The new joint operation uses laser-based technology capable of detecting, tracking, and disabling commercial drones linked to human and drug trafficking.

The new joint operation uses laser-based technology capable of detecting, tracking, and disabling commercial drones linked to human and drug trafficking.

The reason for CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s recent surprise visit to Moscow hasn’t been officially revealed. However, indications suggest that at least part of the unusual trip was meant to warn the Kremlin against possible provocations targeting NATO.

Given its current situation, the idea that Russia might deliberately pick a fight with NATO right now seems, on its face, absolutely insane.

Moscow has failed to achieve anything close to its original objectives in Ukraine. Its military remains heavily committed there, and Kyiv is increasingly taking the war inside Russia, creating additional economic and political pressure on the Kremlin.

Why the hell would Putin want to pick a fight with NATO now?

For starters, there’s an important distinction between provoking NATO and actually wanting to start a war with it. The former may very well be the objective. The latter is something Putin almost certainly wants to avoid.

A deliberately murky incident designed to test NATO’s political resolve and widen the growing divide between the United States and Europe, however, is a different story.

Take, for example, a Ukrainian-made drone, or a convincing Russian copy, that crosses into Lithuania or Latvia and strikes critical infrastructure or a military target. Polish and Baltic intelligence officials have recently warned that Russia could be gearing up for precisely this kind of false-flag operation.

Whatever form the provocation takes, it only needs to be serious enough that NATO cannot ignore it, but ambiguous enough that its members can’t agree on how to respond. And that’s the point.

​Article 5 says an armed attack against one NATO member is considered an attack against them all. However, it neither requires every member to respond in the same way nor automatically commits the alliance to war. Each ally ultimately determines what action it considers necessary. Critically, the treaty itself does not explicitly define what constitutes an “armed attack.”

Create enough ambiguity over whether that threshold has even been crossed, and suddenly 32 governments are left debating not only what happened, but what they are willing to do about it.

This type of hybrid attack would put Washington in an especially uncomfortable position.

With the Iran crisis still ongoing and the midterm elections just months away, the Trump administration would likely be deeply reluctant to risk a direct military confrontation with Russia over an ambiguous incident—even if European governments were pushing for a stronger response.

That alone will deepen political divisions at home while simultaneously widening the existing rift between Washington and Europe.

For Moscow, that’s a hell of a payoff from a relatively small provocation. And ultimately, driving the U.S. and Europe further apart would very likely be the larger strategic objective.

U.S.-European relations are already under extraordinary strain. But one thing often gets overlooked is that for nearly 80 years, the U.S. has served as much of the political glue holding NATO, and indirectly, the wider European security order, together. That role has never been based solely on America’s military strength.

​The United States occupies a distinct position within NATO as one of only two members—along with Canada—located distinctly outside the European sphere. As an “outside” ally, America is powerful enough to help guarantee European security while remaining geographically removed from the historical rivalries that have repeatedly divided the continent.

​Today, Western Europe and the EU can look like a collection of regional best friends. However, historically, they most definitely were not.

​For centuries, European powers competed over territory, resources, influence and security, often with disastrous consequences. One of the great achievements of the post-WWII order was finally breaking that cycle.

In fact, NATO expressly notes that preventing renewed destructive competition in Europe—including “the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence”—was one of the founding purposes of the post-World War II transatlantic security order.

We shouldn’t assume Europe’s extraordinary period of tranquility and partnership is somehow its natural state or that it would continue indefinitely under radically different security conditions.

That doesn’t mean European countries will suddenly start shooting at each other if the American “glue” substantially weakens. But national interests, regional rivalries and competing security goals could begin to reemerge. And history gives us plenty of reason to take seriously the possibility that renewed political competition in Europe could eventually become military competition.

In the near term, European governments will begin asking whether resources currently devoted to collective security objectives might eventually be needed closer to home.

And that’s where Ukraine comes into the equation.

If European governments become less certain that the United States will guarantee their security, continued support for Ukraine will look very different in their wider strategic calculations.

