between “this is technically possible” and “this is what we should do,” and that gap tends to close faster in the Mars discourse than it does almost anywhere else. The survival problem gets all the oxygen. The ethical one gets treated as settled — as if the answer to “should we go?” is obviously yes, and the only thing left to figure out is the radiation shielding.

I’m not a space scientist and I don’t have a strong stake in any particular answer here. What I do have is a persistent discomfort with how questions get framed — with the way the tractable problem has a tendency to absorb all the attention that the harder one deserves.

The question we’re not asking

The survival discourse is, in its way, extraordinary. Cosmic radiation at the Martian surface running at roughly six to seven chest X-rays per day under normal conditions — and significantly higher during transit and solar storm events. An atmosphere that amounts to about one percent of Earth’s. Temperatures swinging 70 degrees Celsius or more between day and night. The progressive bone density loss from low gravity that compounds across months into something that isn’t easily reversed. These are real problems, and the engineers working on them deserve the coverage they get. None of that is what I’m questioning.

What I’m questioning is the habit of treating “can we survive there?” as a proxy for “should we go?” — as though answering the first settles the second. It doesn’t. They are different questions that require different kinds of thinking, and we have, for the better part of a decade, let the excitement and tractability of the first crowd out serious engagement with the second.

The life question nobody wants to stop for

One of the more uncomfortable things I’ve come across in reading about this is the planetary protection question — specifically, the possibility that Mars might not be as empty as the colonization narrative tends to assume. The debate about whether Mars currently harbors microbial life, perhaps in briny subsurface water or in the recurring slope lineae that have been periodically interpreted as evidence of seasonal liquid water, remains genuinely open. No confirmed biology has been found. But “not yet confirmed” is not “not there,” and the question of what we would do if we found it — before or after we arrived — seems to get less serious treatment than it warrants.

NASA’s planetary protection guidelines exist precisely because this uncertainty is real. They were built around the concern that Earth microbes carried on spacecraft could contaminate Mars and compromise any future ability to find or study native life there — or vice versa. The protocols apply most strictly to robotic missions, which can be sterilized. They apply far less cleanly to humans, who exhale, shed skin cells, and carry an internal ecosystem of trillions of organisms that are not optional passengers. A crewed mission, by design, cannot be managed the same way a probe can.

What this means, if taken seriously, is that any crewed mission to Mars before we have higher confidence about the biological status of the planet carries a non-trivial risk of introducing an extinction event for whatever might be living there. Carl Sagan, who spent his career both advocating for space exploration and urging caution about it, made this point repeatedly — that introducing Earth organisms into a low-diversity Martian ecosystem, if one exists, could eliminate it entirely before we ever knew it was there. The argument has not aged out. If anything, growing scientific interest in Martian subsurface habitability has made it more pressing, not less.

We have spent years asking whether humans can survive on Mars. We have spent much less time asking what Mars might be surviving from, if we arrived.

The backup civilization argument and its hidden premises

The most common justification offered for Mars colonization at the level of civilizational stakes is the backup argument: a multi-planetary species is an insurance policy, and the cost of not going is existential risk to the entire human project. Stephen Hawking made this argument in his final years. Elon Musk has built it into the explicit ideological foundation of SpaceX’s long-term mission — a self-sustaining city on Mars as a hedge against collapse on Earth.

I find this argument more worth taking seriously than most critics give it credit for. The underlying concern about existential risk is real. The logic that a species concentrated on one planet is more vulnerable than one distributed across two is coherent. But the argument is doing more work than it usually admits, and some of its hidden premises deserve more scrutiny.

The most obvious one is timing. The existential threats most likely to end civilization on Earth in the foreseeable future — climate change, engineered pandemics, nuclear conflict, biodiversity collapse — are immediate relative to any realistic projection of a self-sustaining Martian colony. A genuinely self-sustaining Mars city, by most serious estimates, is generations away. The threats we are failing to address are not. If the backup civilization argument is meant to be taken literally as a response to existential risk, it would seem to require securing the primary civilization first — not as an alternative to Mars ambitions, but the sequencing matters considerably more than the discourse tends to acknowledge.

