But not for all women

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The thing that has happened to the global space economy over the past 25 years is the kind of phenomenon that is easier to see in retrospect than to recognise while it is occurring. In 2000, the entire global space industry generated approximately $130 billion in annual revenue, almost all of it from government programmes and satellite communications. By 2023, the figure had reached approximately $630 billion. By 2035, on the most widely-cited forecast available, it is projected to reach $1.8 trillion — making space comparable in economic scale to the current global semiconductor industry, and substantially larger than the global pharmaceutical industry. The growth is occurring above the cloud line, mostly out of sight of the populations whose lives are being increasingly shaped by it, and at a pace that exceeds essentially any other major economic sector currently being tracked by long-range forecasters.

According to the World Economic Forum’s April 2024 announcement of the $1.8 Trillion Opportunity report developed with McKinsey & Company, the central finding of the analysis is that the bulk of the space economy’s growth between now and 2035 will not come from rockets, exploration missions, or moonwalks. It will come from terrestrial industries that have begun to depend, in fundamental but mostly invisible ways, on satellite-enabled services. Earth observation. Satellite communications. Positioning, navigation, and timing services. Weather forecasting. Supply-chain tracking. These are the categories projected to drive the substantial majority of the new value, and the industries most affected are not aerospace companies but supply-chain and transportation firms, food and beverage producers, retail chains, insurance companies, and the digital communications sector — none of which traditionally classified themselves as space companies, and most of which will not be aware of how dependent their operations have become on orbital infrastructure until something disrupts it.

The two halves of the space economy

Per McKinsey’s overview of the space economy structure, the field can be usefully divided into two distinct halves. The first is what McKinsey calls “the backbone” — the satellites, launchers, ground stations, and physical infrastructure that constitute the traditional space industry. This category includes SpaceX, Blue Origin, Rocket Lab, the various government space agencies, satellite manufacturers, and the companies that build and operate the orbital and ground hardware. The second half is “the reach” — the much larger ecosystem of applications, services, and businesses that depend on the backbone to deliver value to end users on Earth. Ride-hailing apps that rely on GPS satellites. Agricultural operations that use Earth-observation imagery for crop management. Logistics companies that track shipments via satellite. Climate monitoring services. Financial-services firms that use satellite-derived timing signals for high-frequency trading.

The growth projection puts most of the new value in the reach rather than the backbone. The McKinsey-WEF analysis specifies that traditional hardware and service providers will see their share of the total space economy slowly decrease over the next decade, while the reach grows substantially faster than the backbone. The implication is that the space industry of 2035 will look substantially different from the space industry of today — not because the rockets and satellites will be radically different, but because the population of companies and customers depending on them will have expanded across nearly every major sector of the global economy.

What is real versus what is aspirational

The drivers that have attracted the most popular attention — asteroid mining, lunar resource extraction, helium-3 fusion fuel, space-based manufacturing, orbital tourism — are largely not the drivers of the $1.8 trillion projection. They are aspirational additions to the space economy that may or may not materialise in the projected timeframe. Asteroid mining, in particular, has been promoted by various ventures over the past decade — Planetary Resources, Deep Space Industries, AstroForge — but no commercial asteroid-derived material has yet been brought to market, and the engineering and financial obstacles remain substantial. Lunar resource extraction is closer to operational reality, with NASA’s Artemis programme planning to demonstrate water-ice extraction from permanently shadowed polar craters in the 2030s, but commercial-scale lunar mining is unlikely to contribute meaningfully to the global economy before 2040 at the earliest.

What is real and immediately driving the growth is mostly less glamorous. Satellite mega-constellations are real — SpaceX’s Starlink alone has launched approximately 7,000 satellites and is on track for tens of thousands more. Amazon’s Project Kuiper, OneWeb, and several Chinese constellations are also deploying at scale. The total number of operational satellites in orbit has grown from approximately 2,000 in 2018 to more than 10,000 currently, and is projected to exceed 100,000 by 2030. Earth-observation services have matured to the point where commercial satellite imagery is now used routinely by agricultural insurance providers, commodity traders, climate scientists, and intelligence agencies. Commercial space stations, designed to replace the International Space Station when it retires in 2030, are under active development by Axiom Space, Voyager Space (Starlab), and the Blue Origin / Sierra Space joint venture (Orbital Reef). These are not science fiction. They are construction projects with timelines and financing.

What this means for the next decade

As reported by a December 2025 World Economic Forum analysis of developing economies in the space sector, the geographic distribution of space-economy growth is also shifting substantially. For most of the post-Apollo era, the global space sector was dominated by the United States and Russia, with significant activity in Europe and Japan. The picture in 2025 is more diverse. India successfully landed Chandrayaan-3 on the Moon’s south pole in 2023 — the first country to reach the south pole — and operates a substantial domestic launch industry. China’s space programme has approximate parity with NASA on several metrics and is targeting a crewed lunar landing by 2030. The United Arab Emirates has a Mars orbiter and is participating in lunar missions. Brazil, Nigeria, Mexico, and several Southeast Asian countries are building domestic satellite capabilities. The space economy is becoming, for the first time, a multipolar industry in which substantial value is generated outside the historical aerospace powers.

The structural risks to the projection are real and worth noting. The continued accumulation of orbital debris raises the long-term possibility of the Kessler syndrome — a cascading collision sequence that could render certain orbital altitudes unusable. The regulatory framework for space activity remains fragmented and inadequate to the scale of commercial activity now underway. Geopolitical tensions between the major space powers could produce export controls, technology restrictions, or worse. As covered in a 2024 Innovator analysis of the WEF/McKinsey findings, the $1.8 trillion figure is itself a base-case projection; the report’s upside scenario reaches $2.3 trillion, and the downside scenarios — in which orbital congestion, regulatory failure, or geopolitical disruption substantially slow the growth trajectory — produce significantly lower numbers. The most likely outcome is that the actual 2035 space economy lands somewhere in the broad range between these scenarios. The basic direction, however, is no longer seriously contested. Space is now an industrial sector at the scale of pharmaceuticals or semiconductors, growing faster than either, and is no longer adequately described as a frontier.

The post By 2035, the global space economy is predicted to reach roughly $1.8 trillion in annual value — up from approximately $630 billion in 2024 — driven by satellite mega-constellations, Earth observation services, commercial space stations, and the early stages of lunar resource extraction, in a quiet industrial revolution that many economists believe will exceed the speed of every previous economic transition in modern history appeared first on Space Daily.

The popular framing of emotional pain treats it as something metaphorical. The broken heart of unrequited love, the sting of rejection, the ache of grief, the cutting remark, the wound that will not heal: the language of physical injury used to describe emotional injury is so widespread across cultures and languages that it has been treated, until quite recently, as a poetic convention rather than a scientific claim. People who use the language to describe their suffering are usually understood to be reaching for a metaphor that captures something about the intensity of what they feel.

The peer-reviewed neuroscience of the past two decades has substantially complicated this picture.

What the brain imaging evidence has shown, across multiple research teams, multiple methodologies, and multiple populations, is that emotional pain is not metaphorically similar to physical pain. The two states activate substantially overlapping neural systems, produce substantially similar behavioural and physiological responses, and respond to substantially the same pharmacological interventions. The language of broken hearts and stinging rejection is, on the strongest current reading of the evidence, more literally accurate than the popular framing has assumed.

The 2003 Cyberball study

The foundational peer-reviewed study of the neuroscience of social pain was published in October 2003 by Naomi Eisenberger, Matthew Lieberman, and Kipling Williams in the journal Science. The team designed an experiment to induce social rejection in a controlled laboratory setting while participants were inside a functional magnetic resonance imaging scanner. They used a computer game called Cyberball, in which the participant played a virtual ball-tossing game with what they believed were two other human players. After a brief inclusion phase in which all three players passed the ball to each other, the two other players began passing the ball only to each other, excluding the participant for the remainder of the game.

The two other players were not, in fact, human. They were computer-controlled. The exclusion was a designed feature of the experiment. From the participant’s subjective experience, however, they had just been deliberately excluded from a social activity by two people they had been interacting with moments earlier.

The brain activation pattern during the exclusion phase was the most significant finding of the study. The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, a region of the brain that processes the affective component of physical pain, was significantly more active during exclusion than during inclusion. The level of activation correlated positively with the participant’s self-reported distress at being excluded. The same region of the brain that becomes active when a person is burned, cut, or struck became active when the same person was ignored in a virtual ball-tossing game.

The Eisenberger team’s interpretation, supported by the subsequent literature, was that the human brain treats social exclusion as a form of injury. The neural alarm system that evolved to alert humans to physical damage to their bodies is, on the available evidence, the same alarm system that alerts humans to damage to their social bonds.

The 2010 Tylenol study

The strongest follow-up evidence for the Eisenberger thesis came from a different direction. In 2010, a team led by Nathan DeWall at the University of Kentucky, with colleagues at Toronto, Florida, UCLA, Florida State, and Georgia College, published a study in Psychological Science that asked a simple question. If social pain and physical pain activate the same neural systems, then a pharmacological intervention that reduces physical pain should also reduce social pain. The team tested this prediction directly.

Participants in the first experiment took either 1,000 milligrams of acetaminophen, the active ingredient in Tylenol and Panadol, or a placebo, every day for three weeks. They reported their daily experience of social pain (feelings of rejection, exclusion, hurt feelings) on a standardised scale throughout the study period. The participants who took acetaminophen reported significantly lower social pain than those who took placebo, with the difference emerging gradually over the three weeks and becoming statistically significant by the end of the study.

The second experiment, also with three weeks of acetaminophen or placebo, used functional magnetic resonance imaging at the conclusion of the dosing period. Participants played the same Cyberball exclusion game while being scanned. The acetaminophen group showed significantly reduced neural activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula during the exclusion condition, compared with the placebo group. The pharmacological intervention designed to reduce physical pain had reduced both the felt experience and the brain activation associated with social pain.

The finding was substantial. Acetaminophen is one of the most widely used pain relievers in the world, taken by hundreds of millions of people for headaches, muscle aches, fever, and other physical conditions. Its mechanism of action involves central nervous system effects rather than purely peripheral pain blocking, which is the reason it can affect the brain regions that process social pain in addition to the brain regions that process physical pain. The DeWall team noted that this finding has implications for the treatment of social rejection, chronic loneliness, and the social aspects of grief, although they emphasised that acetaminophen is not a recommended long-term treatment for any of these conditions.

The 2011 somatosensory finding

A third major piece of evidence came from a 2011 study by Ethan Kross, Marc Berman, Walter Mischel, Edward Smith, and Tor Wager, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The Kross team designed the most powerful induction of social pain that had been attempted in a brain imaging study. They recruited 40 participants who had experienced an unwanted romantic break-up within the previous six months and who reported that thinking about their ex-partner still produced significant emotional distress. The participants were placed in an fMRI scanner and shown alternating photographs of their ex-partner and of a familiar but emotionally neutral acquaintance. In a separate task, the same participants experienced a moderate physical pain stimulus, applied as heat to the forearm.

The Kross team found that thinking about the rejecting ex-partner activated not only the affective regions of the brain associated with physical pain, as the Eisenberger team had shown, but also the somatosensory regions, including the secondary somatosensory cortex and the dorsal posterior insula. These are the brain regions that process the felt sensory quality of physical pain, not merely the emotional response to it. The activation pattern in these regions during the romantic rejection condition was 88 per cent predictive of physical pain when compared with a database of more than 500 published pain studies.

The finding moved the science forward in an important way. Until 2011, the strongest interpretation of the Eisenberger data was that social and physical pain shared the affective components but probably not the sensory components. The Kross data suggested that, at sufficient intensity, social pain activates the sensory components as well. The brain of a person looking at a photograph of an ex-partner who has recently rejected them is, on the available evidence, doing something substantially similar to the brain of a person who has been physically burned.

Our team came across an interesting short video that explains the psychology behind what happens when someone has been through too much in life. If this article resonates, it’s worth a watch – click here to view it. 