Britain, France, Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states will still view Russia as a threat. However, they won’t necessarily agree about how limited defense resources should be allocated, which threats are most urgent, or how much risk each country should accept on Ukraine’s behalf.

​The more national security becomes national again, the harder it is to preserve a unified European position.

​​Russia doesn’t have to defeat NATO militarily. It just has to create a situation where NATO cannot agree on what to do.

That strategy exploits a basic reality of international politics that often gets overlooked because we talk about countries as “friends.” Nations don’t have friends in the same way people do. They have allies with shared strategic interests.

Shift those interests, even slightly, and allies can become competitors. Competitors can become rivals. And history has repeatedly shown what can happen when rivalries in Europe are allowed to spiral out of control.

So if Putin believes he can start pulling at the threads holding NATO together without triggering a war, there is every reason to believe he will try.

The most consequential part of any Russian provocation will not be the incident itself, but how NATO chooses to respond.

​Moscow may be betting that distance, domestic politics, and competing national interests can pull the alliance apart. The best answer would be to prove otherwise.

​The Atlantic may physically separate North America from Europe. Still, in today’s interconnected world, geography provides far less insulation from shared threats than it did 77 years ago when NATO was founded.

Whatever disagreements exist between Washington and European capitals, both sides would do well to remember a fundamental strategic reality. Strong allies make each member stronger, and preserving those relationships remains firmly in everyone’s national interest.

Tim McMillan is a retired law enforcement executive, investigative reporter and co-founder of The Debrief. His writing typically focuses on defense, national security, the Intelligence Community and topics related to psychology. You can follow Tim on Twitter: @LtTimMcMillan.  Tim can be reached by email: tim@thedebrief.org or through encrypted email: LtTimMcMillan@protonmail.com 

Private space launch services company Rocket Lab has unveiled its GHOST (Global Hypersonic & Orbital Spaceport Technology) self-contained mobile launch system, capable of placing payloads in orbit or enabling suborbital launches from virtually anywhere on Earth.

Designed to accommodate the company’s Electron and HASTE rockets, the company said GHOST’s “launch-anywhere, launch-anytime” capability can support multi-launch flight campaigns for commercial applications. Rocket Lab said the system’s versatility also offers benefits for “critical” national security missions.

GHOST Private Space Launch System Fits Into Standard Shipping Containers

In science fiction, rockets can launch spacecraft from just about anywhere. However, until recently, most launches have occurred at dedicated, government-owned and operated facilities. Even the relatively recent proliferation of private launch services companies promising cheaper, faster alternatives hasn’t reduced the need for a launch facility specially designed to send rockets into orbit.

Now, Rocket Lab says the company has created an all-in-one launch solution called GHOST that can accommodate rocket launches from seemingly anywhere.

For example, when announcing the formal unveiling of GHOST, the company said the entire system can be packaged in standard shipping containers. This includes all the hardware to launch complete rockets and the ground support infrastructure needed to complete single-launch missions or multi-launch campaigns.

Perhaps most critically, the system can be shipped to any destination for customized launch services worldwide. If the already scheduled real-world inaugural launches prove the claims, that launch-location versatility could give Rocket Lab a technological edge over its private space launch competitors.

Two New Alaska Launch Pads Will Provide the System its First Real-World Test

When unveiling GHOST, Rocket Lab also announced its first launch site. Dubbed Rocket Lab Complex 4, GHOST’s new home will be at the Pacific Spaceport Complex at Kodiak, Alaska. The company said this inaugural site will include two distinct launch pads for “high-frequency launch campaigns.”

The new site will join the already operational Launch Complex 1 in New Zealand and Launch Complexes 2 and 3 in Virginia. The company said that taken together, Rocket Lab now controls six total launch pads “across two hemispheres.” Along with its reported mobility, the company emphasized GHOST’s ability to accommodate both Electron and HASTE.

“GHOST delivers a dual-launch capability across new locations, allowing Rocket Lab to expand the mission profiles of both vehicles and meet increasing international demand for orbital and suborbital sovereign launch capability,” the company explained.