The governance question matters here too. The Mars colonization effort as it currently stands is being driven largely by the decisions of a very small number of extraordinarily wealthy individuals and their companies, operating mostly outside democratic institutions, international treaty frameworks, or any serious mechanism of public deliberation. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits national sovereignty claims over celestial bodies, but it was not designed to address private colonization by corporations operating under whatever regulatory minimums they can find. The choices being made now — when to go, at what pace, under what protocols — will shape the terms of Mars activity for a very long time. The fact that those choices are being made by a small group of people with specific and concentrated interests seems like something a more serious public conversation would address.

What an honest accounting would require

I want to resist the easy conclusion here — the “we should never go” position that treats any Mars ambition as inherently reckless or hubristic. There are real arguments for human Mars exploration. The science alone — the geology of ancient riverbeds, the evidence of a once-warmer world, the complex chemistry of the regolith — has produced discoveries with no parallel in the history of planetary science, and there are legitimate cases that humans on the surface could accelerate that science in ways robots fundamentally cannot. I find the impulse to go, the sheer ambition of it, genuinely compelling on some level I can’t entirely defend rationally.

But I think we owe it to the question — and possibly to whatever might be living on that planet — to stop treating the survival problem as a substitute for the ethical one. An honest accounting would start with the life question: invest seriously in determining whether Mars is biologically empty before a crewed mission departs, and treat a positive finding as a real constraint on what comes next rather than a footnote to manage. It would include meaningful international deliberation about who gets to make these decisions, and why the current answer to that question is “the people with the most rockets.” It would take the backup civilization argument seriously enough to notice what it actually implies about sequencing and urgency on Earth.

The conversation I had a few months ago was a good one. The engineer was genuinely thoughtful, and I learned things I didn’t know. But I’ve been bothered, in the time since, by how naturally we both moved through the technical questions and how completely we both skipped the other kind. The “can we?” problem is captivating in a way the “should we?” problem never quite is. It has cleaner edges. It has milestones. It announces itself as progress.

The harder question doesn’t do any of that. It just sits there, waiting for the conversation to slow down enough to make room for it.

The post We keep asking whether humans can survive on Mars and skipping the more important question of whether we should go at all appeared first on Space Daily.

The face you walked into the room with this morning was being read, by every person who looked at you, in approximately one hundred milliseconds — about a tenth of a second, faster than any conscious thought. The reading was not primarily about the features that took your DNA twenty years to assemble. The bones of your face, the colour of your eyes, the shape of your jaw, the symmetry of your features — these all contributed to the judgement, but they were not, on the available evidence, the only ingredients of it. A substantial part of how attractive any individual stranger perceived you to be, in the brief moment before they had any other information about you, was almost certainly whether you appeared to be having a good time. A genuine smile, animated expression, and the visible signs of a person enjoying being where they are produce, in the moment of first impression, attractiveness boosts that can rival what carefully selected clothing, makeup, or grooming can plausibly achieve.

According to a 2014 paper by Jessika Golle, Fred Mast, and Janek Lobmaier published in Cognition and Emotion titled “Something to smile about: The interrelationship between attractiveness and emotional expression”, the social effect of smiling on stranger-rated attractiveness has been replicated across enough independent studies and across enough cultural contexts to be considered one of the more robust findings in social psychology. Smiling faces are rated more attractive than neutral faces of the same person, across both sexes, across multiple age ranges, and across essentially every population that has been examined. The neuroimaging literature has identified the underlying mechanism: when human observers see a smiling face, the medial orbitofrontal cortex — a region of the brain involved in reward processing and the assignment of positive value to stimuli — shows a substantially stronger response than when the same observer sees a neutral face. The smiling face is, in a literal sense, registering in the observer’s brain as more rewarding to look at.