Why the brain works this way

The current best evolutionary explanation for these findings is that the social attachment system in the human brain piggybacked on the existing physical pain system rather than developing a separate alarm mechanism of its own. Mammalian young, including human infants, require an unusually long period of caregiving to survive. An infant separated from its caregivers will die. The evolutionary pressure to keep infants attached to caregivers, and caregivers attached to infants, has been one of the strongest selection pressures shaping the human brain over the past several hundred thousand years.

The existing physical pain system, which had evolved to register damage to body tissue and motivate behaviour that reduces such damage, was already capable of producing a sufficiently intense aversive signal. The most parsimonious evolutionary solution was to extend this signal to social loss, so that the threat of being separated from social bonds would feel as urgent and unbearable as the threat of physical injury. The result is that the human brain treats damage to relationships, exclusion from social groups, and the loss of attachment figures as variants of the same general category of threat that includes physical wounds.

This explanation, sometimes called the social attachment piggyback hypothesis, has been articulated in detail by Eisenberger in subsequent papers and is the standard evolutionary interpretation of the imaging findings. It is also consistent with the cross-cultural ubiquity of physical pain language in descriptions of social loss. Speakers of unrelated languages, in unrelated cultures, with no shared history of metaphor formation, describe rejection and grief in substantially the same terms. The convergence on physical pain vocabulary appears to be driven by the underlying neural reality rather than by any cultural transmission.

The honest limitations

The social-pain-physical-pain overlap thesis is not, despite the strength of the evidence above, fully settled in the peer-reviewed literature.

A 2014 study by Choong-Wan Woo, Tor Wager, and colleagues, published in Nature Communications, applied a more sophisticated form of brain imaging analysis called multivariate pattern analysis to data on both social rejection and physical pain. The Woo team found that while the same anatomical brain regions are activated by both kinds of pain, the precise neural patterns within those regions are distinct. The brain appears to be using the same general neighbourhood for both kinds of pain, but it is doing different things within that neighbourhood.

The Woo finding does not negate the Eisenberger and Kross results. It does mean that the strongest possible interpretation, in which social and physical pain are essentially the same experience differently triggered, is too strong. The current best reading is that the two kinds of pain share substantial neural infrastructure but are not identical. The overlap is genuine and substantial. The identity claim is too strong on the available evidence.

A separate methodological concern is that the laboratory inductions of social pain, including the Cyberball game and the ex-partner photograph paradigm, are short-duration acute experiences that may not perfectly model the chronic social pain of long-term loneliness, sustained grief, or persistent interpersonal trauma. The neural systems engaged by acute laboratory rejection may differ in important ways from those engaged by months or years of sustained social suffering. The peer-reviewed evidence on chronic social pain is thinner than the evidence on acute laboratory social pain, although the available work suggests broadly similar neural patterns.

What it means

Several things follow from the neuroscience of social pain that are worth saying clearly.

The first is that the popular framing in which emotional suffering is treated as fundamentally different from physical suffering, less real, less serious, less worthy of medical attention, is not supported by the available evidence. The brain treats damage to social bonds as a category of injury and produces a measurable distress signal that overlaps substantially with the distress signal produced by physical injury. The chronic loneliness that the World Health Organization now treats as a global public health concern, the grief that follows the death of a close attachment figure, and the social rejection that produces measurable mortality in long-term studies are all, on the available evidence, registering in the brain as forms of sustained low-grade pain.

The second is that the language people use to describe their emotional suffering is, on the strongest current reading, an accurate report of what is happening rather than a poetic exaggeration of it. A person who describes a breakup as feeling like being punched in the chest is not being dramatic. They are providing the most accurate available verbal description of a neural state that genuinely shares features with being punched in the chest.

The third is that the pharmacological evidence suggests interesting possibilities for the treatment of acute social pain, although the practical implications remain genuinely contested. The DeWall finding that acetaminophen reduces social pain has been replicated and extended in subsequent work, but the long-term implications for grief management, loneliness intervention, and the treatment of attachment-related disorders are not yet established.

The fourth, on the strongest current reading of approximately twenty years of peer-reviewed neuroscience, is that the human capacity for enduring pain extends to the capacity for enduring social pain, because the same neural systems are involved in both, and the same biological constraints determine what can be borne and for how long.

The popular framing has, in a sense, always known this.

The neuroscience is just confirming what every person who has ever lost someone has already been trying to say.

The post Research into the neuroscience of social rejection has shown that the brain regions that activate when a person is excluded, rejected, or grieving a lost relationship are the same regions that activate during physical injury, with the overlap being so substantial that a standard over-the-counter painkiller measurably reduces both kinds of pain, because the human brain has co-opted the physical pain system to register damage to social bonds appeared first on Space Daily.

Joanna Gray has a new low to report from the coal face of what remains of British education: the trend for blank walls in classrooms. This miserable "display diet" is designed, inevitably, to help the 'neurodiverse'.

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Thought of the week, from Hannah Arendt: “Loneliness is not solitude. Solitude requires being alone whereas loneliness shows itself most sharply in company with others.”

We tend to treat those two words as different doses of the same medicine. Solitude is a bit alone, loneliness is very alone, and both come down to the simple business of not having people around. Arendt is saying something stranger and, I’ve come to believe, far truer. They aren’t two points on one scale at all. They’re separate states, and the proof is that the worst of one tends to strike at the exact moment you’re surrounded.

The two aren’t even related

Solitude is being alone, and it can be one of the better things in a life. When I’m in it, I’m not actually without company. I’ve got myself. There’s a quiet conversation that goes on between you and you when no one else is about, and in solitude that conversation has room to happen. You think, you wander, you settle. Alone, and entirely fine.

Loneliness is a different animal altogether. It’s the sense of not being met, of there being nobody, possibly including yourself, who registers that you’re really there. And its cruel signature, the thing Arendt puts her finger on, is that it doesn’t require you to be physically alone to do its work. It does its sharpest, coldest work in a full room.

Two evenings

I can hand you both states as two specific nights.

The first was a solitary one. An evening alone in my flat, no plans, nobody about, the phone face down. I cooked something slow, read for a good while, sat out on the balcony watching the city do its restless thing. Not a word exchanged with another human for hours, and I felt full, settled, perfectly good company to myself. That was solitude. Alone, and not lonely in the slightest.

The second was a crowded one. A big party here in Bangkok, packed and loud, a whole room of people I half-knew, a drink in my hand, laughter going off all around me. And somewhere in the thick of it, a cold wave of about the purest loneliness I know rolled straight through me. Surrounded on every side, and abandoned. Everyone present, nobody meeting me, the noise widening the gap rather than filling it. The strange thing was that I’d have sworn, walking in, that a big lively night was exactly what I needed. It turned out to be the precise opposite of the cure. I left early, walked home by myself, and felt better the instant I was out the door, because being alone had never been the problem. The un-meeting crowd was.

Why we reach for exactly the wrong cure

Because we muddle the two together, we reliably apply the wrong fix. Someone admits they’re lonely and we tell them to get out more, see people, fill the diary up. Sometimes that helps. Often it makes things worse, because we’ve prescribed company for a condition that sharpens in company. It’s handing a man dying of thirst a tall glass of saltwater. More people is the right answer to a solitude you didn’t choose. It is frequently no answer at all to loneliness, and now and then it’s an accelerant.

It runs the other way too. People who genuinely need solitude, real time alone with themselves, often grow frightened of it, because they’ve absorbed the idea that all aloneness is the dangerous kind. So they stuff their lives with company to dodge a thing that would actually have done them good, fleeing solitude as though it were loneliness, and losing the one dependably restorative sort of alone there is.

The company you keep with yourself

What sits underneath Arendt’s distinction is the relationship you have with your own self. In solitude you’re alone but not deserted, because you’re still keeping yourself company, still on decent terms with the only person guaranteed to be in the room. Loneliness, in her sense, is when even that company gives out, when you’ve been deserted by everyone else and, worse, by your own self too, and that is a desertion no crowd on earth can reach. A party can’t talk you out of it, because the party isn’t addressing the actual absence. Arendt put it with a precision I can’t improve on: in solitude I am with myself, two-in-one, but in loneliness I am truly one, left by everybody. The absence is closer to home than any room full of strangers.

That reframes the whole problem. If the loneliness that bites hardest in a crowd is partly the loss of your own company, then a real portion of the cure was never out there in a bigger guest list at all. It’s in rebuilding the ability to sit with yourself, so that you turn up to the party already in decent company, and the crowd becomes a bonus rather than a frantic, failing remedy. The people hardest to make lonely tend to be the ones most at home in their own solitude, the ones who never lost the thread of that quiet two-way conversation in the first place.

Working out which one you’re in

So the genuinely useful first move, when the alone feeling lands, is to figure out which of the two has actually arrived, because they want opposite things from you. If it’s solitude you’re flinching from, the answer is to stop bolting, sit in it, and rediscover that your own company isn’t an enemy to be drowned out. If it’s loneliness, especially the sort that flares up in a crowd, the answer was never simply more bodies in the room. It’s the harder work of being properly met by a few people, and of repairing the relationship with the self that’s gone silent.

I think about those two evenings whenever I catch myself reaching for company as a cure-all. The night alone that felt full, and the crowded night that felt like being left behind. Between them they taught me what Arendt put far more elegantly, that being alone and being lonely have almost nothing to do with one another, and that the loneliest I am ever likely to be is not in an empty flat but in a bright, loud room full of people, not one of whom, myself included, is fully there. Solitude I can always go home to. Loneliness is the thing that follows me into the party. Telling them apart is the first step to not handing myself the saltwater every time.

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A new view of the prisoner’s dilemma

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Quote of the day, from Friedrich Nietzsche: “He who has a why to live for can bear almost any how.”

It’s the kind of line that can sound like a fridge magnet if you meet it cold, the sort of thing printed under a photo of a mountain. But it has a much heavier history than the mountain photo suggests. Viktor Frankl, the psychiatrist who survived the Nazi camps, took this exact sentence as the key to who lived and who didn’t around him. The prisoners who held on, he observed, were rarely the strongest or the best fed. They were the ones who still had a why, a person to get back to, a piece of work unfinished, some reason waiting on the far side. Strip a man of his why and the how, however mild, became unbearable. Give him one and he could endure almost anything.

The how is never the deciding factor

We get this backwards most of the time. We assume people break under the weight of their circumstances, the how, and that if we could just make the how easier, lighter, more comfortable, people would cope better. So we chase comfort, and we treat hardship as the enemy, and we measure a good life largely by how few difficult hows it contains.

What Nietzsche saw, and Frankl confirmed in the most extreme laboratory imaginable, is that the how is almost never what does people in. People endure staggering hows, illness, grief, poverty, loss, as long as the why holds. And people crumble under remarkably gentle hows, a comfortable life, no real hardship at all, the moment the why goes missing. It isn’t the size of the burden that breaks a person. It’s carrying any burden at all without a reason to.

My grandmother, who refused to die on schedule

I watched this play out in my grandmother, my mum’s mother, in the last stretch of her life.

She’d been given a grim prognosis, a matter of a few months at the outside, and by every medical expectation she should have gone roughly when they said she would. She did not. She hung on, stubbornly, well past the date, and the doctors did that polite shrug doctors do when a patient ignores the timetable. What kept her going wasn’t medicine or clean living or luck. It was my cousin’s wedding, eight months out, which she had decided, flatly and without negotiation, that she would attend.

That wedding was her why. She talked about it constantly, planned her outfit, fussed about the seating, used it as a rope to pull herself along a corridor everyone else assumed she’d already reached the end of. She made it. She sat in the second row in a hat she’d agonised over for weeks, cried through the vows, danced one slow number with my cousin, and she died about three weeks later, the job done, the why spent. I have never seen a clearer demonstration that the body will keep going far past what seems possible if the mind has somewhere it absolutely intends to be.

The danger of a borrowed why

The trouble with a why is that not all of them hold, and we’re often running on ones that can be taken away. A why pinned entirely to another person, to your children, say, or a partner, is real and powerful, but it has a hostage quality. If they leave, or grow up, or die, the why goes with them, and people who built their entire reason for being on a single relationship can collapse spectacularly when it ends.