Rocket Lab also said that the mobile launch platform is “purpose-built to support responsive launch needs and time-critical national security missions, enabling rapid site activation and simultaneous launch possibilities.”

The company expects to conduct its first GHOST-supported launch from Launch Complex 4 in 2027, including launches announced in July for the U.S. Space Force.

“The size and scale of this contract reflects the Space Force’s confidence in our ability to meet their urgent national security demands with speed, responsiveness, and scale, and we’re proud to provide the high-frequency launch capacity required to keep the U.S. ahead of global threats,” company CEO Sir Peter Beck said at the time of the announcement.

“Leading the Field in Small Launch for Missile Defense and National Security”

After noting that Rocket Lab has been “leading the field in small launch for missile defense and national security for years,” Sir Beck heralded GHOST’s seemingly sci-fi-sounding ability to launch a rocket into space from virtually anywhere in the world as another example of the launch service reliability and repeatability.

“Creating GHOST is about packaging that up into a deployable system that can serve the world’s most important programs from wherever those missions need,” Sir Beck said. “Whether it’s for missile defense and deterrence, or opening up more trajectories, orbital missions, and sovereign launch capabilities in allied nations, GHOST is the answer to launching anywhere, anytime, and without compromise.”

Christopher Plain is a Science Fiction and Fantasy novelist and has spent the last six years as Associate News Editor and Head Science Writer at The Debrief. Follow and connect with him on X, learn about his books at plainfiction.com, or email him at christopher@thedebrief.org.

An analysis of dozens of strange objects captured in official U.S. government videos has revealed new insights—and challenges—involving the study ofunidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP).

Since May 8, 2026, the U.S. Department of War has released more than 100 videos that reportedly capture evidence of unknown objects in U.S. airspace and near American military operations around the world.

Now, a preprint paper by researchers Jacob Haqq-Misra of Blue Marble Space and Ravi Kopparapu of NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center examined 112 videos released this year under the Presidential Unsealing and Reporting System for UAP Encounters (PURSUE).

The researchers, both of whom serve on the UAP Science Advisory Council to the U.S. government, say their study highlights significant limitations on analysis of the purported UAP videos due to missing or redacted sensor data, which prevents civilian researchers from having enough of the tools necessary to determine whether seemingly fast-moving objects in the videos actually display anomalous velocities.

Kopparapu and Haqq-Misra’s new study, which has not yet undergone peer review, highlights a fundamental problem that has impeded analytical efforts involving UAP videos collected by U.S. military personnel: that the apparent speed of an object suggested by its movement across a camera’s field of view is not necessarily an accurate indication of its real physical velocity.

In an email to The Debrief, Haqq-Misra explained that while the new study is among the first to explore the limitations on what can be discerned about these objects based on analysis of the current batch of PURSUE releases, the underlying problem is not a new one for researchers tackling the UAP problem.

“I think our conclusion will come as no surprise to people in the aviation, aerospace, and intelligence communities who have already been closely following UAP disclosure,” Haqq-Misra told The Debrief, though expressing that the conclusions he and Kopparapu present “may not be fully appreciated in the broader public discussion.”

“I get lots of questions from friends, family, and other scientists about my opinion of the government ‘UAP disclosure’ data,” Haqq-Misra said. “A lot of people haven’t even looked at the data and may assume that there is more available than we really are getting.”

In terms of what data has been made available to the public since May, Haqq-Misra says the limitations are obvious.

“Most of the useful quantities are redacted,” he said. “It is also not immediately obvious that what appears to be a fast-moving object in an infrared sensor video might be a mundane object (like a bird) much closer to the camera.”

Analyzing the DOW’s ‘PURSUE’ UAP Videos

The videos Haqq-Misra and Kopparapu analyzed, all of which are currently available at the U.S. Department of War website, were acquired by targeting pods and other turret-mounted camera systems aboard military aircraft or similar government platforms. The collection includes infrared and electro-optical imagery, much of it showing unidentified objects either crossing the camera’s field of view or being actively tracked by the sensor.