What kind of smile actually works

The specific type of smile matters substantially. As reported by a peer-reviewed PMC review of smile research and the broader perception literature, the most extensively studied distinction in the smile literature is between what researchers call Duchenne smiles and non-Duchenne smiles. The Duchenne smile, named after the 19th-century French neurologist Guillaume Duchenne who first characterised it, activates two distinct sets of facial muscles: the zygomatic major, which pulls up the corners of the mouth, and the orbicularis oculi, which creates the small crinkles around the outer corners of the eyes. Both muscle activations occur involuntarily when a person is genuinely amused or pleased. The non-Duchenne smile activates only the mouth corners and is the kind of polite, social smile produced on demand for photographs or to acknowledge a casual greeting.

The two types of smile are perceived very differently by observers, even though most people cannot articulate exactly what the difference is when they see one. Duchenne smiles register as genuine, warm, trustworthy, and substantially more attractive. Non-Duchenne smiles register as polite at best, performative or insincere at worst, and produce far smaller boosts to attractiveness ratings. The discrimination is automatic and is operating in the observer’s brain at the level of unconscious pattern recognition rather than conscious analysis. This is the underlying reason why the standard advice to “smile more in photos” often produces mediocre results in practice: the smiles are non-Duchenne. The viewer’s brain registers the difference even when the viewer cannot consciously identify what is wrong with the expression.

Why the effect is so large

Per a 2023 study in Evolutionary Human Sciences examining how smiling expressions interact with facial features in attractiveness judgements, the magnitude of the smiling-on-attractiveness effect is large enough to substantially affect outcomes in real-world social contexts. Across studies, happy facial expressions consistently produce the highest attractiveness ratings of any expression tested; angry expressions produce the lowest. The effect appears in both sexes but is particularly pronounced for ratings of female faces, where smiling can shift attractiveness ratings by amounts comparable to the difference between an averagely-rated face and a substantially above-average face. Even male facial masculinity — which interacts in complex ways with attractiveness preferences — is moderated by smiling: smiling reduces the avoidance response some women show toward strongly masculinised male faces.

The evolutionary and social explanation for this effect is, in the relevant literature, fairly direct. A smile is one of the few human expressions that is broadly cross-cultural — recognised across nearly every population that has been tested — and that consistently signals friendliness, low threat, willingness to engage, and positive emotional state. For an observer making rapid social judgements about whether to approach a stranger, the smile is a substantial piece of information: it indicates that the encounter is likely to go well, that the person on the other side is in a positive frame of mind, and that initial overtures will probably be reciprocated. The attractiveness boost is, in this account, the observer’s brain doing what brains do — bundling the information about the smile into a single quick-summary judgement about whether this stranger is worth engaging with. The summary judgement, in shorthand, comes back as “attractive.”

What the framework does not claim

Intellectual honesty requires noting the limits of the smiling-as-attractiveness effect. The research does not show that smiling can substitute for every other physical or social factor in attractiveness ratings. As covered by a 2025 review at All About Psychology on the broader smile-attractiveness literature, static physical features — facial structure, body shape, height, age, grooming — still contribute substantially to first-impression attractiveness ratings, and the smile effect is best understood as a substantial modifier of these underlying factors rather than as a replacement for them. A smiling face is more attractive than the same face not smiling. A smiling person is generally more approachable than a neutral one. Whether the smiling person is, in absolute terms, more attractive than a non-smiling person with substantially different underlying physical features is a question the research does not consistently answer.

What the research does support is a more specific and more practically useful claim. For any given person, in any given moment, the version of that person who appears to be genuinely enjoying themselves is going to be perceived as more attractive than the same person looking flat, distracted, or unhappy. The variable that each individual has the most direct control over, in the seconds before a first impression forms, is not their face or their body — those are mostly fixed at the moment of the encounter. The variable that is actually within their control is their expression, their visible emotional state, the degree to which they appear genuinely engaged with what is happening around them. The research consistently suggests that this variable, despite being the one most readily modifiable, is one of the larger factors that the observer’s brain weights when assigning the first-impression attractiveness rating. Looking like a person who is glad to be where they are turns out to be, by every available measure, a substantial part of what other people are responding to when they form their first impression of you.

The post One of the biggest factors in whether a stranger finds you attractive may not be your face, your body, or your clothing — research suggests it is whether you appear to be enjoying yourself in the moment they first see you, with a smile substantially modifying how attractive you appear in the brief seconds when first impressions form appeared first on Space Daily.

The face you saw in the mirror this morning was not the face anyone else saw when they looked at you over breakfast. The two are related but not identical. Most human faces are slightly asymmetric — the eyes are at slightly different heights, the smile pulls more strongly on one side than the other, the hair parts on one side, freckles sit in specific positions that do not perfectly mirror across the vertical axis. When you look in a mirror, you see one version of your face, with left and right reversed relative to what other people see. When other people look at you, they see the opposite. You have, over the course of your life, become deeply familiar with one of these two versions. They have become familiar with the other. Neither version is wrong. Both are, however, surprisingly different from each other in ways that affect how each party perceives the same underlying face.

According to a 1977 paper by Theodore Mita, Marshall Dermer, and Jeffrey Knight published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, the experimental setup that established this phenomenon was straightforward. The researchers took a frontal photograph of each of 37 women — undergraduate psychology students at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee — and printed each photograph twice: once as a true image (showing the face as a camera or another person would see it), and once as a mirror-flipped image (showing the face as the subject herself would see it in a bathroom mirror). The subjects were then shown the two versions side by side and asked which they preferred. The same pairs were shown to the subjects’ friends and lovers, who were asked the same question. The results, in both Study 1 and a subsequent Study 2, were striking and consistent. The subjects themselves preferred the mirror-flipped version of their own face. Their friends and lovers preferred the true version.

Why this happens

The mechanism underlying the effect is one of the better-established findings in social psychology: the mere-exposure effect, first proposed by the University of Michigan psychologist Robert Zajonc in 1968. As described in Gizmodo’s coverage of the mere-exposure mechanism behind the mirror preference, the mere-exposure effect is the phenomenon by which repeated exposure to a stimulus increases a person’s preference for that stimulus. The more often you encounter something, the more comfortable you become with it, and the more positively you evaluate it on subsequent encounters. The effect operates across an enormous range of contexts. People develop preferences for songs they have heard repeatedly, for faces they have seen frequently in public, for words that appear often in their reading, for foods they have eaten before. It does not require any explicit reasoning or evaluation; it works at the level of automatic familiarity processing.

The mirror-image preference is a particularly clean demonstration of the effect because the two stimuli being compared — the true image and the mirror image of the same person’s face — are objectively almost identical. The asymmetries are small. The lighting is the same. The expression is the same. The only difference is which side of the face is on which side of the photograph. The subject has, over the course of her life, spent many thousands of hours looking at one specific version. Her friends and lovers have spent many thousands of hours looking at the opposite version. When the two parties are then asked which version “looks more like” the person in question, or which version is more attractive, each party prefers the version they have been seeing all along. Neither is wrong. Each is simply applying the mere-exposure effect to the version of the face they have the most experience with.

What this implies about self-perception

Per the Mita et al. paper’s broader theoretical discussion, the finding has implications that extend well beyond the specific experimental setup. The general principle is that the version of yourself that you have internalised as canonical — the face you recognise as belonging to you, the face you adjust before going out, the face whose minor blemishes and asymmetries you have catalogued in detail — is a version that essentially nobody else has ever seen. Every photograph anyone else has ever taken of you. Every memory anyone else has formed of your face. Every impression you have made on a stranger across a room. All of these have been based on the opposite version of the face from the one you have been carrying around in your own head.

This is the underlying psychological mechanism behind the common experience of looking at a photograph of yourself and finding it subtly wrong. The face in the photograph is the true image — the version other people have been seeing all along — but it does not match the mirror image you have spent your life looking at. The mismatch produces the small but real sense of discomfort that most people experience when seeing themselves in photographs, particularly photographs they did not pose for and in which they had no opportunity to adjust their expression before the shutter clicked. The photographs are not unflattering. The photographs are accurate. Your face is mirroring back at you, several centimetres off from where you expected it to be.

The selfie problem

The modern environment has complicated the picture in ways that the Mita team could not have anticipated in 1977. As covered by Goody Feed’s analysis of how mirror-image preferences apply to selfie photography, most smartphone cameras now display selfies in the front-facing camera as a mirror image of the user — because that is what the user is accustomed to seeing — and then save the resulting photograph in one of two ways, depending on the phone model and the specific app being used. Some phones save the mirror-flipped version (the version the user saw in the viewfinder). Others save the true version (the version other people would see). The user is, accordingly, receiving inconsistent feedback about which version of their face is “really” them. A selfie that looked fine in the camera viewfinder may appear subtly wrong when reviewed afterwards, because the photo has been flipped to the true orientation. The same selfie viewed by a friend may look slightly strange to the user but entirely normal to the friend, who has been seeing that orientation of the face all along.

The broader implication, beyond the specific case of selfies, is that nearly every modern human is now navigating a world in which both versions of their own face are routinely available — the mirror version every morning in the bathroom, the true version in every photograph, video, and reflective non-mirror surface. The two versions are different enough that the brain registers the discrepancy. The version each person has learned to recognise as their own is, by all available evidence, the one that other people have not seen, except in the rare case of looking at the person directly while standing on the opposite side of a mirror. Everyone else has been seeing the other one. Your face, the one in your head, is essentially the reverse of the one the world has been looking at for as long as you have had it.

The post The face you see in the mirror every morning is not the face other people see — when researchers show people two photos of themselves, most prefer the mirror-flipped version, while their friends and partners shown the same pair consistently pick the unflipped one, meaning the face you have grown to recognize as your own is essentially the reverse of the one the world has been seeing all along appeared first on Space Daily.

Casey Harrell can now talk for twelve hours at a stretch. Two years ago, he could not talk at all. The ALS he was diagnosed with several years earlier had progressively destroyed the motor neurons controlling the muscles of his face and throat, leaving him with the symptoms doctors call dysarthria and, eventually, anarthria — the inability to speak intelligibly even with substantial effort. Harrell still knew what he wanted to say. The neural commands his brain was sending toward the muscles of his lips, tongue, jaw, and larynx were intact. The muscles themselves no longer responded. What the BrainGate clinical trial team at UC Davis did, in a July 2023 surgery that took several hours, was implant four small arrays of microelectrodes into the left precentral gyrus of Harrell’s brain — the region of the speech motor cortex that ordinarily sends those commands to those muscles. The arrays contain 256 electrodes between them. The electrodes record the firing patterns of individual neurons in real time. Machine-learning software running on a nearby computer translates the patterns into the words that Harrell, despite no longer being able to produce them with his mouth, is still trying to say.

According to UC Davis Health’s June 2026 announcement of the latest results, the system now operates at approximately 99 percent accuracy across a working vocabulary of 125,000 words — essentially every word an English-speaking adult would ordinarily need. Harrell’s average speaking rate via the device is approximately 56 words per minute, comparable to slow natural conversation. He has used the system at home, without researchers present, for more than 3,800 hours over a 400-day continuous-use period — averaging roughly five hours of daily use, with maximum single sessions of approximately twelve hours. He has produced more than 183,000 sentences and approximately two million words. His synthesised voice is modelled on recordings of his own pre-ALS voice. When he first heard it during the early trial phase, his own comment was: “It feels a lot like me.”