The sturdiest whys, I’ve come to think, tend to be the ones that renew themselves. A piece of work that’s never quite finished. A craft you keep getting better at. A cause larger than your own lifespan. Even, in my grandmother’s case, a next thing, always a next thing, a wedding and then a christening and then a great-grandchild she’d decided in advance she had to meet. She kept manufacturing new whys the moment the old ones were used up, which is, I suspect, the real trick. A why isn’t a thing you find once and keep. It’s a thing you have to keep renewing, because life keeps spending them.

Why comfort can be the quiet danger

What unsettles me about all this, as a reasonably comfortable man living a reasonably comfortable life, is the warning Nietzsche’s line carries underneath. If a why lets you bear almost any how, then the people most at risk aren’t necessarily the ones with the hardest hows. They’re the ones with the emptiest whys.

You can build a life with the difficulty engineered almost entirely out of it, smooth, cushioned, frictionless, and find yourself strangely unable to bear it, because comfort is not a why. It’s just an easy how. A person with everything and no reason can be far more fragile than a person with nothing and a fierce one. Which means the modern project of removing all hardship, if it isn’t matched by the harder work of building a reason, can leave people more breakable, not less. We optimise the how and forget to ask about the why, and then wonder why so many of the comfortable are the ones falling apart behind closed doors.

The question worth keeping in view

I don’t have my grandmother’s clarity. Most of us don’t, until something forces it on us. But the quote has changed the question I ask myself when a stretch of life gets heavy. The instinct is always to ask how do I make this easier, how do I reduce the load, how do I escape the how. Nietzsche points at the better question, which is whether the why is still there at all.

Because if the how feels unbearable, it’s worth checking whether the real problem is the weight or the missing reason underneath it. Often the burden hasn’t actually grown. The why has slipped out from under it, and the same load that was fine last year has become impossible, not because it got heavier, but because the thing that made it worth carrying went missing while you weren’t looking.

My grandmother couldn’t be killed on schedule because she point-blank refused to miss that wedding. None of us gets to choose our hows, not really. The one thing we have any say over is whether we’ve got a why strong enough to drag us through them, and whether, when one gets used up, we’re paying enough attention to reach for the next.

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If you are currently in your mid-forties and feeling somewhat worse about your life than you remember feeling in your twenties, the data suggest you are not alone, you are not broken, and the curve you are on bends back upward. The basic finding is one of the more robust patterns in the empirical economics of well-being. In a long series of papers running from approximately 2004 through 2025, the economists David Blanchflower of Dartmouth College and Andrew Oswald of the University of Warwick have analysed survey data on life satisfaction and happiness from millions of individuals across more than 130 countries. The pattern that has consistently emerged is a U-shape — high in youth, declining through early and middle adulthood, reaching a minimum somewhere in the late forties, and then rising again through the late fifties, sixties, and into the seventies. The same shape appears, with minor variations, in advanced economies, developing economies, individual US states, every European country examined, and the great majority of Latin American, African, and Asian countries surveyed.

The most comprehensive single statement of the finding came in 2020, when Blanchflower published a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper analysing life-satisfaction data from 132 countries. Averaging across the country-level estimates, he found the age minimum of well-being at 47.2 years in advanced countries and 48.2 years in developing countries — strikingly similar figures across radically different economic and cultural contexts. “The happiness curve is everywhere,” he concluded. A 2021 follow-up in the Journal of Population Economics extended the analysis to 145 countries and confirmed the same essential pattern, with the U-shape robust to statistical controls for income, education, marital status, and employment.

What the data actually show

The shape of the curve, examined country by country, is not identical everywhere. In some countries the dip is sharper; in others it is more gradual. The recovery phase varies in steepness. The absolute level of happiness at any given age varies enormously across countries — Scandinavian populations report substantially higher life satisfaction at all ages than populations in many lower-income or politically unstable countries. But the basic temporal pattern — that any given country’s well-being levels are lower in midlife than in either young adulthood or old age — replicates across an extraordinary range of national contexts. As reported in the University of Warwick’s press coverage of the original 2008 Blanchflower-Oswald paper, the researchers found the same U-shape in happiness levels and life satisfaction across 72 countries in their initial dataset, including economies as different as Norway, China, Iraq, and Argentina. The pattern is not specific to wealthy industrial democracies or to any particular cultural tradition. It appears to be a feature of being human across the adult lifespan, regardless of where the human in question happens to live.

For people inside the dip, the data carries a specific implication. The years between approximately 40 and 55 are, on average across the surveyed populations, the lowest-satisfaction years of adult life. The recovery is not automatic and not guaranteed for any individual — these are statistical averages across enormous populations, and any given person can defy the curve in either direction. But the general trajectory means that the experience of feeling that life has somehow narrowed or dimmed in midlife is, by the available data, the modal experience for adults in this age range, not a personal failure or a sign that something has specifically gone wrong. The corollary is that the late sixties and seventies, contrary to widely-held assumptions about ageing as a steady downhill, are typically reported by the people living through them as among the higher-satisfaction periods of adult life.

Why the curve might exist

The mechanisms behind the U-shape are not fully settled, and several competing explanations are now under active research. One leading hypothesis comes from the socioemotional selectivity theory developed by the Stanford psychologist Laura Carstensen, which proposes that as people perceive their remaining time as shorter, they progressively prioritise emotionally meaningful experiences over information-seeking or status-seeking ones. Older adults, in this account, are happier in part because they have become better at selecting the activities, relationships, and goals that actually produce contentment, and at letting go of the ones that do not. A second hypothesis emphasises expectation adjustment — by the late forties, most adults have learned what their lives will and will not deliver, and the gap between what they hoped for and what they have can produce acute disappointment; by the late sixties, that gap has often been reconciled. A third hypothesis emphasises the practical reduction of midlife stressors — the children grown, the career trajectory settled, the financial pressure typically eased — which simply removes some of the load that was depressing midlife well-being.

Per a 2022 review and replication of the U-curve in Frontiers in Psychology, neurobiological mechanisms may also play a role. Midlife is the period when adults typically carry the heaviest combination of work, financial, caregiving, and intergenerational responsibilities — the “sandwich generation” effect of being responsible for both children and ageing parents simultaneously. The cumulative allostatic load of chronic stress can suppress subjective well-being for years at a time. As these responsibilities reduce in late life, the stress load reduces, and the underlying capacity for satisfaction reasserts itself.

What the framework does not claim

Intellectual honesty requires noting that the U-curve finding has been actively contested within happiness economics over the past two decades, and the methodological debate remains unresolved on several points. Some critics — notably Paul Frijters and Tony Beatton in 2012, and Sonja Kassenboehmer and John Haisken-DeNew in 2013 — have argued that the U-shape appears in cross-sectional data but weakens substantially or disappears in longitudinal data that follows the same individuals across their lives. Others have suggested that the U-shape may be partly an artifact of cohort effects (different generations having different baseline happiness levels) rather than a pure age effect. The Princeton economist Angus Deaton has argued that the U-shape may depend on specific socioeconomic conditions and may not be as universal as the Blanchflower-Oswald papers suggest.

The Blanchflower group has responded to these critiques with subsequent analyses that they argue confirm the basic pattern across multiple datasets and methodological approaches. The debate continues. What is largely uncontested is that the well-being of younger adults (ages 18-25), particularly young women, has declined substantially in many developed countries since approximately 2014, in ways that complicate the traditional U-curve picture for the most recent cohorts. As documented by the Global Interdependence Center in a 2025 review of the global U-shape literature, the youth-end of the curve has flattened or reversed in some recent samples — meaning that for some current young adults, the typical pattern of starting high and dipping into midlife may not apply to them in the way it did to earlier generations. The midlife dip and the late-life recovery, however, continue to show up consistently in the older portions of the data.

Why the curve is invisible while you are on it

The most disconcerting feature of the U-curve, for people currently inside the dip, is that it tends to be undetectable as a temporary pattern from within. Someone in the middle of midlife dissatisfaction typically experiences the dissatisfaction not as one particular point on a long curve but as the new permanent reality of being themselves. The retrospective view from the seventies — that the forties were, statistically speaking, the lowest-satisfaction years of an otherwise broadly improving life — is not available to the person in their forties, who has no way to see the forthcoming recovery. The curve appears in the aggregate data because researchers can examine millions of lives at different ages simultaneously. Each individual life sees only the slice it is currently in. The empirical contribution of the Blanchflower-Oswald research programme, whatever the eventual outcome of the methodological debates around it, has been to make the broader shape visible at all — to point out, on the basis of survey data from hundreds of millions of human beings, that the dip is a feature rather than a final destination, and that the curve generally bends upward again on the other side.

The post Across more than 100 countries, researchers have documented a “U-curve” of human happiness — life satisfaction reliably dips through middle age before rising again in late life — and the happiness people report in their late 60s and 70s is often greater than what they felt in their 30s, in a quiet curve almost nobody expects to be on while they are inside the dip appeared first on Space Daily.

If you have ever lain awake at 3 a.m. running through a conversation you cannot rewrite, a decision someone else has already made, or a future event you cannot guarantee, you have arrived at the specific psychological territory that a former Roman slave named Epictetus mapped out approximately 1,900 years before you got there. Epictetus, who lived from roughly 50 to 135 CE, did not write anything down. His teachings were recorded by his student Arrian, who transcribed his lectures and later compiled the most essential ones into a short handbook called the Enchiridion. The handbook, approximately 53 short chapters long, opens with what is probably the single most consequential sentence in the entire Stoic tradition. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry on Epictetus, the line begins: “Of things that exist, some are in our power and some are not in our power. Those that are in our power are conception, choice, desire, aversion, and in a word, those things that are our own doing. Those that are not under our control are the body, property or possessions, reputation, positions of authority, and in a word, such things that are not our own doing.”

What Epictetus then argued is that almost all human suffering arises from a single, repeated, correctable error: confusing the first category with the second. We try to control things that belong in the not-in-our-power column — other people’s opinions of us, the behaviour of relatives, the outcome of negotiations, the weather, the economy, the past, the future, our own bodies and lifespans — and we neglect the small, genuinely controllable category, which consists of our own judgements, intentions, and responses. The result is chronic frustration about things we were never going to be able to change, accompanied by chronic neglect of the things we actually could change. The Stoic prescription, articulated in chapter 1 of the Enchiridion and elaborated across the much longer Discourses, is to perform this sorting deliberately and continuously, until it becomes second nature.

The dichotomy in practice

The classical Stoic exercises around what modern Stoic-revival writers have called the “dichotomy of control” were not abstract philosophical contemplations. They were daily practices, intended to be performed in the morning before the rest of the day’s events began, and reviewed in the evening after the day was over. The morning practice involved anticipating the day’s likely difficulties — encounters with rude or dishonest people, unexpected setbacks, frustrations of various kinds — and pre-sorting them into the two categories. The encounter with the rude colleague would happen or not happen; that was not in our control. Our response to it was. The traffic on the road would be heavy or light; that was not in our control. Our patience inside that traffic was. The clients we hoped to sign would sign or not sign; that was not in our control. Our preparation, our presentation, and our equanimity in the meeting were.

The same logic applied to the bigger questions of a life. Whether one’s children turn out as one hopes, whether one is loved by the people one loves, whether one’s career succeeds, whether one stays healthy, whether one lives to be old — Epictetus would have placed all of these squarely in the not-in-our-power column. The only things in our power, in his strict reading, are our own judgements and responses. As the modern Stoic writer Donald Robertson summarises the framework, drawing on Epictetus’s own emphasis: maintaining the distinction between what is up to us and what is not is the foundational practice from which all other Stoic exercises follow. Per Philosophy Break’s reference on the dichotomy of control as a Stoic device for a tranquil mind, the point of the practice was not resignation but reallocation of attention — moving one’s effort away from the controllable shape of the world and toward the controllable shape of one’s own response to whatever world arrives.