Haqq-Misra and Kopparapu reviewed all 112 videos to determine what kinematic information could be extracted from them. At its simplest, analysts can measure how quickly an object moves across a video in pixels per frame. However, the problem arises when it comes to converting that apparent motion into an actual velocity—a process that requires several additional pieces of information.

In an email to The Debrief, Kopparapu, who expressed that his views are based on his own independent analysis and do not reflect those of NASA, said there was one primary form of data that, if it were to accompany future video releases, could make them far more useful to scientists working to understand the performance characteristics of the objects they convey.

“Based on our preliminary mathematical analysis, perhaps the single most important missing quantity is the range; the distance between the object and the observing platform, ideally measured over time,” Kopparapu told The Debrief. “Without range, something moving rapidly across the image could be a small nearby object moving relatively slowly or a much larger, distant object moving extremely fast.”

Additional information Kopparapu says would be very useful would include details about the camera’s field of view, as well as “the motion of the observing platform and viewing geometry.”

In their recent paper, Kopparapu and Haqq-Misra detail the specific measurements that would be required to determine an object’s velocity. However, Kopparapu expressed to The Debrief that “Some apparent anomalies could even arise from sensor or imaging effects,” adding that without the additional data outlined above, “there is simply not much more that can be concluded scientifically.”

Haqq-Misra told The Debrief that one of the goals of the UAP Science Advisory Council is to make recommendations about what kinds of data future PURSUE releases might be able to include that would enable independent scientists to conduct more accurate and meaningful kinematic analyses. 

“We are hopeful that our recommendations based on analyses of sensor videos like these will lead to additional release of data that may even help us resolve some cases,” Haqq-Misra told The Debrief, echoing Kopparapu’s sentiments about the importance of having access to information about the object’s range from the camera system at the time the video was captured.

“Knowing the distance from the camera to the object is essential,” Haqq-Misra said. “This information might be under the redacted black boxes of some of the videos, so unredacted videos would be best.”

UAP Transparency vs National Security

The question of whether information currently redacted from government UAP videos can be safely released to scientists without compromising U.S. national security—as well as how much of that data should be released—remains a sticking point between Pentagon officials and the broader scientific community.

For researchers like Haqq-Misra, one solution might involve having some form of verifiable U.S. government record that certifies certain portions of the redacted information, without necessarily conveying that in the videos themselves in ways that could compromise sensitive information about the systems used to obtain the footage.

“Even just telling us the distance on an official government document would help!” Haqq-Misra told The Debrief.

“The flight trajectory of the aircraft with the observing camera is another important piece of data,” Haqq-Misra added. “In some cases, this data may simply be lost, but if flight logs exist for any of these cases, that would also help.

Although Haqq-Misra adds that technical information about the specific cameras used to capture a given video would “make the data even more useful,” the U.S. Department of War regulates much of this technical data under strict security classification, export control, and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) policies. Such restrictions are imposed to protect critical capabilities like sensor resolution, focal lengths, tracking algorithms, and other capabilities or technical properties that might potentially be exploited by foreign adversaries if they were revealed publicly.

While U.S. military concerns over the release of such information is often warranted, without access to it, the nature of how some military systems operate can make it difficult—if not impossible—to make meaningful determinations about the objects detected.

One example includes objects that are being actively tracked while they are filmed. By its design, a targeting system can move its camera to keep an object near the center of the frame, making the subject’s apparent movement approach zero, even if it is traveling rapidly through the environment. The resulting imagery can create the illusion of a stationary object and becomes unhelpful without access to additional information about the object’s movement.

GOFAST: A Case Study in Transparency?

Another example where the appearance of an object’s movement on video can differ significantly from its actual speed appears in the well-known Navy “GOFAST” video. Haqq-Misra and Kopparapu note that this footage was once widely interpreted as evidence of an object moving at extraordinary speed near the ocean surface. However, subsequent analysis using available telemetry showed that much of its apparent motion resulted from parallax generated by the observing aircraft, with its calculated motion ultimately being consistent with wind-borne drift—in other words, the object was most likely a balloon.

The important difference between the GOFAST video and those included in recent PURSUE releases, the researchers note, comes down to the amount of additional information that was available.

“In the GOFAST case, sufficient information was available to constrain the object’s motion relative to the observer and assess it in relation to reported wind conditions,” Haqq-Misra and Kopparapu write in their recent study. Notably, following its initial unauthorized release in 2017 along with two other historical U.S. Navy videos of alleged UAP, the Pentagon eventually determined that GOFAST did not reveal any sensitive information that compromised U.S. national security.

“After a thorough review, the department has determined that the authorized release of these unclassified videos does not reveal any sensitive capabilities or systems, and does not impinge on any subsequent investigations of military air space incursions by unidentified aerial phenomena,” an April 2020 Pentagon statement read. Seemingly, this case would appear to demonstrate that in at least some cases, enough additional information could remain unredacted in future UAP video releases to allow similar technical determinations to be made.

DOW-UAP-PR113: Anomalous Appearance, but Limited Information

Another example Kopparapu and Haqq-Misra look at in their paper involves a video in the recent PURSUE releases designated DOW-UAP-PR113, which features an infrared video reportedly recorded over the western United States in 1996.

The footage depicts what appears to be a compact dark object (or possibly two moving in very close proximity) rapidly crossing the camera’s field of view. Based on Kopparapu and Haqq-Misra’s measurements, the object travels approximately 142 pixels per frame, equivalent to roughly 2.2 frame widths per second, and remains directly visible for only about one-tenth of a second.

One thing that makes the video unique among the PURSUE releases is the presence of markings in the imagery, which the researchers say allows them at least a limited ability to reconstruct an approximate angular scale and horizontal field of view. However, like in other cases, too little information is present to be able to make a complete determination about the object’s motion and capabilities.

For Kopparapu, circumstances like these demonstrate why he advises against drawing conclusions based on what can often appear to be remarkable speed or other capabilities in the PURSUE videos, yet without ruling them out necessarily as being mundane.

“With such limited data, I would urge people to avoid both extraordinary conclusions and outright dismissal,” Kopparapu told The Debrief. “Something can look extremely anomalous when we are seeing only a small part of the information needed to understand it.”

What the PURSUE Videos Can—and Cannot—Tell Scientists

Fundamentally, Haqq-Misra and Kopparapu believe that the videos currently made available under the PURSUE initiative cannot demonstrate—nor can they necessarily be used to exclude—the presence of anomalous kinematics displayed by the alleged UAP they contain.

This issue extends beyond just the PURSUE releases, however, since similar limitations can arise even with imagery captured by conventional cameras, whose technical capabilities are easily discernible. For instance, a single camera primarily measures angles, meaning some aspects of an object’s three-dimensional motion simply cannot be reconstructed based on that imagery alone.

To overcome such problems, Haqq-Misra and Kopparapu point to the use of multi-sensor approaches by independent research efforts.

In terms of what kinds of scientific observations might constitute a “genuine” UAP in future detections, Haqq-Misra says he and his colleagues with the UAP Science Advisory Council are already providing recommendations for the kinds of sensor platforms that could be leveraged to capture better UAP imagery and other data in the future.

“We have already provided recommendations for sensors that could be deployed to collect better quality data for understanding these objects,” Haqq-Misra told The Debrief. “An ideal observatory would be a multi-modal and multi-site observatory, leveraging video observations from infrared to visible and including other modalities such as radio, radar, and audio data collection.”

“The Galileo Project at Harvard is an example of a privately funded effort following this experimental design,” he adds.

Overall, the researchers say that while based on their analysis “the PURSUE sensor videos in their present form cannot fully resolve unidentified cases or conclusively indicate anomalous velocities,” the new research presents a meaningful early step toward identifying future strategies that may help researchers obtain better, more useful data.

“Reality takes time,” Kopparapu told The Debrief, “but fallacy does not.”

“Careful scientific investigation, accompanied by access to the underlying data, is the only reliable way to make progress on these cases,” he adds.

Kopparapu and Haqq-Misra’s recent paper, “Limits on Velocity Recovery from the PURSUE Sensor Videos,” appeared on the arXiv.org preprint server.

Micah Hanks is the Editor-in-Chief and Co-Founder of The Debrief. A longtime reporter on science, defense, and technology with a focus on space and astronomy, he can be reached at micah@thedebrief.org. Follow him on X @MicahHanks, and at micahhanks.com.

Plus: A judge rules cell tower dumps unconstitutional, water utility hacks spread to a dozen states, a phishing email opens a missile-parts supplier’s inbox, and a ransomware boss gets 16 years.

Plus: A judge rules cell tower dumps unconstitutional, water utility hacks spread to a dozen states, a phishing email opens a missile-parts supplier’s inbox, and a ransomware boss gets 16 years.

For decades, Washington has assumed that military aid translates into political influence. If the United States provides the weapons, intelligence, training, and diplomatic backing that keep an ally fighting, conventional wisdom suggests it should also have considerable leverage over when, and how, that war ends.

Yet, a sweeping new analysis published by the Brookings Institution and authored by Dr. Dafna Rand, a senior fellow at Brookings, the Federation for American Scientists, and the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that the opposite has increasingly become true.

Whether in Ukraine, Gaza, Yemen, or Afghanistan, the U.S. has repeatedly discovered that sustaining an ally’s war effort is often far easier than steering its ultimate direction. Instead of conclusive victories followed by lasting peace, modern conflicts are increasingly settling into drawn-out stalemates, frozen conflicts, or recurring cycles of violence that resist outside pressure—even from Washington.

Dr. Rand’s report examines one of the defining strategic dilemmas confronting American foreign policy in the 21st century: why the world’s most powerful military and diplomatic actor has struggled to shape the decisions of partners whose war efforts depend heavily on U.S. support.

Drawing on more than 30 interviews with senior American officials involved in decision-making throughout four major conflicts, alongside hundreds of government documents, the analysis shows recurring patterns that appear independent of geography or the adversary involved.

“Wars, whether between or within states, are not ending in the 21st century,” Dr. Rand writes. “Frozen conflicts, on-again-off-again fighting, and stalemates have become the norm.”

Dr. Rand argues that this changing nature of warfare has profoundly changed the assumptions underpinning American security strategy.

Following the costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington increasingly shifted toward supporting partners rather than committing large numbers of U.S. troops directly to combat. The expectation was that supplying allies with military assistance would provide the United States with considerable influence over battlefield strategy and political consequences.

Instead, Dr. Rand says that American leverage consistently diminishes as conflicts drag on.

One of the study’s central conclusions is that Washington and its partners frequently begin wars without agreeing on what victory actually means. At the outset of each conflict examined—including Ukraine’s defense against Russia, Israel’s campaign against Hamas, the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, and America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan—American and partner governments shared broad objectives, though often failed to establish detailed political end states.

That omission, Dr. Rand argues, becomes increasingly costly as wars continue.

Early battlefield success frequently encourages partners to pursue more ambitious goals than originally envisioned. At the same time, Washington gradually becomes more interested in negotiated settlements as financial costs mount, domestic political support declines, and wider strategic priorities begin competing for attention.

According to Dr. Rand, many officials interviewed expressed regret that these conversations about political objectives, postwar governance, and acceptable settlement terms did not occur before military campaigns gained momentum.

The report also highlights an uncomfortable reality of modern alliances. Although the United States provides enormous military assistance, it does not exercise command over allied governments or their armed forces. As a result, disagreements naturally emerge over strategy, operational design, and acceptable risks.

Ukraine provides one of the clearest examples. Initially, Washington and Kyiv shared an overriding objective of preventing Russia from conquering the country. However, over time, American officials became increasingly divided over whether continued fighting or eventual negotiations better served long-term U.S. interests.

Some officials viewed prolonging the conflict as strategically beneficial because it weakened Russia’s military while strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Others believed diplomatic attempts should have begun earlier, particularly after Ukraine’s battlefield gains in 2022 created what they viewed as an opportunity to negotiate from a stronger position.

Dr. Rand notes that internal disagreements within the U.S. government complicated communication with Ukrainian leaders, in particular regarding expectations for territorial objectives and the role military offensives were intended to play in eventually creating conditions for diplomacy.

The Gaza conflict exposed a different, but related, collection of challenges.

Following Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attacks, President Joe Biden’s administration moved rapidly to reassure Israel of unshakable American support while simultaneously urging restraint based on lessons learned from America’s own post-9/11 military campaigns.

Dr. Rand concludes that Israeli leaders largely heard the reassurances while failing to fully internalize Washington’s accompanying warnings about civilian casualties, operational design, and the long-term strategic consequences of an extended campaign.

As the war progressed, American officials increasingly concluded that humanitarian concerns and mounting civilian casualties were not exclusively moral issues but strategic ones as well, arguing that prolonged destruction could ultimately strengthen Hamas’ long-term recruitment and undermine Israel’s own security objectives.

Despite this growing divergence, the report suggests Washington hesitated to use its available leverage aggressively, partly because of domestic political sensitivities surrounding support for Israel.

Another recurring finding centers on American public opinion.

Support for allies often begins overwhelmingly strong immediately after major attacks or invasions. But that support steadily erodes as wars lengthen, casualties mount, humanitarian problems increase, or questions come up regarding the conduct of partner governments.

Dr. Rand says this pattern appears across Yemen, Afghanistan, Gaza, and, increasingly, Ukraine.

Importantly, she argues this erosion can occur even when Americans continue believing the underlying cause remains just. Instead, fatigue over prolonged commitments, concerns about costs, or doubts regarding the likelihood of decisive success gradually reshape political calculations in Washington.

Those changing domestic dynamics, in turn, reduce America’s leverage abroad.

Once congressional debates begin questioning military assistance or public enthusiasm declines, allied governments recognize that Washington’s ability to maintain long-term support has become less certain.

Dr. Rand argues this weakens American bargaining power precisely when policymakers most need it.

Among the study’s most significant recommendations is that future administrations should treat leverage as a rapidly diminishing resource.

Rather than assuming influence will expand alongside continued military assistance, Dr. Rand contends the opposite usually occurs. The strongest opportunity to shape an ally’s political objectives exists during the opening weeks of conflict, before battlefield realities, domestic politics, and diverging national interests begin pulling partners in different directions.

To address this, the report proposes forming formal “security contracts,” or a memorandum of understanding, early in future conflicts that clearly define shared political objectives, expected end states, standards for humanitarian conduct, and mechanisms for periodically reassessing strategy.

Dr. Rand also recommends keeping consistent communication across the entire U.S. national security apparatus, warning that mixed signals from different agencies make it easier for partners to ignore American advice or exploit disagreements inside Washington.

Perhaps most notably, the report argues that future administrations should not focus solely on influencing allies. Even in conflicts involving close partners, Washington should simultaneously pursue diplomatic means with adversaries whenever possible, recognizing that negotiated settlements often require engaging both sides rather than relying exclusively on pressure directed at friendly governments.

Ultimately, the analysis shows that the challenge confronting U.S. policymakers goes beyond any single conflict. As interstate wars, civil wars, and proxy wars become increasingly protracted, America’s ability to translate military assistance into political influence may continue shrinking unless it fundamentally rethinks how partnerships are managed from the very beginning of a war.

“The United States must be brutally honest with its partners,” Dr. Rand writes. “The United States must recognize that pressuring its partners to end wars will get harder, not easier, as time passes and the partner grows better able to resist U.S. pressure.”

Study: Dr. Dafna H. Rand, Why can’t the United States end allies’ wars?, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy at Brookings (2026).

Tim McMillan is a retired law enforcement executive, investigative reporter and co-founder of The Debrief. His writing typically focuses on defense, national security, the Intelligence Community and topics related to psychology. You can follow Tim on Twitter: @LtTimMcMillan.  Tim can be reached by email: tim@thedebrief.org or through encrypted email: LtTimMcMillan@protonmail.com 

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