What changed between 2024 and 2026

The BrainGate team’s first publication on Harrell’s case, in the New England Journal of Medicine in August 2024, established that the basic approach worked — that brain activity recorded from the speech motor cortex could be decoded into fluent speech with high accuracy, in a setting with researchers present and a constrained working session. The June 2026 paper documents something fundamentally different: the same patient continuing to use the same system, but now in an independent home setting, operated by his own care team rather than by researchers, for thousands of hours over multiple years. As reported by ScienceAlert’s coverage of the latest results, this transition — from a proof-of-concept demonstration in a research lab to a sustained, independent communication tool used as part of daily life — is the genuinely novel achievement that the BrainGate team is reporting.

David Brandman, the UC Davis neurosurgeon who implanted the device and co-led the research, framed the shift directly: “For years, BCIs have been proof-of-concept devices that lived in highly controlled research labs. This work shows that we may have crossed a threshold, by empowering a person with paralysis to speak on his own terms.” The practical difference is substantial. A device that requires researchers to be physically present every time it is used can demonstrate scientific feasibility but cannot become part of a person’s actual life. A device that the patient’s regular home care team can connect every morning and disconnect every evening, with no specialist intervention required, can. Harrell has been doing the latter for two years.

What the system actually does

The fundamental insight underlying the BrainGate speech BCI is that the brain continues to send speech commands even after the muscles can no longer execute them. When Harrell attempts to speak, the neurons in his speech motor cortex fire in patterns that are essentially identical to the patterns they would have produced if he could still move his speech muscles normally. The implanted microelectrodes record those firing patterns from approximately 256 individual neurons. The decoding software, trained on Harrell’s specific neural signatures during initial calibration sessions, identifies which phonemes he is trying to produce and assembles them into words. Per The Next Web’s analysis of the BRAND platform that powers the decoding, the system uses a custom machine-learning architecture optimised for real-time speech reconstruction, with continuous adaptation to changes in the neural signal over time.

One of the more remarkable aspects of the system is its inclusion of a deliberate “privacy mode,” in which Harrell can disable data recording when he does not want his neural activity captured or used to train future versions of the decoder. The feature exists because the technology raises real concerns about the boundary between intended speech and unspoken thought. Brain-computer interfaces, by their nature, record neural activity that the user may not have chosen to externalise. The BrainGate team has been careful to design the system so that the user controls what gets recorded and what does not.

What this means for the broader field

The Harrell case is part of a broader convergence in the BCI field that has been gathering pace over the past several years. As covered by a Clinical Trials Arena analysis of the BCI clinical trial landscape, the BrainGate consortium — which has been running clinical trials of brain-computer interfaces since the early 2000s, and now spans Brown University, Massachusetts General Hospital, the VA, and UC Davis — is one of several parallel efforts working on the same general problem. Elon Musk’s Neuralink, Synchron, Paradromics, and the UCSF and Stanford BCI groups have all produced demonstrations of varying scope and ambition. The BrainGate Harrell case is, at present, the most extensively documented sustained-use BCI result in the published literature, but it sits within a broader trajectory in which the basic technology is moving from research curiosity to clinical reality.

For the approximately 30,000 Americans currently living with ALS, the practical implications of the Harrell case are limited in the short term. The technology remains experimental, requires invasive surgery, and is not yet commercially available outside the clinical trial setting. Scaling the approach to a second patient, a tenth patient, a hundredth patient will require substantial work on hardware durability, surgical standardisation, software adaptation across individual neural signatures, regulatory approval, and the long list of practical and economic questions that any new medical device must answer before becoming generally available. None of these are insurmountable. None of them are immediate. Harrell himself is now able to communicate, work, and participate in family and social life in ways that were not available to him two years ago. The question of how soon the same becomes true for other ALS patients, for stroke survivors with severe communication impairment, for people with locked-in syndrome, and for the broader population of patients with severe paralysis is now a question of engineering, manufacturing, and policy rather than of fundamental scientific possibility. The threshold the BrainGate team is now claiming to have crossed, in Brandman’s framing, is the one between proof-of-concept and tool. Whether the rest of the field follows, and how quickly, will define the next decade of BCI research.

The post A brain-computer interface has, for the first time, restored fluent everyday speech to a person who had lost it — a man with ALS who had not spoken aloud in years until a small implant from the BrainGate clinical trial began translating his attempts to speak directly into computer-synthesised words, in a result researchers reported in June 2026 appeared first on Space Daily.

Red Granite Pictures, a small Los Angeles production company co-founded by Riza Aziz, the stepson of then-Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, wrote the checks that put Leonardo DiCaprio on a yacht in Martin Scorsese’s The Wolf of Wall Street. The film, released in December 2013, cost roughly $100 million to make and grossed almost $400 million worldwide. U.S. Department of Justice civil forfeiture filings later alleged that a large share of that production budget came from money looted out of 1Malaysia Development Berhad, the sovereign wealth fund known as 1MDB.

A movie about a stockbroker who defrauds investors was paid for, prosecutors say, with the proceeds of one of the largest financial frauds in history.

The irony is the kind screenwriters usually have to invent.

The fund that was supposed to build Malaysia

1MDB was set up in 2009, the year Najib Razak became prime minister. The pitch was straightforward: a state investment vehicle that would borrow on the strength of Malaysia’s sovereign credit and pour the money into power plants, real estate, and infrastructure that would lift the country into the upper tier of developed economies.

Within a few years, the fund had raised billions through bond issues arranged by Goldman Sachs. Where the money actually went became the subject of investigations on four continents.

U.S. prosecutors allege that at least $4.5 billion was siphoned out of 1MDB between 2009 and 2015, routed through shell companies and offshore accounts, then spent on penthouses in Manhattan, a Bombardier jet, a 300-foot superyacht called the Equanimity, Van Gogh and Monet paintings, jewelry for Australian model Miranda Kerr, and a slate of Hollywood films.

Red Granite and the Scorsese pitch

Riza Aziz founded Red Granite Pictures in 2010 with an American partner, Joey McFarland, a former event promoter from Kentucky. Neither had produced a major studio film. Within two years they had outbid Warner Bros. for the rights to The Wolf of Wall Street, the memoir by convicted penny-stock fraudster Jordan Belfort that Scorsese and DiCaprio had been trying to get made for years.

Red Granite covered the entire production budget. They threw a launch party in Cannes in 2011 with Kanye West performing. The young executives told the trade press they had backing from wealthy Middle Eastern investors.

The real source, according to the Justice Department’s 2016 and 2017 civil forfeiture complaints, was Low Taek Jho, better known as Jho Low, a Malaysian financier in his early thirties who had become close to the Najib family and who allegedly orchestrated the looting of 1MDB from the inside.

How the money moved

The U.S. complaints trace a specific path. In 2012, prosecutors alleged, hundreds of millions of dollars traceable to diverted 1MDB bond proceeds moved into accounts linked to Red Granite and were used to fund film production.

From there, prosecutors say, money tied to the diverted bond proceeds helped finance The Wolf of Wall Street specifically. DOJ remarks at the time put the figure at more than $100 million involved in the theft from 1MDB used to finance the film.

The film opened on Christmas Day 2013. DiCaprio was nominated for an Academy Award. He thanked Riza Aziz and Joey McFarland at the Golden Globes when he won Best Actor in a Musical or Comedy.

The yacht, the paintings, the Oscar statuette

The asset list U.S. authorities tried to recover reads like a parody of what a 1990s screenwriter would imagine a corrupt billionaire owns. The Equanimity, valued at around $250 million, was seized off Bali in 2018 and later sold to a Malaysian gaming company for $126 million.

Malaysian authorities have since recovered and displayed Picasso and Joan Miró works that prosecutors say were bought with stolen funds, unveiling the paintings publicly as part of the asset-recovery effort.

Jho Low also allegedly bought Marlon Brando’s Oscar statuette for On the Waterfront as a birthday gift for DiCaprio. DiCaprio handed it back to investigators in 2017, along with a Picasso he had been given and a Basquiat collage.