The route from Greece to the modern clinic

The connection between Epictetus’s teaching and modern cognitive behavioural therapy is not a strained academic parallel. It is direct, documented, and explicitly acknowledged by the founders of the therapeutic tradition themselves. As reported in a 2023 review in Neurological Sciences on the Western origins of mindfulness therapy in ancient Rome, Albert Ellis, the founder of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy in 1955, explicitly credited Epictetus as the primary philosophical influence on his approach. Ellis quoted the famous line from chapter 5 of the Enchiridion — “Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of them” — in his foundational 1955 paper introducing the new therapeutic method, and reproduced it in numerous subsequent publications. Aaron Beck, who developed Cognitive Therapy in the 1960s (the broader framework that came to be called Cognitive Behavioural Therapy when combined with behavioural techniques), wrote in his original treatment manual for depression that “the philosophical origins of cognitive therapy can be traced back to the Stoic philosophers, particularly Epictetus.”

The structural parallels are precise. Ellis’s foundational ABC model — Activating event, Belief about the event, Consequence (emotional or behavioural) — maps almost exactly onto Epictetus’s distinction between events themselves and our judgements about events. The CBT technique of “cognitive restructuring,” which involves identifying automatic negative thoughts and examining whether they accurately reflect reality, is structurally identical to the Stoic exercise of examining one’s judgements about external events. The CBT concept of “locus of control” — directing attention toward what one can influence rather than what one cannot — is the dichotomy of control restated in the language of mid-twentieth-century psychology. Even the third-wave therapies like Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) and Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT), which add components of mindfulness and acceptance, draw on Stoic exercises that Ellis and Beck had originally underemphasised. The Serenity Prayer, written by Reinhold Niebuhr in 1932 — “grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference” — is the dichotomy of control rendered in twentieth-century devotional language.

What the evidence base now shows

The descendant of Epictetus’s teaching is now, by a substantial margin, the most empirically supported form of psychotherapy in modern medicine. Cognitive Behavioural Therapy has been tested in literally thousands of randomised controlled trials across the past five decades, covering depression, generalised anxiety disorder, panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, eating disorders, insomnia, chronic pain, and a long list of other conditions. The aggregate effect sizes from meta-analyses are typically in the moderate to large range, with Cohen’s d values between approximately 0.5 and 1.0 depending on the condition and the specific protocol. CBT is the first-line recommended treatment for several major mental-health conditions in clinical guidelines issued by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence in the UK, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, and equivalent bodies across most developed countries.

As documented in the Robertson and Codd 2019 paper in The Behavior Therapist, the central therapeutic insight that runs through this entire empirical edifice — that emotional disturbance is mediated by judgements about events rather than by the events themselves, and that the path to reduced disturbance runs through revising the judgements rather than changing the events — is, in essentially its original form, what Epictetus was teaching his students in Nicopolis in the late first and early second centuries CE. The mechanism is the same. The vocabulary has changed. The clinical context has changed. The empirical infrastructure has changed beyond anything anyone in ancient Rome could have imagined. But the basic move at the heart of the intervention — sorting the things that are up to us from the things that are not, and reallocating attention accordingly — is recognisably the same move that opens chapter 1 of the Enchiridion.

What the framework asks

The practical implication for an ordinary person not currently in therapy is not that they should adopt the entire apparatus of clinical CBT. It is that the basic distinction Epictetus drew is available to anyone, costs nothing, and has been validated by approximately seventy years of clinical research and approximately two thousand years of philosophical practice. The exercise itself is straightforward. Whatever is currently troubling you — the conversation, the decision, the rejection, the diagnosis, the news, the relative, the political situation, the future you cannot guarantee — has two components. Some part of it is genuinely within your power to change. Some part of it is not. Sorting the two takes a few minutes of honest attention. Most of the suffering, in Epictetus’s account, comes from skipping that step. Most of the relief, in the modern CBT literature, comes from doing it.

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The drug currently sweeping through the world’s prescription markets as a treatment for diabetes and obesity may turn out to do something its manufacturer never quite designed it for. In July 2025, a research team led by Michael J. Corley of UC San Diego, with Varun Dwaraka of the epigenetic-testing company TruDiagnostic as a key collaborator, published a preprint paper on medRxiv reporting the results of a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical trial in which 108 adults received either weekly semaglutide injections — the active ingredient in Ozempic and Wegovy — or placebo, for 32 weeks. The work was subsequently published in Nature Communications in 2026. At the end of the trial, the participants who had received semaglutide showed measurable reductions in biological age across multiple validated epigenetic clocks, with an average reduction of approximately 3.1 years on the most-cited indices and up to 5 years on the most sensitive clocks. The placebo group showed no comparable changes. The trial is, by the researchers’ own characterization, the first direct clinical-trial evidence that a GLP-1 receptor agonist can modulate validated biomarkers of human aging.

According to the University of California’s press release on the study, the trial population was specifically people with HIV-associated lipohypertrophy — a condition in which excess fat builds up around the abdomen, and which is known to be accompanied by accelerated biological aging, persistent low-grade inflammation, and elevated cardiovascular risk. The choice of this population was deliberate. People with HIV-associated lipohypertrophy exhibit biological aging patterns substantially in excess of their chronological age, which makes them an unusually sensitive population for detecting any age-slowing effects of a candidate intervention. The 108 participants were randomized to either weekly semaglutide injections or matching placebo, with blood samples collected at baseline and at 32 weeks to enable detailed epigenetic age measurements before and after the intervention.

What the epigenetic clocks measured

The biological-age measurements in the trial were not based on subjective health indicators or simple physical metrics. They were based on DNA methylation patterns in the participants’ blood cells — chemical modifications that accumulate on the DNA over time and that have been validated across multiple independent studies as reliable indicators of biological age, mortality risk, and the rate at which a person’s body is aging. The trial used several different epigenetic clocks in parallel, each capturing slightly different aspects of the aging process. The first-generation clocks (Horvath clock and similar) measure cumulative biological age. The second-generation clocks (PhenoAge, GrimAge, PCGrimAge) are tuned to predict morbidity and mortality outcomes. The third-generation DunedinPACE clock measures the current rate at which aging is occurring, rather than the cumulative damage to date.

Per the original Corley et al. preprint on medRxiv, semaglutide produced the most pronounced effects on second-generation clocks predictive of morbidity and mortality risk, and on the third-generation DunedinPACE measure of biological aging rate, which slowed by approximately 9 percent in the treatment group. The first-generation clocks showed smaller but still measurable effects. The convergence of effects across multiple independent epigenetic measures is what gives the trial result its weight — semaglutide was not modulating a single biomarker that might have been a statistical artifact; it was modulating several at once, including the ones with the strongest established links to disease and mortality outcomes.

What the mechanism might be

The pathways by which semaglutide produces these aging-slowing effects are not yet fully characterized, but several converging hypotheses are now under investigation. The Corley team’s preprint identifies three plausible mechanisms. The first is reduced systemic inflammation — semaglutide treatment is associated with substantial reductions in inflammatory cytokines, and chronic low-grade inflammation is one of the central drivers of accelerated biological aging in the broader geroscience literature. The second is reduced visceral adipose tissue — the deep abdominal fat that secretes inflammatory and metabolically active molecules, and that has been independently linked to accelerated aging trajectories. The third is the modulation of what the authors call “obesogenic epigenetic memory” — the persistent epigenetic marks that obesity leaves on cells even after weight loss has occurred, and that may continue to drive accelerated aging long after the metabolic indicators have normalized.

As reported in Singularity Hub’s coverage of the trial, the magnitude of the semaglutide effect is comparable to the effects observed in the CALERIE trial of caloric restriction — the gold-standard randomized human trial of slowing biological aging through dietary intervention. The CALERIE participants, on approximately 12 percent caloric restriction for two years, showed approximately 2 to 3 percent slowing of biological aging on the DunedinPACE clock. The Corley semaglutide participants, on 32 weeks of weekly injections, showed approximately 9 percent slowing on the same clock. The convergence with the dietary-intervention literature suggests that semaglutide may be operating through some of the same metabolic pathways that caloric restriction does — reduced inflammation, reduced visceral fat, improved insulin sensitivity, modulation of mitochondrial function — but through pharmacological rather than dietary means.

What the trial does not establish

Honest framing requires several caveats. The study population was specifically people with HIV-associated lipohypertrophy, who exhibit elevated baseline biological aging — meaning the magnitude of the effect in a general adult population without accelerated-aging conditions is not yet established and could be smaller. The biological-age measurements are based on epigenetic biomarkers, which are well-validated as predictors of aging-related outcomes but are not themselves clinical outcomes. A 3-year reduction in epigenetic age is meaningful in terms of what it predicts about future mortality and disease risk, but it is not the same as a 3-year extension of measured lifespan, which would require multi-decade follow-up to confirm.

The trial also cannot fully disentangle the question of whether semaglutide is slowing aging directly, slowing aging indirectly through its effects on weight and metabolism, or both. As reported in Pharmaceutical Executive’s coverage of the trial, the participants who showed the largest reductions in biological age also tended to show the largest improvements in visceral fat, inflammatory markers, and metabolic indicators — suggesting that the age-slowing effect may be mediated by the metabolic improvements rather than being independent of them. Whether this distinction matters clinically depends on what one cares about: if the goal is slowing biological aging through any available means, the mechanism is less important than the outcome. If the goal is identifying a “pure” geroscience intervention that targets aging directly rather than indirectly, semaglutide may turn out to be more accurately described as an exceptionally effective metabolic drug whose age-slowing effects are downstream of its primary action.

Where this fits in the broader picture

The Corley trial is one of several recent findings positioning GLP-1 receptor agonists as candidate longevity drugs. The SELECT trial, published in 2024, followed 17,604 overweight people with cardiovascular disease for several years and found that semaglutide reduced major cardiovascular events by approximately 20 percent — an effect substantially larger than would be predicted by weight loss alone. A pilot study published in npj Aging in 2025 found that 42 percent of HIV-positive participants with metabolic dysfunction-associated steatotic liver disease showed reduced DunedinPACE aging rates on semaglutide. Additional trials in non-HIV populations, including the recently launched study at Zhejiang University comparing semaglutide and tirzepatide in obese adults without other conditions, are now underway to address the generalisability question that the 2025 Corley trial cannot answer on its own.

The next several years of GLP-1 research will determine whether semaglutide and similar drugs become routinely prescribed not just for diabetes and obesity but for the underlying biology of aging itself. If the early findings hold up across broader populations, the implications would be substantial: a class of drugs already approved by the FDA, already covered by major health insurers, already taken by an estimated 6 to 12 percent of US adults at last count, may turn out to be among the first medications in human history to formally extend healthspan in addition to treating the specific conditions for which they were originally designed. The 2025 Corley study is one piece of evidence in a longer chain of investigation, and the broader case is still being built. The biological signal, however, is now strong enough that the question is no longer whether to investigate semaglutide as a longevity drug, but how quickly the necessary trials can be designed, funded, and completed.

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The popular framing of intense romantic obsession treats it as an emotion, something that happens within the heart, that should be cultivated when reciprocated and resisted when unwelcome. The framing is intuitive and is the foundation of almost all of Western literature on romantic love. It is also, on the strongest reading of approximately twenty-five years of peer-reviewed neuroscience, inaccurate.

The state of intense romantic obsession is not, on the available evidence, an emotion. It is closer to what neuroscientists call a drive state, a category of brain activity that includes hunger, thirst, and the desire for sleep. Drive states are not voluntary. They are not reasoned. They are not regulated by the cognitive systems that humans use to evaluate evidence and make considered decisions. They are biological imperatives that operate on subcortical brain circuits and produce behaviour that the person experiencing them often describes as happening to them rather than being chosen by them.

The brain activity of someone in the early stages of intense romantic obsession is, on the available imaging evidence, biochemically and neurally closer to addiction than to love.

The Fisher fMRI study

The foundational peer-reviewed study of the neuroscience of romantic obsession was published in 2005 by the anthropologist Helen Fisher and her colleagues Arthur Aron and Lucy Brown in the Journal of Comparative Neurology, with the methodological details set out in a companion paper by the same team in the Journal of Neurophysiology in 2005. The team recruited 17 participants aged 18 to 26 who described themselves as intensely in love, with the duration of their romantic state ranging from one to seventeen months. Each participant was placed in a functional magnetic resonance imaging scanner and shown alternating photographs of the person they loved and photographs of a familiar but emotionally neutral acquaintance. The brain activity in response to each set of photographs was recorded and compared.

The activation specific to the beloved was concentrated in two brain regions. The first was the right ventral tegmental area, a small structure in the midbrain that produces and releases dopamine. The second was the right caudate nucleus, a subcortical structure involved in reward processing, goal pursuit, and the formation of habits. Both regions are part of the brain’s mesolimbic dopamine reward system, the same neural network that is activated by cocaine, by gambling wins, by sugar consumption, and by the anticipation of receiving any other strong reward.

The Fisher team noted that the activation pattern in romantic love was not identical to addiction but was substantially overlapping. The brain regions involved were the same. The neurotransmitter system involved was the same. The behavioural patterns produced, including obsessive thinking about the source of the reward, craving for contact, emotional dependence on signs of reciprocation, and difficulty regulating attention to anything else, were the same. What was different was the source of the reward. The brain did not appear to distinguish, at the level of reward-system activation, between the chemical reward of cocaine and the social reward of a particular person.

The Fisher team also noted, in subsequent analyses of the same data, that the prefrontal cortex regions involved in critical judgment and skeptical evaluation showed reduced activation during exposure to images of the beloved. The brain was activating the reward system at full intensity while simultaneously quieting the evaluative system that would otherwise check the reward-driven impulses.

The Marazziti serotonin finding

The Fisher fMRI findings on dopamine were preceded by a different and equally striking peer-reviewed finding from a research team at the University of Pisa in Italy. In 1999, Donatella Marazziti and colleagues published a study in Psychological Medicine that examined a different neurotransmitter system. The team recruited 20 participants who had fallen in love within the previous six months, 20 patients with severe obsessive-compulsive disorder, and 20 controls matched for age and sex. The team measured the platelet serotonin transporter density in each group, which is one of the most reliable available indicators of central serotonin system function.

The serotonin transporter levels in the people who had recently fallen in love were approximately 40 per cent lower than in the controls. The serotonin transporter levels in the patients with severe obsessive-compulsive disorder were also approximately 40 per cent lower than in the controls. The two groups, on the laboratory measurements used, were biochemically indistinguishable from each other.

The Marazziti finding, which won the Ig Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 2000 and has since been broadly confirmed in subsequent peer-reviewed work, established that the obsessive-thinking patterns of intense romantic love are not metaphorically similar to obsessive-compulsive disorder. They are biochemically indistinguishable from it at the level of the serotonin transporter system. The popular language of “love sickness” and “love-crazed” turns out to have been more accurate, in the literal neurochemical sense, than the popular sentimental language of love.

The Marazziti team also followed their subjects over time and found that the lowered serotonin transporter levels returned to baseline within approximately 12 to 18 months from the initial measurement, regardless of whether the romantic relationship continued. The biochemical state that produced the obsessive thinking was time-limited.

The 18-month rule

The finding that intense romantic obsession is biologically self-limiting has been one of the most consistently replicated results in the neuroscience of love. The dopaminergic activation in the ventral tegmental area and caudate nucleus, on the longitudinal data, does not maintain its intensity indefinitely. It typically remains elevated for approximately 12 to 24 months and then declines toward baseline. The serotonin transporter suppression follows a similar curve. The cortisol elevation, which is the third major neurochemical signature of early-stage romantic love, also resolves within approximately the same period.

The 18-month rule, as it is sometimes called in the popular psychology literature, was first proposed by Dorothy Tennov in her 1979 book Love and Limerence: The Experience of Being in Love. Tennov, based on more than a decade of interviews with approximately 500 subjects, observed that the most intense phase of romantic obsession, which she called limerence, typically resolved within 18 months to 3 years regardless of whether the relationship continued. Her observation was based on qualitative interview data and was not, at the time of publication, supported by neurochemical evidence.

The peer-reviewed neuroscience of the past twenty-five years has substantially confirmed Tennov’s observation. The dopaminergic, serotonergic, and cortisol changes that produce intense romantic obsession are not sustained by ongoing relationship presence or by ongoing relationship absence. They are sustained by the brain’s own time course, which is approximately one to three years. The relationship may continue past that point, in which case the intense obsessive state transitions into a different and more sustainable neurochemical pattern centred on oxytocin, vasopressin, and the attachment system. The relationship may end before that point, in which case the intense obsessive state continues for the remainder of its biological course and then resolves on its own.

The implication is that the experience the popular psychology literature has called limerence is not, primarily, a fact about the other person. It is a fact about the limerent person’s brain, which has entered a specific neurochemical state that will persist for a specific period of time before returning to baseline.

A short video we came across goes into the psychology behind limerence, breaking down exactly what it is and how its effects can be so powerful – click here to watch it. 

What this means for the involuntary feeling

The peer-reviewed neuroscience also explains a feature of intense romantic obsession that has been described consistently across cultures and centuries: that it does not feel chosen. The classical and Renaissance literature on love is full of metaphors of being struck by arrows, possessed by spirits, or driven mad by external forces. The popular contemporary language uses similar metaphors of falling, being captured, being unable to help oneself.

The metaphors are, on the available evidence, broadly accurate descriptions of what is happening at the neural level. The reward system is being activated involuntarily, by stimuli the person has not chosen and cannot turn off. The evaluative system that would normally regulate the impulses produced by reward activation is partially deactivated. The neurochemical state is being sustained by the brain’s own time course rather than by any decision the person is making.

The state of intense romantic obsession, in other words, is happening to the person rather than being performed by them. The person can choose what to do with it. They cannot choose to have it or not have it, and they cannot, on the available evidence, choose how long it lasts.

The honest limitations

Several caveats apply to the literature described above.

The Fisher 2005 fMRI study had a sample size of 17 participants, which is small by contemporary neuroscience standards. The findings have been broadly replicated in subsequent work, including the Fisher, Brown, Aron, Strong, and Mashek 2010 follow-up study in the Journal of Neurophysiology that examined the brains of people who had recently been rejected in love, but no individual study in this field has the kind of large sample size that would constitute definitive evidence. The conclusions are supported by a body of converging evidence rather than by any single decisive experiment.

The Marazziti 1999 finding on serotonin transporters was based on a platelet measurement, which is an indirect indicator of central serotonin function rather than a direct measurement of brain serotonin activity. The interpretation that the platelet finding reflects brain serotonin activity is plausible and is the standard interpretation in the literature, but it is not definitively established.

The concept of limerence, as developed by Dorothy Tennov, is not a recognised clinical diagnostic category in the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual or the International Classification of Diseases. The phenomena Tennov described are real and have been substantially confirmed by subsequent neuroscience, but mainstream clinical psychology has largely absorbed them into adjacent frameworks including early-stage romantic love, obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorders, and anxious attachment patterns, rather than maintaining limerence as a distinct category.

The 18-month rule is a statistical central tendency rather than a deterministic timeline. Some individuals experience the intense obsessive phase for substantially shorter periods, and some experience it for substantially longer. The biological mechanisms involved are self-limiting in general but operate on different schedules in different people.

What it means

Several things follow from the neuroscience of intense romantic obsession that are worth saying clearly.

The first is that the experience that the popular psychology literature has called limerence is a real biological phenomenon with measurable neurochemical correlates. It is not a moral failure, a sign of weakness, or a psychological aberration. It is a specific state of the human brain that has been documented across cultures, across history, and across the available neuroscience evidence.

The second is that the involuntary quality of the experience is also real. The dopaminergic reward system is being activated subcortically, by mechanisms that operate beneath conscious decision-making. The serotonergic obsessive-thinking system is being suppressed by mechanisms that operate beneath conscious decision-making. The cortisol stress response is being elevated by mechanisms that operate beneath conscious decision-making. None of these systems can be turned off by willpower.

The third is that the experience is also, by the available evidence, time-limited. The neurochemical state that produces intense romantic obsession is biologically self-limiting in ways that are unique to the early stages of romantic love. It will end. The available timeline is approximately 12 to 18 months for most people, with substantial individual variation. What the person does during that period is partly under their control. What they feel during that period is largely not.

The fourth, on the strongest current reading of approximately twenty-five years of peer-reviewed evidence, is that the relationship between the popular sentimental language of romantic love and the underlying neuroscience is more honest than the relationship between the popular sentimental language and the underlying experience.

The brain in intense romantic obsession is, by the available evidence, doing what the classical literature has always said love does to people.

It is just doing it through dopamine, serotonin, and cortisol rather than through arrows.

The post The neuroscience of intense romantic obsession shows that the brain in early-stage romantic love activates the same dopamine reward circuits as cocaine and gambling, with serotonin transporter levels indistinguishable from those of patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder, in a finding that explains why the experience feels involuntary and typically resolves within approximately 18 months regardless of outcome appeared first on Space Daily.

The popular assumption about empathy, repeated across most of contemporary psychology, ethics, education, and public discourse, is that it is one of the unambiguously good human capacities. The empathic person feels what other people feel, understands their suffering, and is for that reason motivated to act in ways that reduce suffering rather than cause it. The assumption is intuitively appealing and, until recently, has been broadly shared across most of the scientific and clinical disciplines that study human behaviour.

The peer-reviewed evidence of the past two decades has substantially complicated the picture.

Empathy, on the strongest current reading of the social neuroscience and personality literature, is selective rather than universal. It is exhaustible rather than inexhaustible. It is exploitable rather than reliable. And in some cases, it can be one of the cognitive resources that the most dangerous personalities in the population use most effectively against the people they are harming.

The Heym 2020 study

In 2020, Nadja Heym and colleagues at Nottingham Trent University published a peer-reviewed study in the journal Personality and Individual Differences that used a statistical technique called latent profile analysis to identify distinct personality patterns within a sample of 991 adults. The participants completed standardised measures of empathy and of the three personality traits collectively known as the Dark Triad: narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. The Dark Triad has been studied since the early 2000s as a cluster of socially aversive but non-clinical personality traits that show consistent associations with manipulation, exploitation, and reduced concern for others.

The standard assumption in the personality literature, before the Heym study, was that high empathy and high Dark Triad traits were essentially mutually exclusive. The empathic person was, by definition, not the narcissistic or Machiavellian person. The latent profile analysis tested this assumption.

It did not hold up.

The Heym team identified four distinct profiles in the sample. The Typicals (approximately 34 per cent) had moderate empathy and low Dark Triad traits. The Empaths (approximately 33 per cent) had high empathy and low Dark Triad traits. The Dark Triad group (approximately 13 per cent) had low empathy and high Dark Triad traits, matching the standard assumption in the literature. The fourth group, comprising approximately 19 per cent of the sample, had high empathy combined with high Dark Triad traits. The team called this group the Dark Empaths.

The Dark Empaths were not a hypothesised construct or a clinical category. They were a statistical pattern that emerged from the data, in approximately one in five participants. The proportion has since been broadly replicated in follow-up studies on samples from different countries.

What the dark empath profile actually shows

The follow-up analyses in the Heym study found that Dark Empaths shared some characteristics with each of the other two relevant groups but differed from both in specific ways. Like the standard Dark Triad group, the Dark Empaths showed elevated rates of indirect aggression, including gossip, rumour spreading, social exclusion, and the strategic damage of other people’s reputations. Like the standard Empaths, they showed higher emotional understanding of others and more accurate perception of other people’s mental states.

The combination produced what the team described as an “antagonistic core with empathy.” The Dark Empaths were not simply Dark Triad individuals with a softer surface presentation. The empathy was real, on the measurement instruments used. What distinguished the Dark Empaths from typical empaths was not the absence of empathy but the use to which empathy was put.

Empathy, on this reading, is a cognitive tool. It can be used to identify suffering in others and to reduce that suffering. It can also be used to identify suffering in others and to exploit it. The Heym team’s evidence suggests that approximately a fifth of the adult population is using it for the second purpose at least as often as the first, even while scoring as highly empathic on standard measures.

A short video explains more about the psychology behind dark empaths and why they are so hard to spot – click here to watch it.

Empathy is selective

The Dark Empath finding sits within a broader scientific reassessment of empathy that has been gathering peer-reviewed evidence for approximately two decades.

