If you’re thinking about moving house or just feeling nosy about your neighbours, your first port of call may be an online property marketing site: Rightmove and Zoopla in the UK, Zillow in the US or Magic Bricks in India.

They offer 3D plans of their properties and a video walkthrough, sometimes with added interactive tools. It all seems very modern – yet it turns out, at least one pioneering London estate agent was offering its clients 3D visual walkthroughs long before the advent of commercial photography.

In the UK, estate agents came into being as a specialised profession in the mid-19th century, as rapid urbanisation and greater social and geographic mobility led to a dramatic increase in the demand for housing.

But in this pre-photography era, how did the Victorian era’s newly monied see what they could buy with their gains from trade or industry? One high-end London estate agent, Brooks & Green, came up with a novel answer.

In 1838, the year of Queen Victoria’s coronation, this Old Bond Street estate agent began advertising an early form of immersive visual technology called a “cosmorama”, to offer prospective buyers a virtual tour of the properties it was selling.

A cosmorama involved looking at paintings or artists’ prints through a large convex lens, which magnified the image and enhanced the perspectival depth, creating a basic 3D effect.

A blackened square frame between the lens and picture hid the edges – enhancing the viewer’s sense of looking at a large scene through an extended opening. Clever lighting effects further enhanced the depth and immersive effects.

To create this cosmoramic view, a skilled artist would have had to visit the estate to prepare the sketches. For 20 years, Brooks & Green promoted its “cosmoramic gallery” as a proto-version of a digital walkthrough. This was nearly 50 years before photography was widely used to advertise property.

The estate agent advertised heavily in the London press. An 1842 advert claimed its office property gallery included “several hundred views of different estates”. Prospective buyers of one property were promised an “aerial perspective, the site and architectural elevation of a mansion, the local scenery and features of a park [and] ornamental grounds”.

The viewing experience of the cosmorama supposedly offered much more realism and detail than a written prospectus – without rich London buyers having to travel miles to inspect the property in question.

But this service was definitely not available to ordinary families. Only high-value mansions and estates were valuable enough to be visualised in this way. Entrance to the Brooks & Green gallery was supposedly free, but you needed an admission card – probably granted only to those who looked like they had suitably deep pockets.

Exhibits around the world

For the first half of the 19th century, the cosmorama was one of the most common forms of visual show across Europe and the Americas. It was first revealed at a Paris exhibition in 1808 by the French showman Abbot Constant Gazzera. His success led to many more exhibitions throughout Europe during the 1820s and ‘30s.

In London, the Cosmorama Rooms opened in 1821 at 29 St James’s Street, moving to Regent Street in 1823. The gallery became one of the established London attractions for over 30 years. With Regent Street only a mile from Old Bond Street, it may have prompted an ambitious Brooks & Green employee to have the idea of using this innovation to market its property.

Also shown across Europe in pleasure gardens, popular science institutions, retail bazaars and fairgrounds, the cosmorama was successful because urbanisation and population growth had created a critical mass of middle-class audiences. It offered a new kind of immersive visual exhibition, reaching audiences who would never visit a fine-art gallery.

Cosmorama means “views of the world” in Greek. It was mainly used to display picturesque landscapes, renowned European sites and striking architectural interiors – such as the eruption of Mount Vesuvius, the canals of Venice or the interior of Saint Peter’s Basilica in Rome. The interest in this device reflected the public’s growing desire to be cultivated, and to learn about the wonders of the wider world.

Fascination with 3D worlds

But the cosmorama is just part of the story of immersive pictorial entertainment from the early 19th century. Other popular technologies included peepshows, panoramas and dioramas, all of which offered users a sense of virtual travel.

Panoramas were large circular paintings – the Imax cinema of the age – and dioramas were illusionistic spectacles created from 3D models. At the same time, itinerant exhibitors of peepshow boxes travelled the country’s fairgrounds displaying scenes of national events and sensational murders. Picturegoing had become part of everyday life.

I came across the Brooks & Green adverts for its cosmorama in my research for a historical project led by the Universidade Lusófona in Lisbon, which has mapped cosmorama exhibits across Europe and beyond. In all, Curiositas: Peeping Before Virtual Reality has catalogued more than 650 cosmoramas in Portugal, Spain and the UK.

Many more of these devices were exhibited in countries as far apart as North America, Brazil, Cuba and Australia. The famous US showman P.T. Barnum installed a cosmoramic gallery in his American Museum in New York.

The cosmorama was ultimately superseded by the stereoscope, which also created a 3D photographic experience by looking through lenses. Thus, the cosmorama was an early part of the story of our fascination with virtual worlds – of being taken outside and beyond ourselves, and immersed in another environment.