Settlements, pleas, and a fugitive

Red Granite Pictures settled with the U.S. Department of Justice in March 2018, agreeing to pay $60 million without admitting wrongdoing. The settlement covered claims that production money for The Wolf of Wall Street, Dumb and Dumber To, and Daddy’s Home had come from tainted sources.

Najib Razak lost the 2018 Malaysian general election to a coalition led by his former mentor Mahathir Mohamad. He was arrested weeks later. In July 2020 he was convicted on seven charges of abuse of power, criminal breach of trust, and money laundering tied to a smaller 1MDB-linked entity called SRC International, and sentenced to 12 years in prison. His sentence was later halved to six years. His path from prime minister to prison inmate took barely two years.

Riza Aziz was charged in Malaysia in 2019 with laundering $248 million of 1MDB funds. Those charges were dropped in 2020 under a settlement requiring him to return assets, a decision that prompted public anger in Kuala Lumpur.

Goldman Sachs paid more than $2.9 billion in penalties to U.S., Malaysian, and other regulators in 2020 for its role in arranging the 1MDB bond issues. Its Malaysian subsidiary pleaded guilty.

Jho Low remains at large. Interpol has issued a red notice. He is believed to be in China.

The Switzerland trial

The case keeps generating new courtrooms. In April 2024, two men accused of embezzling $1.8 billion from the fund went on trial in Switzerland, another set of hearings stemming from the multibillion-dollar scandal that has touched banks, royals, and Hollywood studios across half a dozen jurisdictions.

Swiss prosecutors have been pursuing the case since 2015, when the country’s attorney general announced criminal proceedings over what he described as serious indications that funds had been misappropriated from Malaysian state companies.

What the film became

The Wolf of Wall Street made Scorsese’s longest theatrical cut, at three hours and two minutes, and the film’s reputation has only grown. It is taught in business ethics courses. Belfort himself tours the world giving motivational speeches.

Whether films about financial crime glamorize the behavior they depict, or warn against it, is a live question in academic research on media representation and public perception of crime. Outlets shape understanding by selecting which incidents to report and how to frame them, and the 1MDB case is a near-perfect study in that framing problem.

The film about Belfort’s quaaludes and stolen millions was paid for, prosecutors allege, with quaaludes-and-stolen-millions money. The closing scene shows Belfort, freshly out of prison, running a sales seminar in Auckland. The audience leans forward. They want to learn how he did it.

Why people do this

The psychology of large-scale financial fraud is its own field. One useful clue is the gap between how people see their own ethics and how they judge everyone else’s. A Psychology Today discussion of researchers’ self-ratings points to bounded ethicality and motivated reasoning, the ordinary mental machinery that can let people preserve a moral self-image while making decisions they might condemn from the outside.

Jho Low, in the few public statements his lawyers have made, has consistently denied wrongdoing. Najib has maintained that he believed the funds in his personal accounts, a now-famous transfer of roughly $681 million, were a gift from the Saudi royal family.

Malaysian voters did not buy that explanation. According to reports, Najib defended distributing money to win votes, a practice that critics said epitomized his administration’s approach to governance.

A footnote in the credits

The opening credits of The Wolf of Wall Street still carry the Red Granite Pictures logo. Streaming services have not edited it out. The film plays on Paramount+, on airline seatback screens, on television at 1 a.m. on a Tuesday.

The closing scene with Belfort in Auckland was shot in late 2012. By then, according to U.S. prosecutors, the wire transfers into Red Granite-linked accounts had already cleared. The film was, in a sense, already inside the crime it was about to depict.

Of the roughly $4.5 billion U.S. authorities allege was stolen from 1MDB, the Malaysian government has so far recovered a little over half. Jho Low’s whereabouts are unknown. The Equanimity sails under a new name. And somewhere in a federal evidence locker, a Picasso and an Oscar statuette wait to be sent home.

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