The most fundamental challenge to the popular framing comes from the social neuroscience research showing that empathy is selective rather than universal. Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have consistently found that the same neural circuits that activate when a person observes pain in an in-group member fail to activate, or activate substantially less, when the same person observes pain in an out-group member. The effect has been measured across racial, national, religious, political, and team-affiliation categories. People do not, on the neural evidence, feel the same empathy for everyone. They feel substantially more empathy for people who are like them.

The selective activation of empathy is one of the most consistently replicated findings in social neuroscience. It also has direct implications for how empathy operates as a moral guide. A moral system based on empathy is, by the neural evidence, a system that systematically over-weights the suffering of the in-group and under-weights the suffering of the out-group. This is not a bug in the empathy system. It appears to be how the empathy system was designed by evolution to operate.

Empathy is exhaustible

The second major challenge to the popular framing comes from the empathy fatigue research. Tania Singer and Olga Klimecki of the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences published a foundational paper in Current Biology in 2014 that examined the neural and behavioural consequences of sustained exposure to the suffering of others. The findings, which have since been replicated across multiple populations, indicate that prolonged empathic engagement with suffering activates the same neural pain pathways in the empathiser as in the person being empathised with. Over time, sustained empathic engagement produces measurable distress, anxiety, and depression in the empathiser.

The Singer and Klimecki paper made a further distinction that has become increasingly important in the empathy literature. Empathy, in the technical sense the team used, is the affective sharing of another person’s emotional state. Compassion is different. Compassion involves caring about the suffering of others without sharing it in the same direct affective sense. The two states activate different neural networks. Empathy activates the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex, the same regions that process physical pain. Compassion activates the ventral striatum, the medial orbitofrontal cortex, and the ventral tegmental area, the regions that process reward and motivated action.

The practical implication of the distinction is that compassion is sustainable in ways that empathy is not. The healthcare worker who maintains compassion for patients across a thirty-year career does not do so by feeling the patients’ pain on an ongoing basis. The patients’ pain, sustained at that intensity over decades, would damage the worker’s mental health. What the long-career healthcare worker has typically learned to do is to care for patients without sharing their distress, which is a different and more durable cognitive state.

The Bloom case

The most prominent recent popular articulation of these findings is the 2016 book Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion by the Yale psychologist Paul Bloom. The book drew on the social neuroscience and personality research described above to argue that empathy, properly defined, is a poor guide to moral judgment. Bloom argued that the same evidence supporting empathy’s selectivity and exhaustibility also supported a substantial reorientation of how psychology and ethics should treat empathy.

The Bloom argument is not that empathy is bad. The argument is that empathy is a specific cognitive capacity that operates in specific ways and has specific consequences, some of which are good and some of which are not. The popular framing in which empathy is the moral foundation of human goodness does not survive contact with the empirical evidence. What does survive contact with the evidence is a more limited claim: empathy is one of several cognitive resources that humans use in their social and moral lives, with both benefits and costs that depend on how it is deployed.

The Bloom case has been contested by other researchers, including the developmental psychologist Jamil Zaki of Stanford University, who argues that empathy can be trained and refined rather than abandoned. The disagreement is genuine and ongoing in the peer-reviewed literature. What is not in dispute is that the previous consensus, in which empathy was treated as unambiguously good and the only question was how to increase it, is no longer scientifically defensible on the available evidence.

The honest limitations

Several methodological caveats apply to the literature described above.

The Dark Empath construct, while peer-reviewed, is relatively new. The Heym 2020 study has been replicated in some follow-up work but not yet across the breadth of populations and cultures that would establish it as a robust personality category. The 19 per cent proportion identified in the original sample may differ in samples from other cultures, age groups, or socioeconomic contexts. The construct is genuinely supported by the available evidence but should be treated as a current scientific hypothesis rather than as an established personality category.

The neural research on empathy and compassion, while strong, is based largely on laboratory measures of brief emotional responses to specific stimuli. The relationship between laboratory neural patterns and the empathy people actually exercise in their daily lives is plausible but not perfectly direct. The Singer and Klimecki framework has been broadly accepted in social neuroscience but is not the only available model.

The in-group and out-group selectivity of empathy has been measured robustly but is also context-dependent. The same individual can show strong empathy for an out-group member in some circumstances and reduced empathy for the same person in others. The selectivity is not a fixed personality trait but a context-sensitive cognitive bias.

What it means

Several things follow from the differentiated picture of empathy that are worth saying clearly.

The first is that empathy is not, on the strongest current reading of the evidence, a reliable moral compass. It is a cognitive capacity that operates selectively, depletes with use, and can be deployed by people whose intentions are not aligned with the welfare of those they are empathising with. The popular framing in which empathy is the foundation of human goodness underestimates each of these complications.

The second is that the alternative the peer-reviewed literature points to is not the abandonment of empathy but the recognition that compassion is a distinct and more durable mental state. Compassion does not require feeling another person’s pain. It requires caring about another person’s welfare. The distinction has measurable neural correlates and measurable practical consequences for how the two capacities can be sustained across time.

The third is that the existence of the Dark Empath profile, which approximately a fifth of adults appear to display, has practical implications for how individuals navigate their personal and professional relationships. The standard heuristic that emotional understanding equals safety is not, on the available evidence, reliable. Someone can read another person’s emotional state with substantial accuracy and use that reading to manipulate rather than to help. The popular framing that the most dangerous personalities are emotionally cold is, on the Heym evidence, incomplete. Some of them are emotionally warm and using that warmth strategically.

The fourth, on the strongest current reading of fifty years of research that has now substantially shifted in its conclusions, is that empathy is real, important, and useful, but it is not what it has been popularly assumed to be. It is one cognitive tool among several, with specific properties that determine how it operates and what it can and cannot do.

What it cannot do, by the available peer-reviewed evidence, is reliably tell us who is trustworthy and who is not.

The post Researchers identified a personality profile that combines high empathy with high levels of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, in a finding that has complicated the standard scientific picture of empathy as an unambiguously prosocial human trait appeared first on Space Daily.

Using the protocol, anesthesia dreams were common, pleasant, and linked to a better patient experience.

Kids who can hold it together until the final bell may be primed for more academic success in life

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If you had to summarise Seneca’s most uncomfortable observation in a single sentence, it would be this: most of what you are spending your life trying to acquire is not actually going to satisfy you when you get it. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, the Roman Stoic philosopher who served as tutor and later adviser to the Emperor Nero, wrote 124 surviving letters to a younger Roman official named Lucilius across the final years of his life — letters that have remained in continuous circulation for nearly 2,000 years and that contain some of the more concentrated observations of human psychology produced in the ancient world. Among the recurring themes in these letters is the curious gap between what people pursue and what actually makes them content. Seneca’s specific claim was that the pursuit of more — more wealth, more possessions, more recognition, more of essentially anything one could accumulate — does not converge on satisfaction. As the supply increases, the demand increases with it, and the gap between the two never closes.

According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s reference on Seneca, his writings repeatedly addressed this question across multiple letters and essays. “It is not the man who has too little, but the man who craves more, that is poor,” he wrote in his second letter to Lucilius. “Contented poverty,” he added, quoting his philosophical opponent Epicurus approvingly, “is an honourable estate.” In another letter, again quoting Epicurus: “Whoever does not regard what he has as most ample wealth, is unhappy, though he be master of the whole world.” Contentment, in Seneca’s account, is not a function of how much one has but of how little one needs. People who have learned to need less can be content with very little. People who have not can fail to be content with essentially anything.

The empirical convergence

For most of the period between Seneca’s death and the late twentieth century, his observations existed as philosophical claims — defensible by argument, supported by example, but unverifiable by anything resembling modern empirical methodology. This changed in 1971, when the psychologists Philip Brickman and Donald Campbell introduced into the social-science literature the concept of the “hedonic treadmill” — a model in which positive events produce short-term elevations in subjective well-being that fade over time as people adjust their expectations upward to match their new circumstances. The model predicted that lottery winners, despite their substantial good fortune, should not end up much happier than they were before winning, because their reference point would shift upward and their new wealth would come to feel normal rather than exceptional.

Per the Wikipedia reference on the hedonic treadmill and its empirical foundations, Brickman and his colleagues Dan Coates and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman tested this prediction directly in a now-famous 1978 study published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. The research team compared 22 major lottery winners with 22 demographically matched controls and 29 individuals who had been paralysed in accidents. The results were striking. Lottery winners were not significantly happier than controls. They reported finding less pleasure in ordinary daily activities than non-winners did, suggesting that the peak experience of winning had contaminated their capacity for mundane satisfaction. The paralysed accident victims, while clearly less happy than controls, were closer to controls than would have been predicted by the magnitude of their loss. The basic Stoic claim — that the relationship between external circumstances and inner contentment is much weaker than ordinary intuition suggests — was, in its broad outlines, empirically confirmed.

Why the mechanism works

The mechanism Brickman and Campbell identified, which Seneca had described in different language, is that humans adjust their internal reference point as their external circumstances improve. The first car you own provides substantial improvement over having no car. By the time you have reached the tenth car in a lifetime of progressively improving vehicles, each new one barely registers, even though every one of them would have seemed luxurious to the person you were before you owned any. The same pattern applies to houses, salaries, food, clothing, professional recognition, and essentially every other category of acquirable good.

The economist Richard Easterlin documented the same pattern at the level of whole societies in 1974, in what has come to be called the Easterlin Paradox. Within any given country at any given moment, richer people report being happier than poorer ones. But as an entire country grows richer over decades — as per-capita income doubles, then triples, then quadruples — average happiness barely moves. The collective acquisition of more does not produce collective contentment. The individual aspiration level rises in parallel with collective wealth, and the gap between aspiration and achievement remains essentially constant.

The hypocrisy charge

The honest account of Seneca’s argument requires noting an awkward complication. Seneca himself was extraordinarily wealthy. He served as a senior adviser to Emperor Nero and accumulated, over the course of his career, a personal fortune estimated by Roman historians at approximately 300 million sesterces — making him one of the richer private citizens in the Roman Empire. He owned multiple villas, substantial estates, and significant financial holdings, including loans to provincial elites that some historians believe may have helped trigger the Boudican revolt in Britain. The contrast between his philosophical writings on the worthlessness of wealth and his actual accumulation of substantial personal fortune has been the subject of debate since his own lifetime, when the Roman senator Publius Suillius Rufus publicly attacked him on this point in 58 CE.

Seneca’s response, articulated in his essay On the Happy Life, was that the wise person does not need wealth but is also not required to refuse it when it comes — that what matters is one’s relationship to one’s possessions, not the bare quantity of them. The defence is contested. Some readers find it self-serving. Others find it consistent with the broader Stoic framework, which emphasised the cultivation of an inner attitude rather than the renunciation of external goods. The biographical inconvenience does not, in any case, invalidate the underlying psychological claim. The clinical observation that the pursuit of more does not produce satisfaction can be empirically true even if the person making the observation happens to be wealthy. The Brickman and Easterlin data confirm Seneca’s claim regardless of how the philosopher himself lived.

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The marshmallow test is one of the most repeated stories in popular psychology. A small child is left alone with a treat and told that waiting will earn a second one. The children who held out, the familiar version goes, grew into teenagers and adults who scored higher, coped better, and generally did well, as if a single act of willpower at four had set the course of a life.

A 2018 study tested that promise against a much larger and more varied group of children, and the promise mostly did not hold. Concentrating on children whose mothers had not completed college, the researchers found that an extra minute of waiting at age four predicted only about a tenth of a standard deviation more achievement at age fifteen. That link was roughly half the size reported in the original work, and it shrank by about two-thirds once the researchers accounted for the child’s family background, early cognitive ability, and home environment.

What the replication actually did

The original results came from a study by Shoda, Mischel, and Peake in 1990, which reported strong correlations between a preschooler’s ability to delay gratification and both achievement and behaviour in adolescence. The sample was small and highly selective, drawn from children in the Stanford University community.

The 2018 team, led by Tyler Watts with Greg Duncan and Haonan Quan, ran what they called a conceptual replication. Rather than re-stage the exact experiment, they drew on the long-running NICHD Study of Early Child Care and Youth Development, which had measured children’s delay of gratification at 54 months and then followed them for years. Their analysis sample included 918 children, and the subgroup they focused on, children whose mothers had not finished college, numbered 552, about ten times the size of the original 1990 study.

That difference in scale matters. A larger and more economically mixed sample makes it possible to ask whether an apparent effect of willpower is really an effect of the circumstances that shape willpower in the first place.

The choice to focus on children of less-educated mothers was deliberate, and it cuts against the suspicion that the researchers were stacking the deck. The full study sample skewed toward advantaged families. The subgroup of children whose mothers had not completed college was, by the authors’ account, more comparable with a nationally representative sample of American children. In other words, the group where the marshmallow effect looked weakest was also the group that looked most like the country as a whole.

Why the story travelled so well

Part of what made the marshmallow test so sticky is how clean it looks. A child, a treat, a timer, and a single number: seconds waited. From that one number flowed a tidy moral that fit decades of advice about character and success, the idea that the capacity to wait is a stable trait, visible early, that quietly shapes the rest of a life.

A finding that simple is easy to repeat and hard to qualify. The original correlations were real, but they came from a small and unusual group of children, and a strong correlation in a narrow sample can look very different once a wider, more varied population is measured. That is the gap the 2018 study set out to probe, and it is why the size and makeup of the new sample do so much of the work.

The link did not vanish, but it thinned

It would overstate the findings to say the marshmallow test was debunked outright. Among children of less-educated mothers, waiting longer at age four was still associated with somewhat better achievement at fifteen. The point is how much of that association survived scrutiny.

Before controls, the correlation was already only half the size of the original studies’ headline numbers. After the researchers adjusted for family background, early cognitive skills, and the home environment, roughly two-thirds of even that smaller link disappeared. What remained was a faint association rather than the strong, life-shaping signal of the popular telling.

The team also noticed that most of the predictive value sat at the very start of the waiting period. Most of the variation in adolescent achievement came from whether a child could wait at least 20 seconds, not from the heroic minutes of resistance that make the test memorable. A child who could hold out briefly looked much like a child who held out for the full delay.

The part the famous version leaves out

The behavioural promise fared worst of all. The original story implied that early self-control predicted not just test scores but a calmer, better-adjusted adolescence. In the replication, associations between delay time and measures of behaviour at age fifteen were much smaller and rarely reached statistical significance.

In other words, the strand of the marshmallow legend most often repeated by parents, that a patient four-year-old becomes a well-behaved teenager, is the strand the larger study supported least.

What this does and does not prove

This is a single conceptual replication, and it should be read as one. Because it used a different sample and a different delay-of-gratification measure than the 1990 study, it is not a perfect like-for-like rerun, and the authors are careful to frame it as a replication and extension rather than a verdict. A follow-up analysis by other researchers later argued that the two studies’ results, read carefully, are less far apart than the headlines suggested.

The findings are also correlational. The study can show that early delay of gratification predicts later outcomes more weakly once background is accounted for; it cannot prove that teaching a child to wait would, or would not, change that child’s future. Self-control may still matter. What the data undercut is the specific, tidy claim that a few minutes of waiting at four reveals a trait that determines how the next decade goes.

And the controls themselves carry the real message. The reason the link thinned so much is that delay of gratification is bound up with the resources around a child: a parent’s education, the cognitive skills already in place by age four, the stability of the home. A test that looks like it measures character may be measuring circumstance.

What is left to sit with

The marshmallow test endures because it offers a clean moral: wait, and you will be rewarded. The larger study does not erase that idea so much as complicate it. A child’s patience at four still says something, but much of what it says is about the world that child was already living in.

That is a less quotable finding, and a harder one to put on a poster. It asks whether we have been admiring willpower when we were looking, much of the time, at advantage.

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For one or two days each spring, the wind pattern at the top of Mount Everest shifts just enough to allow human beings, for a brief and dangerous window, to reach the summit. They climb in convoy, in oxygen masks, along ropes anchored years ago by previous expeditions. They pass landmarks that have become unofficially named over the decades — the Hillary Step, the South Summit, Rainbow Valley, Green Boots Cave. Some of these landmarks are geological features. Others are dead human beings. “Green Boots” is the name climbers have given to a body believed to be that of the Indian climber Tsewang Paljor, who died in the 1996 Everest disaster and whose corpse — still wearing the green plastic mountaineering boots that gave him the nickname — lies in a small limestone alcove near the standard route to the summit. For nearly thirty years, climbers passing by Green Boots have used him as a navigation marker. He is one of approximately 200 corpses still on the mountain. Some of them have been there for decades. Until recently, most of them were buried in ice. They are not, in 2026, buried as deeply as they used to be.

According to CBS News’s coverage of the 2024 Nepali army clean-up operation, climate change has been thinning the snow and ice on Everest’s upper slopes at a rate that is now beginning to reveal bodies and equipment that had been entombed for years or decades. Aditya Karki, the major in Nepal’s army who led the 2024 clean-up team, described the phenomenon directly: “Because of the effects of global warming, (the bodies and trash) are becoming more visible as the snow cover thins.” His team of 12 military personnel and 18 supporting climbers spent 45 days at altitudes above Everest base camp, working their way through the higher camps and into the death zone itself, chipping at the ice with axes and occasionally using boiling water to free objects from the grip of decades of accumulated freeze. They recovered five bodies — four full corpses and one skeleton — and brought back approximately 11 tonnes of refuse, in what was the largest single clean-up operation in the history of high-altitude mountaineering.

What the death zone actually does to a body

The reason there are still 200 corpses on Mount Everest, and the reason it took a 45-day operation by Nepali army professionals to recover only five of them, is the brutal physics of the altitudes at which the bodies sit. The death zone — the formal mountaineering term for the region above 8,000 metres (approximately 26,247 feet) — was named in 1953 by the Swiss physician Édouard Wyss-Dunant, who recognised that this altitude band represented the upper limit beyond which the human body could no longer acclimatise to the available oxygen. At 8,000 metres and above, the atmospheric pressure drops to approximately one-third of sea level. Each breath delivers approximately one-third the oxygen molecules that the same breath would deliver at the coast. The body’s cells begin dying of hypoxia within minutes of unsupplemented exposure. Even with bottled oxygen, climbers in the death zone can survive only 16 to 20 hours before their bodies begin to fail systemically.

Most climbers who die on Everest die in the death zone, either on the way up or, more frequently, on the descent — when they have used up their oxygen reserves, their physical resources, and their cognitive capacity, and the remaining strength to make it back to lower altitudes simply runs out. The bodies left behind freeze almost immediately. The death zone’s temperatures hover well below freezing year-round, the air is dry enough that decomposition is essentially suspended, and the bodies are typically partially or fully covered with windblown snow within hours of death. They do not decay. They preserve. A climber who died on Everest in 1996, like Tsewang Paljor, can look in 2026 essentially the way they looked the day after they died, complete with clothing, equipment, and even facial features. The mountain has become, accidentally, an enormous cryogenic preservation facility for human remains.

The 2024 operation

As reported in CNN Travel’s coverage of the Mountain Cleanup Campaign, the Nepali army’s 2024 operation was the latest iteration of a programme that began in 2019 in partnership with the consumer-products company Unilever. Between 2019 and 2023, the campaign had collected approximately 110 tonnes of waste from Everest and the surrounding peaks. The 2024 effort added another 11 tonnes to that running total, alongside the recovery of the five bodies. The total budget for the 2024 campaign exceeded $600,000, employed 171 Nepali guides and porters in addition to the army personnel and climbers, and ran from mid-April through late May, timed to coincide with the brief annual climbing window when high-altitude work on Everest is feasible at all.

The work was, by any measure, extraordinarily dangerous. The team operated for extended periods in the same death zone where the bodies they were recovering had died. Each member of the army team had to climb above 8,000 metres carrying equipment to extract frozen corpses from ice that had encased them for years or decades. The bodies, once freed, had to be carried back down the mountain on the same rope-and-ladder system used by ordinary climbers — except that an ordinary climber descending Everest is making themselves lighter by burning oxygen and water, while the army team was descending with the additional weight of a frozen adult human body. Per the AFP report carried by Phys.org’s coverage of the operation, the recovered bodies were transported to Kathmandu, where they were examined for identification. Those that could not be identified — and most could not, because their documents had long since deteriorated — were eventually cremated according to Nepali tradition.

The garbage problem

The 11 tonnes of rubbish removed by the Nepali army in 2024 was only part of a larger waste-collection effort that season. As reported by The Himalayan Times’s coverage of the Sagarmatha Pollution Control Committee’s 2024 base camp operations, the SPCC — the local body responsible for waste management in the Everest region — collected an additional 77,191 kilograms (approximately 85 tonnes) of waste from Everest Base Camp during the same spring 2024 season. Of that total, approximately 27,533 kilograms — nearly 28 tonnes — was human waste, with the remainder consisting of burnable rubbish (27,990 kg), kitchen waste (14,150 kg), and recyclable materials (7,518 kg). The human and kitchen waste was transported to a disposal site near Gorakshep. The burnable and recyclable waste was carried down to Namche for further processing, with the recyclables eventually transported to Kathmandu for recycling. The combined SPCC and Nepali army operations in spring 2024 removed approximately 96 tonnes of accumulated waste from the Everest region — a single-season total greater than the cumulative output of every previous year of large-scale clean-up efforts combined.

The decomposition problem at high altitude is what makes the figures so striking. Per Smithsonian Magazine’s coverage of the broader Everest pollution issue, the sub-zero temperatures of the upper camps essentially halt biological breakdown. Faeces left at Camp IV in 1953 by the original Hillary expedition would still be present in essentially preserved form today if it had not been disturbed by subsequent climbers. The same applies to the food packaging, the oxygen bottles, the discarded climbing equipment, and the colourful synthetic-fibre tents that have accumulated over seven decades of mountaineering. The mountain does not recycle. It accumulates.

What the operation revealed

The 2024 Mountain Cleanup Campaign was significant not only for the 11 tonnes and five bodies it brought back, but for what it documented about the broader trajectory of the Everest ecosystem. The melting that exposed the bodies was visible. The discoloured ice that now contained microplastics from generations of climbers was measurable. The exposed equipment from expeditions decades old — gas canisters from the 1960s, oxygen apparatus from the 1970s, climbing ropes from the 1980s — provided a stratigraphic record of how long the world’s tallest mountain had been accumulating human refuse, and at what depth that refuse had been preserved before climate change began bringing it back to the surface.

The 2024 campaign also raised a question that has no clear answer: who is responsible for cleaning up the historic mess. The Nepali government has implemented progressively stricter rules requiring 2026-era climbers to bring their own waste back down with them, and these rules appear to be reducing the rate at which new waste accumulates. But the existing 30 to 50 tonnes of legacy trash, and the approximately 195 corpses still on the mountain, were left behind by climbers who in many cases are now themselves dead, by expeditions that were dissolved decades ago, by governments that have changed hands several times since. Major Karki, the leader of the 2024 operation, framed the dilemma directly: “This year’s trash might be brought back by the mountaineers. But who will bring the old ones?” The answer, for the moment, appears to be Nepali army personnel and Sherpa climbers, working at altitudes that kill people who underestimate them, removing — at a rate of approximately 11 tonnes per year — the cumulative residue of seventy years of human ambition. The melt that is making the work newly possible is also making it newly necessary. The mountain that buried these things is no longer cold enough, on its upper slopes, to keep burying them.

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Most people who are quietly miserable do not know it. That, in essence, is what a Danish philosopher named Søren Kierkegaard tried to tell the readers of nineteenth-century Copenhagen in 1849, and what the empirical psychology of regret has been confirming, in laboratory studies and museum surveys, for the past three decades. When most people use the word “despair,” they mean acute unhappiness — the kind of low mood that follows a loss, a failure, or a difficult life event. Despair in this ordinary sense is something a person is aware of. They can name it, describe it, and (with luck) move through it. Kierkegaard, writing under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, used the word in a substantially different way. The despair he described was not an emotion. It was a structural condition of the self, present in the great majority of human beings, generally unnoticed by the people who carried it, and most acute precisely in those who did not know they had it. Kierkegaard’s book on the subject, The Sickness Unto Death, is one of the founding texts of existentialist philosophy.

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry on Kierkegaard, the framework rests on a specific definition of what the self is. For Kierkegaard, the self is not a thing or a substance. It is “a relation that relates itself to itself” — a dynamic process by which a human being takes up the various contradictory features of being human (finite and infinite, possible and necessary, free and determined) and synthesises them into a coherent personality. The self is not given at birth; it is something a person has to become. And despair, in Kierkegaard’s account, is the misrelation that occurs when this becoming fails — when the synthesis goes wrong, when the person fails to take on the self they were capable of being.

The three forms of despair

Kierkegaard identified three primary configurations the failure can take. The first and most common is the despair of ignorance — being in despair without knowing it. A person in this state has not yet noticed any gap between the life they are living and the life they were capable of living. Their attention is consumed by the routine surfaces of daily existence: work, possessions, social position, the consumption of entertainment. The deeper question of what kind of person they are, in any meaningful sense, has never been seriously posed. Kierkegaard considered this unconscious form to be the dominant pattern in modern society — most people, in his view, were in despair without realising it, because the structures of their lives had insulated them from ever asking the question.

The second form is the despair of weakness — knowing what self one is meant to be and not being willing to be it. The person in this state has had some glimpse of their own possibilities and has, for whatever combination of fear, comfort, social pressure, or fatigue, declined to pursue them. The third form is the despair of defiance — willing to be a self other than the one one is, refusing the actual configuration of one’s life in favour of an imaginary or constructed alternative. The defiant form, Kierkegaard thought, was the most acute but also the rarest. As one frequently-cited line from the book puts it: “The greatest hazard of all, losing the self, can occur very quietly in the world, as if it were nothing at all. No other loss can occur so quietly; any other loss — an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife, etc. — is sure to be noticed.”

What modern psychology has found

Kierkegaard was writing in 1849, in a theological framework, with no empirical methodology beyond his own observation of the people around him in nineteenth-century Copenhagen. His specific claims about despair as a sickness of the spirit cannot be tested in the same way an empirical hypothesis can be tested. What can be tested is whether the basic phenomenon he described — that the failures most haunting to people across a life are the failures to become the self one was capable of being — shows up in modern psychological data on regret. The answer is that it does. Per a 2023 replication in Royal Society Open Science of the foundational research by Thomas Gilovich and Victoria Medvec at Cornell University, the empirical psychology of regret converges on a striking temporal pattern: in the short term, people’s most acute regrets tend to be about things they did and wish they had not done. In the long term, the pattern reverses. The regrets that haunt people across years and decades, and that dominate when people look back on their lives as a whole, are overwhelmingly about things they did not do — chances not taken, paths not pursued, selves not allowed to emerge.

Gilovich and Medvec’s original 1994 paper in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology found this pattern across multiple population groups, including a sample of nursing-home residents reflecting on their entire lives. The 2023 replication, conducted at a Chicago museum of psychological science with a large public sample, reproduced the temporal interaction even though the specific magnitudes differed. The pattern is now considered one of the more robust findings in the empirical literature on regret. Its philosophical implication aligns closely with Kierkegaard’s framework, even though the researchers involved generally do not cite him.

Why the despair is so quiet

The most disconcerting feature of Kierkegaard’s account is his insistence that this despair is, in its most common form, undetectable to the person carrying it. Unlike acute sadness, which announces itself, the unconscious form of despair tends to be hidden by the very busyness of life that produces it. A person fully occupied with work, family obligations, consumption of news and entertainment, social media, the small daily tasks of contemporary existence, is unlikely to encounter the question of whether they are actually becoming the self they were meant to be. The question requires solitude, reflection, and a degree of confrontation with one’s own choices that ordinary life does not generally provide. As reported in D. Anthony Storm’s commentary on The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard described despair as a “misrelation in the relation of a synthesis that relates itself to itself” — a sickness that, unlike most diseases, the patient is largely responsible for and from which the patient cannot escape simply by avoiding awareness of it. The avoidance, in Kierkegaard’s framework, is itself part of the despair.

What the framework does not promise

Intellectual honesty requires noting what Kierkegaard’s account does not establish. It is not a recipe for happiness. It does not specify what self any given person was meant to become, or how to identify that self, or how to pursue it once identified. Kierkegaard’s own answer to the question of how despair is overcome was specifically Christian — through a particular relation to God that he called faith — and many modern readers find that the theological framing limits the framework’s applicability. The diagnostic side of his work, however, has had broad influence well beyond the specifically Christian context, including on the existentialist philosophers of the twentieth century, on the founders of existential psychotherapy, on Erik Erikson’s developmental concept of “integrity versus despair” in late life, and on the broader twentieth-century literature on authenticity and self-realisation. What the framework provides is a vocabulary for naming a condition that often goes unnamed — the slow recognition, late in a life, that the person one has been is not quite the person one started out hoping to be. Kierkegaard called this the breaking through of despair into consciousness, and he thought it was, paradoxically, a kind of progress. The unconscious form, in his account, was worse than the conscious form, because it left no opening for change.

The post Søren Kierkegaard suggested that the deepest form of despair is not unhappiness but the failure to become the self you were quietly meant to be — a despair so subtle that most people who carry it never notice they are carrying it — and the difficulty of late-life regret is the slow recognition that the person you have been is not quite the person you started out hoping to be appeared first on Space Daily.

There appears to be a gender attractiveness gap, but it fades away with age.

Think for a moment about the person in your life whose presence costs you the most energy. Not someone who has genuinely wronged you in a clear, identifiable way, but someone whose small habits and ordinary behaviour produce, in you, a reaction that is consistently bigger than what those habits or that behaviour would seem to warrant. The colleague whose tone of voice puts you immediately on edge. The relative whose certainty about politics or food or anything else triggers in you an irritation you cannot fully explain to yourself. The friend of a friend you have decided, on insufficient evidence, that you do not particularly like. The Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung, working in the early decades of the twentieth century, paid sustained clinical attention to this kind of disproportionate dislike, and proposed that it has a specific psychological mechanism behind it. The mechanism, he argued, is that the parts of other people that bother us most acutely are very often the parts of ourselves that we have refused to recognise — repressed into a region of the psyche that he eventually came to call “the shadow.”

The shadow, in Jung’s mature formulation, is not the same as “the bad parts of you.” According to the Society of Analytical Psychology’s reference on the Jungian shadow, drawing directly on Volume 9 of Jung’s Collected Works, the shadow consists of “the hidden, repressed, for the most part inferior and guilt-laden personality” — but it also contains “good qualities, such as normal instincts, appropriate reactions, realistic insights, creative impulses.” Whatever the conscious self has refused to identify with, for whatever reason — whether out of shame, out of social training, out of fear, or simply out of inattention — becomes part of the shadow. The shadow, in Jung’s clinical experience, is then projected outward. The person carrying it tends to see, with unusual intensity, those very same qualities in other people, while not seeing them in themselves at all.

What Jung was actually claiming

The specific clinical mechanism Jung proposed was psychological projection — the unconscious attribution of one’s own disowned traits to someone else. Jung was emphatic that the process is automatic and largely outside conscious awareness. “Everyone carries a shadow,” he wrote in his 1938 essay “Psychology and Religion,” “and the less it is embodied in the individual’s conscious life, the blacker and denser it is.” The more vigorously a person represses an unwanted aspect of themselves, in Jung’s view, the more vividly they tend to see that same aspect in other people, and the more strongly they tend to react to it. The reaction, importantly, is not in proportion to anything the other person has actually done. It is in proportion to how much energy the perceiver is spending on keeping the same trait outside their own self-image.

The first clinical implication of this framework is that the people we find most difficult are, in a quiet sense, diagnostic. They are pointing — usually without any intention of doing so — at material in our own psychology that we have not yet acknowledged. A person who finds laziness intolerable in others, Jung suggested, is often someone who has not made peace with their own desire to rest. A person who reacts disproportionately to the arrogance of others has often suppressed their own ambition. A person who is harshly critical of vanity in their colleagues has often disavowed their own desire to be seen. The shadow does not invent these patterns; it inherits them from whatever the conscious self has refused to admit. The disproportionate reaction is the marker that something has been refused.

What modern empirical psychology has found

Jung was a clinician, not an experimentalist, and his framework was developed primarily through case work, dream analysis, and theoretical synthesis rather than through controlled studies. The empirical psychology literature has been mixed on whether his specific claims hold up under laboratory conditions. The general concept of projection — that people attribute their own traits to others — turns out to be well-documented, but in a form somewhat different from what Jung proposed. The form Jung described, where specifically repressed or disowned traits are projected outward, was disputed by mid-20th-century empirical psychologists, who could not consistently demonstrate the effect in laboratory studies.

This changed substantially in 1997. According to a 1997 paper in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology by Leonard Newman, Kimberley Duff, and Roy Baumeister, defensive projection of the kind Jung described does occur, but through a specific mechanism: when people try to suppress thoughts about the possibility that they have undesirable personality traits, the suppression makes those trait concepts more cognitively accessible, and the accessible concepts then get used disproportionately when interpreting other people’s behaviour. In experimental terms, the Newman team showed that people who both avoided thinking about having threatening personality traits and denied possessing those traits also readily inferred those same traits from ambiguous behaviour by other people. The effect was robust across multiple studies and replicated in subsequent work. The Jungian clinical observation, after seven decades of contested empirical status, turned out to be partially correct, with a mechanism somewhat different from the one Jung had originally proposed but converging on the same basic phenomenon: what we cannot tolerate facing in ourselves, we are unusually quick to perceive in others.

What it means to “meet” the shadow

The clinical work that Jungian analysts have developed around the shadow concept over the past century has focused on a specific therapeutic move: taking back the projection. In practice, this means noticing the people and situations that produce a disproportionately strong reaction, asking what specific quality is triggering the reaction, and then asking honestly whether that same quality exists, in some form, in oneself. According to the International Association of Analytical Psychology’s institutional reference on shadow work, “the integration of the shadow, or the realization of the personal unconscious, marks the first stage in the analytic process” in the Jungian tradition. The IAAP framing notes that complete integration is impossible — the shadow contains material that extends beyond the individual into what Jung called the collective unconscious — but partial integration substantially changes the person’s experience of other people.

What changes, in this account, is the energy spent on rejecting other people for traits they may or may not actually possess. Once a quality is acknowledged as also present in oneself, the unconscious need to police it in others tends to subside. The colleague who used to be intolerable becomes, often, merely a colleague. The relative whose certainty was unbearable becomes someone whose certainty is one feature among many. The friend of a friend, met fresh, turns out to be more interesting than first impressions had suggested. The change is not in the other person. The change is in the perceiver’s relationship to a previously hidden part of themselves.

The limits of the claim

Honest framing requires noting what Jung’s shadow framework does not establish. It is not a comprehensive theory of why all difficult relationships are difficult. Some interpersonal conflict is straightforwardly about real disagreements over real things — values, resources, mistreatment, incompatible needs — and is not reducible to projection. Some dislikes are accurate appraisals of genuinely difficult people. The shadow framework applies most clearly to the specific subset of reactions that are disproportionate to their apparent cause, persistent across multiple instances, and surprisingly resistant to factual correction. Not every dislike is a projection. Some are simply dislikes.

The framework also makes no promise that meeting the shadow eliminates difficulty. Some relationships remain difficult even after substantial inner work, because the difficulty was never about projection in the first place. What the framework does seem to do, both in the clinical literature and in the experimental work that has followed Jung, is reduce the specific kind of disproportionate reaction that comes from disowning parts of oneself. The mechanism is not magical and the change is not total. But the pattern — that the people who bother us most are often pointing at material we have not yet been willing to claim — appears to be real, and the work of meeting it is, by every clinical and empirical account that has examined it, one of the more reliable ways to make the small irritations of ordinary human life take up somewhat less space inside a single person’s head.

The post Carl Jung observed that the things we cannot stand in other people — the small irritations that seem disproportionate, the people we find ourselves unable to forgive — are almost always reflections of the parts of ourselves we have not yet acknowledged, in a quiet psychological pattern he called the shadow, and the surprise is that doing the work of meeting it tends to soften nearly every difficult relationship a person carries appeared first on Space Daily.