John Plunkett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment. He is the co-author of Popular Visual Shows 1800-1914: Picturegoing from Peep Shows to Film (Oxford University Press, 2025)

Scientists have crossed an important line in biological engineering. In a recent study, researchers used artificial intelligence to design complete sets of genetic instructions for bacteriophages, viruses that infect bacteria. Some of those computer-generated designs produced working viruses when they were built and tested in the laboratory.

These viruses were designed to infect bacteria rather than people. The researchers worked with bacteriophages that target E. coli, and one of the AI models they used, Evo 2, was developed with safety restrictions. Its developers excluded viruses that infect organisms such as animals, plants and humans from the data used to train it.

Even so, the experiment raises an important question: if AI becomes increasingly able to help design biological systems, are our safeguards developing fast enough?

As engineers working in vaccine manufacturing and public health security, we see good reasons to continue this research. Bacteriophages could potentially be used to treat bacterial infections, including those that are becoming harder to treat with antibiotics. But advances in biological design also create new challenges for biosecurity.

Genome language models work in a broadly similar way to AI language models that learn patterns in text. Instead of learning from words and sentences, they learn patterns in genetic code. Evo 2, for example, was trained on trillions of DNA building blocks taken from many different forms of life.

This gives researchers a powerful new way to study biology and generate possible DNA sequences. It also means that part of biological design can now happen on a computer, before anything has been made in a laboratory.

An AI-generated DNA sequence is still several steps away from becoming a real biological threat. A digital design has to be turned into physical genetic material, assembled correctly and tested under the right laboratory conditions. Each of those stages also creates an opportunity to reduce risk.

One safeguard can be built into the AI model itself. The developers of Evo 2 deliberately removed viruses that infect humans and other similar organisms from its training data for safety reasons. Their research found that the model performed poorly when tested on proteins from viruses that infect humans.

Such precautions will need to be tested and strengthened as AI tools for biology become more capable. Researchers have already argued that AI and biosecurity need to be considered together, so that safeguards develop alongside new capabilities.

Another checkpoint comes when digital DNA is turned into physical DNA. Companies that manufacture DNA to order can check both the requested genetic sequence and the person or organisation ordering it for potential security concerns. Researchers working on DNA synthesis screening have argued for common international approaches as this technology becomes more widely available.

Screening may also need to become more sophisticated. A system designed mainly to recognise DNA that resembles known dangerous pathogens may struggle if AI produces something genuinely new. Recent research on identifying “sequences of concern” has therefore considered what a genetic sequence might do, as well as whether it resembles one already linked to a dangerous organism.

Laboratories and research institutions provide another layer of protection. Potentially risky research can be assessed before experiments begin, including questions about how biological material will be contained, who will have access to it and whether the expected benefits justify the risks.

Research funders can also influence how security risks are managed. UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), for example, has established a Trusted Research and Innovation team to help researchers and institutions identify and manage security risks in collaborative research.

Public health preparedness belongs in this discussion too. If biological design becomes faster and more accessible, health authorities will need to be able to detect and investigate unusual outbreaks quickly. The Metagenomics Surveillance Collaboration and Analysis Programme (mSCAPE), led by the UK Health Security Agency, analyses genetic material from samples to help detect and track emerging pathogens.

The programme is not specifically designed to find AI-created viruses. But its approach is relevant because scientists do not have to know exactly which pathogen they are looking for in advance. Systems capable of detecting unusual or previously unseen organisms could become increasingly valuable as biological technologies develop. Preparedness also means being able to develop diagnostic tests, treatments and vaccines quickly when a new threat appears.

In our view, one of the biggest weaknesses in global biosecurity is that countries are not equally prepared. Some already have established systems for identifying and responding to biological risks, while others are still developing them. We see a similar gap in vaccine regulation, where countries vary considerably in their ability to assess new products. Biological threats can cross borders, so effective preparedness will depend on strengthening these capabilities internationally.

There are difficult trade-offs. Heavy restrictions can slow useful research, including work aimed at understanding disease or developing treatments. Weak safeguards can allow scientific capability to develop faster than the systems intended to prevent misuse.

Open science makes this harder. Evo 2 was released openly, including the code and technical information needed for other researchers to use and develop it. Openness can accelerate discovery and widen access to powerful research tools. But once such tools are widely distributed, controlling how they are used becomes harder.

No single safeguard can deal with all of these risks. Biosecurity will need to operate at several stages, from how biological AI models are developed and released to DNA screening, laboratory oversight and public health preparedness.

The recent bacteriophage study does not show that AI can design a pandemic virus. What it shows is significant enough: AI can already help design complete viral genomes that work when they are physically created.

We have an opportunity to decide what responsible safeguards should look like while this technology is still developing. Waiting for more dangerous capabilities to emerge would leave scientists, governments and public health systems trying to develop protections after they are already needed.

AI is beginning to change what humans can design in biology. Our ability to govern that power needs to develop alongside it.

Tuck Seng Wong receives funding from Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), and Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO).

Kang Lan Tee receives funding from Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), and Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO).